Rav and Shmuel both rule that a receptacle belonging to the purchaser acquires everywhere but for in the Reshus ha'Rabim. Rebbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish say 'Afilu bi'Reshus ha'Rabim'.

We qualify the statement 'Keilav shel Adam Koneh lo' by confining it to where the owner specifically declared that they should (as we shall see later in the Sugya).

According to Rav Papa, there is no dispute because Rebbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish are really referring (not to a Reshus ha'Rabim, but) to a Simta ...

... and the reason that they refer to it as 'Reshus ha'Rabim' is because it is not a Reshus ha'Yachid.

We prove Rav Papa right from a statement of Rebbi Avahu Amar Rebbi Yochanan, who ruled that a person's receptacles acquire wherever he has the right to place them, automatically precluding the Reshus-ha'Rabim.

We ask on the above from a Beraisa which discusses four Dinim regarding someone who sells wine or oil, the first by a measure which belongs to neither party and in a Reshus ha'Rabim or a Chatzer that belongs to neither of them (but which they borrowed for the sale). The measured contents belong ...

... to the seller until the measuring process is complete.

... to the purchaser after it has been completed.

The second Din concerns where the wine or oil is being poured into the receptacle belonging to one of them in which case the Din is 'Rishon Rishon Kanah' (he acquires the wine that flows into the receptacle as it flows in [depending on whose receptacle it is. This will be explained shortly]).

In the third case, where the wine or oil is lying in the domain of the purchaser the latter acquires it from the moment the seller agrees to sell it.

The fourth Din refers to when the wine or oil is lying in the domain of the seller or of the guardian. The purchaser then acquires it in one of four ways: 1. through Hagbahah, 2. through Meshichah from the owner's domain to a Simta (as we already learned) 3.&4. through the seller or the guardian (upon the seller's instructions) undertaking to lend or to rent the purchaser a place with which he will acquire the goods simultaneously.

The Tana divides the last Din into two parts, connecting the first two with the seller, and the second two with the guardian. The reason that he does rather present them as four Reshuyos, Reshus ha'Rabim, Reshus Mocher, Reshus Loke'ach and Reshus Nifkad is because, strictly speaking Reshus Mocher and Reshus Nifkad (who is basically the Mocher's Shali'ach) are one and the same.

Despite the fact that all four Dinim apply both to both, the Tana lists Hagbahah and Hotza'ah with Reshus Mocher because presumably, the Mocher wants the sold article removed from his domain, and Kabalah and Sechirus Makom with Reshus Nifkad because generally, the guardian, who is already looking after the article on behalf of the Mocher, will agree to extend the guardianship a little longer (for the duration of the measuring and the sale).

The ramifications of ...

... 'Ad she'Lo Nismal'es ha'Midah, le'Mocher' are that if the wine spills or the price of wine rises, it is the Mocher who loses.

... 'mi'she'Nismal'es, le'Loke'ach' are that he now has the right to pour the wine or the oil into his own receptacles or to use the borrowed vessel to store it until he decides to do so.

The ramifications of ...

... 'Im Haysah Midah shel Echad Meihen, Rishon Rishon Kanah' (assuming that the receptacle belongs to the buyer) are that as the wine is poured into his receptacles, he acquires it (as we already explained).

... the seller) are that the wine never becomes the purchaser's, since the seller's receptacle cannot acquire on his behalf in the Reshus ha'Rabim (the domain that we currently think we are speaking about), even if the price has been fixed.

We establish this in a Reshus ha'Rabim or in a Chatzer that belongs to neither of them, which, in order be placed it in the same category as a Reshus ha'Rabim, must mean where the owner did not grant either of them permission to effect the sale there.

This Beraisa, which specifically validates a sale that is effected by means of the purchaser's vessel in the Reshus ha'Rabim, poses a Kashya on Rav and Shmuel, who ruled earlier that a purchaser's receptacles cannot acquire in the Reshus ha'Rabim.

To answer the current Kashya, Rav and Shmuel must interpret ...

... 'bi'Reshus ha'Rabim' to mean in a Simta (like we did earlier).

... 'Chatzer she'Einah shel Sheneihem' (in order to conform with that) to mean that the Chatzer does not belong to either of them, but to both of them jointly.

Rav Sheshes asked Rav Huna whether the receptacle of a purchaser will acquire on his behalf in the seller's domain either by fixing the price and pouring the goods into them, or in addition, by first measuring the goods in his own vessel before pouring them.

Perhaps he will acquire the goods because they are, after all, in his receptacle, which is considered his own domain. Perhaps on the other hand, he will not acquire them because the receptacle is Batel to the domain in which it finds itself.

The Mishnah in Gitin rules that if a husband throws his wife a Get which lands in her lap or in her basket she is divorced.

When Rav Sheshes attempted to resolve his She'eilah from the latter case (on the assumption that his wife was sitting in his house at the time) Rav Nachman protested on the grounds that the Amora'im in the Sugya there explain the Mishnah in numerous ways each of which will automatically refute the proof, as we shall now see.

Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel establishes the Mishnah there where her basket was hanging from her; Resh Lakish, where it was tied but not hanging by which he means that it was tied to her, but was lying on the ground (and not hanging from her waist, as Resh Lakish explains).

This refutes Rav Sheshes proof inasmuch as she is now divorced because the basket is considered like her hand (and not because her receptacle can acquire even in his domain).

According to Rav Ada bar Ahavah, the basket is lying between her thighs even if it is also lying on the floor of the husband's house (because a man is not particular about the area where his wife sits, placing it in her domain for her needs).

This explanation (as well as the subsequent ones), serve to refute Rav Sheshes proof inasmuch as the reason that she is divorced is now because it is as if her husband was Makneh his domain to her (see Tosfos. DH 'K'gon'), which is not applicable by a Reshus ha'Rabim).

Rav Mesharshiya b'rei de'Rav Ami explains that the Mishnah speaks where the husband is a basket-seller in which case, he will not mind her leaving her basket in the room where he keeps his baskets.

Rebbi Yochanan explains that it is the location of her lap and of her basket that acquires on her behalf which Rava explains to mean that similar to the previous case, a man is not fussy about his wife using the location where the clothes that she is wearing hang from her, or the location where she places her basket.

So we try to resolve Rav Nachman' She'eilah from the Beraisa 'bi'Reshus Mocher, Lo Kanah ad she'Yagbihenah ... '. Assuming that the Tana speaks where the goods are placed in the purchaser's receptacles we extrapolate from the Beraisa that the purchaser's receptacles do not acquire for him in the seller's domain.

To reconcile the Beraisa with Rav and Shmuel, we establish it where the receptacle belongs to the seller.

Nevertheless, we establish the Seifa 'bi'Reshus Loke'ach, Keivan she'Kibel Alav Mocher, Kanah Loke'ach' by a receptacle belonging to the purchaser.

The logic behind establishing the Reisha by receptacles belonging to the seller, and the Selfa by receptacles belonging to the purchaser is that seeing as the Reisha is speaking in the seller's domain, and the Seifa, in the purchaser's, that is what one would expect to find there.