When the gemara discusses shechting on Yom Tov the gemara goes through a whole cheshbon of breira and that the shchita is mevarer that the behaima was omed l'achila. My question is why do we have to go through a whole chesbon? Why can't we simply say that on shabbos the torah asers shchita and therefore the animal is not muchan l'achila. On Yom Tov the torah maters shchita and that is a giluy that this animal is omed l'achila. In other words why can't we say the torah teaches us that animals are muchan sometimes and sometimes not. Why is it a choice of either or?
AG, New York, USA
1. At this stage of the discussion, the Gemara maintains that there is no such concept of "Muktzah Machmas Isur," that an item should be Muktzah merely because one is prohibited to use it. This is stated by the Maharam (printed below the Maharsha) on the Gemara here (14a). The Maharam points out that the Gemara (end of 14b) asks, "[Does this imply] that Rabbi Yehudah agrees to the prohibition of Muktzah Machmas Mi'us (an item that is repulsive is automatically Muktzah on Shabbos because people decide before Shabbos not to use it, and therefore they put it aside, which makes it Muktzeh)? However, we have learned that Rebbi Yehudah agrees to Muktzah Machmas Isur!" We see from this comment that until the end of 14b (when the Gemara finally answers that Rebbi Yehudah indeed agrees to Muktzah Machmas Isur), the Gemara did not hold of the latter concept. According to this, it makes no difference whether we are discussing Shabbos or Yom Tov, because even though it is forbidden to slaughter on Shabbos, the Gemara at this stage understood that this alone does not make it Muktzah.
2. Even though Tosfos (14b, DH Eimar) writes that the above comment of the Gemara is only a "Dichuya b'Alma," merely a deflection which does not remain in the subsequent discussion, because according to the Halachah, Muktzah Machmas Isur is a more severe prohibition than Muktzah Machmas Mi'us, nevertheless at the beginning of the Gemara there did appear to be a Havah Amina that Muktzah Machmas Isur is less severe. The Maharsha (14a) gives a reason for why this would be so, when he cites the Gemara later (beginning of 15a) which states, "Perhaps there (the case of the candle which was lit on Erev Shabbos) is different because he actively pushed the candle aside [from being used on Shabbos] by lighting it." At that stage, the Gemara has already accepted partially that Rebbi Yehudah agrees with the concept of Muktzah Machmas Isur, but the Gemara points out that actively putting an object out of one's mind before Shabbos makes it a more severe kind of Muktzah. According to this logic, one also can understand why the Gemara initially thought that Muktzah Machmas Isur was permitted entirely because the animal (which cannot be slaughtered on Shabbos) has not been *actively* put out of action, but rather since the Torah prohibits the slaughtering, it automatically results that one cannot use it. If one did not do an action to make it forbidden, then it may be a lesser form of Muktzah than, for example, "Gerogeros u'Tzemukin" (dates and raisins), which a person actively placed on the roof to dry. The Gemara in Beitzah (end of 40a, as cited by Tosfos here in Chulin 14a, DH Mechatchin) states that this is the only type of Muktzah to which Rebbi Shimon agrees, because the person actively put it out of action.
3. In summary, the fact that one may not slaughter an animal on Shabbos is not a sufficient reason to make it Muktzah according to the Gemara at this stage, because one has not performed a positive action to put it out of one's mind.
Kol Tuv,
Dovid Bloom