The second Tana presumes that the first Pasuk ("ve'Lo Sisov Nachalah mi'Mateh ... ") is speaking about Hasavas ha'Ben, and not Hasavas ha'Ba'al because a son, who is a blood relative, is a closer relative than a husband (as we explained above).

Siman Amar Rabah bar Rav Shiloh and Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak respectively, suggest that the first Tana establishes the second Pasuk by Hasavas ha'Ba'al either because the Torah uses the word "Ish" or because it uses the word "Yidb'ku" (alone) - since both expressions pertain more appropriately to a husband than to a son (the latter because from a logical point of view, the former, like we find in Megilas Rus "Ish Naomi").

We reject both suggestions however on the grounds that - both expressions appear in both Pesukim (even though those who proposed this answer assumed that, for some reason, it was preferable to apply these Leshonos specifically to the husband in the second Pasuk, and to use them for some D'rashah or other in the first).

Rava therefore learns that the second Pasuk speaks about Hasavas ha'Ba'al from the Lashon "Yidbeku Matos", which implies a husband more than it does a son, Rav Ashi from the Lashon "mi'Mateh le'Mateh Acher" - because the woman's son, her own flesh and blood (as we explained earlier), is not considered "Acher".

Rebbi Avahu Amar Rebbi Yochanan, citing Rebbi (or Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah) extrapolates from the Pasuk in Divrei Hayamim "u'Seguv Holid es Ya'ir, Vayehi Lo Esrim ve'Shalosh Arim be'Eretz Gil'ad" that - a husband does not inherit property that his wife does not actually have in her possession at the time of her death, even though it is Ra'uy (due to her at a later date).

Had S'guv's wife died after her father - S'guv would therefore have inherited his father-in-law's property.

If not for the Pasuk, we would have thought that, even had she died before her father, her husband would not only inherit her, but would even take precedence over her son, just like he did regarding property that was in her possession when she died.

Rebbi Avahu cites a second proof for this from the Pasuk in Yehoshua "ve'Elazar ben Aharon Meis ... " - because in the previous case, it is possible that it was Ya'ir's own wife who died, and whom he inherited.

Rabeinu Chananel learns this latter D'rashah from the word "B'no" (in the Pasuk "be'Giv'as Pinchas B'no", that we already discussed earlier), which otherwise appears superfluous, seeing as we already know that Pinchas was Elazar's son. We might also learn it however, from the Pasuk there "asher Nitan lo be'Har Ephrayim" which implies that Elazar and Pinchas made a Din Torah over Elazar's wife's property, which Beis-Din placed with Pinchas (because Elazar's wife did not yet have it in her possession).

Rebbi Avahu knows that Pinchas' valley was not a Sadeh Charamim (as Rav Papa suggested earlier) - because he learns from the word "lo" that Elazar ought really to have inherited it, only it was given to Pinchas' (see Maharsha).

With reference to our Mishnah, the Beraisa Darshens 'Bnei Achyos, ve'Lo B'nos Achyos'. This D'rashah cannot be taken literally - since there is no reason why a daughter should not inherit her uncle, there where is no son.

Rav Sheishes therefore explains it to mean that - she does not inherit her uncle if she has brothers (as we shall now see).

Based on the Pasuk in Pinchas "ve'Yarash Osah", Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak in the presence of Rav Huna compared Yerushah Sheniyah to Yerushah Rishonah - the Torah's initial case of a son inheriting his father's property.

What he now meant was that - like, when a son inherits his father, he takes precedence over his sister, so too is the Din with regard to a nephew inheriting from his uncle.

He actually learns it - from the extra 'Vav' in "Veyarash".

The current D'rashah is not confined to the Yerushah of uncles, to which this Pasuk refers - but extends to all the heirs mentioned in the Parshah before nephew ...

... since by each one, the Torah inserts an extra 'Vav' ("ve'Im Ein lo Bas", "ve'Im Ein lo Achim").

If a man dies, leaving a nephew and a niece (the respective children of two uncles), but no father, children, brothers or sisters - both the nephew and the niece inherit their respective fathers' portions.

If in the same case, he also left ...

... grandsons - then they will inherit his property.

... granddaughters - then they will inherit it.

We have already learned that if a man dies, the order of inheritance is 1. sons; 2. daughters; 3. father; 4. brothers; 5; sisters; 6. paternal uncles; 7. paternal aunts. In a case where he has only a maternal aunt, but his deceased uncle left ...

... a son - he will inherit the property of the deceased.

... a daughter - she will inherit it.

When, based on the Pasuk "ve'Hayah be'Yom Hanchilo es Banav", Rabah bar Chanina cited a Beraisa in front of Rav Nachman that read 'be'Yom Atah Mapil Nachalos ve'I Atah Mapil Nachalos ba'Laylah', Abaye objected to the implication that - if someone died at nighttime, his heirs will not inherit him.

So he suggested that the Beraisa ought to read (not 'Nachalos', but) - 'Din Nachalos'.

We learn from the Pasuk in Yirmiyah "Beis David Diynu la'Boker Mishpat" that - money-matters must be judged in the day-time.

Another Beraisa learns from the Pasuk in Pinchas "ve'Haysah li'Venei Yisrael le'Chukas Mishpat" that - the Dinim of inheritance fall under the category of money-matters in this regard.

We might have thought otherwise - because distributing the inheritance seems to be no different than dividing property between two partners, which may be performed at night-time for reasons that will now become clear.

We reconcile the above Pasuk with the Pasuk "ve'Shaftu es ha'Am be'Chol Eis", from which we extrapolate that Beis-Din are permitted to judge even at night-time - by establishing the latter by the final pronouncement of the Halachah, which may be performed at night-time.

Rav Yehudah stated that if three people go to visit a Shechiv-M'ra (a person on his death-bed) , who then wants to distribute his property to whoever it may be have the choice of - either recording the details in the capacity of witnesses, or of serving as Dayanim to instruct the heirs to carry out the deceased's instructions.

The fact that, should they choose to be Dayanim, there will be no witnesses doesn't matter - because there is no reason to consider witnessing something directly any worse than hearing it from witnesses ('she'Lo T'hei Shemi'ah Gedolah me'Re'iyah').

Their having witnessed the proceedings will not suffice however - if what they saw took place at night-time, when they were not eligible to act as Dayanim. In such a case, they will need to hear the testimony from other witnesses, should they wish to serve as Dayanim.

If the three men came following the Shechiv-M'ra's invitation to testify to his actions, it will have the same Din as if they had come in the night about which Rav Chisda says that - they can only serve as witnesses, but not as Dayanim ...

... due to the principle 'Ein Eid Na'aseh Dayan (A witness cannot become a judge' [and at night-time, when they cannot be Dayanim, they can only be witnesses but not judges]).

This follows the opinion of Rebbi (in the Mishnah in Makos). Rebbi Yossi says there that if a relative or someone who is disqualified from testifying, witnesses a crime for example, then he disqualifies all other witnesses from testifying. Whereas acording to Rebbi - a witness is only considered as such if he actually intends to testify, but not by merely witnessing what happens.

The source for the principle 'Ein Eid Na'aseh Dayan' lies in the Pasuk "Ve'Amdu Sh'nei ha'Anashim Lifnei Hash-m" (obligating the witnesses to stand before the Dayanim, who must be seated).

If it is not three people, but two, who enter the presence of the Shechiv-M'ra - they have no option but to act as witnesses.

When Abaye put to Rabah bar Chanina what we wrote earlier (that perhaps one ought to change the wording of the Beraisa to 'Din Nachalos') - he conceded that this was indeed the case.

Witnesses who have not been invited to do so by the parties concerned ('Atem Eidai') - are not eligible to testify in money-matters.

We extrapolate that 'Atem Eidei' is not necessary by a Shechiv-M'ra, from Rav Yehudah (through Rav Chisda's statement) which cannot be speaking where the Shechiv-M'ra specifically stated 'Atem Eidai' - because how could he then rule 'Ratzu, Osin Din' by day (as Rav Chisda explains) seeing as the Shechiv-M'ra specifically appointed them as witnesses?