1)

(a)What does our Mishnah say about someone who undertakes to donate his own weight to Hekdesh?

(b)What does the Tana say about the mother of Yarmatyah, who undertook to donate her daughter's weight to Hekdesh?

(c)What does Rebbi Yehudah say about someone who declares 'Mishkal Yadi Alai'?

(d)On what grounds does Rebbi Yossi disagree with him? What does he therefore say?

1)

(a)Our Mishnah rules that someone who undertakes to donate his own weight to Hekdesh - must keep his word, adding 'Im Kesef, Kesef; ve'Im Zahav, Zahav'.

(b)The Tana then cites the story of the mother of Yarmatyah, who undertook to donate her daughter's weight to Hekdesh, and who upon arriving in Yerushalayim - paid her weight in gold.

(c)Rebbi Yehudah rules that someone who declares 'Mishkal Yadi Alai' - must place his arm up to his armpit (see Tosfos DH 'Marpeiko') in a barrel full of water, and then replace the displaced water with parts of a donkey (whose weight [kilo for kilo] is similar to that of a human being) that comprise flesh, bones and veins (like a human arm).

(d)Rebbi Yossi disagrees with him on the grounds that - it is anyway extremely difficult to match the flesh-bone make-up of a donkey with that of a person. So we may as well just simply assess the Nidar's weight.

2)

(a)Rav Yehudah explains our Mishnah 'Im Kesef, Kesef' to mean that it depends on which one he specified. How do we answer the Kashya P'shita?

(b)This follows a statement by Rachbah. What did Rachbah say about a place where pitch is customarily sold by weight?

(c)This too, seems obvious. How do we therefore establish the case?

(d)And how do we establish the case of Rav Papa, who says the same thing about a place where onions are customarily sold by weight?

2)

(a)Rav Yehudah explains our Mishnah 'Im Kesef, Kesef' to mean that it depends on which one he specified. We answer the Kashya P'shita - by extrapolating that if he had not specified one or the other, he would be permitted to use any commodity (that is normally weighed).

(b)This follows a statement by Rachbah, who said that in a place where pitch is customarily sold by weight - a Noder would even be permitted to give his weight in pitch ...

(c)... and, because this too, seems obvious, we establish the case - where only some people sold the pitch by weight, whereas others sold it by measure.

(d)The case of Rav Papa however, who said the same as Rachbah about a place where onions are customarily sold by weight, we establish - in a town where, after weighing them, one tends to remove two or three onions, before handing them to the purchaser. So the Amora'im are teaching us that both the pitch and the onions are considered a commodity that is weighed, in spite of the reservations.

3)

(a)The story with Yarmatya and her mother appears to clash with the ruling that precedes it. How do we therefore amend the Mishnah? What must we add to the ruling, before relating the story?

3)

(a)The story with Yarmatya and her mother appears to clash with the ruling that precedes it. We therefore amend the Mishnah, adding (to the ruling before relating the story) that - if the Noder is an Adam Chashuv, then we assess him according to his Chashivus (even though he did not specify the commodity he intends to weigh the Nidar with), like we find by the mother of Yarmatya.

4)

(a)According to Rav Yehudah, someone who declares 'Komasi' must give Hekdesh a thick stick of his own height that cannot bend. What is the Din if he declares 'M'lo Komasi'?

(b)Why is that?

(c)What does the Beraisa say about someone who declares either 'Komasi Alai' or M'lo Komasi Alai'?

(d)Like whom do we establish Rav Yehudah, in order to reconcile him with the Beraisa?

4)

(a)According to Rav Yehudah, someone who declares 'Komasi' must give Hekdesh a thick stick of his own height that cannot bend. If he says 'M'lo Komasi' however - then he may give a thin stick that can bend ...

(b)... because otherwise - why did he add the word M'lo?

(c)The Beraisa rules that someone who declares either 'Komasi Alai' or M'lo Komasi Alai' - must give a thick stick of his own height that cannot bend.

(d)To reconcile Rav Yehudah with the Beraisa, we establish him like Rebbi Akiva, and the Beraisa, like the Chachamim (whose Machlokes we are about to discuss).

5)

(a)What does the Mishnah in Bava Basra rule regarding whether a pit and an enclosure are included in the sale of a house, there where one specifically included the depth and the height in the sale?

(b)Rebbi Akiva requires the seller to buy himself a path to the pit. The Chachamim disagree. What is the basis of their Machlokes?

(c)In which case will Rebbi Akiva concede that it is not necessary to do so? Why is that?

(d)How does this now explain Rav Yehudah's current ruling?

5)

(a)The Mishnah in Bava Basra rules that - a pit and an enclosure are not included in the sale of a house, even if one specifically included the depth and the height in the sale

(b)Rebbi Akiva requires the seller to buy himself a path to the pit. The Chachamim disagree. The basis of their Machlokes is - whether a seller sells generously (be'Ayin Yafeh [Rebbi Akiva]) or stingily (be'Ayin Ra'ah [the Chachamim]).

(c)Rebbi Akiva will concede however, that it is not necessary to buy himself a path - there were he specifically included the depth and the height in the sale (which, as we explained, do not increase the contents of the sale) ...

(d)... because Rebbi Akiva holds that - a person does not make vain stipulations which is the root of Rav Yehudah's ruling too, as we explained).

19b----------------------------------------19b

6)

(a)We ask what the Din will be if someone declares 'Omdi Alai, Rochbi Alai, (Yeshivasi Alai, Avi Alai) or Hekeifi Alai'. What exactly is the She'eilah Omdi Alai?

(b)Rochbi Alai could mean a stick as wide as himself. What else might it mean?

(c)Hekeifo too, has two potential meanings. It might could a stick that is as long as his girth. What else might it mean?

(d)What is the outcome of these She'eilos?

6)

(a)We ask what the Din will be if someone declares 'Omdi Alai, Rochbi Alai (Yeshivasi Alai, Avi Alai) or Hekeifi Alai'. The She'eilah 'Omdi Alai' is - whether he means the same as 'Komasi Alai' or not (see also Tosfos DH 'Ibaye Lehu'), though it is unclear what the alternative is.

(b)'Rochbi Alai' means, either a stick as wide as himself - or a stick as long as his width.

(c)'Hekeifo' too, has two potential meanings. It means either a thin stick that is as long as his girth - or a thick stick as broad as his girth.

(d)The outcome of these She'eilos is - Teiku.

7)

(a)What does Rebbi Yehudah say about someone who declares 'Mishkal Ragli Alai'?

(b)What support does he bring for his ruling from the Pasuk in Yechezkel " ... asher Basar Chamorim Besaram"?

(c)How does Rebbi Yehudah in this Beraisa, answer Rebbi Yossi, who wondered ...

1. ... how it is possible to match the make-up of the donkey's bone with that of a human being?

2. ... why, if that is so, we do not just assess the weight of the person's arm or leg?

7)

(a)In the case of someone who declares 'Mishkal Ragli Alai' - Rebbi Yehudah repeats what he says by 'Mishkal Yadi', only this time it is his leg up to his knee that he requires him to place into the barrel of water.

(b)And he support his ruling from the Pasuk in Yechezkel - "... asher Basar Chamorim Besaram" (though he admits that this is no more than a hint, since that is not what the Pasuk really means).

(c)When, in this Beraisa, Rebbi Yossi queried Rebbi Yehudah ...

1. ... how it is possible to match the make-up of the donkey's bone with that of a human being - he replied by means of assessment.

2. ... that if so, why we do not just assess the weight of the person's arm or leg, he replied that - Lechatchilah, we try to work out the solution practically, and it is only when we have no choice, that we refer to oral assessment.

8)

(a)What Shi'ur does the Beraisa give for Kidush Yadayim ve'Raglayim in the Beis-Hamikdash each morning?

(b)How do we initially reconcile this with the previous Beraisa 'be'Yad ad ha'Atzil' (which is synonymous with Marpek in our Mishnah)?

(c)We have a problem with that however, from Tana de'bei Menasheh. How does Tana de'bei Menasheh interpret "Yadcha" (in Parshas Bo, in connection with Tefilin)?

(d)We therefore conclude that min ha'Torah Yad incorporates the entire arm up to the muscle. How will we then explain ...

1. ... Yad ad ha'Atzil (of Rebbi Yehudah)?

2. ... 'Kidush Yadayim ve'Raglayim ba'Mikdash ad ha'Perek?

8)

(a)The Shi'ur the Beraisa gives for Kidush Yadayim ve'Raglayim in the Beis-Hamikdash each morning is - up to the wrist.

(b)We initially reconcile this with the previous Beraisa 'be'Yad ad ha'Atzil' (which is synonymous with Marpek (the armpit) in our Mishnah) - by differentiating between a Torah obligation (Kidush Yadayim ve'Raglayim) and Nedarim ('be'Yad ad ha'Atzil'), where we follow the vernacular.

(c)We have a problem with that however, from Tana de'bei Menasheh, who interprets "Yadcha" (in Parshas Bo in connection with Tefilin) as - on the muscle of the upper arm.

(d)We therefore conclude that, min ha'Torah Yad incorporates the entire arm up to the muscle, whereas ...

1. ... Yad ad ha'Atzil (of Rebbi Yehudah) - is governed by the Din of Nedarim, as explained, and ...

2. ... Kidush Yadayim ve'Raglayim ba'Mikdash ad ha'Perek is - Halachah le'Moshe mi'Sinai.

9)

(a)We also query 'be'Regel ad ha'Arkuvah' from a Beraisa (in connection with the Mitzvah of Oleh Regel). Who does the Tana preclude, based on the Pasuk in Mishpatim "Shalosh Regalim ba'Shanah ... "?

(b)How do we initially try to reconcile this with 'be'Regel ad ha'Arkuvah'?

(c)What does the Beraisa say about a woman who performs Chalitzah by removing the shoe from the Yavam's knee and downwards?

(d)Having just precluded the calf from the Torah's definition of Regel, on what basis is it Kasher regarding Chalitzah?

9)

(a)We also query be'Regel ad ha'Arkuvah from a Beraisa (in connection with the Mitzvah of Oleh Regel). Based on the Pasuk in Mishpatim "Shalosh Regalim ba'Shanah ... " - the Tana precludes Ba'alei Kabin (who have only a stump from the ankle down (implying that Regel only goes up to the ankle).

(b)We initially attempt to reconcile this with be'Regel ad ha'Arkuvah - by differentiating between Min ha'Torah and Nedarim (like we did by Yad).

(c)The Beraisa rules that if a woman performs Chalitzah by removing the shoe from the Yavam's knee and downwards - the Chalitzah is Kasher.

(d)In spite of having just precluded the calf from the Torah's definition of Regel it is Kasher by Chalitzah - because the Torah writes (not 'Raglo', but) "me'al Raglo" (implying above the ankle).

10)

(a)If the knee is Kasher for Chalitzah because it is considered "me'al Raglo", then why is above the knee not Kasher too, for the same reason?

(b)What does Rav Papa extrapolate from there regarding the ankle? What would be the problem if there was another bone between the ankle and the foot (like there is by an animal)?

(c)How does Rav Ashi refute Rav Papa's proof?

10)

(a)Even though the knee is Kasher for Chalitzah because it is considered "me'al Raglo", above the knee is not - because it is considered me'al de'me'al.

(b)Rav Papa extrapolates from there - that the ankle and the foot are one bone, because if there was another bone between them (like there is by an animal) - the ankle would be considered "me'al Raglo" and the knee 'me'al de'me'al'.

(c)Rav Ashi refutes Rav Papa's proof however - on the grounds that, even if the ankle and the foot were two bones, whatever works in conjunction with the foot is considered part of the foot.

11)

(a)How does our Mishnah assess someone who declares 'D'mei Yadi Alai'?

(b)What would be the Din if he declared 'Erech Yadi Alai'?

(c)Rava suggests that we assess D'mei Yadi like one assesses the damage caused to someone whose arm has been severed. How does one assess that?

(d)On what basis does Abaye refute Rava's suggestion?

11)

(a)Our Mishnah assesses someone who declares 'D'mei Yadi Alai' - by assessing him twice, once with an arm, and once without it. The difference between the two assessments constitutes the value of the arm.

(b)If someone declares 'Erech Yadi Alai' - he is exempt from paying anything, since his life does not depend on his arm (as we have already learned).

(c)Rava suggests that we assess 'D'mei Yadi' like one assesses the damage caused to someone whose arm has been severed - by assessing the value of an Eved (of his caliber) first with two arms, and then, with one arm missing, and making him pay the difference.

(d)Abaye refutes Rava's suggestion - bearing in mind that the Nidar still possesses both arms (and to assess him as if he had only one, would be under-evaluating him), since the value of a person without an arm decreases.

12)

(a)On what basis do we reject Abaye's suggestion, that we assess the difference between how much someone would be willing to pay for an Eved who works with two hands and an Eved who works with only one? What is he really saying with that?

(b)So how do we finally assess him?

12)

(a)We reject Abaye's suggestion, that we assess the difference between how much someone would be willing to pay for an Eved who works with two hands and an Eved who works with only one - because in effect, he is then saying the same as Rava.

(b)So we finally establish the case - by differentiating between someone who purchases an Eved of his caliber S'tam, and someone who makes such a purchase from a master who insists on retaining the exclusive rights to the use of one of his arms (which in no way detracts from the man's health, thereby allowing for a proper assessment).

13)

(a)Rava asks what the Din will be if, after assessing a man for a wound, the latter declares 'Dami Alai'. Why might the first Shuma (assessment) not cover the obligation to Hekdesh?

(b)On the assumption that it does not, we ask what the Din will be if someone declares 'Dami Alai' and, after having been assessed, he repeats it. Why might the first Shuma not cover the second one?

(c)Once again, on the assumption that the previous case requires a fresh Shuma, we ask what the Din will be if he says 'Sh'nei Dami Alai'. Why might even this case require two assessments?

(d)What are the practical ramifications of the other side of this She'eilah and of the previous one? How much will he have to pay if no second Shuma is necessary?

13)

(a)Rava asks what the Din will be if after assessing a man for a wound, the latter declares 'Dami Alai'. The first Shuma (assessment) might not cover the obligation to Hekdesh - since, whereas it only required a Beis-Din of three, the obligation of Erchin requires one of ten, including one Kohen (as we learned in Sanhedrin).

(b)On the assumption that the first Shuma is not valid for the declaration of Hekdesh (as we explained), we ask what the Din will be if someone says 'Dami Alai' and, after having been assessed, he repeats it, before having been assessed for the first Neder, which might nevertheless require a fresh assessment - because we need to take into account any improvement (or depreciation) that may have occurred between the two declarations.

(c)Once again, on the assumption that the previous case requires a fresh Shuma, we ask what the Din will be if he declares 'Sh'nei Dami Alai', which might require two assessments - because it may be as if he said 'Dami Alai' twice, where each one requires an independent Shuma (not only on account of a potential improvement).

(d)In both this She'eilah and the previous one, if no second Shuma is necessary - the Noder will simply have to pay the amount determined by the assessors, twice.

14)

(a)Finally, assuming that all of the above cases do indeed require two assessments (see Tosfos DH 'Amduhu'), we ask, assuming that the Nidar had already been unofficially assessed (for no particular reason), whether a fresh Shuma is required. Why should it not, seeing as the assessment for Erchin requires ten people?

(b)In that case, why would another Shuma be necessary, seeing as we already know his value?

(c)How do we try to resolve this She'eilah from the forthcoming Mishnah 'Dami Alai, u'Meis, Lo Yitnu Yorshin'? How are we bound to know his minimum Damim?

(d)And how do we refute this proof?

14)

(a)Finally, assuming that all of the above cases do indeed require two assessments (see Tosfos DH 'Amduhu'), we ask whether, if the Nidar had already been unofficially assessed (for no particular reason), a fresh assessment is not required - under the added assumption that the Shuma was made by ten people including a Kohen.

(b)Another Shuma might nevertheless be necessary - because it might require li'Shemah (doing it for the sake of the case in hand).

(c)We try to resolve this She'eilah from the forthcoming Mishnah 'Dami Alai, u'Meis, Lo Yitnu Yorshin' - implying that a Shuma is indeed required, because otherwise, we ought to obligate them to pay at least four Zuz (as there is nobody who is not worth at least that - though it is unclear what the proof from there is, since in any case, a Shuma requires ten people, and this did not take place here. Maybe this is included in the forthcoming refutation).

(d)We refute this proof however - on the grounds that, a Shuma is required here, because, unlike the case of our She'eilah, no Shuma at all has yet taken place.

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