Dear Rabbi Kornfeld
Re: Miktsat Hayom K'Kulo On Moed Katan 20b we derived this rule from the act of Rabbi Hiyya:
after he received a Shmu'a Rehoka he went to the bath house. Questions: a) Perhaps he received the information close to sundown - in which case he started to bathe after sundown' a different day? Why do we need the evidence of Rabbi Hiyya? On Moed Katan 21a we find a discussion between Rabbi Eliezer, who says: 'From the third day onward, the third day included, the mourner is permitted to Tefillin...' and Rabbi Yehoshua says: 'From the second day onward, the second day included, the mourner is permitted to Tefillin...' - both implying that part of a day counts as a full day!A possible answer could be that from Rabbi Hiyya we see this rule in
the case of Shmua Krova, and from the two Tanaim we learn this rule in
case of ordinary mourning. The problem with this answer is that if so
it seems we must derive the rule in every applicable case individually;
and then the qustion arises: why can we not learn from one case to
another?
Furthermore: if we do not learn that Miktsat Hayom K'Kulo is a general
rule, the Gemara should have been phrased differently: Miktsat Hayom
K'Kulo b'Avel; Miktsat Hayom K'Kulo b'Shmua Rehoka etc.: the phrasing
without any qualifier ("Stam") implies we have a general rule!
Thank you for the excellent insights!
Yeshayahu HaKohen Hollander
(a) The Gemara implies that he bathed immediately after hearing about the death of his brother and sister, and it is very unlikely that Sheki'ah occurred between his hearing of the deaths and his statement, "Bring my clothing behind me." It is not logical to say that he meant to bring his clothing after sundown, because his intention in speaking was to teach a Halachah (as Rashi says), and he certainly should have clearly specified his intention if his intention was to teach that it is Asur to bathe until the evening.
(b) It must be that the Gemara's intention is not to prove that in every case, Miktzas ha'Yom is considered a full day, for we learn that principle for several explicit Mishnayos in Nazir. Moreover, with regard to Aveilus itself, we find a clear Machlokes in the matter between the Chachamim and Aba Shaul, concerning a case where Erev Yom Tov is the seventh day of Aveilus (19b). It must be that each case we must judge by itself whether Miktzas ha'Yom k'Kulo, as you wrote (this is clear from TOSFOS 19b, DH sh'Asur).
Mordecai