Explanation: The orphans can retract the sale.

Question: In a similar case involving Hekdesh one could not retract, being that a regular person would receive a "Mi she'Para (loosely translated as a curse by Beis Din)." This is as stated in Kidushin (29a) regarding a case where someone redeemed Hekdesh worth one hundred, and he was unable to get around to pulling it (and finalizing the acquisition) until it became worth two hundred.

Answer: In that case he acquires with money according to Torah law. The reasoning, "In order that the power of a regular person should not be more stringent than that of Hekdesh," does not apply here, as a person would also receive a Mi she'Para. However, orphans are considered in Torah law to be like regular people and they therefore do not acquire with money and do not even receive a Mi she'Para.

Question: Rashi asks, if they are burned the orphans should be able to retract the sale, just as we stated they can do when the item went down in value (52a)?

Answer: Being that if it rose in value we say it did so in their possession, we similarly state that it was burned when it was in their possession.

Question: Earlier (52a), the Gemara said that if someone pulled fruit from orphans and then it went up in value this seems to be the law of Rav Chanilai, and the orphans can therefore retract. Why would the Gemara say this if the ability to retract is bad for the orphans, as stated in our Gemara that people who are buying from them will say that it was the wheat of the orphans that got burned in the attic?

Answer: In this case the buyers (who pulled the fruit from the orphans) are made into guardians for pay, being that they can eat the fruits and do whatever they want with them.

This is as stated in Bava Metzia (81a). The Beraisa there states that if someone took a vessel from the artisan's house in order to send it to his father-in-law's house, and it was broken due to forced circumstances on the way there, he is liable to pay for it. If it happened on the way back, he is exempt, because he is like a guardian for pay (who is exempt from damage due to forced circumstances). This shows that on the way back he is a guardian for pay who is like a guardian for pay. The reason this is so is because he received benefit (from being able to show the vessel to his father-in-law) he gives back benefit (of being an upgraded guardian).

Explanation#1: Rashi explains that this was to appease the tax collector. This implies that for other needs of the orphans, an announcement of sale is required (thirty days beforehand).

Question: This is difficult. In Erchin (22a), the Gemara asks a question on Rav Asi who says that we only deal with (i.e. sell) the property of orphans if interest is eating away at their holdings. The Gemara's question is from the Mishnah regarding the evaluation of property of orphans (that it takes thirty days). Why doesn't the Gemara answer say that this Mishnah is discussing other needs of orphans besides paying back creditors?

Answer: It therefore seems that our Gemara means for taxes, food, and burial of their mother and sisters. (Note: The Tosfos Ha'Rosh and others explains that an announcement is unnecessary for any need of the orphans. Our Gemara is merely telling us this by providing examples (i.e. taxes, food, burial).)

Implied Question: It is obvious that we would not wait to bury the dead person until we would make an announcement (for thirty days) before selling their land. (Note: Why does the Gemara even have to tell us this?)

Answer: Rather, the Gemara is telling us that if the orphans borrowed money for the burial, we sell their property without announcement in order to pay back the loan.

Opinion: Rabeinu Tam says that this is the law.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that we say in Eiruvin (62b) that the teachings of Rebbi Elazar ben Yaakov are thoroughly sifted, and the Beraisa states that the law follows his opinion. (Note: Why, then, don't we rule like his opinion?)

Answer: We do not learn the law from a statement of the Talmud (that the law follows a certain opinion).

This is also implied in Kesuvos (88b). The Gemara there establishes the argument between Rebbi Shimon and the Rabbanan as being the same argument as (this argument between) Abba Shaul and the Rabbanan, with Rebbi Shimon holding like Abba Shaul. In all of the versions of the argument there, the law is like Rebbi Shimon (indicating that the law is like Abba Shaul).

Explanation#1: Rabeinu Chaim says that we only force a caretaker to swear that he did not take anything from the orphans. However, he does not have to swear that he was not negligent. Even if he was negligent he is exempt, as stated in Bava Kama (39a) that an ox of orphans that gored allows the victim to collect from the best property of the orphans. If you will say that he collects from the best property of the caretaker, people will refrain from being caretakers for orphans.

Even according to Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Chanina who says that the victim collects from the best property of the caretaker, the caretaker goes back and collects this amount from the orphans when they grow up.

Explanation#2: The Rav, Rebbi Shlomo bar Yosef from Vardun, brought a proof that he is liable for being negligent with their property. The Gemara says in Bava Metzia (42b) regarding an ox that did not have teeth (see Tosfos in Avodah Zarah 28a, DH "Kachi") and therefore died (as it couldn't eat and wasn't being treated specially), why don't we tell the caretaker that he should pay? The Gemara there answers, he could say that he gave the animal to a shepherd (and it therefore is not his fault). This implies that if he did not have this claim, we would indeed say he is liable.

It is not possible to say that people will refrain from being caretakers unless they were only appointed to pay (i.e. if the oxen damage). This is as they were appointed not for the good of the orphans, but rather for the good of others that they should not be damaged by the (animals of the) orphans. However, according to everyone, caretakers that were appointed for the good of the orphans will not refrain from being a caretaker because he will have to pay if he is negligent. This could be because he is happy that he is helping their deceased father's children, or because he is becoming known as a trustworthy person. They only argue regarding whether or not the caretaker has to take an oath to this effect (that he was not negligent).

However, it seems that if he was negligent he is liable to pay according to everyone. Even so, as long as we do not know if anything was lost it is inappropriate to make him swear to this effect (that he was not negligent) without a claim.

This is as the Yerushalmi states in our chapter that Rebbi Yochanan, who says that the payment is from the orphans, holds like the Rabbanan. Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Chanina who says that the payment is from the caretaker's property holds like Abba Shaul. The Gemara asks, does Rebbi Yochanan really hold like the Rabbanan? The Gemara answers, he could even hold like Abba Shaul. A person does not mind paying money in order that he should be called a trustworthy person. However, in the case of the ox of orphans, the caretaker was not appointed to ensure the welfare of the orphans, but rather to ensure that their ox would not gore.

The Gemara asks, does Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Chanina hold like Abba Shaul? The Gemara answers, he could even hold like the Rabbanan. A person will try to get out of taking an oath, but will not try to get out of paying. This means that he will want to pay if he was negligent, but does not want people to make him swear for no reason.

Implied Question: The reason that each person should not go and make his friend's Taharos impure is not enough of a reason to make him liable to pay. (Note: Why not?)

Answer: This is not enough of a reason to make him liable more than if it was a clear physical damage.

Question: According to Shmuel, how is this different from the Gemara in Kesuvos (30b) that says that Rebbi Nechunya ben Ha'Kanah admits that if someone steals forbidden animal fat from his friend and eats it, he is liable (to pay for the fat)? The reason he is liable is because he already was liable for the theft before he came to eat the forbidden fat.

Answer: Shmuel holds that picking up the wine is more of a necessary thing to do for the pouring for Avodah Zarah, as one cannot pour without picking up the wine. However, in Kesuvos (ibid.) it is possible to eat without picking it up. If he wants, he could crawl on his stomach and eat it.

The Gemara there indeed differentiates between that case and Rebbi Avin's statement regarding Shabbos. Rebbi Avin states that if someone threw an arrow from the beginning of four Amos to the end of four Amos, and it tore clothes along the way, he is exempt from paying for the clothes because of Kam Ley etc. This is because the uprooting of the object means that it is impossible that it will not be placed down. Shmuel holds that the case of Nisuch is similar to the case of Rebbi Avin.

Implied Question: Rebbi Yirmiyah and Rav here do not hold like this. (Note: What do they hold?)

Answer#1: They hold like the other answer there (in Kesuvos ibid.) that differentiates between the case of the thrown arrow and the stolen forbidden animal fat. In the case of the arrow, he cannot retract the arrow. However, he can return the fat. Regarding Nisuch as well, being that he can retract he is liable (to pay).

Answer#2: Alternatively, he holds that it is possible to be Menasech without picking it up, unlike the uprooting and placing done on Shabbos (where the uprooting means there will be a placing).

Answer#3: Alternatively, it is possible that Rebbi Yirmiyah argues on Rebbi Avin. This (fact that there are those who argue on Rebbi Avin) is also implied in Bava Kama (70b), where someone who says to his friend, "Throw what you stole into my courtyard and let me acquire it (and I will pay you money)." The Gemara asks, once it gets into his airspace he has acquired it, while the person who threw it only is liable to receive the death penalty when it lands. (Note: Accordingly, Kam Ley etc. should not apply, as they happened at different times!)

The Gemara answers, the case is where he said, do not acquire your theft until it has rested. This is unlike Rebbi Avin. According to Rebbi Avin, the Gemara would not have to say that this is the case, as uprooting it means that there will certainly be a placing. (Note: This Gemara therefore seemingly argues on Rebbi Avin.)

This is also implied in Bava Kama (117a). The Gemara says that originally they said that if someone made Terumah impure or mixed it with regular grains (the law of the Mishnah applied). They went back and said, even someone who pours wine.The Gemara explains that originally they held like Rebbi Avin, and then later held like Rebbi Yirmiyah.

Answer (#2 to question c): It is also possible to say that Shmuel's reasoning is that even though picking up the wine is not necessary for pouring, even so he is exempt. Being that he is not liable for the time of the Nisuch, as Kam Ley etc., he is also exempt when he picked up the wine. He can say to the person, "Harei Shelcha Lefanecha" -- "Here is yours before you," as in a case where Terumah became impure.

If someone else would pour it, he can say, "Harei Shelcha Lefanecha." Similarly, if he pours it, even though he did so with his hands, he can say this because of Kam Ley etc.

Rav holds that because when he picked it up it is not possible to say Kam Ley etc., he should be held liable because he picked it up for whatever happens to it afterwards. This is despite the fact that at that time Kam Ley etc. could be applicable.