We already cited the Machlokes between Rav Zvid and Rav Papa whether, according to Reish Lakish, 'al-Menas sheha'Deyuta ha'Elyonah Sheli' comes to permit the owner to fix ledges (Rav Zvid), or to build another floor (Rav Papa). According to Rav Dimi from Neharda'a (who maintains that Stama, the purchaser does not acquire Umka ve'Ruma) why does Rav Papa) require the owner to stipulate 'al-Menas ... ', in order to retain the roof, since it belongs to him anyway?

To reconcile Rav Papa with Rav Dimi, we establish that he speaks with regard (not to building a new floor, but) to rebuilding the roof should it cave in (which he would otherwise not have been permitted to do).

We have already dealt with our Mishnah 've'Lo es ha'Bor ve'Lo es ha'Dus, Af-al-Pi she'Kasav lo Umka ve'Ruma'. The Mishnah then cites Rebbi Akiva, who requires the seller to purchase a path to his Bor va'Dus because he holds that a seller sells generously (though this will be queried in the Sugya).

The Rabanan hold that it is not necessary for the seller to purchase a path (because, in their opinion, someone who sells, sells begrudgingly, retaining whatever he needs for himself).

In a case where the seller specifically precludes the Bor and the Dus from the sale, Rebbi Akiva says that this includes a path to his pit, which he no longer needs to buy from the purchaser.

They also argue over what the Din will be with regard to whether the purchaser needs to buy a path from him.

Rebbi Akiva does not require him to do so (because here too, he holds that the seller sells generously).

The Rabanan do (because here too, they hold that the seller sells begrudgingly).

The problem Ravina had with our Mishnah was that a 'Bor' and a 'Dus' seem to be the same thing?

Rabah Tosfa'ah resolved Ravina's problem by citing a Beraisa which defines 'Bor' as a pit, and 'Dus' as a built enclosure.

Rav Ashi had the same problem with our Mishnah as Ravina, and Mar Kashisha brei d'Rav Chisda gave him the same answer as Rabah Tosfa'ah gave Ravina.

The Tana needs to mention them both, because, had he only mentioned that the sale does not include ...

... a Bor, we might have thought that a Dus is included in the sale, since it is a building like the house.

... a Dus, we might ascribed that to the fact that a Dus is Chashuv, and is considered an independent entity, but that a Bor is Batel to the house.

In Chezkas ha'Batim, in a case where someone sells trees that are growing in his field, but retains the field itself, we assumed that, according to the Rabanan, the purchaser does not even acquire the land underneath the trees. According to Rebbi Akiva however, we assume that he does.

The basis of their Machlokes is whether a seller sells generously (Rebbi Akiva) or not (the Rabanan), and its ramifications are whether, should the tree die, he may plant another one in its place.

The source for their opinions cannot be our Mishnah, where their bone of contention might well be whether on the one hand, a purchaser doesn't pay good money for others to walk on his property (Rebbi Akiva); or whether it is not the purchaser who loses anything, but the seller, who doesn't sell his property on the understanding that he has to fly to his pit (the Rabanan).

We then suggest that the source of their Machlokes must then be the Seifa of our Mishnah (whether or not, the purchaser of the pit needs to buy a path) on the grounds that Rebbi Akiva does not hold of the Sevara of the Rabanan (that a person doesn't pay money in order to have to fly to his Chatzer, which this time would work in favor of the purchaser), and the Rabanan do not hold of the Sevara of Rebbi Akiva (that a person doesn't want others waking through his land, which would work on behalf of the seller). Consequently, their Machlokes must be based on whether a seller sells generously or begrudgingly.

We refute this suggestion too however, on the grounds that both Tana'im might well hold of both Sevaros. However, Rebbi Akiva always goes after the purchaser (because a person does not spend his money for something that is worthless), whereas the Rabanan always go after the seller, following the principle (Yad Ba'al ha'Shtar al ha'Tachtonah [the owner of the Shtar always has the underhand, seeing as he is the one who is Motzi]).

If that is so, then, in the case of Chezkas ha'Batim (where Reuven purchases trees in Shimon's field) both Tana'im might hold that he has acquired the land in which the trees grow, or they might hold that he has not.

So we cite the Mishnah later, where the Tana rules, with regard to someone who sells a field 'Lo es ha'Bor ve'Lo es ha'Gas ve'Lo es ha'Shovach ... '. the 'Bor' there refers to a water-pit, from which they would water the field.

Rebbi Akiva rules there that the owner must nevertheless purchase a path to get to his pit and to his wine-press. It is obvious that the basis of their Machlokes there cannot be exactly the same as that of the house. Initially we establish it by whether a seller sells generously or begrudgingly (the sought for source of the Mishnah in Chezkas ha'Batim).

We conclude however, that maybe the basis of their Machlokes is indeed the same as in our Mishnah (like we just explained), but that the Tana found it necessary to present it both in the case of a house and in that of a field. Had he taught us Rebbi Akiva's Din in the case of ...

... a house, we would not have applied it to a field because, in the former case, we might have based the purchaser's objection on the discreet nature of a house ('Mishum Tzeni'usa' [which is simply not applicable to a field]).

... a field, we would not have applied it to a house because there we might have ascribed his objection to the fact that walking through a field causes damage to the plants ('de'Kashi lei Davsha'), which is not the case by a house.

Both of these Chidushim go according to Rebbi Akiva. Conversely, we could equally well have said that the Rabanan argue with Rebbi Akiva in the case of a house only because walking there causes no damage (but in a field, where it does, perhaps they will agree with him), or that they argue in the case of a field, because it is not subject to Tzeni'us ... .

In the Seifa there, Rebbi Akiva concludes that if the owner of the field sold the pit or the wine-press ... to someone else, the purchaser does not need to acquire a path either. The Rabanan rule that he does.

The basis of their Machlokes is whether a seller sells generously (Rebbi Akiva) or begrudgingly (the Rabanan), even in cases where the other Sevaros do not apply, such as the case in Chezkas ha'Batim (the ultimate source that we have been looking for).

We do not refute this proof too, and establish that both Rebbi Akiva and the Rabanan hold of both Sevaros even in the case of a field, and that Rebbi Akiva always goes after the purchaser, whereas the Rabanan go after the seller because this is something that we already know from the Reisha (our current Mishnah).

Nor can we counter that the Seifa is needed to teach us that the Rabanan contend with the seller's argument of 'de'Kashi Lei Davsha' (like Rebbi Akiva holds in the Reisha) because it is clear by now that the Rabanan and Rebbi Akiva do not dispute each other's Sevaros, only whether we go after the seller or the purchaser.