The Gem. makes a Hekish between "Dam" and "Korben" and says that just as "Dam" is thrown, so must the "korban" be thrown on the mizbeach. And a space was left next to the Mizbeach to remind the Kohanim not to forget to throw.
1. If one would not throw a steak on the plate of a "melech bosor V'dom" it seems very not "kovedik' and even a "bizoyan?" to do so to the "Ribono Shel Olam?!
2. The RMA (167) says that the reason one needs to dip the HaMotzi into salt is because our table is compared to the mizbeach and eating compared to a Korban.
If so it should obligated to throw bread to people sitting at the table, similar to throwing the korban on the mizbeach. Yet the Shulchan Aruch (171) paskens that it is Asur to throw bread because it is a bizoyan! (Although I have seen bread being thrown at "chosheve" tables.
Thank you for taking time to consider and to answer all the questions.
Chag Kosher Vsomeach!
Alex Lebovits, Toronto, Canada
1. Your question is based on the principle of Hashta Lifnei Melech Basar v'Dam Ein Osin Kein Lifnei Melech Malchei ha'Melachim Lo Kol Shekein. This rule is used where we are left to decide of our own Sevarah how to do the Avodah. In our case, however, we have a Drashah that instructs us to behave as such, so we do not apply this rule.
2. Firstly, I would suggest that we are mainly interested in doing things that emulate the Karbanos where there is some symbolism involved, for example salt reminds us of the Bris Melach, and is Mechaper as mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch you quote.
Secondly, we put salt on the table so we may eat it with the bread and the eating is compared to a Korban. The act of throwing would not have any connection with a Korban and so has no place at the table.
Thirdly, since it is a Bizayon to throw bread as you point out, and since we do not have a direct instruction to throw food at the table, we are therefore reluctant to do so even if this would emulate a Korban.
Dov Freedman
I would like to say the following re your answers and hear your reply.
I am of the opinion that although some of the things the Torah says are beyond reason or understanding; nothing that the Torah says is against reason.
And if what you say above is correct; then we should be able to ask and prove- that the principle of "Hashta Lifnei Melech Basar v'Dam Ein Osin Kein Lifnei Melech Malchei ha'Melachim Lo Kol Shekein cannot be correct and should never be applied! Because we see from the case of "throwing Korbanos" that it doesn't apply! And one simply cannot compare even a King to the Ribono Shel Olam.
Or do you say that a Drashah that is against logic still overrides logic?, And we throw logic out the window!
I would also like to suggest the following for your criticism.
Although throwing is less "kovadik" than placing; there are times when throwing is definitely more appropriate than placing. (for some reason baseball comes to my mind.)
And why is it so by "korbonos"!?
Perhaps because of one of the main reasons given for "korbonos", is that the person bringing it, should feel that what is being done to that animal is really what should be done to him,
Then it is very proper in the instance of a "chatos" that that meat should be tossed on the fire rather than reverently placed there.
And just as the "chatos" was not shechted in a unique place to save embarrassment for the owner, the same way the "chatos" would not be the only unique korban that's to be thrown.
And the drashah comes to tell us that the Ribono Shel Olam is "maskim".
The same cannot be said for bread at the table.
Does this make sense?
Chag Kosher v'Someach
Alex Lebovits
(1) You are certainly correct to say that the Torah is never against reason. However the things written in the Torah are there to inform us of Halachos that we would have not otherwise have known. Hence the Gemara occasionally asks "Sevara Hu Lamah Li Kra". This means that invariably, something that the Torah writes cannot be deduced from our own logic, because if we could work it out without the Torah we would not need the Torah to write it.
Furthermore although you are correct in saying that normally when the Torah tells us a Halachah we can learn from there to other places with a Meh Matsinu, where we have a rule that is clear to us we would not disregard the entire rule just because the Torah specifies one exception.
(2) Your explanation is very appealing!
Dov Freedman