When he says he wants to bring a Minchah of lentils, it is relatively more obvious that he is Chayav to bring a wheat Minchah. The reason is because his words contained a glaring error. No one, after all, would actually think that a Minchah can be made from lentils. So, based on the premise that he must have intended something coherent, we can only assume that he was attempting to retract from his original commitment to bring a Minchah. But, in fact, he is not able to retract; therefore, he certainly remains Chayav to bring a Minchah.

If, on the other hand, he says he wants to bring a Minchah of barley, it is relatively less obvious that he is Chayav to bring a wheat Minchah. The reason is because his words contain only a slight error. One could potentially be unaware that a Minchah should not be made from barley. But if so, then there is no reason to assume that he meant to commit himself to anything other than what he actually said, i.e., a barley Minchah. Since he cannot in fact bring this, therefore one might have thought that he remains exempt from brining the Minchah.

Where did you find Beis Shamai's view regarding the individual who expressly makes a Tenai regarding which animal will come out of his house?

I now see you were referring to the Mishnah at the beginning of the fifth Perek. Although I do not have a full answer, I am nevertheless tempted to suggest three potential approaches to begin work at resolving the challenging point you are raising.

1) The very "Chidush" of the ruling in the Mishnah may be exactly your point. In other words, the Tana is coming to teach us that we do not say "there is no Chiyuv because it was based on a mistake." Rather, the view being conveyed in our Mishnah, i.e., that of Beis Shamai, is that even when a person erred in his understanding of the situation when stipulating a Korban, it is nevertheless binding.

a) A difficulty with this is that seemingly there would be no reason to teach such a Chidush in this Mishnah when it is already going to be taught explicitly in the Mishnah in chapter five.

b) Possibly, one could resolve this by saying that the Mishnah is not intending to inform us per se that this is Beis Shamai's view; but rather, as a matter of style, the Tana is simply selecting the case which is indeed a greater Chidush, the reason for which is based on the Mishnah in chapter five.

2) I believe your question is based on Daf 31a where the Gemara expresses its initial understanding of Beis Shamai's view. But Rav Papa rejects that view. Maybe our Gemara is in accordance with his interpretation of Beis Shamai. One, however, may object to this because it does not seem appealing to establish the Stam Gemara on Dapim 9b-10a like one opinion in a later Perek, especially if we do not see a clear comment to this effect in the Gemara or Rishonim.

3) There is a difference between two types of declaration. One is declaring a particular item to become Kadosh, which Beis Shamai validates even though there was a mistake involved, such as by the Shor on Daf 31. The other is taking upon oneself the obligation to bring a future offering, such as the individual on Daf 9 who vows to bring a Minchah. Therefore, possibly, even if one were to hold that Hekdesh on a specific object will take effect even if the person who was Makdish made a mistake -- for example, declaring that the Shor emerging from the house is Kadosh while being mistaken about the color -- nevertheless, one could still theoretically hold that taking on an obligation cannot take effect if the person vowing was under a mistaken impression. For example, he vowed to bring a Minchah made of lentils. We see this distinction, by the way, in the context of the question raised by the Gilyon ha'Shas on 9b.

One may seriously question my argument, however, because as the Kashya of the Gilyon ha'Shas makes clear, for some reason our Gemara does feel comfortable inferring from a case in which one declares an item to be Kadosh (vowing to be a Nazir from figs) to a case in which one takes upon himself an obligation (vowing to bring a barley Minchah).

Since I did not find my proposed resolutions discussed in the commentaries, I cannot tell you that I have a definite answer right now. But for the time being I hope our discussion helps contribute to your fascinating analysis of this topic. Meanwhile, I will continue to defer to other members of the Kollel in case they are able to offer additional and help and insights on this challenge you raised.

Warmest regards,

Yishai Rasowsky

I can hear your opinion, but I still would like to sharpen my point a bit.

Even if we accept your opinion, that 'Mincha' alone, is a full statement to apply Hekdesh, you will certainly agree that this is because the word Mincha, simply includes the only Mincha a person can donate, is one of wheat, so wheat is built in or rather a default of a Mincha. Same goes for the kind of baking has a default and if not known otherwise, we use the default. Still, my point is that if you decide to specify, say, you want to donate a 'Minchas Marcheshes' (a fried Mincha), this is an essential part of the Mincha, because it defines your Mincha, even if without saying the word 'Marcheshes', the default Hekdesh will apply.

Hekdesh be'Ta'us is in a case he would say, I want to bring a Mincha if I have a car on Tuesday, while he did not know, his wife already made out with her friends and will take the family car with her. This mistake - according to Beis Shamay ? does not affect the Hekdesh, and is not regarded as a essential condition, and he has to bring the Mincha even if he needs to use the bus.

Bottom line, I want to say that the 'mistake rule', applies only to conditions, but not to the description of the Neder itself.

Anyhow, thank you again for your great question, and Yasher Koach for this interesting discussion of Torah, in your Zechus.

Kol Tuv,

Aharon Steiner