MENACHOS 22 (21 Elul) - Dedicated in memory of Miriam (Teitelbaum) z'l bas Yehudah Aryeh and Brachah.

OPINIONS: In the Beraisa, Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon states that one might have thought that when a person obligates himself to bring an Olah, he is also obligated to bring wood to burn the Korban, just as he is obligated to bring Nesachim. Therefore, the verse teaches, "On the wood that is on the fire that is on the Mizbe'ach" (Vayikra 1:8); just as the Mizbe'ach belongs to the public, the wood on the Mizbe'ach must come from the public funds. Rebbi Elazar ben Shamua derives from this verse that just as the Mizbe'ach is not used by an ordinary person, the wood and fire may not be used by an ordinary person.
The Gemara explains that the difference between the two opinions in the Beraisa is whether or not new wood (that was never used for any other purpose) must be used on the Mizbe'ach.
Which of these opinions does the Gemara consider to be the primary one?
(a) The AGUDAH (Menachos, ch. 3) and others understand that the Gemara considers the opinion of Rebbi Elazar ben Shamua to be the primary opinion. They rule that his statement applies to Tashmishei Kedushah, items used to serve a holy item, such as a Tefilin case. The Agudah rules that one may not make a cover for a Sefer Torah from fabric that was used for a mundane purpose.
(b) The CHAVOS YA'IR (#161) understands that the Halachah does not follow the view of Rebbi Elazar ben Shamua. This is because the Tana of the Beraisa first quotes the opinion of Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon, implying that his view is the primary one.
The Chavos Ya'ir cites the Gemara in Zevachim (116b) in which Rava instructed that new fire and new wood be used for the Korban of Ifra Hurmiz. Abaye there says that Rava follows the view of Rebbi Elazar ben Shamua. The Chavos Ya'ir says that this is not proof that the Halachah should follow the view of Rebbi Elazar ben Shamua. Rather, Rava wanted to beautify the sacrifice of Ifra Hurmiz, and therefore he instructed that Rebbi Elazar ben Shamua's opinion be followed in that case. The Chavos Ya'ir points out that since the Gemara there needs to point out that Rava acted in accordance with the view of Rebbi Elazar ben Shamua, this implies that his opinion is not the one that is normally followed.
(The Chavos Ya'ir adds that even if the Halachah would follow the view of Rebbi Elazar ben Shamua, one could not apply his ruling, as the Agudah does, to Tashmishei Kedushah.)
The TESHUVOS CHASAM SOFER (OC 1:40) does not agree with the Chavos Ya'ir's understanding of the Gemara here, or with his understanding of the Gemara in Zevachim. Why does the Gemara here need to ask what the difference is between the two opinions, when the difference between them seems obvious? Moreover, why does the Gemara not say that the difference is simply whether a person must bring wood when he brings a Korban?
The Chasam Sofer explains that it must be that there is no argument about whether the wood is brought from the public funds. This is why this teaching is quoted first by the Beraisa, and why this is not mentioned as a difference between the two opinions. The difference between the two opinions is highlighted to show that the Halachah follows the view of Rebbi Elazar ben Shamua, who requires that virgin wood be used on the Mizbe'ach. The Chasam Sofer writes that although this understanding of the Gemara is not conclusive, there certainly is no evidence to rule like Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon over Rebbi Elazar ben Shamua.
(Although the REMA (OC 147:1) and others seem to rule like the Agudah, the MISHNAH BERURAH (OC 147:13) writes that the custom is to rely on the lenient opinion of the Chavos Ya'ir and others. See Insights to Zevachim 116:2, and see "Halachic World," vol. 2, Parshas Terumah, for further discussion of this topic.) (Y. MONTROSE)


OPINIONS: The Mishnah (22a) teaches that if a Kometz of a Minchah became mixed with a Kometz of another Minchah, or with a Minchas Kohanim, a Minchas Kohen Mashi'ach, or a Minchas Nesachim, it is valid. Rebbi Yehudah says that if it became mixed with a Minchas Kohen Mashi'ach or a Minchas Nesachim, it is invalid. He explains that since one is a thick mixture and the other is a thin mixture, they absorb from each other.
What exactly is invalid according to Rebbi Yehudah?
(a) RASHI (DH Rebbi Yehudah) and TOSFOS (DH she'Zo) understand that both the Kometz, and the Minchah into which the Kometz became mixed, are invalid according to Rebbi Yehudah. The Kometz is invalid because it absorbs from the Minchas Nesachim and thus contains too much oil to be valid for a Kometz. The Minchas Nesachim is invalid because it is deemed to have too little oil. If the mixture would consist of two similar types of mixtures, they would be valid.
The TOSFOS YOM TOV has difficulty with this explanation. The Gemara (22b) asks, why should it make a difference if the two items in the mixture absorb from each other? After all, they are the same type, "Min b'Mino." The Gemara's question has no relevance if the invalidating factor is that the Kometz now has too much oil. Even though both contain oil, the problem is that the Kometz absorbs oil from the Minchah, and not that they are different types.
TOSFOS REBBI AKIVA EIGER and the CHOK NASAN answer that absorption does determine whether or not there is too much oil. The Gemara is asking that if they are the same type, and therefore are not Batel to each other, then the oil that was part of the Minchas Nesachim is still deemed part of the Minchas Nesachim, and the oil that was part of the Kometz is still deemed part of the Kometz, and thus both items should be valid. This is the question of the Gemara.
(b) The BARTENURA and the SHITAH MEKUBEZTES (#2) understand that only the Kometz is invalid, because it is considered to have absorbed oil from the Minchas Nesachim. The large amount of oil in the Minchas Nesachim nullifies the Kometz. However, the Minchas Nesachim itself is still fit to have Kemitzah performed to it. Although it now has more oil due to the mixture with the Kometz, since the Kometz was nullified it is considered as though its oil is not present (and therefore the Minchah is not considered to be a Minchah with too much oil).
According to this explanation, a Minchah becomes invalid only when too much oil is purposely mixed into it. If more oil is mistakenly mixed into a Minchah, it remains valid. If, however, there is not enough oil, the Minchah is invalid whether the lack of oil was accidental or done on purpose. (Y. MONTROSE)