1)

(a)When Rav Nachman made his statement conceding that the seller cannot reclaim any fruit that the purchaser actually picked and ate (because he holds 'Mechilah be'Ta'us Havya Mechilah') - what did Rava have in mind to ask him from Ona'ah?

(b)Rav Nachman however, preempted his Kashya, by proving from Ailonis that 'Mechilah be'Ta'us is indeed Mechilah. What does the Mishnah in Kesuvos say about a Mema'enes, a Sheniyah and an Ailonis with regard to Kesuvah (including her Nichsei Tzon Barzel), Peiros, Mezonos or Bela'os (her worn-out clothes that her husband used)?

(c)What is the reason for this, regarding ...

1. ... a Mema'enes?

2. ... a Sheniyah?

3. ... an Ailonis?

(d)How does Rav Nachman prove his point from here?

1)

(a)When Rav Nachman made his statement conceding that the seller cannot reclaim any fruit that the purchaser actually picked and ate (because he holds 'Mechilah be'Ta'us Havya Mechilah') Rava had in mind to ask him from Ona'ah - whose return the Mishnah in the previous Perek obligates, even though it also appears to be a case of Mechilah be'Ta'us.

(b)Rav Nachman however, preempted his Kashya, by proving from Ailonis that 'Mechilah be'Ta'us is indeed Mechilah. The Mishnah in Kesuvos rules - that a Mema'enes, a Sheniyah and an Ailonis do not receive a Kesuvah, Peiros, Mezonos or Bela'os (the worn-out clothes that her husband used).

(c)The reason for this, regarding ...

1. ... a Mema'enes is - because she leaves her husband against his will.

2. ... a Sheniyah is - because we assume that she persuaded her husband to perform the sin of marrying her (so Chazal penalized her).

3. ... an Ailonis - because it was a Mekach Ta'us (an erroneous sale).

(d)Rav Nachman proves his point from here - because, despite the fact that the Ailonis was Mochel be'Ta'us (thinking that the Kidushin was valid), her Mechilah nevertheless stands.

2)

(a)Rava concludes however, that neither is Ona'ah a Kashya on Rav Nachman, nor does Ailonis prove him right. Why is ...

1. ... Ona'ah not a Kashya? Why is it not considered Mechilah be'Ta'us?

2. ... Ailonis not a proof. Why is it not considered Mechilah be'Ta'us?

2)

(a)Rava concludes however, that neither is Ona'ah a Kashya on Rav Nachman, nor is Ailonis a proof.

1. Ona'ah is not a Kashya - because the person who is being overcharged is not aware of it, in which case it is not even Mechilah, let alone Mechilah be'Ta'us.

2. And Ailonis is not a proof - because the woman would want to live with her 'husband', even if he eats her Peiros ... , in order to attain the status of marriage (even if they are not legally married).

3)

(a)From whom did 'that woman' ask a Shali'ach to purchase a field on her behalf?

(b)What did the relative stipulate when selling the field to the Shali'ach?

(c)The Shali'ach replied 'At ve'Navla Achi', which might mean 'You and Navla (the purchaser's name) are relatives, and will work out a plan. Assuming that Navla was not her name, what does 'At ve'Navla Achi' mean?

(d)Either way, what did Rabah bar Rav Huna rule regarding the field?

3)

(a)'That woman' asked a Shali'ach to purchase a field on her behalf - from a relative of hers.

(b)When selling the field to the Shali'ach, the relative stipulated - that in the event that he obtained the money with which to buy the field back, she would return it.

(c)The Shali'ach replied 'At ve'Navla Achi', which might mean 'You and Navla (the purchaser's name) are relatives, and will work out a plan. Assuming that Navla was not her name, 'At ve'Navla Achi' would then be equivalent of 'You and he', or 'you and she - will work it out'.

(d)Either way, Rabah bar Rav Huna ruled - that 'At ve'Navla Achi' is a firm condition (and not an Asmachta).

4)

(a)We ask whether, in the event that the Mocher did redeem the field, the Peiros that the woman ate in the interim need to be returned or not. What are the two sides of the She'eilah?

(b)What did Rabah bar Rav Huna rule there?

(c)Who concurred with Rabah bar Rav Huna's ruling?

4)

(a)We ask whether, in the event that the Mocher did redeem the field, the Peiros that the woman ate in the interim need to be returned - because it is considered Ribis Ketzutzah) or not - (because it is considered Avak Ribis).

(b)Rabah bar Rav Huna rule there - that it is considered Avak Ribis, and the woman was not obligated to return the Peiros ...

(c)... a ruling with which Rava concurred.

5)

(a)Abaye asked Rabah what the Din would be in the equivalent case of Mashkanta. What is the case of Mashkanta?

(b)We might consider the fruit Avak Ribis, like in the previous case, because there was no stipulation permitting the creditor to eat the fruit. Why might we nevertheless obligate the creditor to return the fruit as if it was Ribis Ketzutzah?

(c)How do we reconcile Rabah, who replied that here too, the fruit is considered Avak Ribis, with Rav Nachman, who ruled earlier (with regard to our Mishnah, 'Hadri Ar'a, ve'Hadri Peiri')?

(d)Ravina is even more stringent than Rabah bar Rav Huna. What stringent ruling does Rav Papi quote him as having issued?

5)

(a)Abaye asked Rabah what the Din would be in the equivalent case of Mashkanta - where the debtor gave the creditor a Mashkon without making any conditions, and the latter proceeded to eat the Peiros of his own volition.

(b)We might consider the fruit Avak Ribis, like in the previous case, because there was no stipulation permitting the creditor to eat the fruit. On the other hand, we might obligate the creditor to return the fruit as if it was Ribis Ketzutzah - because this is a case of a loan (see foot of previous Amud), as opposed to the previous case, which was a sale.

(c)Rabah, who replied that here too, the fruit is considered Avak Ribis - disagrees with Rav Nachman, who ruled earlier (with regard to our Mishnah), 'Hadri Ar'a, ve'Hadri Peiri'.

(d)Ravina is even more stringent than Rabah bar Rav Huna. Rav Papi cites him as having ruled - that even in the case of a purchase, the purchaser is obligated to return the fruit that he ate.

6)

(a)Mar Brei d'Rav Yosef rules in the name of Rava 'be'Asra de'Mesalki, Achal Shi'ur Zuzi, Mesalkinan leih'. What does Rava mean by ...

1. ... 'be'Asra de'Mesalki'?

2. ... 'Achal Shiur Zuzi, Mesalkinan leih '?

(b)And what does Rava ...

1. ... rule in a case where the creditor ate in excess of the loan?

2. ... mean when he adds 've'Lo Mechashvinan mi'Sh'tara li'Sh'tara'?

(c)What did Rava rule with regard to the two latter Dinim if the field belongs to Yesomim?

(d)Why is that?

6)

(a)Mar brei d'Rav Yosef rules in the name of Rava 'be'Asra de'Mesalki, Achal Shiur Zuzi, Mesalkinan leih '. When Rava says ...

1. ... 'be'Asra de'Mesalki' - he is referring to a place where it is customary for the creditor to eat the Peiros of the Mashkon, but to return the Mashkon the moment the creditor pays his debt.

2. ... 'Achal Shiur Zuzi, Mesalkinan leih ', he means - that the moment the creditor has eaten the equivalent of the debt, the borrower can retrieve his field and insist that what the creditor ate is in lieu of the debt (because that fruit is no worse than the money with which he could have paid off his debt and redeemed his field).

(b)Rava ...

1. ... rules in a case where the creditor ate in excess of the loan - that the debtor cannot claim what he ate, since it is Avak Ribis (like Rabah above).

2. ... means when he adds 've'Lo Mesalkinan mi'Sh'tara li'Sh'tara' - that in the event that the creditor has another Shtar Chov on the same debtor, the excess Peiros (of Ribis) that he eats from the Mashkon cannot be counted as payment of that debt.

(c)With regard to the two latter Dinim, if the field belongs to Yesomim, Rava ruled - that if the creditor ate in excess of the loan, we claim the difference on their behalf ('Mafkinan mineih'), and 'Mechashvinan mi'Sh'tara li'Sh'tara'.

(d)The reason for this is - because Beis-Din are the father of the Yesomim, and they take into account the fact that the Yesomim (Ketanim) are not Mochel even the Avak Ribis (and it is as if they had already claimed back the field as soon as the creditor ate the equivalent of the debt).

7)

(a)Why does Rava confine the above rulings to a place where it is customary for the debtor to redeem his field with money ('be'Asra de'Mesalki')? How will the Din differ in a place where it is not?

(b)We just learned that Rava obligates the creditor to return the field, before he continues to eat any more fruit (if the debtor so claims). What does Rav Ashi say?

(c)Why does he not reckon the fruit that the creditor ate as the payment of the debt, like Rava holds?

(d)What does Rav Ashi rule with regard to Yesomim? In which point does he disagree with Rava's previous ruling?

7)

(a)Rava confines the above rulings to a place where it is customary for the debtor to redeem his field with money ('be'Asra de'Mesalki'), because in a place where it is not (and where the creditor deducts whatever he eats from the loan for a given umber of years) - the Mashkon is considered a regular sale, and the debtor cannot even stop the creditor from eating the fruit in excess of the loan.

(b)We just learned that Rava obligates the creditor to return the field before he continues to eat any more fruit (if the debtor so claims). Rav Ashi - restricts that obligation to where the debtor pays his debt in full (because he does not agree with Rava, that the fruit that he ate becomes payment of the debt retroactively) ...

(c)... because the debtor did not stipulate to that effect originally.

(d)With regard to Yesomim, Rav Ashi rules - that we do not claim the Peiros that the creditor ate in excess of the loan on their behalf (like Rava ruled earlier).

67b----------------------------------------67b

8)

(a)Rava Brei d'Rav Yosef in the name of Rava only permits a creditor to eat from a Mashkon be'Asra de'Mesalki by means of Nachyasa. What is 'Nachyasa'? Why is it not considered Ribis?

(b)Why does Rava restrict the initial ruling to Asra de'Mesalki? How will the Din differ in an Asra de'Lo Mesalki?

(c)And he adds that a Tzurva mid'Rabanan (a Talmid-Chacham) should avoid doing so. Why is that?

8)

(a)Rava Brei d'Rav Yosef in the name of Rava only permits a creditor to eat from a Mashkon be'Asra de'Mesalki by means of Nachyasa - which entails deducting a fixed amount each year (irrespective of how much or how little he eats, and even in the years when the field produces nothing).

(b)He restricts the initial ruling to Asra de'Mesalki - because in an Asra de'Lo Mesalki, where the creditor may eat for the fixed number of years, it resembles a regular sale, and Nachyasa is not necessary.

(c)And he adds that a Tzurva mid'Rabanan (a Talmid-Chacham) should avoid doing so - because he needs to sanctify himself, to enact stringencies even where the Torah is otherwise lenient, so that people should not learn from him to treat Mitzvos in a disrespectful manner (by searching for leniencies).

9)

(a)Initially, we advise a Tzurva mid'Rabanan to accept a Mashkon 'be'Kitzusa', according to those who permit it (in fact, it is a Machlokes between Rav Acha and Ravina - see Tosfos DH 'Ravina'). According to the first Lashon, 'Kitzusa' means that the creditor eats the fruit for five years without deducting from the loan, but from then on, he assesses all the fruit that grows and deducts it from the loan. With which point does the second Lashon disagree?

(b)How does the second Lashon then explain 'Kitzusa'?

(c)According to the first Lashon, everyone will agree that 'Kitzusa', the way the second Lashon defines it, is permitted even for a Talmid-Chacham. What is the only concession for a Talmid-Chacham according to the one who is strict in the second Lashon? What is 'Mashkanta de'Sura'?

9)

(a)Initially, we advise a Tzurva mid'Rabanan to accept a Mashkon 'be'Kitzusa', according to those who permit it (in fact, it is a Machlokes between Rav Acha and Ravina). According to the first Lashon, 'Kitzusa' means that the creditor eats the fruit for five years without deducting from the loan, but from then on, he assesses all the fruit that grows and deducts it from the loan. The second Lashon disagrees with this. According to them - Mashkanta has no Heter without Nachyasa.

(b)The second Lashon then explain 'Kitzusa' as - the first five years the creditor deducts the fruit that he eats from the loan, and from then on, he assesses all the fruit that grows and deducts it from the loan.

(c)According to the first Lashon, everyone will agree that the way the second Lashon defines 'Kitzusa' is permitted even for a Talmid-Chacham. The only concession for a Talmid-Chacham according to the one who is strict in the second Lashon is - 'Mashkanta de'Sura' (when they specifically stipulate that when the years of the Mashkon terminate, the field goes back and the debt is settled [giving the fruit the appearance of having been sold - see also Tosfos DH 'be'Mishlam']).

10)

(a)Rav Papa and Rav Huna Brei d'Rav Yehoshua state that the Ba'al-Chov (creditor) of a creditor who has a Mashkon be'Asra de'Mesalki and who died, cannot claim the field or the Peiros from his heirs. Why not?

(b)Why on the other hand, could he have claimed the Peiros from their father in his lifetime?

(c)Similarly, they said that, in the event of the creditor's death, his Bechor does not receive a double portion from that field, and Shemitah cancels the debt. Why does ...

1. ... the Bechor not receive a double portion?

2. ... Shemitah cancel the debt (in spite of the Mashkon)?

(d)Why do Rav Papa and Rav Huna Brei d'Rav Yehoshua then rule that in the case of a Mashkon be'Asra de'Lo Mesalki, the creditor's Ba'al-Chov can claim the Mashkon from the creditor's heirs, the Bechor receives double and Shemitah does not cancel the debt?

10)

(a)Rav Papa and Rav Huna Brei d'Rav Yehoshua state that the Ba'al-Chov (creditor) of a creditor who has a Mashkon be'Asra de'Mesalki and who died, cannot claim the field or the Peiros from his heirs - because a creditor only acquires the Peiros, but not the field, and the Metaltelin of Yesomim are not Meshubad to their father's Ba'al-Chov.

(b)On the other hand, he could have claimed the Peiros from their father in his lifetime - because even the shirt on the debtor's back is Meshubad to his Ba'al-Chov.

(c)Similarly, they said that, in the event of the creditor's death ...

1. ... his Bechor does not receive a double portion - because the field and the Peiros are only a Milveh (which will later be returned), and we rule that a Bechor does not receive a double portion in a debt (which his father has yet to claim).

2. ... Shemitah cancels the debt (in spite of the Mashkon) - because the Din of Malveh al ha'Mashkon, which Shemitah cancels, is confined to Metaltelin, which the creditor acquires and which is therefore considered his, but not a Mashkon of Karka 'be'Asra de'Mesalki'), which stands to be returned and which the creditor does not therefore acquire.

(d)And the reason that Rav Papa and Rav Huna Brei d'Rav Yehoshua then rule that in the case of a Mashkon be'Asra de'Lo Mesalki, the creditor's Ba'al-Chov can claim the Mashkon from the creditor's heirs, the Bechor receives double and Shemitah does not cancel the debt is - because such a Mashkon is akin to a sale, which consequently belongs entirely to the creditor.

11)

(a)Mar Zutra quoting Rav Papa rules that regarding a Mashkon of date-palms in an Asra de'Mesalki, the debtor may even reclaim mi'Tamri de'Abudya. What are 'Tamri de'Abudya'?

(b)At which stage however, may he no longer claim them?

(c)And according to which opinion will he no longer be able to claim even before the creditor picked them up?

11)

(a)Mar Zutra quoting Rav Papa rules that regarding a Mashkon of date-palms in an Asra de'Mesalki, the debtor may even reclaim mi'Tamri de'Abudya - dates that the creditor picked from the tree and dropped into mats that he had spread out in the field below.

(b)He may no longer claim them however - once the creditor has picked them up and placed them into baskets (because the latter will then have acquired them with Hagbahah).

(c)And according to those who maintain that the vessels of the purchaser acquire for him even in the domain of the seller, he will no longer be able to claim even before the creditor picked them up - because his mats will have acquired the dates on his behalf.

12)

(a)If, be'Asra de'Mesalki, the debtor undertakes not to 'redeem' the land by paying, no Kinyan is required to clinch the stipulation. If it was, when would it have taken place? What form would it have taken?

(b)What would have been the point of the Kinyan anyway? What would it have achieved?

(c)If, be'Asra de'Lo Mesalki, the creditor undertakes to allow the debtor to pay and 'redeem' his land, Rav Papa does not require a Kinyan to clinch the stipulation. What does Rav Shisha Brei d'Rav Idi say?

(d)Like whom is the Halachah?

(e)What does the Kinyan achieve in this case?

12)

(a)If, be'Asra de'Mesalki, the debtor undertakes not to 'redeem' the land by paying, no Kinyan is required to clinch the stipulation. If it was, it would have taken place - in the form of Kinyan Kesef, which would have taken effect when the creditor lent him the money (see also Hagahos ha'G'ra).

(b)The point of the Kinyan would have been - to strengthen the creditor's rights, because all aspects of Karka can be acquired with money, even as regards clinching stipulations.

(c)If, be'Asra de'Lo Mesalki, the creditor undertakes to allow the debtor to pay and 'redeem' his land, Rav Papa does not require a Kinyan to clinch the stipulation. Rav Shisha Brei d'Rav Idi does ...

(d)... and that is the Halachah.

(e)In this case, the point of the Kinyan (which does not acquire anything) is to reinforce the creditor's undertaking, which otherwise, would consist of words only, from which he could retract at any time (in order to follow the local custom).

13)

(a)What will be the Din if, be'Asra de'Mesalki, the debtor informs the creditor that he is going to fetch the money to pay him?

(b)In which case then does Ravina say that the creditor may eat and Mar Zutra Brei d'Rav Mari say that he may not?

(c)Like whom is the Halachah?

13)

(a)If, be'Asra de'Mesalki, the debtor informs the creditor that he is going to fetch the money to pay him - the latter must stop eating the Peiros immediately.

(b)Ravina says that the creditor may eat and Mar Zutra Brei d'Rav Mari say that he may not - in a case where the debtor informs the creditor that he is going to look for money to pay him.

(c)The Halachah is like Mar Zutra Brei d'Rav Mari.

14)

(a)Rav Kahana, Rav Papa and Rav Ashi did not eat the fruit of a Mashkon 'be'Nachyasa' (as we learned above). When Mar Zutra asked Ravina why he did, he replied that it was no different than Sdei Achuzah. What did he mean by Sdei Achuzah? Which Din of Sdei Achuzah was he referring to?

(b)And what did he mean by the comparison to Mashkanta?

(c)On what grounds then, did Ravina's colleagues disagree with him? What distinction do they draw between Sdei Achuzah and Mashkanta?

14)

(a)Rav Kahana, Rav Papa and Rav Ashi did not eat the fruit of a Mashkon 'be'Nachyasa' (as we learned above). When Mar Zutra asked Ravina why he did, he replied that it was no different than Sdei Achuzah - where the owner may eat the Peiros after paying Hekdesh a Sela and a Pundiyon per annum per Chomer (thirty Se'ah) of barley.

(b)What Ravina meant by that comparison to Mashkanta is - that just as by Sdei Achuzah, the owner eats the fruit, even if it is far in excess of the money that he pays (and is not considered Ribis), so too, is the creditor permitted to eat the fruit of the Mashkanta under the same circumstances (see Ritva).

(c)Ravina's colleagues disagreed with him, however. According to them - Sdei Achuzah belongs to Hekdesh, until the owner redeems it, when it becomes his, immediately; Whereas the case of Mashkanta pertains to a loan, and is Asur because it resembles Ribis ('Mechzei ke'Ribis').