Question (R. Elchanan): Why do we return to take a security? (Even without this, he can collect it after Shemitah, and from the borrower's children.)

Answer: It is so the borrower cannot deny [owing]. Also, he will rush to pay his debt and seek coins, for he is ashamed that every day they return his security.

Question: Why didn't the Gemara answer so when it asks why he takes a security initially?

Answer: It gave a better answer.

Question: Why don't we challenge Shmuel from here? This connotes that from others, we take a security from the borrower's house!

Suggestion: "Ein Memashkenin" means "we are not Menate'ach (to take a security from the borrower in the market)." We infer that we are Menate'ach others.

Rejection: It says "Lo Sachavol", which implies in the house. What is the source to forbid Nitu'ach?

Suggestion: We decree mid'Rabanan to forbid a Shali'ach Beis Din [to be Menate'ach a widow], lest he enter her house!

Rejection: Regarding a Shali'ach Beis Din we need not decree, since normally he is allowed to be Menate'ach, and we do not decree. It is unreasonable to decree more about a widow because there are two Lavim for her [to take from her house].

Answer: This is why we did not ask from our Mishnah here, for we could reject that we are not Memashken her due to the Lav of "Lo Sachavol". Others do not have this Lav. Therefore, he prefers to ask from the Beraisa.

Implied question: In the Gemara, R. Shimon says that one may be Memashken a rich [widow]. (This is unlike Shmuel!)

Answer #1: He could hold like Shmuel. "Memashkenin" means Menatchin, for according to him, the poor [widow] whom he says that we are not Memashken her, he means that we are not Menate'ach her;

The reason "you give to her ill repute among her neighbors" applies even to Nitu'ach.

Implied question: Why did the Torah write "Lo Sachavol", and not "Lo Senate'ach"?

Answer: This is to make one who is Memashken liable for two Lavin.

Objection: If R. Shimon holds like Shmuel, who permits only Nitu'ach for a rich [widow], and the first Tana permits Nitu'ach both for a rich and poor [widow], if so, R. Shimon is more stringent than the first Tana!

The words of the Beraisa connote that he comes to be lenient, and permit for a rich widow what the first Tana forbids!

Answer #2: It seems that R. Shimon holds unlike Shmuel, and he permits to be Memashken a rich widow and other people.

Implied question: [If so,] we could have properly challenged Shmuel from R. Shimon!

Answer #1: R. Shimon is not in our Mishnah. He is only in a Beraisa. We properly asked from another Beraisa.

Answer #2: All agree that "Lo Yachavol Reichayim" and "v'Lo Sachavol Beged Almanah" come to forbid Nitu'ach, which is normally permitted;

Implied question: Why did the Torah use the expression of Chavalah, and not Nitu'ach?

Answer: This is to make one who is Memashken liable for two Lavin.

Support: This is why above, when we asked from them against Shmuel, we needed to answer "so he will transgress two Lavin", and we did not say to forbid Nitu'ach, for it was difficult why it was said in an expression of Chavalah.

Implied question: (Since Chavalah connotes Memashken, why do we establish it to forbid Nitu'ach?) We need it so he will transgress two Lavin according to Shmuel!

Answer: In any case, it is reasonable that the verse primarily comes to forbid Nitu'ach, which is normally permitted, and not only for an extra Lav.

Support: Now it is not difficult at all for Shmuel from the argument of R. Yehudah and R. Shimon, for now "we are not Memashken her" means "we are not Menate'ach her";

Therefore, we do not ask from it, for obviously, just like we answer (113a) "he may be Memashken him only through Beis Din" means "he may be Menate'ach [him only through Beis Din]", we can answer similarly here.

Support: This Perush seems primary, that also Shmuel forbids even Nitu'ach with Kelim used for Ochel Nefesh;

According to the first Perush, that Shmuel comes only for an extra Lav and not to forbid Nitu'ach, this is difficult;

According to the one who argues with him, it seems that for millstones, even Nitu'ach is forbidden, since a Shali'ach Beis Din is permitted even to be Memashken other matters, and millstones are forbidden;

Likewise, even Nitu'ach, which is normally permitted even for the lender, is forbidden regarding millstones, for it is reasonable to forbid equally all securities taken from the house.

However, according to Shmuel, who does not permit a Shali'ach Beis Din to be Memashken other matters, only Nitu'ach, we can say that also millstones, only to be Memashken is forbidden, like is written (Yachavol), but not Nitu'ach.

It turns out that Shmuel, whom it seems comes to be stringent, is more lenient regarding millstones. He permits to be Menate'ach, and the one who argues with him forbids, like I explained.

Explanation: Even in one Hasra'ah, if he took a security at once of Reichayim va'Rachev, and they warned him for "Lo Yachavol Reichayim va'Rachev", he is lashed twice;

If there were two Hasra'os, even for Reichayim and Reichayim he is liable [twice], like it says regarding a Nazir (Makos 21a), if they told him "do not drink. Do not drink", he is liable for each one.

Suggestion: Really, we discuss two Hasra'os. The Chidush is that Reichayim va'Rachev are not one Kli, so that one would not be liable unless he takes both!

Rejection: If so, it should have taught that one who takes Reichayim or Rachev transgresses a Lav, and no more;

Rather, surely it comes to teach that through one Hasra'ah, he is liable twice.

Support: The Gemara explicitly connotes that he is liable twice for Reichayim va'Rachev through one Hasra'ah, for Rav Huna taught that if one took Reichayim va'Rachev he is lashed three times, i.e. through one Hasra'ah;

If there were two Hasra'os, he is lashed twice for Reichayim, and twice for Rachev!

Since we discuss through one Hasra'ah, "he is liable twice" that was taught means two [sets of] lashes.

Question: How is he lashed? The Gemara considers it a Lav ha'Nitak l'Aseh, since Abaye said "go return it!"

Suggestion: He said "go return it", for whatever the Torah said "do not do it", if he did it, it did not help!

Rejection: Abaye himself said in Temurah (4b) that if he did it, it helped!

Suggestion: "He is lashed" in a case that he broke the Reichayim and the Rachev. Now it is no longer Nitak l'Aseh, for he cannot return the Reichayim, therefore he is lashed;

This is like it says in Chulin (141a) that if [he took eggs under the mother], if he killed the mother, it is no longer considered Nitak l'Aseh, and he is lashed.

Rejection #1: We cannot say so, for here is different. Since he loses from his loan corresponding to the Reichayim, it is as if he returned the Reichayim itself, and it is always Nitak l'Aseh!

It says so in Makos (16a) about returning the security. It is Nitak l'Aseh even if the security was lost, for since he pays, he is not lashed.

Rejection #2: In Makos, we do not find [other cases in which lashes depend on] Bitlo (if he made it impossible for himself to fulfill the Aseh that is Menatek the Lav, he is lashed) or Lo Bitlo, in any Lav ha'Nitak l'Aseh, like [we find] regarding Shilu'ach ha'Kan (sending away the mother bird) Pe'ah in which he did not separate, and he ate everything;

If the Lav of taking a security is considered Nitak l'Aseh, and if he broke it, he is lashed, it should have listed also this there!

Rejection #3: How can Abaye consider it Nitak l'Aseh? We do not find that the Torah was Menatek it (said that the Aseh corrects the Lav), the way we find regarding returning a security "Lo Savo El Beiso La'avot Avoto";

There, surely the verse was Menatek it, for it says "Hashev Tashiv" - in any case, even if he was Memashken b'Isur. Therefore it is considered in Makos Lav ha'Nitak l'Aseh!

Answer: Abaye's reason is because we tell him to return it, for if he did (transgressed), it did not help, since he was Shogeg;

Had he known that it is forbidden, he would not have taken the security. This is a mistaken acquisition, and it returns.

Question: According to R. Yoshiyah, what is the source that one is liable for each one by itself, since he needs "Oh" to divide?

And according to R. Yonason, who does not need [a verse] to divide, what is the source that he is liable twice, for two Kelim, each one by itself, since they were said in one Lav?

We say so in Chulin (102b) according to R. Yochanan that he is lashed only once if he ate flesh of a Chai and flesh of a Tereifah, because both were said in one Lav.

Answer #1 - part 1: According to R. Yoshiyah, we can say that since it says "va'Rachev", and not v'Rachev (with a Sheva), it is as if says "Oh Rachev."

Similarly, regarding "Na u'Mevushal" (the Isur to eat Pesach half-roasted, or cooked in water), it is written "Mimenu", which connotes even from one of them.

Similarly, regarding "Se'or u'Devash" (the Isur to burn Chametz and sweet fruits on the Mizbe'ach), we say in Menachos (58b) that he is lashed for each by itself, for it says "Lo Saktiru Mimenu."

Regarding Chartzan v'Zag (the Isur for a Nazir to eat grape peels or pits), it says "v'Ad Zag", which properly connotes to divide.

Answer #2: Also, if one were liable for Reichayim va'Rachev only both together, the verse should have omitted Rachev, and written only Reichayim, which connotes both together.

Question: According to R. Yoshiyah, what is the source that he is liable twice, since they were written in one Lav?

However, according to R. Yonason [this is not difficult], for since [a Drashah] was needed to divide, [due to the Drashah], in all of them he is liable for each.

Answer #1: Also according to R. Yoshiya, since there are verses in all of them to divide, he is liable for each, for it is unlike "Vasar ba'Sadeh Tereifah", in which there is no division.

Answer #2: Since their Isurim are explicit, the Lav applies to each one, like Rashi explained in Makos (18a) regarding "Lo Suchal Le'echol bi'She'arecha Masar Degancha..." It would not be considered Lav she'Bichlalos, even if it were written Lo Suchal Le'achlam.

If he ate from all of them, he would be liable for each one, for it is unlike Basar ba'Sadeh Tereifah.

Distinction: "Lo Sochal ha'Nefesh Im ha'Basar" connotes that there is only one matter;

Even though we expound from it two matters, since it is written in an expression of one Isur, he is liable only once.

Implied question: Why do we need a verse to divide between a widow who is divorced [regarding her Isur] to a Kohen Gadol, in Kidushin (77b)?

Answer: That is because in one body we cannot obligate twice without a verse. Therefore, we need something extra to obligate twice for one woman.

Question: In Kerisus (4a), we say that if one ate Chelev of an ox, sheep or goat, he is lashed only once, and similarly regarding one who ate (Chadash) bread, parched grain and Karmel (moist grain that was cut up), and Ma'aser of grain, wine and oil. He would be lashed only once, if not that there are extra verses in Kerisus!

Answer: Zag and Chartzan are two Shemos (Isurim), and similarly Reichayim va'Rachev and all of them;

However, Chelev of an ox, sheep or goat, [all] Chelev is one Shem. Similarly Chadash is one Shem, and Ma'aser is one Shem.

Note: Our text "bread is one Shem" is very difficult. Lechem v'Kali v'Karmel are three Isurim. We conclude that we could learn Kali from Lechem and Karmel (Kerisus 5a)!

Question: Rav Yehudah's reason is because "Ki Nefesh Hu Chovel" comes for other things, and not for Lav she'Bichlalos, like Abaye says!

Answer: The Gemara is wont to do so. Even though it already explained the reason, it says Leima (let us say), for when Leima was said in the Beis Midrash, they did not yet know the reason;

Rather, it thought that Rav Yehudah's reason is because one is not lashed for Lav she'Bichlalos, and according to Rav Huna one is lashed.

Support: We find like this in Yevamos (38a) regarding a Safek (a woman did Yibum within three months of the death. We are unsure if the baby is the son of the Mes, or of the Yavam) and [Vadai] children of the Yavam who come to divide the Yavam's property;

After it already explained the reason of Admon and of Rabanan, like it explains at the end when it rejects the Leima, that they do not argue about whether Kam Dina (the previous ruling stands), or Hadar Dina (we judge the case from the beginning)...

It says afterwards "Leima that the one who says Kam Dina holds like Rabanan, and the one who says Hadar Dina holds like Admon!"

Question: Also regarding Zag and Chartzan, they argue in Nazir (38b) and Pesachim (41b);

Rava says that if one ate Zag and Chartzan, he is lashed three times - for Zag, and Chartzan, and "Kol Asher Ya'aseh [mi'Gefen ha'Yayin]", even though mi'Kol Asher Ya'aseh comes to teach other matters that we include in Nazir!

Answer #1: "Mi'Kol Asher Ya'aseh" connotes an expression of a Lav more than all of them. Therefore, we establish it for a Lav on Zag and Chartzan, even though we need it also for other matters.

Answer #2: "Ki Nefesh Hu Chovel" connotes that it comes only for other matters, and not to add Lavim to Reichayim va'Rachev;

Surely, had it written 'Kol Nefesh Hu Chovel", like it says mi'Kol Asher Ya'aseh, it would apply also to Reichayim va'Rachev.

Question: Abaye, in any case he cannot reject regarding Zag v'Chartzan like he rejects here regarding the argument about Na and Mevushal, that Rav Huna said only [here that he is lashed for the Klal], because "Ki Nefesh Hu Chovel" is extra...'

Rashi explained that just like it comes for other matters, it comes also for Reichayim va'Rachev;

If so, also for Zag v'Chartzan, we should say that he is lashed three times. Just like it comes for other matters, it comes also for Zag v'Chartzan!

Answer #1: We do not explain like Rashi. Rather, it means as follows. "Nefesh Hu Chovel" is extra. We do not need it for other matters, for we learn them from Reichayim va'Rachev;

They are not Shnei Kesuvim ha'Ba'im k'Echad (two verses, one of which teaches something that we could have learned from the other verse), for we need them to obligate for two Kelim;

We do not need "Ki Nefesh Hu Chovel" for other matters more than for Reichayim va'Rachev. Therefore, we apply it also to Reichayim va'Rachev;

However, "Kol Asher Ya'aseh mi'Gefen ha'Yayin" is only for other matters. We do not learn [other matters] from Zag v'Chartzan.

Answer #2: Also for Rashi this is not difficult. This is why he did not bring the case of Zag v'Chartzan, because he cannot reject it, and he brings only something that he can reject;

This is the Gemara's style. It begins only to prove and show that we cannot learn from here.

When we reject that Rav Huna holds like Abaye, this refers to Abaye's teaching that if one ate Na and Mevushal he is lashed twice, and he is not lashed for "Ki Im Tzli Esh", for Ki Im Tzli Esh comes to teach like the Beraisa (that the Isur to eat Pesach Na applies only when there is a Mitzvah to eat it roasted);

However, according to what we explain Abaye's reason because we do not lash for Lav she'Bichlalos, he cannot hold like Rav Huna, because also "Ki Nefesh Hu Chovel" is Lav she'Bichlalos, and Rav Huna holds that he is lashed for it.

Question: Why does Abaye need the reason here that he is not lashed for "Ki Im Tzli Esh" because it is Lav she'Bichlalos? It should suffice that he needs it to teach like the Beraisa [so it is not extra to teach extra lashes]!

Answer #1: The Gemara explains that reason (Lav she'Bichlalos) according to [Abaye], for it knows that Abaye holds like this elsewhere regarding Zag and Chartzan, and Se'or and Devash.

Answer #2: Abaye addresses Rava according to Rava's words. He says as follows;

I (Abaye) hold that Ki Im Tzli Esh does not come for a Lav, rather, for a Hekesh. However, even according to you that it comes for a Lav, one is not lashed for Lav she'Bichlalos.

Due to the reason that Abaye said, that one is not lashed for Lav she'Bichlalos, he said in Pesachim that he is not lashed twice, but he is lashed once.

However, according to the reason that Abaye explains here according to Rav Huna, that Ki Im Tzli Esh comes to teach like the Beraisa, he is not lashed even once.

Question: We need it to teach like the Beraisa, like Abaye said!

Answer: Rava makes the Hekesh from Tzli Esh in the verse below "Tzli Esh u'Matzos Al Merorim Yochluhu", and next to this it says "Al Tochlu Mimenu Na..."

Implied question: The Beraisa in Pesachim (41b) mentions the verse Ki Im Tzli Esh [because we expound from it]!

Answer: This is not because we expound from it. Rather, we prefer to mention the verse itself of "Na u'Mevushal";

Abaye holds that the Beraisa specifically mentioned the verse Ki Im Tzli Esh, but another verse (Tzli Esh u'Matzos...) is not Samuch.

Question: We still need Ki Im Tzli Esh for Chai (totally raw) and cooked in hot springs of Tiverya. Rava himself said in Pesachim (41a) that [a Beraisa teaches that] he is liable, i.e. for "Ki Im Tzli Esh", when it was cooked in hot springs of Tiverya!

Answer: He is not lashed for eating it Chai or cooked in hot springs of Tiverya. (Maharsha - regarding Chai and cooked in hot springs, Ki Im Tzli Esh is an Isur Aseh. Therefore, he is not lashed);

Source - Citation (41a - Beraisa) Suggestion: Perhaps one is lashed (for eating it Chai)!

Citation (cont.) Rejection: "Na u'Mevushal" - the Torah said [that one is liable] for "Na u'Mevushal", but not for Chai.

In our Sugya, Rava asks "for what does Ki Im Tzli Esh come?", i.e. to be lashed for which Lav, if not to add Lavim for "Na u'Mevushal"?

Question: "Ki Nefesh Hu Chovel", according to Rav Yehudah, Rava says that it comes for other matters, to lash for them. We do not say "the Torah said only Reichayim va'Rachev, and not other matters"!

Answer: "Ki Nefesh Hu Chovel" mentions the Isur that he does. He is Chovel (takes a security). Therefore, it comes for other matters, to lash for them;

However, Ki Im Tzli Esh does not mention the Isur. Therefore, it does not come to lash for other matters, only for Na and Mevushal, in which there is an explicit Lav;

Inference: Now it connotes here that even according to Rava, one is not lashed for Chai, or cooked in hot springs of Tiverya, since he said "rather, what does Ki Im Tzli Esh come for?"