One should not say, "I am disgusted by pig's meat; I have no desire to wear clothing containing Shaatnez [= a mix of wool and linen threads]." He should rather say, "I would like to do these things, but what can I do? My Heavenly Father has forbidden me from doing them!" How do we know that this is the proper attitude to adopt? Because it states (Vayikra 20:26), "I have separated you from the other nations to be Mine," which implies that our separation from these other nations should be solely for Hashem's sake. One should refrain from the forbidden act in such a manner that he accepts the yoke of Heaven upon himself.

(Rashi, quoting from Sifra)

The Rambam, in his introduction to Pirkei Avot (which is commonly known as Shemoneh Perakim), Ch. 6, mentions that the ancient philosophers held the opposite to be true. These philosophers maintain that it is more virtuous for someone to completely excise any desire for forbidden behavior from his mind than to foster such desires and constantly strive to overcome them. The Rambam notes that this position seems to be borne out by Biblical verses: "The soul of the wicked desires evil" (Mishlei 21:10); "Doing justice is a joy for the righteous, but it is a dread for evildoers" (ibid. 21:15). How, then, can the outlook of the Rabbis in the Midrash, that one should not perform Mitzvos because of logical reasons, be reconciled with that of the philosophers (and the Tanach)? Should one strive to make hatred of sin a part of one's psyche, or is it preferable to have a desire for sin and successfully conquer this desire?

The Rambam explains that actually both approaches are correct, depending upon the situation. Torah prohibitions which are considered "ethical" and "logical," such as murder, theft, cheating, etc. are obviously to be eschewed even had the Torah not told us so openly. Thus, it is better for us to develop within ourselves a strong aversion to these actions. For those Torah prohibitions which are "non-rational" -- i.e. they have no independent logical basis other than the fact that they are the Torah's commands, such as the dietary laws, wearing Shaatnez, etc. -- we are told that we should not condition ourselves to despise these acts, but rather we should refrain from them solely for the sake of Heaven.

The distinction which the Rambam makes may be explained as follows. Hashem instilled in human nature the tendency to feel noble and virtuous when performing a morally correct deed for another person, and to feel guilty when acting dishonorably towards another. There is an authentic "good feeling" that one experiences as a result of performing such Mitzvot. This physical feeling of pleasure, then, is just a sign that Hashem is bidding us to perform this act for *spiritual* reasons. The element that makes the deed a Mitzvah -- its moral correctness -- is the same element that gives us pleasure in its performance. A sense of aversion toward dealing dishonestly thus does not interfere with one's intent to serve the Creator through refraining from dishonesty.

With "non-rational" Mitzvot, however, there is no such natural exalted feeling when these acts are performed. A distaste for the meat of non-kosher animals stems only from the meat's physical flavor, an entirely mundane experience. Developing a physical loathing towards these prohibitions would therefore detract from one's purity of intent to serve Heaven alone. This explains the Rambam's approach to the Midrash with which we started.

The Maharal develops this theme further, stating that it is even incorrect to keep the Mitzvot on the grounds that they teach us moral behavior. Although ethical conduct is certainly a praiseworthy, spiritual goal, it is not the purpose of the prohibitions of the Torah. For example, the prohibition of not slaughtering a calf and its mother on the same day (Vayikra 22:28) was not meant to instill in us compassion. This is evidenced by the fact that the prohibition applies only to domestic animals -- not to animals of the wild, such as deer. Also, one is permitted to slaughter the mother even one minute after its child, provided that the sun sets during that minute. Obviously, says Maharal, the reasons Hashem gave us the "non-rational" Mitzvot are more esoteric than we think. A true understanding of the Torah's rationale is attained only by a select few of the greatest scholars. (This sounds like a hint to a Kabbalistic derivation of the Mitzvot -MK.) Since the Mitzvot obviously weren't given exclusively to such scholars, Hashem could not have intended that we perform the Mitzvot for their *real*, deeper reasons. He must have intended that we perform the Mitzvot simply because they are His will in this world, without understanding why. *Any* other motivation for keeping the Mitzvot, would detract from the purity of our intent.

In fact, textual support for the Maharal's understanding can be found in the Midrash itself. The Sifra quoted above ends off by saying, "One should refrain from the forbidden act in a manner that he accepts the yoke of Heaven upon himself," implying that *any* motive one may have for performing a Mitzvah other than to show submission to Hashem, is to be discouraged.

The words of the Maharal in no way contradicts the Rambam's dichotomy between the different types of Mitzvot. According to the Maharal's interpretation of the Midrash, the distinction between "ethical" and "non-rational" Mitzvot ought to be explained as follows. When the Torah commands us not to murder, steal, act deceitfully, etc., it is clear that the Torah intends these rules for the benefit of society. They are not designed to be a medium through which we show our subordination to Hashem. But those commandments which are not based on rational, pre-existing notions, are designed to bring us to the realization that he must submit our will to that of Hashem. We must learn to obey the Divine word even when we have no idea as to the reason behind a particular command. Assigning other explanations for the performance of Mitzvot undermines the essential function of this class of Mitzvot -- to teach us that we must submit ourselves totally to Hashem's will.

How can this be reconciled with the Sages' statement in the Sifra quoted above? Aren't all rationales and physical explanations incorrect and to be shunned? Conversely, if so many reasons *have* been found over the ages to explain the Mitzvot, why does the Sifra insist that the reasons for the Mitzvot are irrelevant? Why can't we base the performance of the Mitzvot on some of these suggested reasons?

For example, let us assume that the reason the Torah prescribes its particular method of slaughter of animals is to minimize the pain to the animal. Nevertheless, we find that a calf that emerges from its mother's womb after the mother was slaughtered is considered to be already slaughtered itself. This calf may be killed and eaten in *any* manner, as Shechitah was already performed on it, as far as the Halacha is concerned. It may even be killed even in a cruel manner! If the Torah instituted the law of Shechitah out of consideration of the animal's pain, why not apply the law to this calf as well?

Another example would be what we have mentioned above. A calf and its mother may be slaughtered one minute apart, as long as they are separated by the halachic start of a new day -- sunset. Obviously, the rationale offered to explain a Mitzvah in the Torah applies only to the general commandment and not to the many details attached to it.

My father-in-law, Hagaon Rav Gedalyah Rabinowitz, augmented the Moreh Nevuchim's statement. The reasons for the Mitzvot, he explains, are learned from the manner in which the Mitzvot are presented in the *Written* Law -- i.e., the *appearance* of the Mitzvot as they are recorded in the Torah. Only the broader, more general view of the Mitzvot appears there. Hashem recorded the Mitzvot in the Torah in such a manner that clear, moral lessons can be learned from each and every one of them. However, the details outlined in the *Oral* Law, which affect the actual performance of the Mitzvot, are not necessarily explained by the reasons that have been offered for the Mitzvot. (Perhaps there is a need for clear-cut Halachic categories and guidelines when it comes to performance. This sometimes makes it necessary to define the law for certain situations in a way that is counter to the general objective of the Mitzvah -MK)

We may now suggest the following: Every Mitzvah has important lessons to teach us, or meaningful values to convey. The lessons, however, are learned from the Mitzvah as it is *described* by the Written Law, i.e., from the *general* structure of the Mitzvah. It is these lessons to which the Torah refers by saying "The Torah will make you look wise and knowledgeable in the eyes of all the nations."

The Midrash that says one should *not* seek ulterior, logical reasons for the Mitzvot, on the other hand, was discussing the *performance* of the Mitzvot. Whatever reasons may be offered for the Mitzvot -- and there are many such reasons -- they will not be able to account for all of the details of the performance of the Mitzvot. If pig's meat is prohibited for health reasons, why is putrid cow's meat permitted? The only way to explain the "non-rational" Mitzvot *as they are performed* -- i.e., with all of the details gleaned from the Oral Law -- is to understand these Mitzvos as a means by which we can show our subordination to Hashem's will. This is what the Midrash means by telling us to "refrain from the forbidden act solely for My sake"!

It is well known that the Mitzvot may be divided into two categories: those between Man and G-d, and those between Man and his fellow. Before we perform any Mitzvah of the first category we recite a blessing: "Blessed is Hashem ... Who has sanctified us through His Mitzvot and commanded us to eat Matzah/ don Tefillin/ separate Challah, etc." Why is there no blessing for Mitzvot done between Man and his fellow? Why do we not praise Hashem for sanctifying us by commanding us to give charity to the needy/ to visit the sick/ to attend to the dead, etc.? The Rashba (in a responsum, vol. 1 #18) suggests that a blessing cannot be said in these cases because the recipient of the favor may refuse the act of kindness offered to him. Since kindness is thus not an absolute obligation, we cannot apply to it the phrase, "Who has *commanded* us to ...."

According to what we have outlined above (section II), however, a different answer may be suggested. The "ethical" Mitzvot were given to us in order to inculcate in us the values that they teach, while the purpose of the "non-rational" Mitzvot is to remind us of G-d's mastery. Announcing that we are dealing kindly with another person "because we were commanded to do so," would diminish the Mitzvah! We should follow these Mitzvot because we yearn to do them, because we have conditioned ourselves to value such behavior. It is only with the "non-rational" Mitzvot that we are expected to declare that we are doing them because, and only because, "Hashem sanctified us through His Mitzvot and commanded us to ...."

May we all merit to serve Hashem with all our hearts, and to love each other with all our inner feelings!