Implied Question: Why does our Mishnah rule that the girl should sit until her hair turns white? The Gemara earlier (102b) said that financial conditions agreed upon by both sides before Kidushin are as if they are sealed with a Kinyan. Accordingly, he should marry the girl and take her father to Beis Din to make him fulfill the conditions! [This question appears explicitly in the Tosfos ha'Rosh.] The Rashbam explains an earlier statement made by Rav Gidal. He said (102b) that if two sides agreed on the monetary aspects of a marriage and the Kidushin occurred, the monetary aspect is considered like it was sealed with a Kinyan. This is only if the Kidushin was done immediately after the monetary agreement, or the Kidushin was done afterwards but they mentioned the monetary arrangements they had made when performing the Kidushin.

However, if they made (monetary) conditions now and the Kidushin was done after awhile without mentioning the monetary conditions, these (conditions) are not considered to be the type of words that effect a Kinyan.

Similarly, this is the Halachah in our case where we say that she should sit until her hair gets white and cannot sue him in Beis Din (as he did not mention the monetary conditions . The language (of Rav Gidal), "they stood up and made the Kidushin" indeed implies that the Kidushin was done after the condition (was either finalized or mentioned).

Question: This is difficult from the Yerushalmi. The Mishnah discusses a case where someone set an amount of money for his son-in-law, and his son-in-law then died (after they had done Kidushin but not Nisuin). He can say to his son-in-law's brother (who wants to perform Yibum) that he was only willing to give this money to his brother. He will not give this amount of money to him.

The Yerushalmi asked, aren't these conditions that are acquired through talk alone? The Yerushalmi answers, the case is where he only set this amount of money for support on condition that he would marry her (and they did not perform Nisuin leaving this condition unfulfilled).

What is the Yerushalmi's difficulty? Even in a case where he was not supporting him on condition that they would get married (text of Tosfos ha'Rosh), the claim remains that he could say "I'm not interested in giving you the money." The case would be where they did not do the Kidushin while (finalizing or) mentioning the condition (and accordingly he does not have to abide by the conditions). [This implies that the case is when there was a condition, and similarly implies that our Mishnah is also discussing a case where there was a similar condition (unlike the explanation of the Rashbam).]

Answer: However, this is not so difficult, as if they did not do the Kidushin when mentioning the conditions, how could he say that he would have given his brother (but not him)? [He wouldn't have had to give his brother anything either!]

Opinion (Rebbi): However, Rebbi does not see this explanation as correct. There is no proof from our Mishnah's statement that she should sit until her hair turns white, as the case may be where the father has no money at all or the husband merely does not want to bother to take his future father-in-law to Beis Din. It is possible that if he would want to take him to Beis Din (according to the second option), he would have what to pay.

However, it does not seem to Rebbi that the Mishnah is discussing a case where the father has nothing to give. This is apparent from the Gemara later which says that the father is forced to pay.

Answer (to (a): Rebbi Shama (see Maharsha) in the Yerushalmi establishes that Rav Gidal (102b here) is talking about a first marriage while our Mishnah is discussing a second marriage.

I searched the Yerushalmi and found in the beginning of the chapter of Af Al Pi that Rav Gidal is indeed only discussing a case of a first marriage. He is also talking about a father setting an amount for his daughter, as opposed to a woman setting an amount for her daughter or a brother setting an amount for a sister.

Question: This is difficult. How can the Halachah be like both the Beraisa and the Mishnah? Don't they contradict each other? The Mishnah says she can say, "if I would have set the monetary terms etc.," while the Beraisa says a different approach that she though that her father was taking care of the money.

Answer: It is possible to answer that when Rav Nachman said the Halachah is like Admon in the Beraisa, he means that the Halachah is like Admon in the case presented by the Beraisa (which is a different case than that of our Mishnah). The case of the Beraisa is when she herself set the monetary terms, and in that case the Halachah is like Admon.

Do not say that the rule of "in all places (the Halachah is like Rabban Gamliel who approves of the statement of Admon)" means that the Halachah is like Admon, with the Mishnah and Beraisa arguing what Admon actually holds.

Implied Question: [What does the Gemara mean when it says that the Halachah is like someone "and in/not in similar instances?"] Rashi explains that the one who is similar to Chanan is Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai, and the one who is similar to Admon is Rabban Gamliel.

Question #1: This is difficult to Rebbi. First of all, the terminology used in our Gemara does not imply this explanation.

Question #2: Additionally, why mention regarding Chanan "and what is similar?" Chanan only discussed two laws. The Gemara should merely say the Halachah is like Chanan, not more.

Answer #2: Rebbi therefore agrees with the explanation of the Rach that "similar to" means that the Halachah is also like him in cases that are similar to these cases. When the Gemara says (regarding Admon) "and the Halachah is like him but not similar to him," it means the Halachah is not like him in cases that are similar to these cases.

This is akin to the Gemara in Shevuos (48b) where Rav Nachman stated "do not add on this." He meant that one should not derive from the law stated there what the Halachah should be in other similar cases.

Implied Question: The Halachah is unlike Admon in this case, as the Mishnah does not state that Rabban Gamliel approves of Admon's words here (which would mean they are codified in Halachah).

You should not ask based on the Gemara in Bava Basra (43b) that states that if someone sold another person a field, he cannot testify for him regarding the field. The case there is when Reuven stole a field from Shimon and sold it to Levi, and Yehudah complained that it is his. Shimon cannot testify for Levi, as it is possibly better for him to have Levi keep the land, because he may claim that the first person (Levi) is easier for me to get the land from, while the second is more difficult. [This seems to use Admon's logic. Didn't we rule in our Gemara that the Halachah is unlike Admon?]

Answer: In our Gemara, he should not have signed and done something that looks like admission (by signing as a witness to the sale of what he now claims is his property) just because it is easier for him to deal with the second person. However, the Gemara there is not talking about an admission.

Question: Rebbi Yitzchak bar Baruch asked that our Gemara implies that the judges do not testify on what is in the document, but rather on the signature of the witnesses.

This is difficult from the Gemara in Bava Basra (52a) that discusses a case where one of the brothers was the one who dealt with financial matters in their household. Different purchase documents and loan documents were found bearing his name (that he bought property or lent money, and he claimed that the money used was his alone). Rav said that in order for him to be believed, he must bring proof that he used his own money and not that of the estate.

The Gemara concludes that proof that the money was his can be produced by his validating the document (in Beis Din). This shows that the signature of the Beis Din (that the document is valid) also tells us that the documents belong to him. It must be that they are testifying regarding everything that is in the document.

Answer: Rebbi answers that the Gemara there (Bava Basra 52a) is certainly talking about judges who are careful to validating what is in the document as well. They knew that he was the one to deal with financial matters, and it should not be his money (unless he can prove to them that it was).

Therefore, unless they know that it is his money, they certainly would not validate the document, and would rule that the documents should belong to the other orphans (as well).

Explanation #1: The terminology implies that it is discussing the person who is complaining that the field should be his. For example, the case could be that he sold one of his fields and stated that a field that he is now claiming he is his actually belonged to someone else. [When he delineated the borders of the field, he mentioned that it borders this other person's field instead of his own field.]

The Gemara explains that what the Mishnah means is when he delineates the border as belonging to someone else. However, he does not lose his ability. This means that if he sells one of his fields to the person he is claiming took a different one of his fields, this sale is not an admission.

If he wouldn't have sold the field, the person currently on his other field would not have made the purchase and he needed money. [What was he supposed to do?] The text does not read "bought" but rather "sold."

Explanation #2: The Yerushalmi implies that the explanation is like that of Rashi that is quoted by the Rach. The Yerushalmi says that not only if the person who is complaining that it is his field wrote that the field belongs to someone else when he was delineating the borders of another field. Even if two people were involved in a sale of property bordering the field he was complaining about, and they mentioned that it belonged to someone else when delineating the borders and he signed as a witness, he lost his right to claim the field as his.

Implied Question: [Why did Abaye originally rule against the orphans when he knew that Rebbi Yochanan's statement was in their favor?] Abaye did not remember Rebbi Yochanan's statement until the guardian reminded him of it. If he would have remembered, he himself would have made this claim for the orphans, as we rule that we make claims for inheritors.

Question: This is difficult. Why is he believed? Being that he admitted that it is not his, how can he go back and claim that he bought it again?

Implied Question: One might say that he should be believed with a Migu claim that he did not have to sign or admit.

Answer: This is incorrect. The claim of Migu is inapplicable in such a case, as we explained earlier (85a, DH "Is Lach Sahadi") in the case of a woman whom people had given a suitcase full of documents to watch.

Opinion (Rebbi): According to what I explained earlier (92b) that we do not claim for orphans that a document is forged, Rebbi explains that our case could be where the signatures of the witnesses have not been validated from other sources. This is why he is believed to say that he went back and bought the field. He has a Migu claim that he could have said the document was forged, he didn't sign it, and did not endorse his field as belonging to someone else. Being that he could have said this, he should be believed when he says that he in fact did endorse the field as belonging to someone else, but then purchased the field from that person.

Implied Question: It does not say that if their father was here, he would claim it was forged.

Answer: This is because we do not claim for orphans that the document is forged.

However, the claim that he went back and bought it from him is a claim we do make for orphans, being that their father would have been believed with such a claim by using a Migu that he could have said the document was forged, as we explained earlier (92b, DH "Dina").

Implied Question: However, the Gemara could not have said that the case is when one person bought the fields from one person, and he could threaten to sell all of the fields to four different people. This way the claimant could not win a case in Beis Din with them (as each will say he should go to a different owner for your pathway).

Answer: He cannot take away the case through selling the fields in this manner, being that before the people would buy the fields the owner had no such claim (as either way he had to give the owner a pathway).

Explanation: However, when one person is buying the field from four people, he can claim that he will give (sell) back the fields to the original owner. The buyer can take away rights that come through him, as he can make the fields have the rights that they had before he bought them (when they had four owners who could all claim that his path is not through their fields).

Implied Question: This that it states in Bava Kama (8a) that if someone sells to one person or to three people as one, meaning that he sells them a field which has excellent, medium, and poor quality, they all receive the status of the original owner. The case there is when the last part of the field he sold them was the excellent quality.

The Gemara asks, let everyone (various creditors) collect from the excellent quality field! The Gemara answers, he (the new owner) can tell the creditors that if you will take like you are supposed to take (medium quality), I will allow you to take. If not, I will give/sell the poor quality property back to its original owner (and you will have to take that). The Gemara asks, regarding damages as well let the new owner make this claim! This implies that this reasoning is accepted according to everyone!

Answer: This is not difficult. The Gemara there is discussing a case where there is no loss to anyone, as the creditors can end up collecting, just from a poor quality field. This is why everyone there agrees that this claim, to return the document of ownership to the original owner, is valid. However, here where there is a real loss (that the middle field owner will not have a pathway) he (Admon) holds that this is not a valid claim.

When the Gemara there asks that this claim should also work for damages, the Gemara could have also asked that this should work for a creditor, that the field owner could tell him that he cannot collect from medium quality. However, the Gemara included more than that, by asking that even claims of damages that are supposed to be paid according to Torah law with excellent quality can be seemingly thwarted through this claim.

Opinion (Rashi): Rashi explains that the Gemara specifically asked from damages, but understood that a regular creditor can collect medium quality as usual. If the owner would make the claim that he should accept poor quality or he will return the ownership document of the poor quality to the original owner, the creditor can say "go and return it!" [This is because all the owner will be doing is losing all of his poor quality land without gaining.] However, regarding paying damages with average quality land, he can say take the medium quality (or I will make you take poor quality by giving the poor land to its original owner). The person damaged cannot say "go and return the poor quality land" (because he will, as he will then get to keep the excellent and medium quality land).

Implied Question: You might ask, why should an owner be able to push away the collection of a Kesuvah that it can only collect from his poor quality land? Let the person with the Kesuvah say, "go and return it!"

Answer: This is incorrect. With this claim there is no way he can take away more than he can collect if the properties were all in the hands of the original owners.

Accordingly, it is understandable why the Gemara here had to say, "if you will listen, you will listen, and I will make it cheaper for you (to buy a pathway from me than what it would normally cost)." Now the person is profiting from the fact that the owner is not returning the field (to the original owners). However, this is not the implication of the Gemara's terminology.

Additionally, the Mishnah says, "let him buy a pathway for one hundred manah," implying that the Rabbanan are saying he will have to pay heavily and will not get a good deal on the pathway.