I hope you can help me with the following quandary:
In the first version of Abaye's clarification, he states the Makhloket between Rabbi and R. Yossi (on whether even in a grain's bundle-state there's a requirement to take trumah) is only in the case of Shibolin, but, in the case of Kitniyot, they both would agree that Trumah IS necessary, even in its bundle form.
In the next version, Abaye's goes in the completely opposite direction: he states the Makhloket between Rabbi and R. Yossi (on whether even in a grain's bundle-state there's a requirement to take trumah) is only in the case of Shibolin, but, in the case of Kitniyot, they both would agree that Trumah is NOT necessary, even in its bundle form.
As Tosfot puts it, it's really hard to swallow that an Ika d'Amrei would be total opposites! So, Rashi gives an interpretation which seemingly addresses this 'opposite' issue and states that in the first case, Shibolin are to be understood as mostly used for processing into dough, while Kitniyot are often used in their raw form (which is why R. Yossi is willing to change his tune and state that Kitniyot, because they are use raw, would need Trumah taken from them even raw); however, in the second version, Rashi is forced(?) to say that now Kitniyot are the ones mostly used for processing into dough, while Shibolin are now the ones that are often used in their raw form (which is why Rabbi is willing to change his tune and state that by Kitniyot, because they mostly used after processing, would NOT need Trumah taken from them raw).
And here's my issue (and I know it's not only MY issue): I can accept Rashi changing a halakhik status based on an Ika d'Amrei change; but to change a agricultural/sociological truth?! To redefine how people used a particular grain based on a halakhik statement made by Abaye? This seemed very odd to me.
Any assistance in this matter would be greatly appreciated.
Thank you,
Jonathan Bailey
(Please forgive the delay in response. Technical problems prevented the mailing of a number of responses.)
As you write, your question is asked by the Mefarshim. Apart from Tosfos that you cite, the Rashash also expresses surprise that the two Leshonos in the Gemara should differ concerning a factual matter. Below I present two possible approaches.
1. The Tzelach, written by the Noda bi'Yehudah, explains this clearly and writes that the difference between the first and second versions in the Gemara is as follows.
(a) The first Lashon in the Gemara maintains that the crucial factor is what is the more frequent way of eating the produce. Since it is very frequent that Kitniyos are consumed as Melilos, it follows that everyone agrees that they require Ma'aser even in their bundle form.
(b) According to the second Lashon, the crucial factor is not what the more frequent way of consumption is, but rather whether the obligation for separating Ma'aser is d'Oraisa or d'Rabanan. The opinion of Rashi is that Kitniyos are not liable for Ma'aser mid'Oraisa, but rather this is only a d'Rabanan requirement. See Rashi to Bava Metzia 88b (DH b'Anavim) who writes that apart from produce of wheat and barley, the only items which are liable for Terumah and Ma'aseros mid'Oraisa are grapes and olives. Legumes are only liable mid'Rabanan. (See also Tosfos to Bava Metzia 88a, DH Hacha, who writes that figs are also only liable mid'Rabanan for Ma'aser; see Tosfos to Rosh Hashanah 12a, DH Tana.)
Since Kitniyos are liable for Ma'aser only mid'Rabanan, the second Lashon maintains that produce of wheat or barley is liable for Ma'aser even in the bundle form, while for Kitniyos it is possible to be more lenient and therefore they are only liable for Ma'aser when they are collected together in a pile.
(c) The above approach appears to be an acceptable way of explaining the Gemara. How, though, does it fit with Rashi?
(d) The Chidushei Chasam Sofer, after citing the Meiri who also makes the above distinction between whether the obligation for Terumah and Ma'aser is d'Rabanan or d'Oraisa, writes, "v'Efshar le'Hamtik Kein b'Rashi." The literal translation of this phrase is that one can "sweeten" this interpretation and see that it fits in the words of Rashi.
I suggest the following approach to help us see the difference between these two versions of the Gemara according to Rashi.
We will notice, when Rashi explains the first Lashon in DH Aval Kitniyos, that Rashi writes that there are many people who use Kitniyos in smaller quantities, according to what is necessary for cooking a dish, and therefore they are liable for Ma'aser already in bundle form.
Later, in DH Ika, when Rashi explains the second version, he writes that the standard reason why one brings in his Kitniyos harvest is in order to collect them in a pile. It is possible to say that there is not necessarily a contradiction between these two statements of Rashi. In his first comment, Rashi does not say that the majority of people bring Kitniyos into their homes in order to use it in the pot. Rather, Rashi says that many people do so. This may mean that a very significant minority do so. Since the first Lashon in the Gemara does not take into account whether the obligation for Ma'aser is d'Oraisa or d'Rabanan, it follows that we compare Kitniyos to produce of barley and wheat and therefore the Halachah is that Ma'aser must be separated as soon as the Kitniyos are used for cooking.
However, according to the second Lashon, the crucial factor is whether the obligation for Ma'aser is d'Oraisa or d'Rabanan. Since Rashi's opinion is that Kitniyos are liable only mid'Rabanan, this means that one may be more lenient, and separating Ma'aser is not necessary until the Kitniyos are collected in a pile (since the latter stage is the standard way of using Kitniyos also). The majority collect the Kitniyos in a pile even though a significant minority do not so, but since the second version maintains that the obligation is only mid'Rabanan, it is no longer necessary to pay attention to the significant minority.
According to the above explanation, the dispute between the two versions is a dispute in Halachah, not a dispute concerning a agricutural/sociological truth.
(2) Here is another way of understanding how the Gemara did not in fact make a full-circle change concerning a factual matter. This explanation is given by the Chazon Ish (Ma'aseros 4:15, DH u'Pligi).
(a) The Chazon Ish writes that according to the first version in the Gemara, the reason why everyone agrees that Kitniyos are liable for Ma'aser in the bundle form is that Kitniyos do actually possess an advantage over Shibolin which makes it easier to eat them in their bundle form. This is because it is easier to remove the bean of Kitniyos from its rod than it is to remove the grain of produce from the stalk, because the grain of produce is smaller than Kitniyos and becomes more closely connected and bound up with the stalk. Therefore, according to the first version of the Gemara, the Kitniyos are liable for Ma'aser immediately, because this is an easy way of eating them, when they are removed from the rods.
(b) However, according to the second version in the Gemara, the crucial factor is what is the standard way of consuming the item. Since it is more common for wheat to be chewed in its raw form than Kitniyos to be consumed in that way, even if an individual decides to chew Kitniyos, we take into account only the normal way of consumption. Since the standard way of eating Kitniyos is not to chew them, it follows that the "Goren" for Kitniyos is only later on when they are collected as a pile. They are not liable for Ma'aser before this (see Derech Emunah, Hilchos Ma'aser 3:57).
(c) The Chazon Ish concludes that according to the above explanation, one does not need to say that there are opposite arguments being mentioned in the Sugya, and the objection of Tosfos (DH Ika) is removed.
(d) In summary, according to the first version of the Gemara, one looks at what species is easier to remove from the stalks. Since Kitniyos are the easiest to remove, they are liable to Ma'aser the earliest (namely, in its bundle form). According to the second version, one looks at the standard way of eating the produce. Since people do not usually chew Kitniyos (even though it is easier to remove them from the stalk if one does want to chew them), it follows that they are liable for Ma'aser only later on. According to this explanation, there is no factual dispute present in the Sugya, but rather the dispute between the two versions in the Gemara is a Halachic dispute.
Kol Tuv,
Dovid Bloom
Thank you very much. As always, your responses are clear, comprehensive and very well-explained. I very much appreciate your 'services' and my students and I always enjoy when I bring your answers to shiur.
I appreciated the Nodeh Be'yehudah's and Chofetz Chayim's answers to the strange 'opposite' approach of the איכא דאמרי; however, I still find some difficulty in the presented reconciliation of Rashi's 'flip'.
You wrote - as I understood it - that because Rashi wrote 'בני אדם הרבה' instead of, let's say 'רוב בני אדם', he was talking about a significant minority. So, a significant minority uses Kitniyot in bundle form, and, even though they are minority, nonetheless still they are a significant minority, and therefore we follow their practice le'halakha taking ma'aser from kitniyot even in bundle form: אסורייתא טבלא
But, in the second Rashi, because he would be working off of his approach in Bava Metzia that ma'aser for kitnyot is merely derabanan, despite the fact that there's still a significant minority that uses it raw, this time, the significant part of the 'significant minority' is superseded by the derabanan leniency (not brought into consideration in the first lashon) and therefore, kitnyot, in bundle form, is still not tevel: אסורייתא לא טבלא.
If this was understood correctly, then here is my issue: the language of Rashi in the second lashon is: "בהנהו מחייב רבי לפי שהרבה כונסין אותן למלילות...אבל בקטניות סתם הכנסתם למרוח" In other words, it seems that Rashi's reason for kitnyot not being tevel is because the majority eats it only once processed and doesn't mention anything about ma'aser being derabanan. Meaning, if was merely based on what Rashi uses to explain the reason, he'd be saying majority use it only processed - which, while this does fit into the previous Rashi on the first Lashon (i.e. sig. minority uses it raw (1st lashon), while, obviously therefore, the majority use it only processed (2nd lashon)) it doesn't, however fit with the reason Rashi gives why אסורייתא לא טבלא. Even according to your own language 'However, according to the second Lashon, the crucial factor is whether the obligation for Ma'aser is d'Oraisa or d'Rabanan.' - but Rashi never mentions this 'crucial factor! He only mentions the reason is because the majority uses it once processed - which seems to imply that in the first lashon, the sig. minority was strong enough to sway the halakha, but for 'some reason' in the second, the majority controls.
Thank you for your help,
Jonathan Bailey
Dear Jonathan,
First of all, let me apologize for the extremely long delay in my reply to this question. I am very happy now to have get around to this finally.
1) To start off with, I would just point out that the explanation I gave in Rashi is not entirely my own, but rather it has at least a mention in the words of the Chidushei Chasam Sofer on the Sugya, who cites the Me'iri. The Me'iri explains that according to the Ika d'Amrei, the reason why everyone agrees that Kitniyos in the bundle form are exempt is because the obligation to take Terumah from Kitniyos is only mid'Rabanan.
The Chasam Sofer then adds the interesting line: "v'Efshar l'Hamtik Ken Gam b'Rashi," which translates literally as, "It is possible to sweeten this explanation into Rashi also."
This phrase about "sweetening" an explanation is sometimes used by the Mefarshim. I guess one would explain it as meaning that this explanation of the words of Rashi might not be the most straightforward explanation, but on the other hand it is a very pleasant and enjoyable way of understanding the matter.
So my Peshat in Rashi was in fact an attempt to show what the Chasam Sofer might have meant when he wrote that the Me'iri's view can also fit sweetly into the words of Rashi.
2) After that lengthy foreword, I will now relate to your question on my Peshat. As I understand it, what is disturbing you is that Rashi does not mention anything about the difference between the two Leshonos in the Gemara being based on whether the obligation to take Ma'aser from Kitniyos is mid'Rabanan or mid'Oraisa.
3) In my opinion, this is not such a worrying challenge. We find elsewhere that two Leshonos in the Gemara dispute whether a matter is mid'Rabanan or mid'Oraisa. An example is in Chulin 109b, where there are two Leshonos in the Gemara. Tosfos (DH ha'Hu) explains that according to the second Lashon, one is allowed l'Chatchilah to roast the udder of a cow, and one need not be concerned with any problem of meat and milk. However, according to the first Lashon in the Gemara, l'Chatchilah one should not roast the udder, but b'Di'eved if one did so, he is permitted to eat the udder. The Minchas Aharon (on the Aruch mi'Shach, written by the Shach and printed at the end of the Mechon Yerushalayim edition of the Tur on Hilchos Basar b'Chalav, Yoreh Deah #90, page 39; the Minchas Aharon is printed on the same page, DH v'Ein) writes that the dispute between the two Leshonos in the Gemara concerns whether the prohibition against roasting meat and milk together is mid'Rabanan or mid'Oraisa.
4) The above Gemara (which is of course dealing with a totally different area of Halachah than ours) shows that sometimes two opinions in the Gemara can depend on whether the prohibition under discussion is mid'Rabanan or mid'Oraisa, and the Acharonim may give such an explanation even though Rashi himself does not mention that this is the source of the dispute.
5) Similarly, in our Sugya, it is valid for us to claim that the dispute between the Leshonos in the Gemara depends on whether Terumah of Kitniyos is a d'Oraisa obligation or a d'Rabanan one.
Kol Tuv,
Dovid Bloom