ERCHIN 5 - Dedicated in memory of Rivkah bas Reb Avraham Leib, who passed away on 15 Adar 5764, and her husband, Nachum ben Reb Shlomo Dovid (Mosenkis) Z"L, who passed away on 23 Teves 5700, by their son and daughter-in-law, Sid and Sylvia Mosenkis (of Queens, NY).
1)
(a)We have a problem with the Beraisa's ruling 'Ein le'Hekdesh Ela Roshah' however, from another Beraisa. What does Rebbi Meir there learn from the Pasuk in Bechukosai "Kol asher Yiten mimenu la'Hashem Yih'yeh Kodesh, from the word ...
1. ... "Mimenu"?
2. ... "Yih'yeh"?
(b)How do Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yossi interpret the Pasuk? What do they say about someone who declares the leg of an animal Hekdesh?
1)
(a)We have a problem with the Beraisa's ruling 'Ein le'Hekdesh Ela Roshah' however, from another Beraisa, where Rebbi Meir learns from the Pasuk in Bechukosai "Kol asher Yiten mimenu la'Hashem Yih'yeh Kodesh, from the word ...
1. ... "Mimenu" that - if someone declares the leg of an animal an Olah, that leg adopts the Kedushah of Olah (and the proceeds of only the leg must go towards the purchase of an Olah).
2. ... "Yih'yeh" that - the leg remains Kodesh, and does not go out to Chulin.
(b)Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yossi interpret the Pasuk to mean that - if someone declares any part of an animal an Olah, the entire animal becomes an Olah (not just the leg. This is known as Hispashtus).
2)
(a)On what grounds will Rebbi Meir concede that if someone declares the head of a animal an Olah, the Kedushah spreads to the entire animal?
(b)What is now the problem with 'Ein le'Hekdesh Ela Roshah'?
2)
(a)Rebbi Meir will concede however, that - if someone declares the head of a animal an Olah, the Kedushah spreads to the entire animal since the head is a limb on which the animal's life depends.
(b)This creates an obvious problem with the Beraisa, which states - 'Ein le'Hekdesh Ela Roshah'?
3)
(a)How do we therefore establish the Beraisa, in order to solve the problem? By which category of Hekdesh does 'Hispashtus' not apply?
(b)We query this however, from Mar, who rules that if someone is declares Hekdesh a ram for its Damim, it adopts Kedushas ha'Guf (and goes on the Mizbe'ach). On what principle is this based?
(c)Why do we not say the same with regard to someone who declares Kedushas the head of the animal?
3)
(a)We therefore establish the Beraisa - by Kedushas Damim, where the concept of Hispashtus does not apply.
(b)We query this however, from Mar, who rules that if someone declares Hekdesh a ram for its Damim, it adopts Kedushas ha'Guf (and goes on the Mizbe'ach) - due to the principle of Migu (since Kedushas Damim takes effect, so does Kedushas ha'Guf).
(c)We do not say the same with regard to someone who declares Kedushas Damim the head of the animal - because whereas we apply one 'Migu' (from Kedushas Damim to Kedushas ha'Guf), we do not apply two (from the head to the body and from Kedushas Damim to Kedushas ha'Guf).
4)
(a)We query the current explanation too, however, from Rabah. What did Rabah say in connection with two 'Migus'?
(b)What is now the Kashya?
(c)So we establish the Beraisa by a Ba'al-Mum (similar to a donkey) which is not fit to go on the Mizbe'ach). How does that answer the Kashya?
4)
(a)We query the current explanation too, however from Rabah, who asked - whether on one limb we apply two Migus or not.
(b)According to the Beraisa - what is Rabah's She'eilah?
(c)So we establish the Beraisa by a Ba'al-Mum (similar to Chamor, which is not fit to go on the Mizbe'ach) - which explains why the Kedushah on the head does not spread to the rest of the body; but by a complete animal, perhaps, as Rabah suggests, we will apply two Migus.
5)
(a)This answer too, we query from another She'eilah of Rabah. What did Rabah declare with regard to someone who says 'D'mei Roshi Legabei Mizbe'ach'?
(b)What is now the problem?
(c)How do we solve it?
5)
(a)This answer too, we query from another She'eilah of Rabah, who asked - whether, if someone declares 'D'mei Roshi Legabei Mizbe'ach', he is Chayav to pay his entire value (Hispashtus).
(b)The problem is - from the Beraisa, which, we just concluded, maintains that by Kedushas Damim, we do not apply the principle of Hispashtus.
(c)And we answer by establishing Rabah's She'eilah before he learned the Beraisa.
6)
(a)Rabah asks whether, in a case where someone said 'D'mei Roshi Legabei Mizbe'ach', we say 'Nidon bi'Chevodo' or not. What are the two sides of the She'eilah? Why should we ...
1. ... say 'Nidon bi'Chevodo'?
2. ... do not say it?
(b)Similarly, Rava asks whether 'Nidon be'Heseg Yad' applies to someone who says 'Erki alai Legabei Mizbe'ach'. What are the two sides of the She'eilah? Why should we ...
1. ... say 'Nidon be'Heseg Yad'?
2. ... not say it?
(c)And Rav Ashi asks a similar She'eilah with regard to someone who declares a Sadeh Achuzah (an inherited field) Hekdesh (for the proceeds) to go on the Mizbe'ach? What are the two sides of the She'eilah? Why ought it ...
1. ... to be redeemed at the fixed price of a Chomer (i.e. a Beis Kur) of barley at fifty Shekalim.
2. ... to be redeemed at its sale price?
(d)What is the outcome of all three She'eilos?
6)
(a)Rabah asks whether, in a case where someone said 'D'mei Roshi Legabei Mizbe'ach', we say ...
1. ... Nidon bi'Chevodo - because, on the one hand, we do not find Damim which is not subject to Nidon bi'Chevodo; or whether, we ...
2. ... do not say it - because, on the other hand, we do not find anything that goes on the Mizbe'ach which is.
(b)Similarly, Rava asks whether ...
1. ... Nidon be'Heseg Yad applies to someone who says 'Erki Alai Legabei Mizbe'ach' - because on the one hand, we do not find a case of Erchin which is not subject to Heseg Yad; or whether we ...
2. ... do not say it - because, on the other hand, we do not find anything that goes on the Mizbe'ach that is redeemed for anything other than its value.
(c)And Rav Ashi asks a similar She'eilah with regard to someone who declares a Sadeh Achuzah (an inherited field) Hekdesh (for the proceeds) to go on the Mizbe'ach. On the one hand, it ought ...
1. ... to be redeemed at the fixed price of a Chomer of barley at fifty Shekalim - because, we do not find a Sadeh Achuzah that is sold at its sale price; or whether, it ought ...
2. ... to be redeemed at its sale price because, on the other hand - anything of which the proceeds go on the Mizbe'ah is redeemed at its sale price.
(d)The outcome of all three She'eilos is - Teiku (Tishbi Yetaretz Kushyos ve'Ibayos).
7)
(a)What does our Mishnah say about a baby of less than a month old with regard to ...
1. ... Damim?
2. ... Erech?
(b)According to Rebbi Meir in a Beraisa, someone who obligates himself to pay the Erech of such a baby must pay his Damim. Why is that?
(c)What do the Chachamim say?
7)
(a)Our Mishnah rules that - a baby of less than a month old ...
1. ... has Damim ...
2. ... but not Erech.
(b)According to Rebbi Meir in a Beraisa, someone who obligates himself to pay the Erech of such a baby must pay his Damim - because a person does not make a statement in vain (Ein Adam Motzi Devarav le'Vatalah). Consequently, since everyone knows that a less than a month old baby has no Erech, the Noder must have meant Damim.
(c)The Chachamim, on the other hand - hold that (even though he knew that the baby had no Erech), people do sometimes make vain statements, and he is Patur.
8)
(a)According to whom does Rebbi Gidal Amar Rav say 'ha'Omer Erech K'li alai, Nosen Damim'?
(b)Why is this statement necessary? Why might we have thought that he goes even according to the Chachamim?
(c)And why does Rav Gidal find it necessary to teach us the Din with regard to vessels? What reason might we have otherwise ascribed to Rebbi Meir, that precludes it?
8)
(a)Rebbi Gidal Amar Rav says 'ha'Omer Erech K'li alai, Nosen Damim' - according to Rebbi Meir.
(b)This statement is necessary, since we might otherwise have thought that - he goes even according to the Chachamim, and that they agree with Rebbi Meir in principle (that a person does not make vain declarations, and) their reason in the Beraisa is because the Noder erred in thinking that a baby of less than a month does have an Erech.
(c)And Rav Gidal finds it necessary to teach us the Din with regard to vessels - to negate the suggestion that Rebbi Meir's reason is because he decrees a baby of less than of a month, on account of one that is more than a month (a decree which does not apply to vessels).
5b----------------------------------------5b
9)
(a)Like whom do we establish Rabah (or Rav Yeiva) bar Rebbi Yossi Amar Rav, who says 'ha'Makdish Beheimas Chavero, Nosein Damehah'?
(b)Bearing in mind Rav Gidal Amar Rav's previous ruling (regarding 'ha'Omer Erech K'li Zeh alai ... '), what is he coming to teach us? Why might we have thought otherwise?
(c)How does Mar bar Rav Ashi qualify Rav Gidal's statement? What distinction does he draw between whether the Noder said 'Harei alai' and 'Harei Zu'?
9)
(a)We establish Rabah (or Rav Yeiva) bar Rebbi Yossi Amar Rav, who says 'ha'Makdish Beheimas Chavero, Nosein Damehah' - like Rebbi Meir (who holds 'Ein Adam Motzi Devarav le'Vatalah') ...
(b)... because, in spite of Rav Gidal Amar Rav's previous ruling (regarding ha'Omer Erech K'li Zeh alai ... ), we might otherwise have thought that - seeing as a Beheimah is subject to Hekdesh, the Noder had in mind to purchase it from the owner and bring it as a Korban (and not to give its value to Bedek ha'Bayis).
(c)Mar bar Rav Ashi qualifies Rav Gidal's statement - by confining it to where he said 'Harei alai', but if he said 'Harei Zu', his Neder does not take effect at all (because one cannot declare Hekdesh something that one does not own).
10)
(a)Rebbi Meir in our Mishnah, says that a Nochri can be Ne'erach but not Ma'arich. What does Rebbi Yehudah say?
(b)What does Rebbi Meir in a Beraisa learn from the Pasuk in Bechukosai ...
1. ... "B'nei Yisrael"?
2. ... "Ish"?
(c)He prefers to apply the Ribuy of Nochrim to Ne'erachin rather than to Ma'arichin, because there are three cases which the Torah includes in Ne'erachin but not in Ma'arichin. Which three cases?
(d)Rebbi Yehudah, on the other hand, applies the Ribuy to Ma'arichin, because of the two cases which the Torah includes in Ma'arichin but not in Ne'erachin. Which two cases?
10)
(a)Rebbi Meir in our Mishnah, says that a Nochri can be Ne'erach but not Ma'arich. According to Rebbi Yehudah - he can be Ma'arich but not Ne'erach.
(b)Rebbi Meir in a Beraisa, learns from the Pasuk in Bechukosai (in connection with Erchin "Daber el B'nei Yisrael ... Ish Ish" ...
1. ... from the words "b'nei Yisrael" that - a Nochri cannot be Ma'arich, and from ...
2. ... word "Ish" that - he can be Ne'erach.
(c)He prefers to apply the Ribuy of Nochrim to Ne'erachin rather than to Ma'arichin, because there are three cases which the Torah includes in Ne'erachin but not in Ma'arichin - Cheresh, Shoteh and Katan.
(d)Rebbi Yehudah, on the other hand, applies the Ribuy to Ma'arichin, because of the two cases which the Torah includes in Ma'arichin but not in Ne'erachin - Tumtum and Androginus.
11)
(a)Rava concurs with the ruling of Rebbi Meir ('Ein Ma'arichin'), but not with his reason. He concurs with the ruling of Rebbi Meir, based on a Pasuk in Ezra, who made a statement to the Nochrim who came to help build the Beis-Hamikdash. What did he tell them?
(b)And on what basis does he disagree with his reason (which is based on the ruling regarding a 'Chashu')?
(c)On the other hand, Rava concurs with the reason of Rebbi Yehudah (but not with his ruling ['Ma'arichin ve'Ein Ne'erachin']). Why does he concur with his reason (which is based on Tumtum and Androginus)?
(d)What problem does he have on the other hand, with his ruling?
11)
(a)Rava concurs with the ruling of Rebbi Meir (Ein Ma'arichin), but not with his reason. He concurs with his ruling, based on a Pasuk in Ezra - where Ezra rejected the offer of the Nochrim who came to assist in the construction of the Beis-Hamikdash.
(b)But he disagrees with his reason (which is based on the ruling regarding a Chashu [who cannot be Ma'arich]) - because Chashu are different in that they have no Da'as (whereas a Nochri has).
(c)On the other hand, Rava concurs with the reason of Rebbi Yehudah (but not with his ruling [Ma'arichin ve'Ein Ne'erachin]). He concurs with his reason (which is based on Tumtum and Androginus) - because if a Tumtum and an Androginus, which have Da'as, cannot be Ne'erach, it stands to reason that a Nochri cannot be Ne'erach, either.
(d)The problem with Rebbi Yehudah's ruling - lies in the Pasuk in Ezra (as we explained by Rebbi Meir's opinion).
12)
(a)In order to reconcile Rebbi Yehudah's ruling ('Ma'arichin') with the Pasuk in Ezra, what does Rav Chisda Amar Avimi suggest that he really means?
(b)What distinction does a Beraisa draw between Kodshei Mizbe'ach and Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis of Nochrim with regard to Me'ilah?
(c)What problem does that create with our current interpretation of Rebbi Yehudah?
(d)Rava therefore concludes that the Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis of a Nochri are indeed acceptable, according to Rebbi Yehudah. On what grounds then, did Ezra refuse the Nochrim's assistance in building the Beis-Hamikdash?
12)
(a)Rav Chisda Amar Avimi suggests that, in order to reconcile Rebbi Yehudah's ruling (Ma'arichin) with the Pasuk in Ezra, he means - Ma'arichin, but ve'Ercho Nignaz' (his Erech is valid, but it must go into Genizah).
(b)The Beraisa draws a distinction between Kodshei Mizbe'ach of Nochrim - which are not subject to Me'ilah, and Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis - which are.
(c)The problem that this creates with our current interpretation of Rebbi Yehudah is that - if, as we suggest, Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis of Nochrim must go into Genizah, how can they then be subject to Me'ilah?
(d)Rava therefore concludes that the Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis of a Nochri are indeed acceptable, according to Rebbi Yehudah, and Ezra refused the Nochrim's assistance in building the Beis-Hamikdash (not on principle, but) - because their intention was in order to sabotage the building and delay its completion, until they would succeed in convincing Koresh (King of Persia) to stop it altogether.
