QUESTIONS: Rav Nachman, Rav Amram, and Rav Yitzchak rule (40b) that a person cannot prohibit something that does not belong to him ("Ein Adam Oser Davar she'Eino Shelo"). They explain that when the Tana Kama in the Beraisa says that an idolater is able to prohibit the wine of a Jew, he means only that a Kusi can prohibit a Jew's wine. If a Jew says that he is being Menasech another Jew's wine for Avodah Zarah, the wine remains permitted, because it is assumed that he does not have true intent to serve Avodah Zarah, but rather he is merely trying to cause distress to the other Jew by making him think that his wine has become forbidden ("l'Tza'urei Ka Michaven").

The Gemara earlier (40a) says that Rav Huna rules that when a person does an action to another person's object (for example, he slaughters his animal to Avodah Zarah), he is able to prohibit something that does not belong to him. Rav Nachman challenges Rav Huna's ruling from the Beraisa that states that one who inadvertently slaughters a Korban Chatas on Shabbos outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash for the sake of Avodah Zarah is obligated to bring three Korbenos Chatas (one for his inadvertent desecration of Shabbos, one for slaughtering a Korban outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash, and one for slaughtering an animal for Avodah Zarah). According to Rav Huna, he should not be Chayav for Shechutei Chutz, because at the time that he cuts one Siman for the sake of Avodah Zarah, the animal becomes forbidden, and when he completes the Shechitah he is not considered to be slaughtering a Korban outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash.

From the fact that Rav Nachman quotes that Beraisa in an attempt to refute Rav Huna it is evident that Rav Nachman agrees with the Beraisa's ruling that the person is Chayav for Shechutei Chutz, and that the animal does not become forbidden when it is slaughtered for Avodah Zarah.

Why, though, does the animal not become forbidden? In that case, the owner of the animal is slaughtering his own animal! Rav Nachman says that when another person slaughters the owner's animal for Avodah Zarah, the animal does not become prohibited, because it is assumed that the Jew who slaughtered it was merely trying to torment the owner. When the owner himself slaughters his animal for Avodah Zarah, who is he trying to torment? It must be that he genuinely intends to serve Avodah Zarah! Why, then, does the Beraisa imply that the animal does not become forbidden as Tikroves Avodah Zarah?

Moreover, what do these Amora'im mean in the first place when they say that the Jew who was Menasech the wine of another Jew for Avodah Zarah intended only to cause the owner distress? Would any Jew who does not serve Avodah Zarah actually say the words, "I hereby perform this action for the sake of Avodah Zarah"? Also, the Gemara later asks whether the animal is permitted in a case in which the Jew who slaughters the animal is warned with Hasra'ah not to slaughter it for Avodah Zarah. How can these Amora'im say that the Jew did not intend to serve Avodah Zarah but intended only to torment the other Jew when he said -- after being warned -- that he intends to slaughter the animal for Avodah Zarah? Does Beis Din absolve him of liability because of the assumption that a Jew does not serve Avodah Zarah? (LEV ARYEH)

ANSWER: The LEV ARYEH explains the Gemara as follows. When Rav Nachman says that the Jew who is Menasech the other Jew's wine does not prohibit the wine because he merely intends to torment the owner, he does not mean that the Jew does not intend to serve Avodah Zarah. When the Jew says, "I hereby perform this action for the sake of Avodah Zarah," he presumably means it, and he will be held liable for his act. However, the wine or the animal does not become prohibited, because, according to Rav Nachman, a person cannot prohibit something that does not belong to him.

How does Rav Nachman explain the Tana Kama's opinion that a Nochri can prohibit wine that does not belong to him?

The Lev Aryeh explains Rav Nachman's opinion based on the words of RASHI earlier (40a, DH Revutzah). Rashi writes that one who steals an animal and then slaughters it for Avodah Zarah effectively makes the animal "Zivchei Mesim," and it is Asur b'Hana'ah. The Kinyan Geneivah that he made is enough to enable him to prohibit the animal. Consequently, a Nochri who was Menasech the wine of a Jew can prohibit it because he first stole it (and thereby made a Kinyan Geneivah), making the animal his own animal to some degree, and not because he is able to prohibit something that does not belong to him. If this is Rav Nachman's reasoning in the case of a Nochri, why does he not apply the same reasoning to the case of a Jew? Why does Rav Nachman say that when a Jew is Menasech the wine of another Jew, it does not become prohibited? Since the Jew made a Kinyan Geneivah, he should be able to prohibit the wine.

The answer is that the Jew wants so much to prohibit the other Jew's wine that he will serve Avodah Zarah in order to do so. However, he has no intention to steal the wine and make it his own. He is not interested in bringing a sacrifice of his own to Avodah Zarah. This is what the Gemara means when it says that he intends to torment the owner of the wine. This Jew indeed has intention to serve Avodah Zarah (and he will be liable for doing so if he was warned with Hasra'ah) in order to prohibit the owner's wine, but he does not have intention to steal the wine. The wine (or animal, in a case of Shechitah for Avodah Zarah) remains permitted according to Rav Nachman, because "Ein Adam Oser Davar she'Eino Shelo."

(An exception to this case is a Yisrael Mumar (or a Nochri). In the case of a Yisrael Mumar, his main intention is assumed to be to serve Avodah Zarah (and not to torment the other Jew), and that he intends to make the wine or animal his own when he steals it so that he will be offering his own possessions to the Avodah Zarah. In such a case, the wine becomes forbidden (according to Rashi on 40a). The Gemara's question about one who slaughters to Avodah Zarah after being warned is whether such an action makes him a Mumar such that we may assume that he wants to sacrifice his own animal. However, there is no question that he is guilty of serving Avodah Zarah and is Chayav Misah.)

According to this approach, it is clear why Rav Nachman agrees with the Beraisa that implies that when one slaughters a Korban outside of the Azarah for the sake of Avodah Zarah, the animal does not become forbidden as Tikroves Avodah Zarah (and the owner is Chayav for Shechutei Chutz), even though "l'Tza'urei Ka Michaven" does not apply (since he is slaughtering his own animal). In this case, the animal is a Korban, and the Korban belongs not to him but to Kodshim. Therefore, he cannot prohibit it as Avodah Zarah because of "Ein Adam Oser Davar she'Eino Shelo." Rav Nachman applies the reasoning of "l'Tza'urei Ka Michaven" only to explain why one person does not have intention to acquire the animal of someone else when he slaughters it for Avodah Zarah. The reason it does not become forbidden is "Ein Adam Oser Davar she'Eino Shelo."

This approach seems to be the intention of the RAMBAM (Hilchos Shechitah 2:21). The Rambam writes, "But if he has no joint ownership in it, it does not become prohibited, because a Jew cannot prohibit something that does not belong to him, for [we assume that] his intention is only to torment the other." The Acharonim ask why the Rambam needs to give two reasons for why the animal is not prohibited: he first writes that it is because a Jew "cannot prohibit something that does not belong to him," and then he writes that it is because "his intention is only to torment the other"! Why are both reasons necessary?

According to the Lev Aryeh's explanation, the words of the Rambam are clear. The Rambam is saying that a person cannot prohibit another person's animal because it does not belong to him. However, since there was a theft, the Jew should acquire the animal through a Kinyan Geneivah and he should be able to prohibit it since it becomes his own animal! The Rambam therefore adds that the Jew's only intention is to cause distress to the owner, and he does not intend to be Koneh the animal for himself by stealing it. Therefore, he cannot prohibit it since it does not belong to him. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)

QUESTION: The Gemara quotes a Beraisa that states that one may not perform Shechitah into a pit in the ground at all. One who wants to keep his courtyard clean should dig a furrow near the pit and slaughter the animal over the furrow, letting the blood flow into the pit. The Beraisa says that slaughtering over a furrow that leads to a pit is permissible only in one's private property. Slaughtering in this manner in public property is forbidden because of the verse, "uv'Chukoseihem Lo Selechu" (Vayikra 18:3), and one who slaughters in this manner in public is suspected of being an idolater.

What is the difference between slaughtering into a furrow that leads to a pit in one's own courtyard, which is permitted, and doing the same act in the public domain, which is prohibited?

ANSWER: The TORAS CHAIM explains that in one's own home, there is no prohibition of "uv'Chukoseihem Lo Selechu." This is based on the reasoning of the MAHARIT, who says that one transgresses this prohibition only when it is evident that he is performing the act in order to emulate the ways of idolaters. If there is another plausible explanation for why he is doing the act, then he does not transgress the prohibition of "uv'Chukoseihem Lo Selechu."

Accordingly, when one slaughters the animal in his own courtyard, it is clear that he is slaughtering into the furrow in order to keep his property clean. In the marketplace, however, where it is not necessary to clean (see RASHI DH uv'Shuk), the only explanation for why one would slaughter into a furrow leading to a pit is that he is emulating the ways of the idolaters.

Why, according to this explanation, is one prohibited to slaughter directly into a pit in his own courtyard? In this case it is also clear that he is slaughtering into the pit in order to keep his property clean! The Toras Chaim explains that slaughtering directly into a pit, even in one's private domain, is forbidden because of Mar'is ha'Ayin, since this is the way idolaters perform Shechitah. This explains why the Mishnah and Beraisa do not mention the verse of "uv'Chukoseihem Lo Selechu" when they forbid slaughtering directly into a pit in one's home, and they mention the verse only with regard to slaughtering into a furrow in a public domain. Similarly, the Mishnah and Beraisa do not state that he is suspected of being an idolater when he slaughters directly into a pit in his home; since there is an obvious reason why he is doing it (to keep his home clean), the only reason why it is prohibited is Mar'is ha'Ayin. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)

OPINIONS: The Gemara quotes a Beraisa that states that one may not perform Shechitah into a pit in the ground at all. One who wants to keep his courtyard clean should dig a furrow near the pit and slaughter the animal over the furrow, letting the blood flow into the pit. The Beraisa says that slaughtering over a furrow that leads to a pit is permissible only in one's private property. Slaughtering in this manner in public property is forbidden because of the verse, "uv'Chukoseihem Lo Selechu" (Vayikra 18:3), and one who slaughters in this manner in public is suspected of being an idolater.

What is the status of the Shechitah? Is the Shechitah a valid Shechitah, even though the person is suspected of being an idolater? If the Shechitah is not valid, is there a difference between slaughtering the animal directly over a pit, and slaughtering the animal near a pit (over a furrow through which the blood flows into the pit)?

(a) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Shechitah 2:6) writes that the Shechitah performed over a pit in a public domain is invalid until the Shochet's reliability is investigated and confirmed. If he is found to be an upright, trustworthy Jew, then we may rely on the Shechitah that he performed over the pit. (That is, investigating him is done in order to be lenient and permit the Shechitah that he performed.)

The RADVAZ infers from the wording of the Rambam that the Shechitah is invalid only when the Shechitah is performed directly over the pit, but not when it is performed over a furrow that leads to the pit. When the Rambam records the Beraisa, he changes some of its words. Instead of the words, "And if he did this" ("v'Im Asah Chen") as the Beraisa states, the Rambam writes, "And if he slaughtered into the pit." The Rambam is emphasizing that the Shechitah is invalid only when he slaughters directly into a pit, but not when he slaughters the animal near the pit. This also implies that we must investigate the Shochet only when he slaughters directly over the pit, but not when he slaughters near the pit.

(b) The RASHBA in TORAS HA'BAYIS rules that since the Mishnah and Beraisa do not say that "his Shechitah is invalid" in this case (as the previous Mishnah (end of 39b) and following Mishnah (41b) mention), this implies that the Shechitah is valid in both cases -- when he slaughters directly over a pit and when he slaughters near a pit. We may rely on the Shechitah (b'Di'eved) even without investigating the Shochet. We must investigate him in both cases only in order to permit him to perform future Shechitos. Moreover, if he is found to be a heretic upon investigation, then the Shechitah he performed over a pit is disqualified retroactively, as the YAM SHEL SHLOMO writes (Chulin 2:23, and as cited by the TAZ YD 12:2). (That is, according to the Rashba, investigating him is in order to be stringent and invalidate him from future Shechitos, as well as to disqualify retroactively the Shechitah that he already performed. See PRI MEGADIM in SIFSEI DA'AS, YD 12:3-4.)

(c) The RADVAZ rules that the status of the Shechitah depends on the manner in which the person slaughtered the animal. If he slaughtered the animal directly over a pit, then his Shechitah is invalid because he probably did so in order to emulate the idolaters. If, however, he slaughtered near a pit so that the blood would fall into a furrow and then flow into the pit, his Shechitah is valid, but we must investigate him. Since he did not slaughter the animal directly over the pit, his intentions are not clear. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)