Implied Question: The truth is that, without this, the Gemara could have answered that someone was standing there at the time of the quarantine and saw that the Nega did not diminish ...

Answer: ... only it wants to present a case where the Kohen himself was able to know.

Question: Bearing in mind the principle that Rov is stronger than a Chazakah, once we establish that we go after the majority, surely it is obvious that we go after Chazakah.

Answer #1: The Gemara actually goes according to Rav Acha bar Ya'akov, who does not learn Chazakah from a Pasuk (see Maharsha).

Answer #2: According to Rabeinu Chayim, who does not learn that Rov is stronger than Chazakah from a S'vara, but from Parah Adumah, from which we extrapolate that we go after Rov even where the Chazakah (of placing the person who is being sprinkled on a Chezkas Tum'ah) clashes with the Rov, the Gemara here fits nicely.

Question: Why do we not learn it from all the Korbanos, which override Shabbos, and we are not concerned that the animal may be found to be a T'reifah, in which case the Kohen will have transgressed Shabbos?

Answer: One cannot prove Rov from there, since it is possible that when the Torah writes that the Mitzvah of Korban overrides Shabbos, it specifically includes a case of Safek.

Precedent: ... just like it does with Piku'ach Nefesh, where we say at the end of the first Perek of Kesuvos (15:) that Chazal do not go after the majority (even in the case of a Safek).

Clarification: It would override Shabbos, even if Erev Pesach were to fall on Shabbos, since it is a Melachah that cannot be performed before Shabbos.

Question: Why should it not override Shabbos, because, seeing as it is still joined (see Tosfos ha'Rosh), it doesn't matter?

Answer: It is implied that during the burning and breaking the neck it should be complete, just as it is during the Shechitah

Implied Question #1: Later in the Perek (on 24a) the Gemara also learns from "ha'Arufah" that 'This one requires its neck to be broken, but not another one (with regard to the goat on Yom Kipur).

Implied Question #2: And at the end of Perek Kol ha'Basar (117:), regarding an article whose Mitzvah has been completed, the Gemara refers to two 'Mi'utim' (preclusions) "ve'Samo" and "ha'Arufah" (So how can we learn so many different things from the same word)?

Answer: The word "ha'Arufah" intrinsically implies the above Miy'ut (on Daf 2.) "This one requires its neck to be broken ... ' (see also Tosfos ha'Rosh); whereas 'ha'Eglah ke'she'Hi Sheleimah' the Gemara Darshens from the juxtaposition of "ha'Eglah" to "ha'Arufah".

Question #1: Since a Parah is two years old, maybe the reason that it is Kasher is because we place it on its Chazakah that it is not a T'reifah - according to those who hold (in Eilu T'reifos 42.) that a T'reifah cannot survive a year.

Answer: Here however, we can counter that there is a Chazakah against that, of placing the Tamei person (who will be sprinkled with the ashes) on his Chezkas Tum'ah.

Question #2: The Kashya will apply however, later when we learn Rov from Eidim Zomemin?

Answer: Any Chazakah that has not been clarified and is not known even if only for a short time, is not considered a Chazakah.

Halachah: From this principle we can learn a Halachah le'Ma'aseh - that if one manufactured cheese with the milk of a number of animals, and one of them is then Shechted and found to be a T'reifah, all the cheeses are forbidden, seeing as, for the reason we just mentioned, we cannot place the animal on a Chazakah and say that it only became T'reifah after the cheese was made.

Reservation: However, if the T'reifus is caused by a lesion on the lung, which might have been declared Kasher had we been experts in examining it, we cannot forbid it, because it is a S'fek S'feika; a. Perhaps the animal is Kasher, and b. even if it is T'reifah, perhaps it became a T'reifah only after the milking.

Question (Part 1): Why does the Gemara not remain with that S'vara at the beginning of 'Ein Ma'amidin' (Avodah-Zarah 23b), regarding the Machlokes between Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Yehoshua, where the Gemara says that up to now, they only argue in a case where the animal is suspected of having been raped, but where it was certainly raped, it is Pasul. A proof, the Gemara suggests, that Parah Adumah is Kodshei Mizbei'ach?

Question (Part 2): But the Gemara refutes the proof, inasmuch as Parah is different, since the Pasuk calls it "Chatas".

Question (Part 3): In that case, asks the Gemara, a 'Yotzei Dofen' (one that is born by caesarian section) ought to be Pasul - Why did a Beraisa then state that the Rabbanan disqualify a 'Yotzei Dofen', but that Rebbi Shimon validates it? What the Gemara means to ask is that if we were to hold of the D'rashah of "Chatas", Rebbi Shimon would hardly argue with a Pasuk?

Question (Part 4): So the Gemara concludes that Parah is different, in that, since a blemish disqualifies it, so will an immoral act and Avodas-Kochavim disqualify it.

Conclusion: This explains why being raped renders it Pasul, whereas a 'Yotzei Dofen' is Kasher. And the reason that the Rabbanan declare a Yotzei Dofen Pasul is because they consider a Parah Kodshei Mizbei'ach.

Refutation: In any event, we cannot explain the Gemara in this way, since that, all the many Sugyos that conclude that Parah is different since it is considered Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis will all hold like Rebbi Shimon.

Answer, Explanation #2 (Part 1): It therefore seems that when the Gemara asks that a 'Yotzei Dofen' ought to be Pasul ... it means to ask irrespective of whether a raped animal is Pasul because it is Kodshei Mizbei'ach, or whether it is Pasul because the Torah calls it Chatas, since Rebbi Shimon would be unlikely to argue with his Rebbes (Rebi Eliezer and Rebbi Yehoshua).

Answer, Explanation #2 (Part 2): ... and the Gemara then replied that Parah is different, since a blemish disqualifies it ... .

Answer, Explanation #2 (Part 3): ... and we do not read the word 'Ela' in the text.

Proof: In fact, it does not appear in the original texts, only Rashi amended the text and inserted it.

Conclusion: ... and the answer that 'the Torah calls Parah a Chatas' goes specifically according to the Rabbanan, who render a Yotzei Dofen Pasul for that reason.

Question: From where does Rebbi Shimon, who does not hold of the D'rashah 'Chatas Karyeih Rachmana', learn that T'reifus disqualifies the Parah?

Answer #1 (Part 1): He learns it from the fact that the Torah writes "Temimah"

Precedent: ... like the Gemara in Avodah-Zarah (6a), which learns that Noach himself could not have been a T'reifah, since the Torah describes him as "Tamim".

Explanation (Part 1): The Rabbanan need "Temimah" for the D'rashah of the Sifri "Temimah" - that even two black hairs render the Cow Pasul.

Explanation (Part 2): Rebbi Shimon on the other hand, learns both D'rashos from "Temimah", one from the actual word, the other, from the fact that it is placed in between the word "Adumah" and "Asher Ein Bah Mum".

Answer #2: Alternatively, when it comes to a bodily P'sul, everybody (even Rebbi Shimon) concedes (that we Darshen "Chatas Hi"), as we learned in Parah (4:1) that if one Shechts it she'Lo li'Shemah, it is Pasul - due to the Pasuk "Chatas Hi".

Proof: In the Sifri too, we Darshen from "Chatas Hi", that the Parah is subject to Me'ilah, as well as a number of other D'rashos.

Question: Wherever the Gemara answers that Parah is 'Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis, why does it not consider it Kodshei Mizbei'ach, seeing as the Torah calls it a "Chatas"?

Answer: On every such occasion, the Gemara concludes with another Kashya (see Maharam).

Exception #1: ... except for the Gemara in Eilu Kodshim (Temurah 20b) which states that a Parah cannot make a Temurah because it is Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis. Only there, since the difference does not affect the body of the Cow, the fact that the Torah calls it a Chatas is not relevant (as we explained earlier).

Exception #2 (Part 1): And except for the Gemara in Bechoros (2a) which states that, unlike P'sulei ha'Mukdashin, there is no Isur of shearing or working with it after it has been redeemed, because it is Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis. There too, the D'rashah of 'Chatas Karyeih Rachmana' does not apply ...

Exception #2 (Part 2): ...because once it has been redeemed and the Din of Parah no longer pertains to it, the Torah no longer refers to it as a Chatas.

Alternative Explanation: Alternatively, the Heter of redeeming a Parah is based on 'Leiv Beis-Din Masneh Alehah' (an unspoken specification of Beis-Din that should it not be needed, it should be redeemed for its monetary value, as the Gemara explains in the first Perek of Shevu'os (Daf 11a).

Implied Question: Even though a Pasuk interrupts between them ...

(Answer): ... the Pasuk nevertheless implies that when the Cow is burned it should be in the same state as it was when it was Shechted.

Observation: The Gemara could also have asked that perhaps it is due to Chazakah (and not Rov) because we place the mother on her Chezkas Kashrus (which every Jewish woman has until she is known to have sinned).

Question: Why do we not learn that we go after the Rov from the murderer himself, who might be a T'reifah, and a T'reifah who kills is Patur?

Answer #1: Perhaps we cannot learn to go after the Rovin other places from the fact that we kill a T'reifah.

Answer #2: Furthermore, it seems that, bearing in mind that the reason that a T'reifah that murdered is Patur is because it is 'Eidus that is not subject to Hazamah', since it would be wrong to sentence the witnesses who testified against a T'reifah to death. In that case, the proof would be (not from the fact that one sentences the murderer, but) from the fact that one then sentences the Eidim Zomemin, and not desist out of concern that the murderer may have been a T'reifah. And Rabeinu Menachem ha'Kadosh also gave this answer.

Question: The question remains however, what the Gemara means when it suggests that it is perhaps speaking where we examine the victim, seeing as at the time of the murder, it was a Hasra'as Safek?

Answer: Perhaps he holds 'Hasra'as Safek is considered a Hasra'ah'.

Implied Question: We cannot ask that there is a case (where the murderer will be Chayav) there where he drowned him in a river, where it is possible to examine the victim afterwards ...

Refutation: ... since the Pasuk (under discussion) is speaking where he killed him with a wooden or metal implement.

Question: Still, why can the case not be there where the membrane of the brain area was open and one could see that the victim was complete before the murderer pierced him and killed him?

Answer: To establish the Pasuk in such a case is a Dochek.

Question (Part 1): At the end of the first Perek of Makos (7a) Rebbi Tarfon and Rebbi Akiva both declared that if they had been on the Sanhedrin, nobody would ever have been sentenced to death. And the Gemara explains that this is because they would have examined them by asking them if they saw whether the victim was a T'reifah or complete; and if he killed him whilst he was complete, if they are certain that there was no hole in the location where the sword pierced ...

Question (Part 2): ... whereas our Sugya implies that we do not contend with that, since we go after the majority?

Answer #1: Rebbi Akiva follows his own reasoning, since he holds 'Chayshinan le'Miy'uta - in Perek ha'Loke'ach Beheimah (Bechoros 20.), where he says that milk does not exempt an animal from the Bechorah, despite the fact that the majority of animals do not produce milk unless they have given birth.

Implied Question: ... despite the act that even Rebbi Meir, who also contends with the Miy'ut, concedes where it is not possible (that we o after the majority).

Answer (Part 1): Rebbi Akiva considers it possible, since one can establish the Pasuk where the membrane of the brain is open, and the murderer pierced it, as we explained.

Answer (Part 2): And as for Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, who argues with Rebbi Tarfon and Rebbi Akiva, and who claims that they only add murderers in Yisrael, even assuming that he also contends with the minority, he nevertheless considers it impossible, since it would be a Dochek to establish the Pasuk like Rebbi Akiva.

Answer #2: Furthermore, Rabeinu Tam explains, even though if one would not ask the witnesses (about a hole in the place where the murderer pierced), he would be Chayav (since we would rely on the majority there where it is impossible), there where we do ask them and they say that they don't know, he is Patur.

Precedent: ... as is the case regarding a sword or a dagger, where the murderer is Chayav if we don't ask the witnesses; yet if we ask them and there is a discrepancy in their testimony, he is Patur ...

Implied Question: ... even though in the case of sword or dagger there where they say that they don't know, he is Chayav as long as there is no discrepancy in their testimony (which is not the case regarding 'a hole in the location where the sword pierced') ...

Answer (Part 1): ... that is because 'a sword or a dagger' is not so much an intrinsic part of the testimony, since what difference does it make whether he killed him with the one or with the other? But whether or not, 'there was a hole in the location where he pierced' is very much part of the testimony. Consequently, if one asks them about it and they don't know, the murderer is Patur.

Answer (Part 2): ... whereas there where one witness claims that he was wearing black clothes, and the other says that they were white, which is totally disconnected from the basic evidence, the murderer will be Chayav even if the testimony of the two witnesses clash.

Question (Part 1): The Rivam asks that here we learn from the case of a murderer and that of Eidim Zomemin that we go after the majority even in Dinei Nefashos, and this is also evident at the beginning of 'ben Sorer u'Moreh' (Daf 69a) ...

Question (Part 2): ... whereas in 'Eilu Hein ha'Nisrafin' (79a) we say that in the event that Niskalin became mixed up in a group of Nisrafin, they are sentenced to the more lenient Sekilah, even though the Nisrafin constitute the majority?

Answer #1: Rabeinu Tam answers that since either way, he is sentenced to death, since it is purely a matter of which death he will receive, we do not go after the majority.

Answer #2: Alternatively, it is a case of Kavu'a, and we follow the principle 'Kol Kavu's ke'Mechtzah al Mechtzah Dami' (so that there is no majority to follow).

Implied Question: And when the Gemara originally asked there (when it thought that it was the Nisrafin that became mixed up with the Niskalin) why it does not give the reason that (they receive Sekilah) because the majority constitute Chayvei Sekilah ...

Answer #2 (Part 2): ... what it really means to ask is that it is surely not because the majority are Chayvei Sekilah that there is any less reason to sentence them to Sekilah?)

Question: Why can we not imprison the murderer for twelve months, and should he survive, he is not a T'reifah?

Answer #1: Perhaps this opinion holds that a T'reifah can survive.

Answer #2 (Part 1): Furthermore, it seems that if one only kills the Eidim Zomemin after twelve months, for fear that the defendant is a T'reifah, then the defendant too, can also be sentenced to death only after twelve months.

Answer #2 (Part 2): And now that they only came to kill the defendant after twelve months, they cannot be killed even after twelve months, in case he became a T'reifah at the end of twelve months, in which case, they came to have a T'reifah put to death (for which they cannot became Zomemin),

Clarification: Since the Gemara says specifically 'According to Rebbi Meir', and not just 'How can we eat?' it implies that we do not rule like Rebbi Meir, who contends with the minority.

Question (Part 1): However, in Perek ha'Loke'ach Beheimah (Bechoros 24a) Rebbi Yochanan rules like Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, that someone who purchases a feeding animal from a Nochri is Patur from the Bechorah, provided the baby follows it around, due to the principle that the mutual bond of affection would not be there unless it actually gave birth to it ...

Question (Part 2): ... but the fact that the animal is milking alone would not suffice, even though the majority of animals do not produce milk unless they have given birth.

Question (Part 3): So we see that we contend with the minority, even where there is no Chazakah, because if we try to place the animal on a Chazakah that it did not give birth beforehand, we will counter by placing the baby on a Chazakah that it is not a B'chor, since it was Chulin prior to its birth.

Answer: Rebbi Yochanan only rules like Raban Shimon ben Gamliel in that there would not be a bond between the two animals if the cow had not given birth to the baby.