QUESTION: The Gemara cites a Beraisa that lists four opinions about the status of work done by a Nochri for himself (and not for a Jew) in the home of a Jew on Shabbos.

The Tana Kama states that a Ger Toshav (a Nochri who has accepted upon himself not to worship Avodah Zarah) is permitted to do Melachah on Shabbos for himself in the same way that a Jew is permitted to do Melachah on Chol ha'Mo'ed. RASHI (DH Oseh) explains that this means that the Nochri is permitted to do Melachah on Shabbos if he will suffer a financial loss by not doing it.

Rebbi Akiva is more stringent and maintains that the Nochri is permitted only to do the type of Melachah on Shabbos that a Jew may do on Yom Tov. Rashi (DH k'Yisrael) explains that this refers to Melachah that is necessary for food preparation for that day. (See Insights to Yevamos 48:1.)

Rebbi Yosi (according to the text of the SHITAH MEKUBETZES #10 and #11) distinguishes between a Ger Toshav and a servant who has not accepted upon himself not to worship Avodah Zarah. A Ger Toshav is permitted to do the same type of Melachah on Shabbos that a Jew is permitted to do on Chol ha'Mo'ed (as the Tana Kama says), but a servant may do any Melachah, as long as he does it for himself and not for a Jew.

Finally, Rebbi Shimon maintains that there is no limitation on the Melachah that a Ger Toshav or a servant may do for himself on Shabbos in the home of a Jew. However, they may not do Melachah for a Jew on Shabbos.

The Gemara (before it quotes the Beraisa) says that the Halachah follows the view of Rebbi Shimon.

Is this indeed the Halachah in practice?

ANSWER: The SHITAH MEKUBETZES (Hashmatos, #11) writes that we rely on the conclusion of the Gemara and we do not tell a Nochri in the home of a Jew to refrain from working (for himself) on Shabbos. However, a Nochri is not permitted to do Melachah on Shabbos for a Jew.

The CHAZON ISH (Shevi'is 24:4) cites the Gemara in Avodah Zarah (64b) in which the Chachamim state that a Ger Toshav is a Nochri who accepted upon himself the seven Mitzvos of Bnei Noach. He says that the Tana'im in the Beraisa here agree with the Chachamim's definition of a Ger Toshav. Accordingly, the Ger Toshav is not required to observe the laws of Shabbos, since Shabbos is not one of the seven Mitzvos of Bnei Noach. (The Chazon Ish seems to differ from Rashi, who defines a Ger Toshav merely as a Nochri who does not worship Avodah Zarah.) Nevertheless, some of the Tana'im are stringent and maintain that there are certain Melachos that he may not do, due to the fact that the Nochri is living among Jews, and if Jews see him working on Shabbos their sensitivity for the observance of Shabbos might be compromised.

The Chazon Ish says that the Halachah follows the view of the Chachamim with regard to the definition of a Ger Toshav, and the Halachah follows the view of Rebbi Shimon who says that a Nochri living among Jews many do any type of Melachah for himself.

Similarly, the HAGAHOS MORDECHAI (to the Mordechai, end of Shabbos, #462) rules, based on the Gemara here, that one is not required to stop a Nochri from lighting a fire for his own use in a Jew's home on Shabbos. (See also Hagahos Mordechai there, #454.)

QUESTION: The Gemara explains that when the verse obligates one who has relations with a Shifchah Charufah to bring a Korban, it refers only to one who did the act b'Mezid, intentionally. The obligation to bring a Korban for unintentional relations with a Shifchah Charufah is derived from the extra words in the verse, "me'Chataso Asher Chata" (Vayikra 19:22).

The Gemara's words are difficult to understand. Why is a verse needed to obligate one to bring a Korban for an act done unintentionally? A general principle applies throughout the entire Torah and states that a Korban is brought for an unintentional act of transgression (as the Gemara earlier points out). Whenever a verse states that one who commits an intentional act of transgression must bring a Korban, it also teaches that one who commits the transgression unintentionally must bring a Korban. (This is derived through a Kal va'Chomer: if one who is Mezid must bring a Korban even though Mezid is exempt in most cases from bringing a Korban, then certainly one who is Shogeg (which is obligated in all other cases) must bring a Korban in this case.) (M. KORNFELD)

(a) The Tosefta in Shevuos (ch. 3) teaches that the principle of "Ein Onshin Min ha'Din" (a punishment cannot be derived through an exegetical process such as a Kal va'Chomer or Binyan Av) applies to Korbanos as well, and we cannot obligate a person to bring a Korban based on a Kal va'Chomer. Accordingly, a special verse is necessary to teach that one who sins b'Shogeg must bring a Korban.

(However, the RITVA in Makos (14a, DH v'Lo) writes that the obligation to bring a Korban may be derived through a Kal va'Chomer. See the SEFER KOVETZ on the Rambam (Hilchos Avodah Zarah 6:4), who makes extensive attempts to resolve the words of the Ritva in light of the Tosefta.)

(b) The RAMBAM (in Perush ha'Mishnayos, beginning of Shabbos) writes that in the case of a Shifchah Charufah, where the sinner is obligated to bring a Korban for an unintentional transgression just as he must do for an intentional transgression, the Shifchah herself is punished with Malkus, just as she is punished for an intentional transgression. According to this view, it is clear why a special verse is necessary to equate an unintentional transgression of Shifchah Charufah with an intentional transgression -- the verse is needed in order to teach that the Shifchah receives Malkus (but not to require the man to bring a Korban, for that obligation is known without the verse).

However, the Rambam seems to retract his view on this point in Hilchos Isurei Bi'ah (3:15). Moreover, all of the other Rishonim maintain that a Shifchah is not punished with Malkus for an unintentional transgression. (See RASHI to Kerisus 11a, DH bi'Zeman; TOSFOS 11a, DH Ein; Tosfos to Temurah 17a, DH Gabei.)

QUESTION: The Mishnah states that if a husband warns his wife several times not to seclude herself with men, and then he brings her to the Kohen on the suspicion that she was unfaithful with them, he needs to bring only one barley offering for all of the accusations (see RASHI DH ha'Mekanei, and Bamidbar 5:15). The Gemara states that this Halachah is derived from the verse, "This is the law of the Kena'os" (Bamidbar 5:29), which implies that only one offering is brought for multiple accusations ("Kena'os," in the plural form; see TOSFOS to Sotah 18b, DH v'Rabanan).

The Gemara here seems to contradict the Gemara in Sotah (18b), in which the Chachamim derive from the same verse that a woman never drinks the Sotah water twice, even if she remarried and the second husband also suspected her. If a woman never drinks the Sotah water twice in her life, then why is it necessary for the Gemara here to derive that the husband brings only one barley offering for multiple accusations? The Korban is offered only when the woman is brought to the Kohen to drink the Sotah water!

Moreover, even Rebbi Yehudah (Sotah 18b) -- who maintains that a woman who married twice does drink the Sotah water twice if the second husband also warned her -- agrees that the same husband cannot make his wife drink the Sotah water twice. Since she never drinks it twice, why is it necessary for the Gemara here to teach that the husband brings only one Korban for several warnings? (See TOSFOS DH Torah.)

(a) The TESHUVOS CHASAM SOFER (EH 2:102, DH v'Ani) answers this question based on the view of the RAMBAM. The Rambam (Hilchos Sotah 1:3) states that if the husband warned his wife not to seclude herself with two men together, and she did not heed his warning, she is forbidden to her husband until she drinks the Sotah water. (See MISHNEH L'MELECH there, who says that even though the Mishnah in Kidushin (80b) states that a woman is permitted to be alone with two men (when those two men are upright and not suspected of immoral behavior), when the husband explicitly warns her not to be alone with them she becomes a Sotah if she does not listen to him. The SHULCHAN ARUCH (EH 178:5) rules like the Rambam.)

Accordingly, the word "Kena'os," from which the Gemara derives that the husband brings only one Korban for multiple accusations, is needed to teach that even though she was alone with two men, the husband still does not need to bring a Korban for each accusation, even though she drinks the Sotah water only once.

(b) The Chasam Sofer adds that according to the Halachic conclusion, this question poses no difficulty. The Halachah does not follow the view of the Chachamim in Sotah. The Rambam (Hilchos Sotah 1:12) rules that if the husband warned his wife several times not to be alone with a man and she did not heed his warnings, she must drink the Sotah water for every act of seclusion, if each time she was alone with a different man. Since the Rambam (Hilchos Sotah 4:16) rules that even though the husband warned his wife several times not to be alone with different men he nevertheless brings only one Korban for the multiple seclusions, the verse of "Kena'os" is necessary to teach that even though she drinks the Sotah water several times, her husband still brings only one Korban. (D. BLOOM)