QUESTION: Reish Lakish says that when the Kemitzah of the Minchas ha'Omer is performed she'Lo Lishmah (not with intent that it is a Minchas ha'Omer), the Korban Minchah still is valid and may be offered, but it does not permit the newly harvested grain from the Isur of Chadash, and thus another Minchas ha'Omer must be brought.

The Gemara asks, how can Reish Lakish permit the Kohanim to eat the Shirayim of the Minchas ha'Omer that was offered she'Lo Lishmah if, when it was offered, it did not serve to permit Chadash? At the time it was offered, its flour was prohibited, and thus it should not be a valid Korban altogether. The Minchas ha'Omer must be brought from grain that a person is permitted to eat, as derived from the verse in Yechezkel (45:15). Why, then, may it be offered as a valid Minchah?

Why does the Gemara not ask a more obvious question on the ruling of Reish Lakish? The Mishnah later (68b, and cited on 5b) states that any Korban Minchah offered before the Minchas ha'Omer is invalid. The Gemara should ask why Reish Lakish rules that the first Minchah (for which the Kemitzah was done she'Lo Lishmah) is valid if it is being offered before the actual Minchas ha'Omer. Why does the Gemara question Reish Lakish's statement from a statement of another Amora and not from an explicit Mishnah? (KEREN ORAH)

ANSWER: The BRISKER RAV (cited by the MINCHAS AVRAHAM) answers that the basis for the Halachah of the Mishnah later is not the verse in Yechezkel which requires that the Minchah be brought from grain that is permitted to a Yisrael to eat. Rather, it is based on an entirely different source which is not relevant to Reish Lakish's ruling.

The Matir (the permitting factor) which permits new grain for ordinary consumption is the Minchas ha'Omer, and the Matir which permits new grain for being offered as Menachos is the Shtei ha'Lechem. The Brisker Rav proves that the Omer is also necessary as a Matir for grain to be offered as Menachos. The Torah calls the Omer the "first" Minchah (Vayikra 23:10), which implies that any other Minchah brought before the Omer is Pasul, because no other Minchah is permitted to be the "first." This is the reason why the Mishnah later says that any Minchah that brought before the Omer is Pasul; it is not because that Minchah is not permitted to a Yisrael to eat, but rather that Minchah is being brought first, before the Omer.

This novel understanding of the Mishnah answers the question of the Keren Orah. The Gemara could not have questioned Reish Lakish's ruling from the Mishnah later that says that any Minchah brought before the Omer is Pasul, because that Mishnah is not relevant to Reish Lakish's case. The Gemara here is discussing an Omer which is offered she'Lo Lishmah, but which nevertheless retains its title as a Korban Minchas ha'Omer (as is evident from the fact that it is forbidden for the Kohen to continue performing the Avodos of this offering she'Lo Lishmah -- "Asur l'Shenuyei" (2a)). As long as this offering retains its title of a Minchas ha'Omer, the law that it must be the first Minchah offered does not change. Therefore, it cannot be Pasul because of the Halachah of the Mishnah later which says that any Minchah brought before the Omer is Pasul; this offering is the Omer with regard to the requirement that it be offered first.

The Gemara therefore questions Reish Lakish only from the Halachah that the verse in Yechezkel requires that the Minchas ha'Omer be fit for ordinary consumption. Since, in the case of Reish Lakish, the Isur Chadash has not yet been removed, the Minchah is prohibited to be eaten and thus it should be Pasul. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)

QUESTION: The Gemara quotes the Mishnah later (68b) that states that if a Korban Minchah is brought from the new harvest before the Minchas ha'Omer is brought, then it is Pasul. Rebbi Yitzchak says in the name of Reish Lakish that the Korban Minchah is Pasul only when it is brought on the fourteenth or fifteenth of Nisan. If it is brought before the Omer on the sixteenth of Nisan, then it is valid b'Di'eved. The Gemara proves from this statement that Reish Lakish maintains that "He'ir ha'Mizrach" -- the coming of dawn of the sixteenth of Nisan -- is the Matir which permits the new grain, and it is not the actual Omer offering that permits it. Therefore, a Korban Minchah offered on the sixteenth of Nisan, before the Omer, is valid, since it is not subject anymore to the Isur of Chadash.

The SHITAH MEKUBETZES questions the Gemara's proof that Reish Lakish maintains that "He'ir ha'Mizrach" permits Chadash. Perhaps the new grain remains Asur until the Minchas ha'Omer is offered, and the reason why a Korban Minchah brought before the Minchas ha'Omer on the sixteenth of Nisan is valid is that Reish Lakish maintains that "Ein Mechusar Zeman l'Vo va'Yom." The Gemara earlier (5a) uses this logic to explain why a Korban Omer offered she'Lo Lishmah is valid, even though the Isur of Chadash is not removed. This logic dictates that since, on this day, Chadash will become Mutar, it is considered Mutar already from the beginning of the day. Accordingly, perhaps Reish Lakish maintains that the reason why the Minchah brought before the Omer is valid is that the Omer eventually will be brought on this day and permit Chadash.

ANSWER: It is clear that the question of the Shitah Mekubetzes is based on the understanding that the purpose of the Omer offering is to remove the Isur of Chadash. Accordingly, since the day is not considered "Mechusar Zeman," on the day that the Omer is brought the Isur Chadash is considered to have been removed from the beginning of the day.

However, the BRISKER RAV proposes that the purpose of the Omer is not merely to remove the Isur of Chadash to permit the new grain for ordinary consumption. The Brisker Rav suggests that the Omer is necessary also to permit Menachos brought from the new grain to be offered (as discussed in the previous Insight). Therefore, the Omer must be the first Minchah offering that is brought.

According to this logic, the question of the Shitah Mekubetzes is not applicable. If there is an order of precedence for bringing Minchah offerings, then the logic of "Ein Mechusar Zeman l'Vo va'Yom" is not relevant. The Omer must be brought first, and only afterwards may other Menachos be brought. The Menachos must be brought according to this order. When the Omer is offered after another Minchah, the logic of "Ein Mechusar Zeman" cannot change the actual order and make it as if the Omer was offered before the Minchah that was actually offered first. Only in the previous Sugya (5a), where the question was whether or not the Minchah is considered permitted for ordinary consumption, does the logic of "Ein Mechusar Zeman" apply and state that since, later on in the day, it will become Mutar, it is considered Mutar now with regard to being a valid Korban Minchah. The Gemara here, however, is discussing a specific order, and thus the logic of "Ein Mechusar Zeman" does not apply. Consequently, the fact that Reish Lakish validates a Minchah brought before the Omer proves that he maintains that Chadash becomes Mutar at "He'ir ha'Mizrach." (See MINCHAS AVRAHAM, p. 48.) (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)