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1) PLOWING WITH AN OX
How could there have been an assumption that the Torah would prohibit plowing with an ox alone? The Torah explicitly commands that one must let his ox rest on Shabbos (Shemos 23:12). This implies that during the rest of the week one certainly may plow with an ox! It cannot be that the Torah's requirement that one let his ox rest on Shabbos refers to other forms of work on Shabbos, while plowing is forbidden on any day of the week. An ox is used primarily for plowing, and thus when the Torah requires a person to let his ox rest from work on Shabbos, it certainly refers to the primary form of work -- plowing. (RITVA in the name of TOSFOS)
ANSWERS:
(b) The Ritva answers further that had the verse not written "Yachdav," it would have been understood as a prohibition for a man himself to plow with an ox or with a donkey, but it certainly would have been permitted to have an ox or a donkey plow by itself. The verse regarding Shabbos, therefore, would have been necessary to prohibit making one's ox plow by itself on Shabbos. The word "Yachdav" teaches that although a man himself may plow together with an ox or a donkey, he may not have an ox and a donkey plow together. (I. Alsheich)
2) THE SOURCE FOR THE LIABILITY OF A "SHO'EL" FOR "GENEIVAH V'AVEIDAH"
Why does the Gemara need a Limud to teach that a Sho'el is obligated for Geneivah and Aveidah? A Sho'el's degree of liability certainly includes that of a Shomer Sachar. Since the liability of Shomer Sachar for Geneivah v'Aveidah is already known, a Sho'el certainly should be obligated as well. (RIVASH #279)
ANSWERS:
(b) The Rivash answers further that it is necessary to have an independent source to teach that a Sho'el is obligated for Geneivah and Aveidah because without such a source it would have been logical to assume that he would be exempt. If a Sho'el would be liable for Geneivah and Aveidah because he is no less accountable than a Shomer Sachar, it would emerge that he is not the sole beneficiary of the arrangement; the owner of the object would also benefit because his object would be guarded by a Shomer Sachar. The Gemara, however, states that in a case of She'eilah, the Sho'el is the sole beneficiary ("Kol ha'Hana'ah Shelo"), and that is why a Sho'el is liable for Onsin. Hence, the liability of a Sho'el for Geneivah and Aveidah cannot be due to the fact that he is also a Shomer Sachar, and the Gemara must find a different source to establish that a Sho'el is liable for Geneivah and Aveidah. Without such a source, it would have been logical to understand that the Torah in fact exempts a Sho'el from such liability so that he will have an absolute status of "Kol ha'Hana'ah Shelo." (A similar answer is suggested by the TESHUVOS HA'RAN, cited by the SHACH CM 72:11. Similarly, the MACHANEH EFRAIM, Hilchos She'eilah #3, writes that a Sho'el who borrows Sifrei Kodesh is not the sole beneficiary of the She'eilah because the lender also benefits from the "Perutah d'Rav Yosef" when others are learning Torah from his books.) (I. Alsheich)
3) THE MORE IMPORTANT TYPE OF "HALACHAH"
The MAHARATZ CHAYOS asks that an opposite idea is found elsewhere in the Gemara. The Gemara in Nedarim (3a) and Yevamos (2a) says that the Mishnayos there (2a) prefer to teach the laws that are derived through a Limud and are not written explicitly in the Torah, because "since it is derived through a Derashah, it is beloved [to the Tana]" (see also Bava Kama 17b, Bava Basra 108b, and elsewhere). How are these opposing Gemaras to be reconciled?
ANSWER: The MAHARATZ CHAYOS answers that in Nedarim and Yevamos, the Mishnah teaches both Halachos -- that which is derived through a Limud, and that which is written explicitly in the Torah. It merely teaches that which is derived through a Limud first. He explains this based on the words of RAV MOSHE KAZIS (in SEFER KIN'AS SOFRIM, and as cited by the YAD MALACHI #11) who asks why the Gemara there (Nedarim and Yevamos) says that "since [a Halachah] is derived through a Derashah, it is beloved?" It would have seemed more logical for the Gemara to say that such a Halachah is "more important." Rav Moshe Kazis explains that when one derives a Halachah through his own toil in applying the methods of Halachic derivation, that Halachah is more cherished and beloved to him because of the effort he exerted to learn it. Based on this, the Maharatz Chayos explains that in Nedarim and Yevamos, where the Tana teaches both Halachos, he prefers to write the one that is "beloved to him" first. That Halachah, though, is not more important than a Halachah written explicitly in the Torah, but is merely more beloved. Here, where the Mishnah mentions only one Halachah, it chooses the Halachah which is written explicitly in the Torah, for that indeed is the "more important" one to teach.
(Although this explains why the Mishnah in Nedarim explains the laws of Yados first, it does not explain why the Gemara in Nedarim says that the Mishnah there first mentions the Halachah that is explicit in the Torah (i.e. Kinuyim), and only afterward mentions that which is learned from a Derashah. The BEIS YOSEF, in his commentary to Halichos Olam, KLALEI HA'GEMARA 3:19, discusses this. See HALICHOS OLAM there, and see also YAVIN SHEMU'AH there.) (I. Alsheich)
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