(Mishnah - R. Yehudah): The general rule is, if intent Chutz li'Zmano came first, it is Pigul, and there is Kares.

Question: According to R. Yochanan, 'the general rule' comes to include intents in one Avodah. According to Ilfa, what does this come to include?

This is left difficult.

(Mishnah - R. Meir): If Reuven said 'this (Chulin) animal is Temuras (in place of an) Olah, Temuras Shelamim', it is Temuras Olah (i.e. it is an Olah);

R. Yosi says, if he meant to say both from the beginning, they both take effect (the animal will be sold, and half the money is used to buy an Olah, and half to buy a Shelamim). Since he cannot say them simultaneously, there is no reason to favor his first words;

If after saying 'Temuras Olah' he reconsidered and said 'Temuras Shelamim', it is an Olah.

Question: If he said 'Temuras Olah v'Shelamim', what is the law?

Version #1 (Rashi) Question: If he said 'l'Chatzos' (half should be Temuras Olah, half should be Temuras Shelamim), what is the law?

Version #2 (R. Chananel): If he said 'l'Chatzos' (at midday it should become Temuras Olah v'Shelamim, so they take effect simultaneously), what is the law? (end of Version #2)

Answer #1 (Abaye): Surely, even R. Meir agrees that both take effect.

Question (Rava): This is like different intents in Shechitah, and R. Yehudah (argues with Chachamim and) says that we follow the first intent (and R. Meir holds like him)!

Answer (Abaye): You assume that Shechitah is instantaneous (i.e. cutting up to half the Simanim is only preparation. Cutting Mashehu (an arbitrarily small amount) past half is the actual Shechitah. Therefore, both intents take effect simultaneously at the moment Shechitah is finished);

You are wrong. The entire cutting (of the Simanim, until the majority is cut) is considered Shechitah. (Therefore, the intents take effect one after the other.)

Question (Rava): 'L'Chatzos' is like different intents in Kemitzah (which is instantaneous), and R. Yehudah says that we follow the first intent!

Answer (Abaye): The case is, he had one intent when burning the Kometz, and the other intent later, when burning the frankincense.

Question (Rava): R. Yehudah argues even about Kemitzah of a Minchas Chotei (which has no frankincense)!

Answer #1 (Abaye): No, he agrees in that case.

Answer #2 (Rav Ashi): We could say that he argues when the intents came during different steps (while bringing the Kometz to the Mizbe'ach).

Rav Simi Bar Ashi taught a Beraisa like Abaye (if he said 'l'Chatzos', even R. Meir agrees that both take effect). Rav Huna bar Noson taught a Beraisa like Rava (even if he said 'l'Chatzos', R. Meir holds that the first takes effect).

(Rav Dimi): R. Meir holds like R. Yehudah. We follow the first thing said.

(Mishnah - R. Yehudah): The general rule is, if intent Chutz li'Zmano came first, it is Pigul, and there is Kares.

Question (Abaye): Rabah bar bar Chanah cited R. Yochanan to say that R. Meir and R. Yosi do not argue.

Objection: They do argue!

Answer: He means, they argue only about what they explicitly argue about, but not whether we follow the first thing said.

(R. Yitzchak bar Yosef): All agree that if he said 'this should take effect (Temuras Olah), and then this (Temuras Shelamim)', the latter does not take effect;

All agree that if he said 'this should not take effect unless this also takes effect', both take effect;

They argue when he said 'Temuras Olah Temuras Shelamim':

R. Meir says, (if he wanted both to take effect) he should have said 'Temuras Olah v'Shelamim.' Since he did not say this, this shows that he tried to retract (but he cannot);

R. Yosi says, he did not say 'Temuras Olah v'Shelamim', for this would imply that half is Temuras Olah, and half is Temuras Shelamim (he knows that this cannot be offered);

He intended that the entire animal be Temurah of an Olah and also of a Shelamim. (He thought that this can be offered.)

Answer (Rav Dimi): I argue with Rabah bar bar Chanah. I say that R. Meir argues with R. Yosi (about whether we follow the first thing said).

Question (Ula): Is the text of our Mishnah 'k'Zayis (tomorrow) k'Zayis (Chutz li'Mkomo)', or 'k'Zayis vek'Zayis?

If it is the former, only in this case R. Yehudah follows the first intent, but if he said k'Zayis vek'Zayis, the intents are mixed, so R. Yehudah admits that there is no Kares.

If it is the latter, R. Yehudah considers even this to be Prata (separate intents), and all the more so he says so about k'Zayis k'Zayis.

Answer: We learn from the following.

Levi: If one intended (to eat the same) k'Zayis tomorrow b'Chutz (li'Mkomo), what is the law?

Rebbi: That is a fine question! It is Pasul, and there is no Kares.

R. Shimon b'Rebbi: Why was it a good question? We already learn this from our Mishnah!

(Mishnah): If he said 'k'Zayis b'Chutz, k'Zayis tomorrow', or vice-versa, or 'half a k'Zayis b'Chutz, and half a k'Zayis tomorrow', or vice-versa, it is Pasul, and there is no Kares; (R. Yehudah says, if intent Chutz li'Zmano came first, it is Pigul, and there is Kares).

They argue about intents for different k'Zeisim, but all agree that intents about the same k'Zayis are Klala (mixed), there is no Kares!

Rebbi: Based on what I taught him, he asked properly.

I taught you (R. Shimon) two cases (of Prata, k'Zayis k'Zayis and k'Zayis vek'Zayis). You properly inferred that the third case (intents about the same k'Zayis) is Klala;

I taught Levi one case (of Prata). He heard Rabanan saying two cases. He was unsure whether I was precise with him (the second case is Klala), and Rabanan (mistakenly) extrapolated to the second case, or if I taught both to them, and I omitted teaching to him one of them.

Question: Which case did Rebbi teach to Levi?

Suggestion: He taught to him k'Zayis vek'Zayis.

Rejection: If so, Levi would have known that all the more so, k'Zayis k'Zayis (is Prata)!

Answer: He taught him to k'Zayis k'Zayis.

Question: If Levi was unsure about k'Zayis vek'Zayis, why didn't he ask about it?

Answer: It was better to ask 'k'Zayis tomorrow b'Chutz', for he will learn two things from the answer;

Had he asked k'Zayis vek'Zayis, and Rebbi would answer that it is Klala, Levi would indeed know that all the more so, k'Zayis tomorrow b'Chutz is Klala;

However, if Rebbi would answer that it is Prata, he would not know k'Zayis tomorrow b'Chutz.

Question: The same applies to asking k'Zayis tomorrow b'Chutz!

If Rebbi would answer that it is Prata, Levi would indeed know that all the more so, k'Zayis ve'k'Zayis tomorrow b'Chutz is Prata;

However, if Rebbi would answer that it is Klala, Levi would not know k'Zayis ve'k'Zayis!

Answer: Levi could derive this from Rebbi's response. (Levi's question implies that Levi is sure that k'Zayis vek'Zayis is Prata).

If k'Zayis vek'Zayis is indeed Prata, Rebbi would not be angry.

However, if k'Zayis vek'Zayis is Klala, Rebbi would be angry that Levi did not infer this (from the fact that Rebbi taught to him only k'Zayis k'Zayis), and rather assumed the opposite!