Question: If so (that the husband is believed), how did the Chachamim help when they instituted that a witness bringing a Get from overseas should state that the Get was written and signed before them? The reason ostensibly was that if the husband would come and complain that the Get was invalid, we would not listen to him.

However, it seems that he could still complain, as he can say that I only gave the Get as a deposit. If there are witnesses that state that the husband gave it over to the messenger to divorce his wife, we do not require that they state it was written and signed before them.

Answer: The husband is only believed if all three (wife, husband, and messenger) are in the city, as only in such a case does the reasoning apply that he would have given it directly to her if he would have wanted the divorce to be final.

Implied Question: The Gemara only asks its question from our Mishnah according to Rav Chisda, implying that there is no question according to Rav Huna. (Note: The Gemara later asks that our Mishnah indicates we do not believe the third party, as it requires witnesses on the appointment and on the acceptance of the Get. Isn't there a question according to Rav Huna as well, as Rav Huna only states the husband is believed when they are all in the same city?)

Answer: This is because Rav Huna can say that the Mishnah is indeed only discussing when they are in the same city (whereas Rav Chisda seemingly holds that the third party is always believed, even if they are all in the same city).

Question: The Gemara earlier (6a) stated that there are even opinions that require one to say it was written and signed before me when taking a Get from one row of houses to another, and from local neighborhood to local neighborhood within one city. If so, how is this decree of the Chachamim helpful (as the husband can always claim he gave it to the messenger as a deposit, not to be used for divorce)?

Answer#1: These opinions hold like Rav Chisda who holds that a third party is believed even in one city.

Answer#2: Alternatively, the case there is when the husband says to people that they should write and give a Get (to his wife), and he then immediately left (i.e. went out of town). In this case, one cannot say that he would have given it to her himself.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that the husband claims that he gave it to the third party before witnesses. (Note: In other words, he did not rely blindly on the third party. Why doesn't this claim counteract the logic that he clearly believed the third party?)

Answer: Even so, the husband clearly relied on this third party, as there are times when witnesses die or go overseas (and will not be able to testify).

Opinion#1: One cannot explain that the third party is believed because he has a Migu claim that he could have given it to the woman, as Rashi explains later.

Question#1: One reason that this cannot be said is because without a Migu the Rabbanan believed the third party, as is implied in Sanhedrin (31a) regarding the case of the grandmother who had accepted a deposit of a loan document, and said that it was paid. Rav Nachman believed her without a Migu. Being that the document already appeared before Beis Din, we do not say that she could have burned it. (Note: She therefore does not have a Migu, and even so she is believed.)

Questions#2: Additionally, if this was a Migu, Rav Huna would not have argued. Where there is a Migu he admits, as stated later (on 64a), that Rav Huna admits that if she says before me etc. Rather, here this is not a Migu as the messenger does not have the ability to give it to the woman, as perhaps the woman won't want to accept the Get being that her husband stated it is for the purpose of deposit alone.

Opinion#2: It therefore seems that the explanation is that the husband believed the third party. Being that he gave the Get to him, he gave it to him with intent that it should be used for divorce if the third party will say the husband said it should be for divorce, even if he is lying.

According to this explanation, we believe a third party even with things that are usually borrowed and rented. This is as long as the owner admits that the object is not in the possession of third party because he lent it to him, but rather because he gave it to him as a deposit.

Explanation: This implies that he is believed even if they are all in the same city. This is despite the fact that it is possible to say that if he would not have given it as a deposit, he would have given it to her.

Explanation: Being that he believed him and gave this loan document to him, his belief in him means that he even is willing to forfeit his money based on the third parties statement about his document. Even if the third party will lie, this person believed in him, and therefore empowered him to make him lose his money, even if it will be in an unjust manner. However, it is not up to the depositor to believe any status of prohibition that the third party will state applies to him. (Note: Therefore, this logic does not apply when it comes to matters of prohibition.)

Rav Chisda holds that regarding a Get a third party is also believed, as the husband gives him this Get with the understanding that the Get should be used for the purpose of divorce if the third party decides that this is what it should be used for, as explained earlier.

Explanation: This means, why are two witnesses who say that he accepted the Get in front of us necessary? However, it is clear that we need two witnesses who say that in front of us she appointed this person a messenger to accept the Get, as we explained earlier.

The Gemara answers, is the Get coming from under his hands? Perhaps he found the torn pieces of the Get in the garbage! Only when the Get is whole, and it is clear that the husband trusted him and gave it to him, is he believed.

Explanation: This means, it is understandable that we need two witnesses who will say that she said before us that he is a messenger to accept the Get. This was never in question (that it was necessary). However, why do we need two witnesses to say that the messenger accepted it (from the husband) before us?

It is understandable that two witnesses that say she appointed the messenger is not enough, as the Get was torn up and the Get is not coming from the messenger's hand. However, why do we require witnesses that the messenger accepted the Get from the husband? We should only require witnesses who saw that the messenger had the Get when it was whole!

Explanation: The case is where the witnesses are not signed on the Get. This is why it is insufficient for witnesses to have seen the messenger have the Get, as they did not seem him accept the Get.

However, if the witnesses are signed on the document, even if there are no witnesses who saw the giving of the Get it is valid. This is because we can assume the Get was given over before witnesses and done in a valid manner. This is as stated earlier (36a), that Rabah said that we only require this for Rebbi Eliezer who says that the witnesses of the giving of the Get effect the Get. According to him, Chazal decreed that there should also be witnesses of the signing of the Get, as sometimes the witnesses die or travel overseas (and are inaccessible).

Later (86a), the Mishnah itself states regarding Rebbi Eliezer's position that the witnesses only sign on the Get due to "Tikun ha'Olam" (meaning that sometimes the witnesses die etc. as stated above).

Implied Question: However, we should not forbid everyone in the world to be Mekadesh a woman based on the suspicion that each person's potential bride might be the one who the messenger was Mekadesh. (Note: Why not?)

Answer: If she would be Mekudeshes, she would not allow herself to be Mekudeshes again. However, this person cannot be Mekadesh anyone, as perhaps his messenger was Mekadesh one of a potential bride's relatives, like her mother or her mother's mother, or similar relatives. Even if all of the potential bride's relatives come and say they did not accept Kidushin from anyone, we do not rely on their word.

Question: Why don't we say that an orphan who is a minor should be forbidden to every man in the world, as it is possible that her father accepted Kidushin for her from this messenger?

Answer: This is a fine, as we fine him that he instructed a messenger to be Mekadesh any woman, and he carelessly did not suspect that this could lead him to stumble (and marry a relative of the woman). However, according to the letter of the law, he is permitted to marry anyone in the world, as this (that we say that the messenger must have carried out his mission) is not a clear Chazakah. It is not up to him to be Mekadesh a woman for this man, as perhaps the women he approaches will not be interested.

Additionally, we go after most women in the world (who are clearly permitted to him).

Implied Question: Even so, it is clear from here that there is a Chazakah that a messenger carries out his mission. (Note: Why is this clear, if really this is only a fine?)

Answer: If it would not be true, it would not be appropriate for Chazal to institute this fine at all.

Implied Question: The Gemara in Nazir (12a) asks on our Gemara from a case where one out of a pair of birds that were dedicated to be brought as a specific Korban flew away. The Gemara says that one must buy another bird to complete the pair. We do not suspect that other birds are problematic (as they might be the bird that flew away, and specifically be a Chatas or Olah). The Gemara asks the question even though our case is a mere fine. (Note: Why does it ask the question if it is only a fine?)

Answer: The Gemara's question is still understandable, as there it is also appropriate to institute a fine, as he was not careful that his bird should not fly away. The Gemara's question there is on the fact that he himself is allowed to buy another bird (after he brings the pair in question) and bring it for the opposite Korban that his bird that flew away was dedicated for. (Note: Just like we forbid him from marrying here, we should also forbid him from bringing another bird as a Korban, as it might be the bird that flew away.)

Explanation: The Gemara's answer there that a woman who does not move is different is not because she is considered permanent, and therefore is not "Batel b'Rov." This is because when something is mixed and not recognizable, we do not say that its permanent status is deemed a case of fifty-fifty (instead of Batel b'Rov).

Rather, the Gemara means that because she is more permanent there is more reason to make a fine than by the case of the bird.

Implied Question: This is even according to Rav Sheshes, who says in Eiruvin (32a) that regarding Torah law we also say that there is a Chazakah that a messenger did what he was sent to do. (Note: This implies that we should rely on the messenger not just as a stringency, but also as a leniency!)

Answer: This is in a place where if the messenger would not do what he was sent to do, the person who sent him would end up sinning if he relied on the messenger having completed his mission. However, in a case where the fact that the messenger did not give a Get or was not Mekadesh a woman does not mean that the sender will sin, Rav Sheshes admits that we do not assume that a messenger completed his mission when this will result in a leniency.

Opinion#1: Rashi explains that this is specifically referring to a Na'arah. However, the father of a "Ketanah" -- "minor" accepts her Get for her. She cannot accept a Get on her own if she has a father.

The Gemara says that the Rabbanan hold that the Torah gave her an extra "Yad" -- "hand (ability to acquire)." According to the opinion above, this is referring to the "hand" that she receives when she becomes a Na'arah. When she was a Ketanah, she could not acquire at all. She herself had no hand, and could only acquire through her father.

Opinion#2: Rashi later commented in Kidushin (43b) that a Ketanah can also receive a Get on her own. The reason Na'arah is stated is to show the power of Rebbi Yehudah's position. This is the main (correct) explanation.

Proof: Rabeinu Yitzchak ben Rebbi Meir brought a proof to Rashi's comment from the question in the Gemara in Kidushin (44b). The Gemara asks, according to Rav Nachman who says that a Na'arah cannot make a messenger to accept her Get from her husband, how can we understand the Mishnah that states that if a minor says, "Accept my Get," the Get is invalid until she receives the Get? This implies that if she would be a Na'arah, it would be valid when the messenger receives the Get! The Gemara answers that the case is where she (the minor) has no father.

However, originally the Gemara thought the case was where the minor did have a father, and even so the Mishnah stated that if she physically received the Get it is valid. This implies that even if the minor has a father, if she receives the Get she is divorced!

The Gemara says that the Torah gave her an extra "Yad" -- "hand (ability to acquire)." (Note: According to this opinion,) it means that the father's hand is an extra hand for her, as her hand is the main hand, as she is technically an adult, and her father's hand cannot nullify her hand. (Note: However,) Rebbi Yehudah holds that her hand is nullified, and the hand of her father is given to her (to be able to accept the Get).

Opinion#1: Rashi explains that such a person cannot even be divorced through her father, as she is a Shotah (insane person). Rebbi Yitzchak states, "And she will be sent from her house," (Devarim 24:3) this refers to someone who is sent and does not (knows not to) come back. This is also stated in Yevamos (113b).

Opinion#2: Rabeinu Tam explains that she can be divorced through her father, even though she herself does not know how to watch her Get. He also ruled this way in an actual case (that came before him).

Proof: According to Rebbi Yanai who learns there from the Pasuk, "And he will give it in her hand," (Devarim 24:1) that this is referring to someone who has a hand to accept her own divorce. This excludes (a Shotah) etc. According to this reasoning, she should be able to be divorced through her father, as even if she is sane her father can accept her Get. (Note: In other words, a father receiving a Get is a permanent way for her to get divorced, and she seemingly always has it regardless of her mental state.)

The Tanna from the (study) house of Rebbi Yishmael who learns from, "And he will send her" is not arguing on Rebbi Yanai. Rather, he is merely deriving this from a different Pasuk. However, it seems that there really is no Halachic difference between the two opinions.

The reason for this law is that because she has a father, he guards her to ensure she does not go back to her ex-husband.

Additionally, the Yerushalmi explicitly call a girl with a father, "someone who can watch her Get." If so, she can be divorced through her father according to everyone, as we only require here that she be able to watch her Get.

This appears correct. If when she cannot guard her Get herself she could not even be divorced through her father, she similarly should not be able to be Mekudeshes through her father! This is because the Gemara states, "v'Yatzah v'Haysah" -- "And she will go and she will be," (Devarim 24:2) which teaches us that we compare Kidushin ("being") to Gitin ("going").

According to this, the end of the Mishnah that states that whoever does not know etc. cannot be according to Rebbi Yehudah and discussing a case where she has a father. It can only be according to the Rabbanan.

According to Rebbi Yehudah, why would it say that being that she cannot guard her Get, she cannot receive her own Get and thereby be divorced? Even if she knows how to guard her Get she cannot be divorced by receiving her Get herself! However, if the case is that she does not have a father, it could even be according to Rebbi Yehudah.

Explanation: This is referring to "Pe'utos," which means children who are between six and ten, depending on how smart they are, as stated later. A similar standard is applied to a minor who is getting divorced.

Observation: Now, if the criteria of Rav Yehudah, that she is given an object and returns it after an hour, is at an age that is earlier than Peutos, Rav Yehudah's logic would end up being totally contradictory from that of Rav Chisda. According to Rav Yehudah one can acquire for others before his purchase is a purchase and his sale is a sale.

According to Rav Chisda, the opposite is true. At the age of Peutos his purchase is a purchase and his sale is a sale, and they do not acquire for others until they have two (pubic) hairs. This is apparent from the fact that the Gemara asks a question on Rav Chisda from a maidservant who has not yet brought two such hairs. (Note: See Dvar Yaakov regarding an argument among the commentaries whether Tosfos is making an observation or asking a question.)

Question: Why is a maidservant different from his son or daughter who are minors, and who he cannot tell to acquire for someone else?

Answer: Rebbi Yochanan says in Bava Metzia (12b) that when the Mishnah says that if his sons who are big discover a lost object they can keep it, it does not mean they are adults, but rather that they are financially independent. If his adult son eats from his father's table, he is considered a minor regarding this law. According to him, we can answer this question by saying a "small son" refers to one who is not financially independent. This is in contrast to a maidservant, who works for a living.

According to Shmuel in Bava Metzia (ibid.) who says that "small" means a minor, and he explains that his father keeps his lost objects because when he finds them he runs to his father to give it to him, we must say that this is why his hand is always like his father's hand.

Question: Rabeinu Tam said this answer that a maidservant eats as part of her pay, for no good reason. We do not consider the hand of an orphan as the hand of the head of the household just because he eats from his table. We only say this regarding a son. Not everyone who eats from the table of a homeowner has to give the lost objects they find to the homeowner.

Even if a person's daughter is financially independent, it seems that the lost objects she finds would go to her father due to the possibility that this would otherwise cause hatred between them. He might end up being Mekadesh her to a disgusting person or a man who is full of boils. This is as stated in Kesuvos (47a), that the reasoning of hatred is applicable even if she is not dependent on him for food. This could therefore even apply to a Na'arah, until she becomes a Bogeres.

Opinion: One must be careful not to have his son, even if he is an adult, acquire the Eiruv (Chatzeiros) for others if he eats from his table, as we rule like Rebbi Yochanan when he argues with Shmuel. We therefore rule that a "big son" is not referring to an adult, but rather that he is financially independent of his father.

Implied Question: Do not wonder why the Gemara here says that a minor maidservant can acquire the Eiruv, and in Eiruvin (49b) we say that according to Shmuel that an Eiruv is because of Kinyan, a minor cannot do so. (Note: Why isn't this a contradiction?)

Answer: The case there is when the minor has his own house in the yard. (Note: In other words, in the Gemara in Eiruvin (ibid.) the minor must give everyone else a portion in his house. He cannot do this effectively, as he has no power to be Makneh his things to others. However, in our Gemara he is merely doing the act of acquisition for others from someone else's possession, because that person is empowering him to do so (i.e. telling him to acquire the food for the Eiruv for others). This is known as "Da'as Acheres Makneh" -- "a different mind is effecting the giving over," and this act can be done by a minor.)

Observation: This implies that Rav Yehudah and Rav Chisda argue whether or not he can acquire for others according to Torah law.

Implied Question: Taking away the lost object of a deaf-mute, insane person, and minor is not stealing according to Torah law, even according to Rebbi Yosi, and is only Rabbinic in nature. (Note: How, then, is it possible that they can acquire for others according to Torah law?)

Answer: Here that others are effecting the acquisition, it is possible for the minor to acquire for them according to Torah law.

Question: The mechanics of acquiring for others works via the mechanics of being a messenger for that person. However, a minor does not have the ability to be a messenger, as derived from the Pasuk, "You," implying also you (the messenger, must be an adult). (Note: How, then, can a minor acquire for others?)

Answer: One can only exclude a minor from being a messenger from this Pasuk stated by Terumah for things that are inapplicable to a minor, as he cannot take his own Terumah. However, regarding acquistion, one can say that just as he can acquire for himself he can also acquire for others.

Question: We should ask a question on Rav Yehudah from the Gemara in Kidushin (42a) that teaches, "A man can acquire and not a minor." (Note: This is despite the fact that a minor possibly has to eat the Korban Pesach, as will be explained below in the answers, and therefore should be able to acquire according to the logic in (e) above.)

Answer#1: The case there is not when someone else is effecting the acquisition. Rather, it is teaching that he cannot have others join his Korban Pesach. One might think that he can have others join, as the Pasuk states, "A sheep for a household." (Note: This teaches that even a minor, who is part of a household, must eat the Korban Pesach.) It is therefore possible that being that this is a Torah concept, his Korban should be treated like that of an adult.

Answer#2: Alternatively, it is teaching us this very lesson that "A sheep for a household" is not a Torah law (and he therefore does not have to eat from the Korban Pesach according to Torah law). He therefore clearly does not have the power to acquire it for others or for himself.