QUESTION: The Gemara concludes that according to Rebbi Yochanan, the sin of Megadef is not considered an action (Ma'aseh) "because it is only [a thought] in his heart." The transgression depends on the intention in his heart; if he did not have intention to blaspheme the Name of Hash-m but intended to blaspheme something else and called it "Hash-m," he is not Chayav. Bowing down to Avodah Zarah, in contrast, is a considered a Ma'aseh for which one is Chayav.

This is difficult to understand. The Gemara earlier (end of 3a) says that the liability for bowing to Avodah Zarah also depends on one's intention. The Gemara there says that one who bows to a statue of the king but does not accept it upon himself as a god has not transgressed. Only when he accepts the statue upon him as a god is he liable for the punishment of Sekilah. Why, then, does the Gemara here differentiate between Megadef and Avodah Zarah in this regard?

(a) RASHI (3a, DH Iy d'Lo Kiblei) seems to address this question. Rashi writes that only when one bows to a statue ("Andarta," a replica of a person) is one exempt when he has no intention to accept it as a god. In contrast, when one bows to an actual idol, he is Chayav even when he has no intention to accept it as a god. The ROSH (cited by the Shitah Mekubetzes #31) infers this from Rashi's words there, and he cites further proof from the Gemara in Avodah Zarah (54a) which says that if not for a verse that explicitly exempts one in such a case, one would have to bring a Korban Chatas even if he was forced to bow down to Avodah Zarah.

(b) The GILYON printed in the text of Rashi here answers that with regard to Megadef, one who blasphemes in his mind transgresses, even though he does not utter a word. Accordingly, even when one is Megadef with speech, it is considered a transgression that depends on one's intention ("Yeshno ba'Lev"), and thus one is never liable for Megadef. In contrast, one who thinks about bowing down to Avodah Zarah certainly is not considered to have served and idol until he performs an actual Ma'aseh.

(c) The SHITAH MEKUBETZES (#2) cites the ROSH who says that with regard to Megadef, the transgression depends on the entity that he calls "Hash-m"; one who calls a stone "Hash-m" does not transgress. This is the meaning of "Yeshno ba'Lev." With regard to bowing to Avodah Zarah, it makes no difference whether he calls an idol "Avodah Zarah" or whether he calls a stone "Avodah Zarah" -- he is Chayav for bowing down to Avodah Zarah, whatever the object is.

(d) The Shitah Mekubetzes there suggests another answer. One who blasphemes is always exempt until it can be proven that his blasphemy was directed against Hash-m. With regard to bowing to Avodah Zarah, however, the sinner is always considered guilty until he can prove that he did not intend to accept the idol as his god. (See more in Insights to Sanhedrin 64:1.)

QUESTION: The Gemara states that according to the Rabanan, one who eats Chelev of Neveilah is punished with two sets of Malkus because he transgressed both the Isur of eating Chelev and the Isur of eating Neveilah. Similarly, one who eats Chelev of Kodshim is punished with two sets of Malkus. According to Rebbi Yehudah, he is punished with three sets of Malkus because he transgressed three prohibitions.

Rav Shizbi said to Rava that Rebbi Yehudah's opinion is understandable; there are three verses in the Torah that express a prohibition against eating Chelev of Kodshim. The first verse says, "It shall be an everlasting statute for your generations in all your dwelling places, that you eat neither Chelev nor blood" (Vayikra 3:17). This verse refers to Chelev and blood of Kodshim.

The second verse says, "You may not eat any Chelev of an ox, sheep, or goat" (Vayikra 7:23). This refers to Chelev of Chulin as well.

The third verse says, "No Zar (non-Kohen) may eat Kodesh" (Vayikra 22:10). This verse prohibits a Zar from eating Kodshim.

These three verses teach that one who eats Chelev of Kodshim is punished for transgressing three prohibitions.

Rav Shizbi's third citation seems problematic. RASHI in Kidushin (69b, DH v'Kol Zar) clearly writes that the verses there (Vayikra 22:6-14) discuss Terumah, not Kodshim. (This is evident from verse 7, which states that one who became Tamei, immersed himself in a Mikvah, and waited until sunset may eat Kodshim. This cannot refer to Kodshim, because a person who was Tamei may not eat Kodshim until after he brings his Korban. TOSFOS in Menachos (74a, DH Lav) also points out that the end of the verse states that one who lives with, or works for, a Kohen may not eat Kodshim, but a member of the Kohen's family, or a servant owned by a Kohen, may eat Kodshim. This clearly shows that the verse refers to Terumah, and not to Kodshim of a Korban.)

Why, then, does Rav Shizbi say that the verse, "No Zar may eat Kodesh," teaches that one transgresses a third prohibition for eating Chelev of Kodshim? The verse refers to Terumah, not Kodshim!

(a) TOSFOS in Menachos (74a, DH Lav) answers that the text of the Gemara here must be emended. Instead of quoting the verse in Vayikra (22:10), Rav Shizbi is quoting the verse, "A Zar may not eat them, because they are Kodesh" (Shemos 29:33). This verse indeed refers to Kodshim.

(b) Tosfos in Menachos gives a second answer, according to which it is not necessary to change the text of the Gemara. Although the third verse indeed refers to Terumah, the Gemara in Me'ilah (18b) teaches a Gezeirah Shavah which compares the laws of Terumah with the laws of Me'ilah. (The verse says "Chet" with regard to Terumah (Vayikra 22:9) and with regard to Me'ilah (Vayikra 5:14).) Accordingly, although the verse refers to Terumah, the Gezeirah Shavah teaches that one transgresses an additional prohibition of Me'ilah when he eats Chelev of Kodshim.

The SHITAH MEKUBETZES (Hashmatos, #6 and #9) challenges the assertion of Tosfos that a Gezeirah Shavah compares Terumah to Me'ilah. The Gemara later compares Chelev to blood and states that just as one receives three sets of Malkus for eating Chelev of Kodshim, one receives three sets of Malkus for eating blood of Kodshim. If there indeed is a Gezeirah Shavah, then one also should be liable for the Isur of Me'ilah when he eats blood of Kodshim. The Mishnah in Yoma (58b), however, teaches that the blood of Kodshim -- after being sprinkled on the Mizbe'ach -- flowed out through the small canal that led out of the Beis ha'Mikdash into Nachal Kidron, and it was sold to gardeners and farmers to be used as fertilizer for their fields. This shows that there is no prohibition of Me'ilah with the blood of Korbanos. The Gemara there (Yoma 59b) says that just as there is no Me'ilah with the blood after Kaparah (after the Zerikas ha'Dam has been done), there is no Me'ilah with the blood before the Zerikah. The Shitah Mekubetzes therefore asserts that the correct answer is the first one given by Tosfos, and that the Girsa of the Gemara must be emended. (D. BLOOM)

OPINIONS: The Gemara explains that the prohibition of Chelev Mukdashin (the forbidden fat of sanctified animals) is "Hutar mi'Chelalo" -- there is an exception to its prohibition. To what exception does the Gemara refer?

There are a number of opinions in the Rishonim about how the prohibition of Chelev Mukdashin is Hutar mi'Chelalo.

(a) RASHI explains that the Gemara refers to the fat of the tail of a Korban. When a lamb is offered as a Korban, its tail fat is not eaten, but rather offered on the Mizbe'ach. In contrast, the fat of the tail of an ox and goat are not offered on the Mizbe'ach and may be eaten. This is what the Gemara means when it says that Chelev Mukdashin is "Hutar mi'Chelalo." (The difficulty with this explanation is that the tail fat that is forbidden, such as that of the lamb, is never permitted, even from a Chulin animal.)

(b) The SHITAH MEKUBETZES (#12), in the name of TOSFOS and the ROSH, explains the Gemara as follows. The Gemara in Temurah (29b) teaches a principle that anything that is forbidden to a person is also forbidden to be offered as a Korban. (The Gemara there derives this from the verse, "mi'Mashkeh Yisrael" (Yechezkel 45:15).) Nevertheless, Chelev -- which is prohibited to a person -- is offered on the Mizbe'ach as a Korban. This is the meaning of "Hutar mi'Chelalo." (The difficulty with this explanation is that the principle of "mi'Mashkeh Yisrael" certainly should not apply to Chelev, because the only reason why Chelev is prohibited to people is because it is offered as a Korban! -M. KORNFELD)

(c) The Girsa of the Gemara according to RABEINU GERSHOM reads, "she'Hutar Besaran" -- "their meat was permitted," and not "she'Hutar mi'Chelalo." He writes that the Gemara means that the meat of sanctified animals becomes permitted to people to eat after the procedure of Zerikas ha'Dam, demonstrating that the prohibition of Kodshim is more lenient than other prohibitions. That is why there is reason to suggest that the prohibition of Chelev of Mukdashin should also be more lenient.