1) A KOHEN WHO PERFORMS THE "AVODAH" WHILE SEATED
OPINIONS: The Gemara earlier (83a) cites a Tosefta which states that a Kohen is forbidden to perform Avodah in the Beis ha'Mikdash while he is sitting. The Tosefta stresses that although this is forbidden, it is not punishable by death. The Gemara here quotes Rava who explains that the source for the law that the Kohen must stand during the Avodah is the verse, "For Hash-m your G-d has chosen him... to stand to minister in the Name of Hash-m" (Devarim 18:5). This implies that a Kohen must stand while he performs the Avodah. However, if standing is not an intrinsic part of the Avodah such that the Kohen is not Chayav Misah if he does not stand, what is the reason behind the verse's requirement that he stand?
(a) RASHI explains that the verse implies that if the Kohen is not standing while he performs the Avodah, he is not considered "chosen"; rather, he is considered like a Zar (a non-Kohen) who is forbidden from performing Avodah in the Beis ha'Mikdash. Rashi proves this from the Gemara in Zevachim (23b) in which Rava asks that if a Kohen who sits during the Avodah is considered like an ordinary Jew and his Avodah therefore is unfit, then why is the Kohen not punished with death, just as a Zar who performs the Avodah is punished with death? The Gemara there answers that the punishment of death for a Kohen who performs the Avodah while sitting cannot be learned from the Chiyuv Misah of a Zar who performs the Avodah, because the Chiyuv Misah of a Zar is written as one of three unique verses. The rule "Sheloshah Kesuvin ha'Ba'in k'Echad Ein Melamdin" teaches that when three verses express the same Halachah in three different subjects, the Halachah cannot be applied elsewhere through a Binyan Av. The fact that the Torah repeats the law the second and third times teaches that the Halachah is *not* meant to be applied automatically in all situations. Rava's assumption (which the Gemara there does not disprove) clearly shows that while sitting, the Kohen's status is that of a Zar with regard to the Avodah.
(b) The RAN argues and says that a Kohen who performs the Avodah while seated is *not* considered like a Zar who performs the Avodah. Rather, Rava means merely that a Kohen who sits during the Avodah is not considered a "choice" Kohen at that moment, as he is doing an improper thing.
(c) The YAD RAMAH disagrees with Rashi's interpretation of the Gemara in Zevachim. If the Gemara there means that the Kohen is actually like a Zar, then no Limud is needed to teach that he is punished with death. He should be liable for the death penalty like any Zar who performs the Avodah, and the Gemara should not need to search for a source. Indeed, no special source is needed to teach a similar law, that a Kohen who performs the Avodah when he is not wearing all of the Bigdei Kehunah is considered like a Zar and, consequently, is Chayav Misah like a Zar. In the case of a Kohen who performs the Avodah while sitting, it cannot be that he is considered a Zar, because a Zar is punished with Misah and the Kohen who sits is not.
Therefore, the Yad Ramah suggests a different way of understanding the Gemara in Zevachim. The emphasis of the Gemara's question there is on the fact that a Kohen who performs the Avodah while sitting makes the Avodah unfit like the Avodah of a Zar. The Gemara does not entertain the possibility that he is actually considered like a Zar. (It is important to note that although Rashi in Zevachim learns the Gemara there similarly to the way he learns the Gemara here, in one version of Rashi there he asks this question on his explanation and does not answer it.)
(d) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Bi'as ha'Mikdash 5:17) apparently follows the opinion of the Ran and Yad Ramah. He writes that the reason why the seated Kohen does not receive lashes is that the prohibition is derived from a positive statement in the verse and not from a direct negative commandment. The BIRKAS HA'ZEVACH in Zevachim asks that the Kohen still should receive lashes because of the negative commandment that prohibits a *Zar* from doing Avodah. However, if the Rambam indeed learns like the Ran and Yad Ramah, then this question is not a question, because the Rambam maintains that a Kohen who performs the Avodah while seated is *not* considered like a Zar. (Y. MONTROSE)
2) IS "ELU HEN HA'NECHENAKIN" THE TENTH OR ELEVENTH CHAPTER OF SANHEDRIN?
QUESTION: In the Gemara, the tenth Perek of Sanhedrin is "Elu Hen ha'Nechenakin," the chapter which describes the transgressions for which a person is punished with Chenek. In contrast, in the Mishnayos and Yerushalmi, the tenth Perek is "Chelek," the chapter which lists those who do not have a share in the World to Come, and it is followed by "Elu Hen ha'Nechenakin." What is the reason for this difference?
(a) The more logical order of the chapters seems to be the order in which they are arranged in the Gemara, with "Chelek" last. It is logical to discuss all of the forms of death administered by Beis Din, and afterwards to discuss the topic of one's fate in the World to Come. This is the opinion of RASHI (90a, DH Kol Yisrael). Rashi states that after the Mishnah discusses the four forms of capital punishment, it proceeds to discuss those who have no portion in the World to Come. This also is the order in which the chapters appear in the RIF.
(b) The RAN disagrees and asserts that the correct order may be the order in which the chapters appear in the Mishnayos. The Mishnayos in Sanhedrin apparently discuss the punishments in descending order of severity. The Mishnayos first discuss the punishment of Sekilah, which is the most severe form of punishment. After the seventh chapter discusses Sekilah, the eighth chapter deals with the laws of Ben Sorer u'Moreh, who is also punished with Sekilah. The ninth chapter deals first with those who are killed with Sereifah and then with those who are killed with Sayif, such as murderers and the residents of an Ir ha'Nidachas. Just as the discussion of the Ben Sorer u'Moreh complements the seventh chapter, the chapter of "Chelek" -- which includes the laws of the Ir ha'Nidachas -- complements the ninth chapter, and thus it logically follows the ninth chapter. This is why the Yerushalmi, the ROSH, RAMBAM and others place "Chelek" before "Elu Hen ha'Nechenakin."
The Gemara in Makos (2a) seems to support the Ran's logic. The Gemara there links the first Mishnah in Makos with the end of Sanhedrin by quoting a Mishnah in "Elu Hen ha'Nechenakin." This implies that "Elu Hen ha'Nechenakin" is the eleventh, and not tenth, chapter of Sanhedrin. However, the ARUCH LA'NER discounts this proof. In Shevuos, the Gemara connects itself to the end of Makos, even though the connecting Mishnah is many Mishnayos away from the end of the last chapter. It is not unusual for the connection between Masechtos to be based on the last Mishnah in the Perek that is second to last.
The Tosfos Yom Tov points out that the words of Rashi in Makos seem to support the opinion of the Ran (in contradiction to what Rashi writes in Sanhedrin 90a). Rashi there states that the Mishnah in Sanhedrin which the Gemara in Makos cites (from "ha'Nechenakim") is at the *end* of Maseches Sanhedrin.
However, there is a difficulty with the Ran's logic for the order of the chapters. Perek "Chelek" discusses the laws of the Ir ha'Nidachas only after it discusses who does or does not have a portion in the World to Come. According to the Ran, the discussion of the laws of the Ir ha'Nidachas should follow immediately after the discussion of the punishment of Sayif. Why does the discussion of Olam ha'Ba break the continuity of the order?
1. One answer (see TOSFOS YOM TOV) is that the Mishnah opens its discussion about the people of an Ir ha'Nidachas by stating that they have no share in the World to Come. As a prelude to that discussion, the Mishnah discusses other people who have no share in the World to Come.
The Ran is not satisfied with this answer for a number of reasons. Older texts of the Mishnah do not contain the statement that the people of an Ir ha'Nidachas have no share in the World to Come. In fact, the Gemara earlier (47a) states that when a person is put to death for his sin, he achieves atonement for his sin. When the residents of an Ir ha'Nidachas are killed for their sin, they achieve atonement and thus they earn back their share in the World to Come. (TOSFOS there answers this question and says that the Mishnah's statement that the people of an Ir ha'Nidachas have no share in the World to Come refers only to a case in which the people were not killed for their sin and therefore had no atonement. However, Tosfos' answer is difficult to answer, because there should be no need to say that the people of an Ir ha'Nidachas have no portion in the World to Come since they are no different from any others who serve Avodah Zarah. See Insights to Sanhedrin 111:2.)
2. The Ran answers instead that because the ninth Perek, "ha'Nisrafin," deals with the topic of sins for which the sinner may be killed outside of Beis Din, the Mishnayos continue with additional serious punishments that occur beyond the jurisdiction of Beis Din, such as the loss of one's share in the World to Come. The RAMBAN adds, in a similar vein, that all of the people who have no portion in the World to Come, as mentioned in Perek "Chelek," are subject to the law that a zealous person may kill such a sinner ("Kana'in Pog'in Bo"). (Y. MONTROSE)