Close to the end of 91b, Rav Papa wanted to permit a woman who remarried based on two witnesses to return to her previous husband. He ultimately didn't permit her because Rav Huna bre dRav Yehoshua said to him "viashinuy leku vilismoch." This translates, I think, "shall we rely on weak answers[to permit her]? What exactly is Rav Huna saying? And why are the answers weak? Is the point here that since the cases brought could have been resolved by saying "what could be done" and yet every time the gemara finds a reason, even a weak reason, to find fault and not apply "what could be done" show that "what could be done" is not convincing logic to permit the woman to return to her first husband? Could you clarify please.
Gregory Lapushin, United States
Gregory, I think that you have the correct idea of what is going on here.
1) The point is that on 91b there are a few Amora'im who try to prove that we do not say "what could be done." Six lines from the top of 91b, Ula wanted to prove that we do not say "what could be done." The Gemara deflects his proof by saying that she could have read the Get. Then, Rav Simi bar Ashi also wanted to prove that we do not say "what could be done." The Gemara deflects this by saying that there was in fact something that "could be done" -- she could have waited to see if the Yevamah is an Ailonis. Then, Abaye also wanted to prove that we do not say "what could be done." Again, we found a way of rejecting his proof. The next Amora who wanted to prove that we do not say "what could be done" was Rava. We managed to push off Rava's proof. Then came along Rav Ashi, and then came along Ravina, and we managed to refute both of their proofs.
2) In short, most of the great Amora'im leaned to the opinion that we do not say "what could be done," even though they could not prove this conclusively. This means that these Amora'im understood that if the wife remarried on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses and then it transpired that the husband is still alive, it does not matter that the wife could not have done anything different or better; the reality is that it was a mistake that she remarried. It does not make a difference that it was an unavoidable mistake.
3) Rashi (end of 91b, DH Amar Lei) writes that the answer we gave to each of the proofs offered by the Amora'im was a forced answer. The fact that each time we had to give a forced answer suggests that really the six Amora'im who tried to prove that we do not say "what could be done" were right all along. If it transpires that the husband was alive, then it does not matter whether or not she could have done something about this.
Kol Tuv,
Dovid Bloom