We learn from this that the problem was that the woman swallowed her saliva and that is why she became ill. Therefore, if one smells food and has a craving for it but is unable to obtain it, he must remember not to swallow the saliva but to spit it out. This is recorded by the Mishneh Berurah (OC 169:3), based on the Gemara here.

1) I would like to prove from the Gemara in Bava Basra 16b that the Roman was not permitted to do what he did. The Gemara there tells us that Esav committed five crimes on the day that he sold the birthright to Yakov. One of them was that he had relations with a Na'arah ha'Me'urasah. Tosfos (16b, DH Ba) asks what transgression was involved in this, since Bnei Noach were not commanded with the prohibition of Na'arah ha'Me'urasah. Tosfos answers that even though they are not commanded against it, nevertheless it is an ugly thing to do. This could mean that the girl consented, but nevertheless she is being unfaithful to her intended. Similarly, I suggest that it is an ugly act to coerce a woman into marriage, and Bnei Noach are also warned against this.

A Jew also would not be permitted to do this. A source for this is the Gemara in Kidushin 2b which teaches that one may not force a woman into marriage; it must be with her consent.

2) This medical fact still applies. The Mishneh Berurah (OC 169:2) writes that it is damaging for a person when good-smelling food is eaten in his presence and he wants to eat from it but cannot. (We do sometimes find in Halachah the concept of "Nishtanu ha'Teva'im" -- that parts of the physical nature have changed from the time of the Gemara to our time, but as far as I am aware none of the authorities write that there has been a change concerning the danger presented by odorous food.)

3) My initial reaction is that the marriage would be Batel. My source is the Shulchan Aruch EH 42:1, who rules that a woman can be married only with her consent.

I found that Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv zt'l, in his He'oros to Kesuvos 61b, says that the marriage would be valid b'Di'eved. He says that the case of our Gemara is not the same as the Din mentioned in Bava Basra 48b that if a woman was physically coerced until she agreed to get married, the marriage is not valid. The distinction is that in the case in Bava Basra, someone else is forcing her to get married, while in the case of the Gemara here, in the final analysis the wish to marry is coming from the woman herself, because she agreed to marry him in order to save her life.

Rav Elyashiv cites the Shulchan Aruch (CM 205:12) who states that if A was forced by B to give a present to C, but A had no money with which to pay for the present and, in order to fund the gift, A sold his field, this is not considered that the field was sold without his "Da'as." Rather, we say that when he sold the field he wanted the sale to take effect, and therefore it is valid. Similarly, in the Gemara here, the woman is not happy about the situation she has been forced into, but once she is in this situation she is happy to save her life by marrying the man. Accordingly, even though the Roman certainly should not have done what he did, nevertheless she consented to marry him in order to save her own life, and thus b'Di'eved the marriage is valid.

Kol Tuv,

Dovid Bloom

We have started in Yeshiva learning the first chapter of Maseches Kidushin, which deals with the topic of consent for a marriage, so I have had an opportunity to look in more depth into the question of whether the marriage performed by the Roman would be valid bedieved and here are sources that I found.

There is a Shiltei Giborim on the first page of the Rif in Kidushin (#2, DH k'Shem). He writes that if a man hit a woman and tortured her until she agreed to marry him, and he performed Kidushin, the marriage is not valid. The Shiltei Giborim writes that since the man behaved in an improper way, Chazal also "played a trick" on him and declared that the marriage is invalid. The Shiltei Giborim writes that this is made clear in the third chapter of Bava Basra. The Shiltei Giborim is referring to Bava Basra 48b. There the Gemara concludes that Mar bar Rav Ashi said that if someone "hanged" a woman (i.e., he tortured her until she agreed to marry him), the marriage is certainly not valid. Because he behaved inappropriately with her, Chazal behaved "inappropriately" with the man and abolished the marriage.

Chazal have the ability to abolish a marriage even if, according to the strict laws of transactions, it should be valid. In other words, even though had this been a mundane sale it would have taken effect since the seller agreed to the sale at the end of the day and also received the right price for his item, when it comes to getting married Chazal are capable of nullifying the wedding even though according to the letter of the law the transaction should technically apply.

The Gemara in Kesuvos 3a states that the reason that Chazal can do this is because anyone who gets married does so right from the beginning according to the understanding that the process works according to the way that Chazal want it to work. Tosfos there writes that this is why we say under the Chupah, "According to the law of Moshe and Yisrael. "Moshe" refers to the Torah law, and "Yisrael" refers to the Rabbinic law.

So it seems to me that the same way that the Shiltei Giborim writes that if a man hit a woman until she agreed to marry him the marriage is not valid, so too in the case of the Roman in Kesuvos, Chazal also dissolved this marriage because the Roman behaved badly.

Kol Tuv,

Dovid Bloom

I have been discussing this question with a big Talmid Chacham who argues that the woman in the story in Kesuvos would be married b'Di'eved.

1) His source for this assertion is a Sevara stated by the Or Same'ach in Hilchos Yesodei ha'Torah 5:5. The Or Same'ach cites the Rambam there (5:4) who discusses the case of a person who should have given up his life not to commit one of the three cardinal sins but instead decided to do the Aveirah to save his own life. The Rambam writes that this person committed a Chilul Hash-m. However, he cannot be punished for what he did, because a person can be punished only for a transgression done out of volition. In other words, even though what this person did was very wrong because the Torah requires a Jew to give up his life in order to avoid transgressing those three Aveiros, nevertheless an action done under duress is not punishable.

2) The Or Same'ach then discusses a seemingly similar, but crucially different, scenario. This involves a person who is dangerously ill and the only medicine capable of saving his life is medicine derived from an Asheirah tree (a tree which has been worshipped as an idol), and from which one is forbidden to derive benefit in the same way that one may not derive benefit from any Avodah Zarah. What would be the Din if this sick person went against the Halachah and decided to save his own life with the Avodah Zarah medicine? Clearly, it is forbidden to do this, but if he did do so would he be punished for this? The Or Same'ach writes that he would be punished. This is not the same as the person who worshipped idols under the threat of his life. The difference is that here he is using the Asheirah tree out of his own volition as a way of saving his life. Therefore, it is considered a totally voluntary action when he took resort to the Avodah Zarah healing in order to save himself. It follows that he would be punished by Beis Din for doing one of the three Aveiros in order to save his life in such a way.

3) The Talmid Chacham I was talking to argued that the same thing applies to the woman in Kesuvos 61b. Her way of saving her life is by agreeing to marry this man. We see from the Or Same'ach that if someone does a voluntary action in order to save his own life, this is not considered as doing an action under duress. Therefore, in the same way that the sick person who voluntary used the idol-worship healing to save his life is considered as having done a voluntary action, so too the woman who agreed to get married in Kesuvos 61b is considered as having done a voluntary action and this is considered to be Da'as in Kidushin and thus she is married.

4) I argued that the scenario in Kesuvos 61b is not the same as that of the Or Same'ach. The reason is that in Kesuvos the illness was caused by the Roman himself. This is not the same as the Or Same'ach's scenario where the illness came on naturally and the patient took advantage of the Avodah Zarah potion in order to save himself. I argue that the case in Kesuvos is similar to a story where a doctor was treating a woman patient and he asked her if she will marry him. When she declined he gave her an injection which made her ill. Then he said that if she will now agree to marry him he will give her a counter treatment to make her healthy again. Here the Or Same'ach will agree that her agreement to this is not considered as genuine consent to marriage because the man forced her into the position where she had to agree.

5) If one looks at the words of the Or Same'ach, one will see that it fits with my argument because he writes that the illness came on without being caused by anything, but he simply uses the option of healing through Avodah Zarah. In contrast, there was a reason why the woman in Kesuvos became ill: because the Roman made her ill.

6) Therefore, I argue that the Gemara in Kesuvos is similar to the case of the Shiltei Giborim, from the beginning of Kidushin that I cited in a previous reply, where the man hit the woman until she agreed to marry him. Similarly, the Roman made her ill until she agreed to marry him if he would cure her. I think that the Talmid Chacham with whom I was discussing this agreed to me in the end.

7) However, I would agree that if a woman was seriously ill and a doctor (who had no connection to the way she became sick) said to her that "if you will marry me I will cure you," then she would be Mekudeshes because she agreed to this voluntarily as explained above in the name of the Or Same'ach. On the other hand, this may be similar to the Gemara in Kidushin 8b which discusses a dog running after a woman who agrees to marry the man who throws a loaf of bread to the dog to prevent the dog from biting her. The Gemara says that possibly this is not considered Kidushin because the man has a Mitzvah d'Oraisa to save the woman from the dog, so it may be that it is not considered that she received benefit from being saved, since anyway the man was obligated to give her that benefit.

Kol Tuv,

Dovid Bloom