1) Tosafos on the bottom of 5a d"h nekitna writes that Raba bar R Huna did not get reshus from Rebbe because Rebbe was not alive at the time and the reshus works like smicha- the one who receives it is able to give it to someone else. Therefore, Rebbe gave reshus to R Chiya who chose to give to to Rav, etc.
The R Yona argues on Tosafos and says that reshus is different than semicha. Even though semicha is transferred from person to person, reshus to judge is only given by the nasi.
What is the machlokes between Tosafos and R Yona? Are they arguing about the nature of semicha or the reshus to judge? What do they say about each?
2) Tosafos on the top of 5b d"h Iy writes that when Rebbe allowed Raba bar Chana to judge issur v'heter, Rebbe was not exempting Raba from payment if Raba made a mistake because that exemption was included in the permission to judge monetary cases.
The Ran quotes the Ramban's answer to Tosafos's question: since Raba bar Chana was receiving semicha to judge dinei kenasos from Rebbe, Raba did not need anymore reshus to judge issur v'heter.
Why is it true that someone who receives semicha for kenasos is allowed to judge all cases and not pay?
Thank you,
Dovid Safier
P.S. If you put the questions and answers on the website, please do not write my name.
Dovid Safier, United States
1) This is a deep and complicated Sugya, and I feel that I am jumping in at the deep end, but I will just make a short comment to try and get us started.
(a) Rav Yonasan Eibeshitz, in Urim v'Tumim (25, end of Tumim 15), explains what the difference is between Reshus and Semichah. (Presumably, his explanation can apply only according to Rabeinu Yonah, who maintains that Semichah is different from Reshus, because, according to Tosfos, the two ideas appear to be similar.)
The Tumim writes that Reshus means that the Dayan has permission to force the two sides to accept his judgement, and even if he makes a mistake he will not be required to pay up. Semichah is different. Semichah means that the judge is allowed to administer the fines of the Torah. He also has the authority to punish transgressors physically. Semichah does not grant so much exemption from paying in the event of a mistaken ruling.
(b) What the Tumim seems to be saying is that Reshus is a more formal issue. It does not give the judge so much power to punish but it is a protection against anyone who challenges and argues that the judge cannot act in a compulsory manner, and, in addition it gives him insurance in event of mistakes he might make. Semichah gives the judge a more wider power to apply the Dinim of the Torah.
The above would apply only according to Rabeinu Yonah, not according to Tosfos, who compares Reshus to Semichah.
(c) I am now going to try, bs'd, to explain a little more the answer that I gave above in the name of Rav Yonasan Eibeshitz, and it might also be possible to make use of the ideas that I write below in the answer to question 2.
According to Tosfos, one must receive Reshus from one's teacher. This is because Reshus, according to Tosfos, is not merely an official process, but rather it is a sign of approval from one's close teacher who testifies thst his student has a profound knowledge of the Halachah. This is why one has to receive Reshus from a scholar who knows the student well. It also explains why Tosfos compares the Reshus required to judge monetary matters to the Reshus required to judge Kenasos. As we saw, the expertise required to judge Kenasos is the greatest possible, and this is clearly dependent on profound knowledge possessed by the judge. For more standard monetary matters, the standard required is not quite so high, but it is still necessary to receive approval from a close teacher.
Rabeinu Yonah has a different way of looking at it. He agrees with Tosfos about Semichah, but he learns Reshus differently. Reshus is a more general permssion to judge, given by the Nasi to scholars whom he does not know so well personally but rather relies on the recommendation of the leading Sages. This is a more official process, which has the authority to exempt the judge from payment in event of error.
2)
(a) If someone had received Semichah for Kenasos, this means he must be at the highest level. The Gemara (Bava Kama 84b) tells us that in Bavel they could carry out the Shelichus of Eretz Yisrael and judge monetary cases but they could not judge Kenasos. For instance, the Torah says that a thief must pay double. This is a Kenas. It is not something that logic implies that one must pay. Logic says that the thief must return what he stole; to make him pay double is a penalty that only the Torah can apply. Only expert judges in Eretz Yisrael who have received Semichah can impose the law of a Kenas. It follows that if someone has received Semichah for Kenasos he must be a great expert, and therefore he is allowed to judge all cases.
(b) The Nimukei Yosef (page 11a of the pages of the Rif in the standard editions), explains why he does not have to pay if he makes a mistake. He writes that if he is an expert at issuing rulings, even if he had not received Semichah, he is exempt from paying. This is because of the way the Gemara (Avodah Zarah 19b) explains the verse (Mishlei 7:26), "And mighty are all her slain." It refers to somebody who knows Halachah but is not prepared to tell others what the Torah ruling is. It is tantamount to murder if he is unwilling to issue rulings.
(c) The Nimukei Yosef writes that anyone who is obligated by the Torah to rule is automatically exempt if he errs because the mistake of an expert is considered as Ones. It is totally unintentional and unavoidable because even the greatest expert occasionally makes a mistake.
I must stress that this Sugya is famous for its depth. I think that what I have written should be looked upon as a suggestion of how to start understanding the Sugya.
Kol Tuv,
Dovid Bloom