Inference: This connotes unlike Rashi explained in Gitin (75a) that even Rabanan of R. Meir agree that we require the Tenai before the action [that he makes contingent on the Tenai];

[Rashi explained so] regarding "rather, Rava said that it is because the action is before the Tenai."

Question #1: What is Rav Nachman's Chidush? Rav said above "this is the opinion of R. Yehudah ben Teima"!

Question #2: It is not appropriate to say "Deika" (it connotes like) about something explicit!

Answer #1 (to Question #1): [Rav Nachman] did not hear Rav's teaching.

Answer (to Question #2): It is appropriate to say "Deika", for it is not explicit in the Mishnah. (Kikayon d'Yonah - since the Tana could have explicitly taught "what is impossible is not a Tenai", teaching "what is possible..." is not considered explicit.)

Question: The Seifa should have taught [explicitly] "any Tenai that he cannot fulfill is Batel", like the other clauses of the Reisha (which discuss when the Tenai is Batel)!

Answer #2 (to Question #1): It seems that Rav Nachman knew Rav's teaching. He explains Rav's source that our Mishnah is like [R. Yehudah ben Teima];

One could say that it is like everyone. ["Any Tenai..." does not teach that a Tenai that cannot be fulfilled is invalid. Rather,] it refers to the Reisha, which taught "anyone who stipulates about what is written in the Torah, his Tenai is Batel."

["Any Tenai..."] gives the reason, for every Tenai that one can fulfill at the end, only such a Tenai is valid;

However, one who stipulates about what is written in the Torah, which he cannot fulfill, his Tenai is Batel. "He stipulated about it at the beginning" refers also to the Reisha, which teaches "any [Tenai] that has an action at its beginning, his Tenai is Batel";

Only if he stipulated about it at the beginning, his Tenai is valid, for the Tenai precedes the action.

[Rav Nachman] infers that [we do not say so. Rather,] it is like R. Yehudah ben Teima, since it teaches "any";

If it were the conclusion of (i.e. the reason for) the Reisha, it should not have taught "any", rather, "and if it is possible to fulfill it at the end, and he stipulated at the beginning, his Tenai is valid;

Rather, surely the Seifa is an independent clause. It comes to teach some Chidush.

If so, surely it comes for the inference "possible - yes (the Tenai is valid), impossible - no."

Remark: The Ri utterly rejected the Rashbam's Perush (that Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak comes to teach that our Mishnah is like Rabanan), therefore I did not write it.

Question (Rivam): It says below (97a) that the city planter, slaughterer, bloodletter or scribe (or barber), while working, all of them are like She'elah b'Ba'alim;

Inference: While they are not working, it is not like She'elah b'Ba'alim!

Answer: [Below,] it does not mean literally while they are working. Rather, [even] while going [to work], or even preparing themselves to go and do, is considered like while they are working;

However, surely from the time of saying, before engaging in the task, is not considered She'elah b'Ba'alim;

This is like we said above (81a) "it was found that at the time he was drinking beer, and it was not Peshi'ah b'Ba'alim."

Explanation: Because our Mishnah brings the verse "v'Im Ba'alav Imo...", we delayed saying "what is the source of this (the Mishnah on 93a)?" until now.

Explanation: We do not discuss negligence, for all [Shomerim] are liable for it;

We say that a borrower pays for everything, i.e. all that is written in the Parshah;

However, if it died due to working, since a borrower has permission to work with it, he is exempt.

Suggestion: We do not want to say that when he feeds it, he does not get all the benefit, and he is exempt [for Ones]!

Rejection: Because in every case, he is liable for Ones!

Explanation: Rather, it means that even a borrower who gets all the benefit, e.g. it is in the swamp, pays only principal.

Implied question: According to him, we expound everywhere, except for where it is not reasonable, like I explained above (31b DH Dibrah)!

Answer: Also here, it is not reasonable to include an Aveidah, since it is written in the expression of theft, so we should say that the Torah speaks like people do.

Explanation: Stam, the verse connotes both of them [together] like one.

Implied question: Why does it say "Yachdav" regarding Shatnez? (We should say that Stam, "wool and linen" connotes both of them together!)

Answer: We need it to teach [that garments are considered connected through] two stitches.

Implied question: Why does it say "Yachdav" regarding "do not plow [with an ox and donkey]"?

Answer: Had the Torah not written Yachdav, one might have thought that even if they are not tied to the plow, just one conducts them at once, or even one after the other [he transgresses].

Explanation: Also R. Yonason, who said "[the Torah refers to either by itself,] unless it explicitly says Yachdav", does not learn from the fact that the Torah needed to write Yachdav, for we need [Yachdav], like I explained!

Rather, he said from reasoning that it connotes like this.