(Mishnah): If a person deposited money with a money-changer; if it is wrapped up, he may not use it; therefore, if he lost it, he is not responsible.

If the money is loose, he may use it; therefore, if he lost it, he is responsible.

If it was deposited with a regular person, either way he may not use it.

R. Meir: A shopkeeper is like a regular person.

R. Yehudah: He is like a money-changer.

(Gemara) - Question (R. Huna citing R. Yirmiyah): When the Mishnah taught that they were wrapped up, did it mean wrapped up with a seal or without a seal?

If you say that it was wrapped with a seal, then without a seal would be permitted to use; if you say it was without a seal, certainly it would be prohibited if it was with a seal. (Note: The Gemara does not answer this question.)

(Mishnah): One who uses an (item given as) collateral - Beis Shamai say that he must pay the higher value, whether it went up or down in price. Beis Hillel say that he must pay according to the time when he used it. R. Akiva says that it is according to the time when the claim is made against him.

One who planned to use a deposit - Beis Shamai say that he is liable; Beis Hillel say he is not liable until he actually uses it.

How is this? If he tipped the barrel and took a revi'is (86ml) of it and the barrel broke, he only needs to pay for the revi'is. If he lifted it and took a revi'is and it broke, he must pay in full.

(Gemara): (R. Akiva was referring to) the time of the claim in court (not the claim that the owner made privately to the watchman).

R. Yirmiyah citing Rav: The Halachah follows R. Akiva, even though Beis Hillel disagree with him.

R. Bun bar Chiya: There was once such a case, and Rebbe ruled like R. Akiva.

Rav Hoshiyah: This is true when there are no witnesses, but if there are, all agree to R. Akiva.

A case came before R. Nasa and he ruled like R. Akiva.

What is Beis Shamai's source (that he pays the higher price)? The pasuk states (Shemos 22, 9), "...in every matter of guilt''

Question: How do Beis Hillel use that pasuk?

Answer: I only know about him, but what about his slave or messenger (that if he told them to use the deposit, he would be liable)? The pasuk teaches, "in every matter of guilt''.

(Important Note: HaGaon Azulai writes, "I found in the notes on the Yerushalmi of HaRav Menachem Diluzano that he wrote - the following large section of text was missing from the texts of the Yerushalmi and I saw fit to print it here for the merit of the many...'' - it is taken from Yerushalmi Maseches Shevuos 41b - 42a.)

What is Beis Shamai's source? The pasuk states (Shemos 22, 8), "For every item of liability'' instead of "For every liability''.

Question: How do Beis Hillel learn this pasuk?

Answer: It is written to include a case of when he used it through a messenger.

Question (R. Yosi bar Chanina): (The end of the Mishnah taught - If he lifted it and took a revi'is and it broke, he must pay in full.) Is the correct text of the Mishnah "to take'' or "and took''? (Is the intent to take wine enough to be considered using it or does he actually need to take some of the wine?)

Answer (R. Oshiya's Beraisa): If it broke or became vinegar, he must pay for it in full.

Question on Beraisa: Did it not become vinegar because it was moved around (as is the nature of wine)? (We can prove from here that even moving it around is considered using it, as the two cases of breaking and becoming vinegar are stated together, indicating that they are comparable. Therefore, the correct text of the Mishnah can even be 'to take'.)

R. Shmuel/ R. Abahu citing R. Elazar: The liability of an unpaid watchman who used a deposit only applies when he actually reduced it.

Question (R. Shmuel to R. Abahu): Is it only if he reduced it or even if he did not? (I.e. Do you agree with the teaching of R. Elazar that you quoted?)

R. Abahu: Was this not the question of R. Yosi bar Chanina? (Just as he was unsure, we are also unsure.)

Another difference: If you say that he is liable even if he lifted it to take from it, if he returned it to its place or to another place he is exempt. However, if he is only liable if he actually took, only if he returned it to its place is he exempt, but to a different place he is liable.

R. Abahu citing R. Yochanan: The Torah mentions 'guarding' about an unpaid watchman and also about a paid watchman. However, the guarding of each of them is different. As for the guarding required by an unpaid watchman, if he guarded it properly, he is exempt. However, even if a paid watchman surrounded it with an iron wall, it is not considered to be guarded (unless he himself stands there guarding it).

We do not say that if he had been there he could have saved it and therefore he is liable; but if he could not, he is exempt. Rather, we say that if he would have been there, we assume that he could have saved it (so he is always liable). (Note: This entry and the next one follow the text of the Rosh in Bava Metzia Perek 3 Siman 21.)

R. Elazar citing R. Oshiya: The Torah says 'using' about an unpaid watchman and also about a paid watchman. However, they are different. Concerning 'using' by an unpaid watchman, he is only liable when he actually pulls (the animal); but for a paid watchman, once he puts his staff and bag upon the animal, he is liable.

R. Yosi ben Nuharai disagrees: I do not accept that there is a difference between them - rather, for both of them, he is only liable when he actually pulls them.

R. Ami citing R. Elazar/ R. Oshiya's Beraisa: The Torah does not need to mention the word 'using' about an unpaid watchman as I could learn it from a paid watchman - if the Torah is stringent with a paid watchman, but he is not liable until he pulled it; an unpaid watchman about whom the Torah is lenient, certainly he should not be liable until he pulled it. If so, why did the Torah mention 'using' about an unpaid watchman? To actually be stringent with a paid watchman and teach that he is liable as soon as he put his staff and bag on the animal.

Question (R. Yosa to R. Ami): If you say this (i.e. to learn an unpaid watchman from a paid watchman) you are applying a stringency from a stringent case to a lenient case, but you could ask...If the Torah was stringent concerning a paid watchman, but until he pulled it he is exempt; for an unpaid watchman, about whom the Torah is lenient, even when he pulled it he should be exempt!

Answer: Rather, the Beraisa should teach as follows - The Torah does not need to mention 'using' about a paid watchman, as it could have been learned from the unpaid watchman through a Kal Vechomer - if an unpaid watchman, about whom the Torah was lenient, is only liable when he pulled it; a paid watchman, about whom the Torah was stringent, will certainly be liable after he pulled it.

If so, why was it written? To be a stringent with a paid watchman, that he is liable as soon as he put his staff and bag on the back of the animal.

Note: The added text from Yerushalmi Maseches Shevuos ends here.