KESUVOS 94 (18 Iyar, Lag b'Omer) - dedicated by Avi and Lily Berger of Queens, N.Y., in memory of Lily's father, Mr. Benny Krieger (Chananel Benayahu ben Harav Yisrael Avraham Aba), zt"l, who passed away on Lag ba'Omer 5763. Mr. Krieger exemplified Ahavas Chesed, Ahavas Torah and Ahavas Eretz Yisrael.


Tosfos DH "she'Nimtzais"

תוס' ד"ה "שנמצאת"

(SUMMARY: Tosfos delves into the reasoning behind the argument of the Tana Kama and Ben Nanas. The second half of Tosfos analyzes the opinion that does not hold of Abaye Keshisha.)

פי' הקונט' שנודע כבר שהיא גזולה


Rashi's Opinion: Rashi explains that it is already known that it was stolen.

הלכך כשבאה רביעית לגבות משביעין לה והדר יהבינן לה לבן ננס דהואיל מה שגבתה גבתה צריכה שבועה שהרי נפסדת אותה שיש לה שדה שאינה שלו


Therefore, when the fourth wife comes to collect we make her swear and then give her a portion according to Ben Nanas. Ben Nanas considers the fourth wife's collection to be valid, even if the stolen field will be taken away from an earlier wife. The fourth wife therefore must swear, as she is causing the earlier wife who received the stolen field to lose out (as soon it will be taken away from her and there will be nothing left of the estate).

וקשה לרבי דמסתמא כשמשביעין הרביעית משמע שעדיין לא גבתה מדקתני גבי רביעית נפרעת לא תפרע והואיל וכן הקודמת לה למה אינה לוקחת אותה שדה דבבירור שלו


First Question: Rebbi has difficulty with this approach. When the fourth wife takes an oath, it seems that she has still not collected her share. This is indicated by the description of the case in our Mishnah that uses words such as "she gets paid" and "she should not get paid." If this is the case, why doesn't the previous wife simply take the field that the fourth wife is about to receive, as the fourth field definitely belonged to the deceased husband?

ואין סברא לומר שנמצאת אחת מהן שדה שאינה שלו ואינו ידוע איזו


It is difficult to say that the Gemara's intent when it states "the field was found not to be his" is that we know there is a field among his possessions that was not his, but we are not sure of its identity.

ועוד קשה לי מאי קאמר בן ננס וכי מפני שהיא אחרונה נשכרת אטו מי קאמר ת"ק נשכרה נפסדה קאמר שאינה נשבעת לפי שאין גבייתה כלום שהקודמת לה נוטלת אותה שדה


Second Question: Additionally, it is difficult to understand Ben Nanas' reply "should she be rewarded because she is last?" in this context. It would seem that the Tana Kama is stating that the fourth wife doesn't swear because she will lose her collection, being that the earlier wife will eventually take the field out of her hands.

והיכא שהאחרונה נפרעת כגון שלא נמצאת אחת מהן שאינה שלו התם מודה נמי בן ננס דנפרעת שלא בשבועה


In a case where the last wife's collection is valid, for example if eventually all of the fields are found to have belonged to him, Ben Nanas would seemingly agree that she should collect without taking an oath.

על כן נראה כפי' ר"ח דאפילו לא נמצאת פליגי דקאמר בן ננס שנשבעת הרביעית משום חשש שמא תמצא אחת מהן שדה שאינה שלו ולא יוכלו אחרי כן לחזור עליה דמה שגבתה גבתה


Rach's Opinion: It therefore seems that the following explanation, authored by the Rach, is correct. Ben Nanas argues that the fourth wife would always swear in such a case, even when there are no rumors of a stolen field. Since it is possible that one of the fields could possibly have been stolen, and the earlier wife would not be able to retrieve the property from the fourth wife if this happened, the fourth wife always has to swear.

וה"ק במאי פליגי כלומר במאי תלוי עיקר טעמא שמחמת אותו טעם משביעה בן ננס לעולם כגון שנמצאת כו' ומשום הכי נשבעת אפילו לא נמצאת


When the Gemara says "what are they arguing about?" it does not mean the literal case, but rather what is the reason that Ben Nanas makes the fourth wife swear. When the Gemara gives the case, it is saying that because of the possibility of finding out that one of the previous fields was stolen Ben Nanas would make the fourth wife swear, even if we have no such information that any field was stolen.

והכא בחיישינן שמא תכסיף קמיפלגי לפי שיראה שמא תמצא אחת מהן שדה שאינה שלו ויחזרו עליה ואינה חוששת להשביח השדה ומפסידתו


Their argument is regarding whether or not the woman will end up destroying the field. If she is scared that one of these fields will be found out not to have belonged to her husband, and other creditors will seize the field from her, she might not be careful to take care of the field. This might end up damaging the field. [Important: The Maharshal explains that the reason why this affects the argument of the Tana Kama and Ben Nanas seems unclear. This is why Rabeinu Tam explains the following.]

ואומר ר"ת דמשביעין אותה כדי שתפרוש אם התפיסה צררי


Rabeinu Tam's Understanding of the Rach: Rabeinu Tam says that according to Ben Nanas the fourth wife must swear so that she will not collect the field if she already grabbed the money owed to her due to her Kesuvah (without telling anyone). [The Maharshal explains that this oath helps keep the field out of her hands (if she does not deserve it), so it should go to the orphans who will make proper use of the field.]

וא"ת א"כ נשביע כל ב"ח דניחוש שמא יכסיף לפי שמא יש בעל חוב קדום שיטרוף ממנו ונשביענו כדי שיפרוש אם התפיסו צררי


Question: If we worry that a woman will end up damaging her field because she thinks it will be taken away from her by another creditor, every creditor should have to swear lest he suspect that a different earlier creditor will come take away his field! Every creditor who is seizing a field should similarly have to make an oath ascertaining that he did not already seize the money owed to him.

לאו מלתא היא דאטו יש לנו לעשות תקנה לבעל חוב דליתיה קמן ושמא אינו בעולם אבל הכא אנו עושין תקנה בשביל הנשים הקודמות


Answer: This doesn't make sense. Should we make a decree for fear of a creditor who we have no reason to believe even exists? In this case, however, we are making a decree for the earlier wives (who are present).

וא"ת ומה יועיל מה שיפרוש גם היתומים שיפול השדה בידם יכסיפוה מחמת יראה זו שמא תמצא אחת מהן שדה שאינה שלו


Question: What is it going to help if the orphans take the field? Perhaps they too will not take care of the field out of the fear that someone will claim that one of the fields belongs to them?

ואומר רבי דלא יכסיפוה בשביל כך שחביבה בעיניהם


First Answer: Rebbi answers that the orphans will not let the field go to waste, as it is beloved in their eyes (because it belonged to their father).

עוד אומר ר' הם למה יכסיפוה אם אותה שדה ישביחו יהא ריוח שלהן שיכולין לסלקו בזוזי דאין להן בשדה אלא כנכרים בעלמא


Second Answer: Alternatively, Rebbi answers that they have no reason not to improve the field. If the field improves in value, it will be for their good as they can now have money to pay the creditor cash instead of allowing him to take the field.

אבל אחרונה תכסיף דהואיל ומה שגבתה לא גבתה אינה יכולה לסלקה בזוזי


However, the last wife will possibly let the field go to waste. Being that her collection is invalid, she cannot even chase away the creditor with money.

וא"ת לרבנן נמי תהא האחרונה נמי צריכה שבועה כדין כל הבא ליפרע מנכסי יתומים


Question: According to the Rabbanan (Tana Kama), the last wife should also need an oath just like any other person who is collecting from orphans.

ופ"ה דביתומים גדולים איירי ודלא כאביי קשישא


First Answer: Rashi explains that the Tana Kama is discussing adult orphans (from whom one does not need to take an oath), unlike the opinion of Abaye Keshisha in our Gemara.

ור' מפרש אפי' לאביי קשישא כגון שפטרה מן השבועה


Second Answer: Rebbi explains that it could even be according to Abaye Keshisha, and the case could be where she was exempt from this oath for other reasons.

וא"ת למאן דלית ליה דאביי קשישא היכי מפרש הנפרעת מנכסי יתומים לא תפרע אלא בשבועה (לעיל פז.)והא דתנן (גיטין לד:) אין אלמנה נפרעת מנכסי יתומים אלא בשבועה


Question: According to the opinion that does not hold of Abaye Keshisha, how does he explain the Gemara's statement earlier (87a) that one who collects from the possessions of orphans should only collect with an oath? How does he explain the Mishnah in Gitin (34b) that a widow only collects from the property of orphans with an oath?

דביתומים גדולים אינה צריכה שבועה וביתומים קטנים נמי ליכא לאוקמא דאין נזקקין לנכסי יתומים קטנים אא"כ רבית אוכלת בהן


Being that this is inapplicable regarding adult orphans, and we know that we only pay from the estate of orphans who are minors if we must do so to stop them from having to pay interest, in what case would we apply the statements above?

ואומר רבי דס"ל כמ"ד בערכין פרק שום היתומים (דף כב.) אף לכתובה משום מזוני


Answer: Rebbi answers that this opinion must hold of the opinion in Erchin (22a) that we also take from the estate of orphans who are minors for the Kesuvah of a widow. Being that as long as she does not collect her Kesuvah she is entitled to support from the estate, this is also considered (akin to interest that eats away at the estate) a pressing reason to allow her to collect immediately.

מ"מ תיקשי מההיא דהנפרעת מנכסי יתומים לא תפרע אלא בשבועה


Question: One could still ask on this answer from the Gemara later (87a) that someone who collects from the possessions of orphans must only collect with an oath.

דהא לעיל בהכותב (דף פז. ד"ה מקשים) פי' ר"י דמיירי בגרושה דלית לה מזוני כי היכי דלא תיקשי אמאי איצטריך למיתני בגיטין אין אלמנה נפרעת מנכסי יתומים אלא בשבועה


Earlier, Tosfos quoted the Ri as explaining that the Gemara was indeed talking about a divorcee who does not receive support from the estate. The Ri said this to get out of the question that the Mishnah in Gitin (34b) is seemingly redundant once the Mishnah earlier (87a) stated the same thing. [Therefore, being that the Ri understood that the collection occurs even when there is no support eroding the estate, how does this opinion understand the case of collecting from orphans?]

ואמר לי רבי דמ"מ איצטריך אלמנה בגיטין שלא נטעה לומר בגרושה ונימא דנזקקין בכל ענין


Answer: Rebbi answered that the Mishnah in Gitin has to state this law regarding a widow, in order that we should not mistakenly say that this also applies to a divorcee.

דאילו באלמנה ה"א דליכא לאוקומא דאקילו בה רבנן משום חינא כדמפרש בערכין


One might have thought that the Mishnah in Gitin (34b) was not even talking about a widow as they wanted her to collect in order that men should want to marry her. [The Maharsha explains that once the Mishnah in Gitin states explicitly that even a widow must swear despite the reasoning above, our Mishnah (87a) is also telling us that a widow who requires support can collect with an oath. Our Mishnah is not talking about a divorcee.]

וא"ת אמאי לא אקשי מברייתא דאביי קשישא למ"ד אין נזקקין אלא אם כן רבית אוכלת בהן דהא קאמר אביי קשישא שגובין מיתומים קטנים בשבועה


Question: Why don't we ask a question from the Beraisa of Abaye Keshisha on the opinion that we do not collect from the estate of orphans unless their estate is being eroded by interest? Abaye Keshisha himself states that we collect from orphans who are minors with an oath!

וי"ל דהוה מוקי לה בב"ח עובד כוכבים דשייכא ביה שבועה כמו שרגיל ר"ת לפרש שמותר לקבל שבועה מעובד כוכבים


Answer: One could answer that the case is where the creditor is a Nochri who must also take an oath to collect from orphans. This is in tune with Rabeinu Tam's common statement that we are allowed to accept an oath in Beis Din from a Nochri.

ואפי' לרבינו שמואל שאסר לקבל ממנו שבועה איכא לאוקמא בגר תושב שקבל עליו שלא לעבוד עבודת כוכבים שנשבע בשם


Even according to the Rashbam who says that one cannot accept an oath from Nochrim, he can explain that this case involves a Ger Toshav (who accepted upon himself not to be an idolater) who swears in the name of Hash-m.

ומיהו קשה לי מדקאמר אביי קשישא יתומים שאמרו משמע דאמתני' דגיטין או דהכותב קאי דמיירי בכתובת אשה


Question: However, this is difficult from Abaye Keshisha's terminology "the orphans stated." This implies the orphans stated previously, implying that Abaye Keshisha is explaining either the Mishnah in Gitin (34b) or in Kesuvos (87a) which talk about collecting with a Kesuvah. [This would mean Abaye Keshisha's case is not involving a Nochri.]

ע"כ צ"ל ודאי דהוה מוקי פלוגתא דבן ננס ורבנן כאביי קשישא וס"ל כרבנן


Answer: Therefore, one must say this opinion (that argues on Abaye Keshisha) understands that the argument between Ben Nanas and the Rabbanan (Tana Kama) is regarding the law of Abaye Keshisha. This opinion holds like the Rabbanan who do not hold of Abaye Keshisha.


Tosfos DH "Shnei Shetaros"

תוס' ד"ה "שני שטרות"

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains why the Gemara is referring to documents of sale or gifts.)

פי' של מכר או של מתנה שמואל אמר שודא דדייני


Explanation: The Gemara is referring to two documents of sale or gifts. Shmuel rules that the judges choose to whom to give the field (see Tosfos in Bava Basra 35a DH "Shuda d'Deini"for the different definitions of this concept).

דלא דמי להא דתנן היו כולן יוצאות בשעה אחת ואין שם אלא מנה חולקות בשוה


Implied Question: This is unlike the Mishnah that states that if all of the documents were written for the same hour in the day and there is only one hundred Zuz to split, that all of the creditors split everything evenly.

דהתם בשעבוד איירי דאין השעבוד חל אלא מאותה שעה שמוכיח מתוך השטר כשהתחיל השעבוד דהיינו ממחרת יום שנכתב בו דביום שנכתב אין מוכיח מתוך השטר מתי התחיל או בבקר או בערב


Answer: The case there was discussing seizure based on a lien. In that case the lein is only from the time stated in the document. This is akin to a lien that must start on the next day of a document which states the date, as the document doesn't say whether it was written in the morning or evening (see Maharshal).

אבל מתנה או מכר כל הקודם באותו יום עצמו זכה


However, regarding a gift or a sale, whoever is clearly first (if such a difference is recorded in their document) on that day receives the gift or sale.



Tosfos DH "Leima Rav" (Starts Bottom 94a)

תוס' ד"ה "לימא רב" (סוף צד.)

(SUMMARY: Tosfos cites three different explanations of our Gemara.)

וכיון דעיקר הוא השטר ומתוך עדים החתומים בשטר אין ניכר שקדם קנינו של זה לקנינו של זה הלכך קונין שניהם בבת אחת


Tosfos' Explanation: Being that the main thing is what is stated in the documents, and from the document itself it is impossible to tell whose document was first, they both acquire at the same time.

אפי' נכתב ונחתם ונמסר לאחד תחלה ואח"כ נכתב ונמסר לשני אע"פ שמתוך עדי מסירה ניכר דלא חשיב להו עדי מסירה עיקר


Even if one person's document was written, signed, and given before the writing and giving over of the second document, and even though the witnesses who testify regarding when the documents were given over relay this information, it is irrelevant. This is because Rebbi Meir understands that the main witnesses are those who sign the document, not those who testify regarding the giving over of the document.

והכי מוכח בגטין דתנן בפ' כל הגט (דף כד:) כתב לגרש את הגדולה לא יגרש בו את הקטנה


Proof: This is also apparent from Gitin (24b), where the Mishnah states that if someone wrote a Get to divorce one wife he cannot use it to divorce a second wife with the same name (the terms "adult" and "minor" there are not didactic, see Rashi ibid. DH "Gedolah").

ודייק בגמ' הא גדולה מצי מגרש אמר רבה זאת אומרת שני יוסף בן שמעון הדרים בעיר אחת מוציאין שט"ח על אחרים


The Gemara (ibid.) infers from this Mishnah that he still can use the Get to divorce the wife that it was intended for. Rabah states that this teaches that if there are two people named Yosef ben Shimon in a city, they can collect with a document saying a person owes them money (and the accused cannot claim that he owes it to the other "Yosef ben Shimon).

א"ל אביי אלא מעתה רישא דקתני פסול לגרש בו ה"נ שני הוא דלא מגרש ביה הא ראשון מצי מגרש ביה והא אמרת אין אחר יכול להוציא שטר חוב עליהם


Abaye asked that if this is the style of the Mishnah there, it seems difficult to understand the earlier case in the Mishnah. The Mishnah states that in a case where a person is asked by a man with the same name if he would like to use a Get that he is no longer using "the Get is unfit to divorce with." Does this also mean that the first person can still use the Get? Doesn't the Mishnah state in Bava Basra (172a) that noone can use a document against one of the people in the city with the same name?

אלא מאי אית לך למימר בעדי מסירה ור' אלעזר


It must be that this document can be used because the main witnesses are the one who see that the Get was given over, as per the opinion of Rebbi Elazar.

משמע אבל לר"מ אפי' ראשון לא מצי מגרש אע"פ שניכר מתוך עדי מסירה הואיל ומתוך עדי חתימה אין ניכר


This implies that according to Rebbi Meir (who holds that the main witnesses are those signed on the document) even the first person cannot use such a divorce, even though it will be apparent who gave the Get through the witnesses who see the giving of the Get. However, being that it is not clear from the witnesses signed on the Get, the Get cannot be used.

ונראה לרבי דמיירי הכא במתנה או במכר במקום שכותבין את השטר


Rebbi's Explanation: Rebbi explains that the case is regarding a gift or sale that is done in a place where the transaction is enacted through the document.

דבמקום שאין כותבין שהקרקע נקנה בכסף ובחזקה ובחליפין והשטר אינו עומד אלא לראיה התם כולי עלמא מודו דאמרינן שודא


In a place where the transaction is not done through a document, and it is mainly enacted through payment, taking ownership of the land, or Chalipin (a mode of acquisition through exchange) and the document is merely proof, everyone would agree that we rule Shuda d'Deini.

דאין צריך התם שיהא ניכר מתוך עדי חתימה איזה קנה תחלה הואיל ואינו אלא לראיה בעלמא


It is not necessary in such a place that it should be obvious from the signature of the witnesses who acquired the field first, being that the document is just being used as a proof.

ור"ת מפרש הא מילתא בענין אחר וז"ל שני שטרות היוצאין ביום אחד מכר שדה אחת לשני בני אדם האחד עיקר


Rabeinu Tam's Explanation: Rabeinu Tam explains this Gemara in a different fashion, and stated the following: When the Gemara says two documents are dated on the same day, it refers to someone who sold the same field to two people. Only one of them is the owner.

אבל שני שטרות של שני בעלי חובין חולקין לכ"ע כדתנן במתניתין חולקות בשוה ובעל כרחך כשכולן יוצאין ביום אחד


However, if two documents of two creditors arise, they split the field according to everyone as stated in the Mishnah. The case clearly is when their documents are dated on the same day.

וטעמא דשניהם אמת ושעה אחת בירושלים כיום אחד בעלמא דמי


The reasoning behind this is that both people are ostensibly telling the truth, and one hour in Yerushalayim is like one day (meaning that it cannot be determined which document is first). [The commentaries (Maharsha and Maharam Shif) say that there is another important underlying reason behind Rabeinu Tam's reasoning here.]

לימא רב דאמר כר"מ דאמר עדי חתימה כרתי ואפשר דנחתם בבת אחת דהנך סהדי חתום אהאי והנך סהדי אהאי בהדי הדדי


The Gemara proceeds to ask, let us say that Rav holds like Rebbi Meir that the witnesses who sign on a document cause the transaction to be valid. The Gemara means to ask that we can assume that the different sets of witnesses signed on the different documents at the same time.

ומסתמא כיון שהחתימה עיקר המסירה היתה לדעת חתימה אע"פ שהיתה זו אחר זו והוי כנמסר בבת א'


It must be that being that the signature is the main part of the transaction, the giving over of the document was based on the signature. This way, even if the documents were given one after the other it is like they were given at the same time.

דהיכא דכתבי שעות תלינן מסירה אחר שעות חתימה ה"נ תלינן המסירה בשעת חתימה


Where one writes the hour in the document, we assume that the document was given over after the signature. Here, too, we assume the giving over of the document was after the signature.

ואפי' אם תימצי לומר לצמצם אי אפשר ואחד מהם נחתם קודם לחברו איהו מיהו סבר דשניהם נחתמו בבת אחת


Even if you will suggest that it is impossible that both were signed at precisely the same time, the person involved might think that they were.

ואין דעתו כלל כשמוסר להם אפי' בזה אחר זה שיקנה אחד יותר מחברו אלא דעתו שיקנה זה כמו זה והוי כאילו מסר שניהם בבת אחת ואין מועיל הקדמת החתימה כלום


His mindset when he gave these documents one after the other was not that (the first) one should have more rights than the other. His mindset was that each should have the same rights as the other. This makes it as if he gave it over to both of them at the same time, and therefore the fact that one signature was technically earlier than the other doesn't make a difference.

ואי נמי העדים שוים בשני שטרות אימא בשעה שעסוקין באותו ענין חתמו דקנין יכול לחזור בו או לקיים שניהם הלכך אמר רב חולקין


Similarly, it is possible that the witnesses are the same in both documents. This could mean that when the people involved were dealing with the topic the witnesses signed the document, as the transaction could still be retracted or validated during this time (that they are dealing with finalizing the transaction, see Tosfos earlier 93a, DH "u'Mei'aimas"). This is why Rav says that they split the field.

ושמואל דאמר כרבי אלעזר דאמר עדי מסירה כרתי וכיון שיוצא השטר מיד המוכר ליד הלוקח נזהר הוא שלא למסור בבת אחת אלא זה שלא בפני זה


The Gemara continues, Shmuel must hold like Rebbi Elazar who holds that the witnesses who witness the giving over of the document are the ones who cause the transaction to be valid. Once the document is transferred from the hands of the seller to those of the buyer, he is careful not to give them over at the same time, unless he does so with one not in front of the other.

דהמסירה ביד המוכר דכותבין שטר למוכר אע"פ שאין לוקח עמו


This can be done as the transfer is up to the seller, as we say that a sale document can be written for the seller even if the buyer is not present.

אבל החתימה לר' אלעזר לאו עיקר הוא ולא תלינן ביה הלכך אמר שמואל שודא דדייני שיש כח ביד הדיינים מובהקים ליתן לכל מי שירצו דהואיל וא"א לפי הענין להיות בבת אחת אימור איתרמי לאותו שזכה


However, the signature of these documents according to Rebbi Elazar is not the main part of the transaction, and is not relied upon. Therefore, Shmuel rules "Shuda d'Deini." This means that the expert judges have the power to give it to whomever they want. Being that it is (almost) impossible (and certainly improbable) that it was given over at the same time, we say that whoever the judges decide to give it to is the one who received his document first.

וכן (לעיל דף פה:) גבי שני טוביה שניהם ת"ח דאיכא שודא וכן גבי ההיא דכאן אמרו בשילהי פ"ק דגיטין (דף יד: ושם) דמייתי הכא


This is also the logic applied earlier (85b) in the case of two "Tuvyah's" both being Torah scholars, that we rule Shuda d'Deini. This is also the case in Gitin (14b) that is quoted later by our Gemara (middle of 94b).

וכן בי' יוחסין (קדושין עד. ושם) גבי נאמן הדיין וכן בהמוכר את הבית (ב"ב סב:) גבי רכבא דדקלי וכן בשבועת העדות ברישיה (שבועות ל:)


This is also the case in Kidushin (74a) where it states that "the judge is trusted." This is also the logic used in Bava Basra (62b) regarding the case where there are palm trees in the field. This is also the logic used in a case in Shevuos (30b).

וגבי אמר רב נחמן בחזקת הבתים (ב"ב לה. ושם) מדמינן דינא דאלים גבר לשודא דדייני ומשנינן דמאן דאלים גבר איכא למיקם עלה דמילתא שודא דדיינא ליכא למיקם עלה דמלתא ולא משום אומדנא דעתא


In the Gemara in Bava Basra (35a) when discussing Rav Nachman's statement, the Gemara compares the ruling of "Kol d'Alim Gevar" - "whoever is stronger wins" with Shuda d'Deini (asking why don't we rule Shuda in a case of Kol d'Alim). The Gemara there explains that Kol d'Alim Gevar is a different type of case, as one could technically find out who really deserves to win. In a case of Shuda d'Deini, it is near impossible. We do not even have any grounds to estimate the person's mindset.

אבל במקום שיכולין לזכות שניהם בבת אחת א"נ ב' בעלי חובין ביום אחד או שתי כתובות ביום אחד כולי עלמא מודו דיחלוקו


However, in a case where both could have acquired at the same time, or two creditors or two Kesuvos that were issued on the same day, everyone agrees that they should split the money. [The Maharam Shif notes that Rabeinu Tam's perspective is that ruling that they should split the money is better if both people could be right, while the previous explanations held that Shuda is the better ruling in such a situation (see at length).]

דחשו רבנן להפסד בעלי חובין משום נעילת דלת ולכתובת אשה משום חינא


This is because the sages did not want to cause creditors to lose, as it might make them not want to lend money out of fear that they will be able to get it back. They also did not want a Kesuvah to be deemed unreliable, in order that a widow will get some money to cause men to want to marry her.

אבל בלקוחות א"נ במתנה עבוד שודא היכא דאיכא למימר דחד קדים והאחר שקר עד כאן לשון ר"ת


However, regarding purchasers or gifts we rule Shuda d'Deini where it is reasonable that one was first and the other is lying. All of the above is a quote from Rabeinu Tam.


Tosfos DH "Kasav l'Echad"

תוס' ד"ה "כתב לאחד"

(SUMMARY: Tosfos explains how Shmuel holds like both Rebbi Elazar and Abaye.)

אע"פ שקדמה הכתיבה למסירה ה"נ ס"ל לשמואל דהא אית ליה שודא והיינו אליבא דרבי אלעזר דאמר עדי מסירה כרתי


Explanation: Even though the writing of the first document preceded the giving over of the second document, Shmuel holds Shuda d'Deini in accordance with Rebbi Elazar who says that the witnesses of the transfer of a document are the ones who validate a transaction.

ותימה הא משמע בפ"ק דב"מ (דף יג. ושם) דשמואל ס"ל כאביי דאמר עדיו בחתומיו זכין לו


First Question: This is difficult. The Gemara in Bava Metzia (13b) implies that Shmuel holds like Abaye that once witnesses sign a document they create the debt stated in the document (the Gemara there was discussing a loan document).

דדחיק התם שמואל דאמר לא חיישינן לפרעון ולקנוניא מתני' דקתני מצא שטרי חוב בזמן שיש בהן אחריות נכסים לא יחזיר אי ס"ל כאביי אמאי לא יחזיר


The Gemara there asks that according to Shmuel who holds that we do not suspect payment and conspiracy (see Gemara in Bava Metzia 13a at length) and (like Abaye) that the witnesses signature creates a debt , what is the interpretation of the Mishnah's statement that if someone finds loan documents with Achrayus that he should not give them back?

ומסיק אמר שמואל אומר היה ר"מ שטר שאין בו אחריות נכסים אינו גובה כו


The Gemara concludes that Shmuel said that Rebbi Meir said that a document that is without Achrayus cannot be used to collect. [After the Gemara there successfully answered the question from the part of the Mishnah regarding the loan document with Achrayus, it had to also answer a question about a document without Achrayus.]

מדדחיק שמואל לומר הך סברא לר"מ ש"מ כאביי ס"ל דלרב אסי הוה מצי לאוקמא בשאין בו הקנאה


From the fact that Shmuel was pushed into saying this answer according to Rebbi Meir, it is evident that he really holds like Abaye. If he didn't, he could have just answered according to the opinion of Rav who said that the Mishnah was referring to a case where there was no unconditional debt (see Rashi ibid. DH "Shetarei Hakna'ah").

ואליבא דאביי משמע כתב לאחד ומסר לאחר את שכתב לו קנה


According to Abaye, it appears that if one would first write a document and then (write and) give a document to someone else, the first document would be the real acquisition.

דאמתני' דקתני כותבין שטר ללוה אע"פ שאין מלוה עמו פריך התם וליחוש דלמא כתב ללוות בניסן ולא לוה עד תשרי ואתי למיטרף לקוחות שלא כדין דמניסן ועד תשרי


The Mishnah there stated that one may write a loan document for the borrower even though the lender is not with him. The Gemara there asks, let us suspect that he wrote that he would borrow in Nisan but the actual loan didn't happen until Tishrei. This would mean that the lender (if the borrower would default on the loan) would end up seizing property bought from the purchasers of the borrower (between Nisan and Tishrei) illegally.

ומשני אמר אביי עדיו בחתומיו זכין לו אלמא אע"ג דמסר ללקוחות קודם למלוה לזה שמסר לו לא קנה


Abaye answers that the signature of the witnesses on the loan document causes the debt to be enacted immediately. This implies that even though the borrower might have given over a sale document to purchasers before he handed the loan document to the lender, the handing over to the purchasers does not override the loan (and the lien of the loan stands).

ובסוף הפרק (שם כ. ושם) משני אביי בכהאי גוונא גבי מצא שובר בזמן שהאשה מודה יחזיר לבעל דלא חיישינן דלמא כתבה בניסן ולא נתנה עד תשרי כו' וא"כ קשיא שמואל אדשמואל


At the end of the chapter there (Bava Metzia 20a), Abaye gives a similar answer. The Gemara discusses someone who finds a receipt for a Kesuvah. When the woman admits she received her Kesuvah, the receipt should obviously be returned to the husband. The Gemara says that we do not worry that she might have written the receipt in Nisan and only given it in Tishrei. Abaye there states that this is because when the receipt was written it was final. This leaves us with a contradiction in Shmuel (who seems to hold like Abaye, but yet holds that the giving of a document is more important than its witnesses' signatures).

ובלא שמואל איכא לאקשויי מאביי גופיה דמשמע בפרק זה בורר (סנהדרין דף כח: ושם) דס"ל כרבי אלעזר


Second Question: Even without this contradiction in Shmuel, Abaye himself seems to make contradictory statements. The Gemara in Sanhedrin (28b) implies that he also holds like Rebbi Elazar.

דמסקינן התם אההיא מתנתא דהוו חתימי עלה תרי גיסי כו' א"ל רב יוסף זיל קנייה בעדי מסירה ומסיק א"ל אביי והא מודה רבי אלעזר במזוייף מתוכו שהוא פסול


The Gemara there concludes regarding a gift document that two brother-in-law witnessed with a statement of Rav Yosef. Rav Yosef said that they should make the acquisition with witnesses who see the giving over of the document. Abaye asked him, didn't Rebbi Elazar himself say that if the document is forged (or unfit) that the transaction is invalid?

משמע דאי לא הוה מזוייף מתוכו היה מכשר כרבי אלעזר וזהו דוחק לומר דאביי לדבריו דרב יוסף קאמר וליה לא ס"ל


This implies that if there was no problem of the document having witnesses signed who were related, Abaye would rule that the witnesses for the giving over of the document validate the transaction. It is difficult to say that Abaye merely made this statement according to Rav Yosef's opinion (who held like Rebbi Elazar that the witnesses of the giving of the document validate the transaction) but that he himself did not really hold this way.

ובלאו אביי גופיה הוה קשה שם הא דפסיק ר"ת הלכה כאביי מדמהדר הש"ס לאוקומא מילתיה דשמואל כוותיה ועוד דאביי בתראה הוה


Third Question: Even without this difficulty, there is the difficulty that Rabeinu Tam rules that the Halachah is like Abaye (that the signatures on a document make a transaction take effect). Rabeinu Tam proves this from the fact that the Gemara in Bava Metzia (13a) takes pains to say that Shmuel holds like him. Additionally, it makes sense to rule like Abaye in this argument, as he is the latest authority mentioned there.

וקיי"ל כר' אלעזר דאמר עדי מסירה כרתי ואמרינן כתב לאחד ומסר לאחר את שמסר לו קנה


However, we also rule that the Halachah follows Rebbi Elazar that the witnesses of the giving over of the document validate the transaction. We rule that if a person wrote a document and then (wrote and) gave a similar document (i.e. sale of the same field) to someone else (before giving the first party his document), the person he gave it to first made the acquisition. [How can we reconcile these two rulings?]

ותירץ רבי דכי אמרינן עדיו בחתומיו זכין לו ה"מ בשני ימים שניכר מתוך השטר שקדם זכותו של זה לזכותו של זה


Answer: Rebbi answers that when Abaye said his rule that witnesses who sign a document effect a transaction, this was when the documents are written on two different days, where it is apparent that one came first.

אבל הכא מיירי שנכתבו ביום אחד הלכך אע"פ שנכתב זה קודם הקודם במסירה זכה דלא אמרינן עדיו בחתומיו זכין לו הואיל ואין ניכר שקדם זכותו מתוך השטר


In our case it is apparent that the documents were written on one day. Therefore, even though one document was written before the giving (and writing) of the second document, the one transferred first is valid. This is because we do not say that the signature makes the document take effect unless it is obvious from the document itself that his rights to whatever is written in the document are before those of anyone else.

וקשיא לי גבי מצא שובר בזמן שהאשה מודה יחזיר לבעל דפריך ניחוש דלמא כתבה ליתן בניסן ולא נתנה עד תשרי ואזלא זבינתה לכתובתה בטובת הנאה ומפיק ליה לשובר דכתוב בניסן ואתי למיטרף לקוחות שלא כדין


Question: The Gemara in Bava Metzia (20a) seems difficult to reconcile with this answer. The Gemara discusses someone who finds a receipt for a Kesuvah. When the woman admits she received her Kesuvah, the receipt should obviously be returned to the husband. The Gemara asks, why don't we worry that she might have written the receipt in Nisan and only given it in Tishrei (when the husband was obligated to pay her Kesuvah)? She might have sold her Kesuvah (between Nisan and Tishrei) for a small amount, and the husband will be able to take out his receipt and possess any land he would have had to pay for her Kesuvah (instead of giving it to the person who bought the Kesuvah) illegaly!

מאי קא משני אביי עדיו בחתומיו זכין לו אכתי ניחוש באותו יום שנכתב השובר מכרה כתובתה קודם מסירת השובר


How can Abaye answer that the witnesses on the document (receipt) enact the acquisition (and it is as if she received payment in Nisan)? We should still suspect that on the day that she wrote the receipt she sold her Kesuvah before she gave over the receipt!

דלא אמרינן התם עדיו בחתומיו זכין לו הואיל ואין ניכר מתוך השובר שנכתב קודם המסירה


In light of what we said above, we should not say that the witnesses on a document enact an acquisition since it is not apparent from the receipt that it was written before the transfer of the Kesuvah!

ואמר לי רבי דכולי האי לא חיישינן דבאותו יום עצמו מכרה כתובתה


Answer: Rebbi told me that we simply do not suspect (although it might be true) that on the same day that she wrote the receipt she sold her Kesuvah.


Tosfos DH "Imei"

תוס' ד"ה "אמיה"

(SUMMARY: Tosfos discusses when we rule Shuda d'Deini, and who has the authority to do so.)

אין זה ההוא עובדא דמי שמת (ב"ב קנא.)


Observation: This is not the same incident as that in Bava Basra (151a).

פי' ר"ח דקבלה בידינו דשודא דדייני דוקא במקרקעי ודוקא דיין מומחה כרב נחמן בדורו


Rach's Opinion: The Rach explains that we have a tradition that the ruling of Shuda d'Deini can only be done in cases involving land, and only by an expert judge like Rav Nachman in his generation.

דהא רב ששת גברא רבה הוה ואמר ליה רב נחמן אינך דיין לעשות שודא דדייני


Proof: his last aspect is apparent from our Gemara, where although Rav Sheshes was a great man, Rav Nachman told him that he is not a judge who can enact a ruling of Shuda d'Deini.

ולי נראה שודא נמי במטלטלי דגבי שליח מייתי לה בפרק קמא דגטין (דף יד:)


Tosfos' Opinion: It seems to me that Shuda d'Deini can also be ruled in cases involving movable objects, as this ruling is discussed regarding the case of the (money given to the) messenger in Gitin (14b).