Implied Question: One cannot say that it is permitted to work with Kilayim because money exchanged for them are not forbidden from benefit. (Why not?)

Answer: If so, how could the Gemara originally have brought a proof from Kilayim to Yayin Nesech?

Explanation: Rather, this is certainly referring to Kilai Zera'im.

Proof: This is also implied from the fact that the Beraisa quotes the Pasuk, "You field you should not plant Kilayim" (which refers to Kilai Zera'im) when discussing this law.

Observation: Therefore, there is no proof from here that Kilayim apply to produce of Nochrim, as this is clearly referring to Eretz Yisrael. If it were talking about Chutz la'Aretz, Kilai Zera'im are even permitted to Jews in Chutz la'Aretz. If so, we can push this aside by saying that it is according to the opinion who says that there is no acquisition by a Nochri in Eretz Yisrael (and therefore Kilayim applies because of Eretz Yisrael despite the fact that it is owned by a Nochri).

Explanation: This means that it is even according to Rebbi Akiva. If it is according to the Rabbanan alone, why say that one can work to uproot it? He can even work keeping it extant! Rather, the Beraisa stated he can work to uproot it to be according to everyone, even Rebbi Akiva.

Explanation (cont.): Similarly, the first part of the Beraisa which said that one cannot dig is according to everyone, and even the Rabbanan. According to Rebbi Akiva, it could have said one cannot work to keep the Kilayim extant, and certainly one cannot dig to help it.

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that he made a fence of thorns to keep them extant.

Proof: His explanation is correct, as in Makos (21b) the Gemara proves that Rebbi Akiva holds that a negative prohibition that does not involve an action does not make one liable to receive lashes. (Accordingly, there has to be an action for Rebbi Akiva to say he receives lashes.)

Explanation #2: This is unlike the explanation of the Aruch who explains that allowing Kilayim to be extant means letting it grow in his field makes him liable to receive lashes. This is according to the opinion that a negative prohibition that does not involve an action does make one liable to receive lashes.

Question: How did the Gemara entertain proving that uprooting would be forbidden, if we discount the logic that getting rid of prohibited items is better, being that he wants the forbidden items to be extant so he can be paid to get rid of them because they are forbidden to keep? In this case he is doing an action by making a fence, as opposed to the case of Yayin Nesech where there is no action involving the forbidden item at all!

Answer: Even so, his thoughts make this into an action, being that he is doing an action at the end when he destroys it. Certainly, if he does not uproot it he does not transgress anything, being that he is not doing any clear action with the item itself. However, if he uproots it he is showing that he wants it. Therefore, it would be prohibited as it is similar to keeping it extant, were it not for the logic that getting rid of prohibited items is better.

Implied Question: It also could have proven this from Rebbi Yehudah. (Why didn't it?)

Answer: Rather, the Gemara wants to conclude with Rebbi Akiva, as it started saying this was according to Rebbi Akiva.

Observation: It appears that the reason for idolatry giving its status to the money exchanged for it is because the Pasuk states, "And it will be Cheirem like it." This indicates that whatever comes to a person because of it is forbidden just like the law of the idolatry itself. However, this Pasuk is specifically regarding a Jew and not a Nochri.

Implied Question: Earlier (12a), we said money of idolatry (belonging to a Nochri) is forbidden. (How can we reconcile this apparent contradiction?)

Answer: This is specifically when he intends to but another idol with this money. However, if he is coming to convert or pay back loans to a Jew, the money is permitted. (See Avodah Berurah at length regarding the logic behind this difference.)

Implied Question: He did not tell them to nullify it by breaking it and then selling it after they convert. (Why not?)

Answer: This is because their plans were to sell it whole to those who worshipped it.

Implied Question: The Gemara states earlier (53a) that if a Nochri sells an idol to those who worship this idol, he has not nullified it. (Why, then, is this considered nullification? See Maharsha who says that this question is only according to the Gemara's question later.)

Answer: Our Gemara is different. Being that their mindset was to convert, they do not consider it an idol and clearly nullify it. Therefore, the proceeds are not considered money exchanged for idolatry.

Question: Rebbi Elchanan asked that this is understandable regarding idols that can be nullified. They can sell them, and the money is permitted. However, one cannot nullify Yayin Nesech. Yet we see that Rabah told them to sell everything they have!

Question (cont.): If so, we should answer our question. When the Beraisa states that a Yisrael who is owed money by a Nochri who mentions that he has an idol or Yayin Neech that he is going to sell to pay the debt etc., it implies that idols and Yayin Nesech share the same law. One cannot say that the reason behind this leniency is nullification, as it is not possible to nullify Yayin Nesech.

Answer: It was always more apparent to them that there is more room to be lenient with Yayin Nesech than with money of idolatry which is a more stringent prohibition.

Observation: Rabeinu Yitzchak noted that the phrase, "Wait for me" implies that you cannot collect your debt from another place, and you must wait for me to sell these forbidden goods. This is certainly forbidden due to his wanting the forbidden items to exist. For example, the case could be where there is no guarantor on the debt, and he indeed has no other possessions from which he could collect the debt.

Observation (cont.): However, if he has a guarantor or he can pay the debt from another place the statement of this Nochri is meaningless. Otherwise, every Nochri can get out of paying a Jew by saying this!

Explanation: The Beraisa is similar to the answer of Rav Papa that the Rabbanan were lenient regarding the inheritance of a convert.

Implied Question: There is no proof to Rav Papa from the first part of the Beraisa quoted previously that if a convert and Nochri inherit their father together, the convert can tell his brother to take the idolatry as his portion of the inheritance. (Why wasn't this sufficient proof to Rav Papa?)

Answer: I would think that this law is due to the ability to choose retroactively (what each brother had passed down to him by his father). However, this Beraisa which discusses their being partners clearly shows that the leniency is not due to choosing retroactively, as otherwise even their partnership should be able to be split up in a retroactive manner (with the forbidden items belonging to the Nochri).

Observation: Due to this, we find that the Gemara in Kidushin (17b), after proving that the inheritance of a convert is a Rabbinic concept from the Beraisa involving a convert and Nochri inheriting their father, quotes another Beraisa showing that the first Beraisa cannot be brushed aside as being due to choosing retroactively.

Implied Question: The Gemara earlier (42a) states that a Jew should have been able to nullify the idol of a Nochri, were it not for the suspicion that he will pick it up (i.e. acquire it) and only then nullify it. (This is against our Gemara's logic that only one who serves idolatry can nullify it. How can we explain this apparent contradiction?)

Answer: This is specifically according to Rebbi Shimon ben Lakish. Rebbi Yochanan argues on him (and our Gemara is according to Rebbi Yochanan).

Observation: The Gemara concludes that this is regarding helping him stay alive.

Question: Isn't he liable to be killed right when he transgresses one of the seven Noahide laws, as the warning not to transgress them causes them to be killed, even without witnesses and warning? (How can there be an opinion that he only has to be careful not to serve idols?)

Answer: As long as Beis Din does not judge him he is not liable to be killed.

Proof: This is clearly true, as the Gemara states earlier that idolaters are not saved nor killed. (It must be referring to those who have not been judged by Beis Din.)

Explanation: It must be that the opinion "Acheirim" found here is not Rebbi Meir, as Rebbi Meir argues on this opinion.

Proof: We indeed have found in many other places that "Acherim" argue with Rebbi Meir. We similarly find that Yesh Omrim argue on Rebbi Nasan (despite the fact that "v'Yesh Omrim" usually mean Rebbi Nasan.)

Opinion #1: Rashi explains that this is because he is not careful that idolaters should not touch the wine.

Question: Rabeinu Tam asked about this that if this is so, even to set aside wine by him for the amount of time that it takes to walk one Mil or slightly more, as (the term "Meyachdin" is) explained by Rashi himself, should be forbidden!

Question (cont.): The Gemara must be referring to a case where he informed the Ger Toshav that he is leaving for a short while. If he did not tell him this, it would even be permitted to leave the wine by an idolater (as he thinks he is coming back any second)! If (Rashi's reason in (a) is) so, why shouldn't we suspect that an idolater who is often in the Ger Toshav's shop will not touch the wine, being that the Ger Toshav is not stringent about stopping an idolater from doing so!

Opinion #2: Rabeinu Tam therefore understands that the correct explanation is the explanation that Rashi himself corrected in his commentary. Rashi erased his previous term "he is not careful," and instead inserted "he is not careful about a long time," as one must suspect that he will switch it with his own wine which is forbidden, as the second part of the Beraisa states that his wine and oil is forbidden.

Observation: It appears that Rashi retracted his first reason for the following reason. Being that we say that the reason his wine is forbidden is similar to why his oil is forbidden, the implication is that it is only forbidden due to a suspicion that a Jew will come to marry his daughter. If he was not careful about idolaters touching his wine, it would seem we should forbid his wine because it itself is prohibited!

Observation (cont.): However, a Jew can leave wine in his shop for the amount of time it takes him to walk a Mil or slightly more, as opposed to an idolater. Being that he does not bow to idols he did not touch the wine or pour it. This is what was stated in Rashi's commentary.

Opinion: Rashi added in his editing that we do not suspect that an idolater who is in his house will touch the wine. Being that the Ger Toshav does not benefit from this touching, he does not allow it. We also do not suspect that the wine will be switched in such a small amount of time.

Opinion (cont.): According to this explanation, we cannot clearly prove that we would permit wine touched by a Ger Toshav to be consumed by a Jew.

Answer: The explanation of Rashi can be answered by saying that the first case of "Ain Mafidin" means that one cannot put wine in the house of the Ger Toshav because he is not careful about touching, as idolaters often enter his house. This is despite the fact that his wine is indeed like his oil. This means that while he is careful about idolaters touching his own wine, as indicated by the fact that it is permitted for benefit (due to Chasnus, not idolatry), he is not careful that idolaters should not touch the Jew's wine.

Answer (cont.): Alternatively, we only say that his wine is like his oil when we know that the idolater did not touch it.

Answer (cont.): However, the case of "Meyachdin," where wine is set aside in his (the Jew's) store, is even when he informs the Ger Toshav that he is walking a Mil or slightly more. In this small amount of time there is no reason to suspect that an idolater will touch the wine, as the idolaters do not normally come to his (the Jew's) store. We do not suspect he will touch the wine being that he does not bow down or our wine. We also do not suspect that he will steal wine to drink, being that he has accepted the seven Noahide laws (one of them being not to steal).

Implied Question: However, Rebbi Meir says that a Ger Toshav only accepts not to serve idols. (How does this help regarding his not being suspected of stealing?)

Answer: One must say that even though they decreed that his wine is forbidden, they did not decree that if he touches wine of a Jew that the wine becomes forbidden.

Opinion #3: However, Rabeinu Yitzchak writes that "Meyachdin" means one can keep wine by the Ger Toshav even in a city which is mostly comprised of idolaters. This means that if the Ger Toshav touches the wine, it can still be consumed.

Implied Question: The Beraisa does not explicitly state that if a Ger Toshav touches a Jew's wine that it remains permitted. (Why not?)

Answer: It is teaching that even in a city that is mostly comprised of idolaters we do not suspect that an idolater will touch the wine, despite the fact that mostly idolaters are found there. This is because the wine is only there for a small amount of time. Rabeinu Yitzchak understands the case of "Ain Mafkidin" the same way as does Rashi in his edited explanation.

Opinion (cont.): Rabeinu Yehudah wrote that there was once an incident regarding a convert who had a Bris Milah but did not immerse in a Mikvah properly. He was in a Jew's house for many days, and he touched the Jew's wine. Rabeinu Yitzchak permitted the wine to be consumed based on his understanding that wine touched by a Ger Toshav is permitted to be consumed. Certainly, then, this convert who accepted Mitzvos (and was merely not yet able to immerse) should not cause the wine to become forbidden!

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that we said earlier (57a) that servants and sons of maidservants who had a Bris but did not immerse cause wine to become Yayin Nesech. (How is this different?)

Answer: This is because the fear of their master causes them to convert, and they do not convert with a complete heart, as explained earlier (57a) regarding being steeped in idolatry.

Proof #1: Another proof to this can be found in the Gemara earlier (59a) regarding converts who had a Bris Milah and did not immerse. Rebbi Yochanan said that people should announce that their sons are Mamzerim. Even though they probably touched wine he was not stringent about this, although he was stringent there regarding a case where an idolater mixed wine and a Jew drank it. (In other words, he was dealing with forbidding wine as well, but did not forbid the wine of these people.)

Proof #2: Another proof is that the rule is that one should be lenient regarding Rabbinic law, which means that we can rely on the opinion that the regular wine of a Ger Toshav is permitted to drink, and so too (certainly) if they touch wine.

Explanation: Even according to the opinion in the Beraisa that their wine is like their oil, it is only because of Chasnus (suspicion of being a cause of intermarriage). However, there is no reason to worry about his touching wine of a Jew.

Opinion: Even so, Rabeinu Yitzchak did not want to be lenient. (The Yavetz explains that this either means that he himself did not rely on this leniency, or he did not permit this Lechatchilah. Tosfos earlier clearly stated that he did permit this regarding the convert who had a Bris but did not immerse in a Mikvah.)