Question: Why did the Gemara say that the case is where Reuven sold the field to Shimon with Achrayus (responsibility that he will pay him back in case the field is later seized by a creditor of Reuven)? It seems that the Gemara's main teaching here is that the orphans can tell Shimon, "our father left movable objects (cash) by you etc." This teaching can be taught whether or not Reuven originally sold the field to Shimon with Achrayus! [Important: See Tosfos Ha'Rosh who understands that there is another question in Tosfos. Why did the case have to be that Shimon paid by way of signing a document that he owed Reuven money (value of the purchase)? This makes the rest of Tosfos more understandable.]

First Answer: Rebbi answers that the case had to be that Shimon paid for the field by way of taking a loan from Reuven. If he would not have done so, the sons of Reuven could not claim anything. This is because the money of the loan is as if it was a security in Shimon's hands in place of the field if a creditor would seize the field.

This is why the case is with Achrayus. If it were not with Achrayus, there would be no difference if Shimon had paid by way of a loan or not (as either way he would have no right to retain the money he paid for the field as a security, being that the purchase by definition was insecure).

Implied Question: One might still want to suggest that the loan was not an integral part of the case. The Gemara might only have said the payment was made into a loan in order to show the sale was valid, as otherwise as long as the seller is always trying to get the money for the purchase from the buyer the sale is not valid. This is as opposed to Reuven arranging that the purchase money should be made into a proper loan, in which case the sale is finalized.

According to this reasoning, the case did not have to be that the money was turned into a formal loan. It could have merely said the sale was finalized.

Answer: Even so, Rebbi stated that Achrayus is a necessary element in the case. If the case was where there was no Achrayus, we would not know from this case anymore than what we know from our Mishnah (84a).

The mere law that the buyer has no permission to "pay" the loan by giving it to the creditor is an earlier Mishnah (84a). The Mishnah earlier states that we do not have mercy in judgement, but rather the money should be given to inheritors (before a creditor or a woman with a Kesuvah) as everyone else needs to take an oath besides the inheritors.

However, our case reveals a more novel teaching that even when the purchaser is holding the money that he was supposed to pay for the field he cannot keep the money. One might think he should be able to keep it in exchange for what he had to pay to keep the field despite the Achrayus. Even so he cannot keep the money as it is a movable object that belong to the orphans.

Observation: [Important: Applying the Tosfos Harosh mentioned in (a), this is actually an answer.] Additionally, it appears to Rebbi that there is another reason that the case must be where the field was paid for by way of a loan. If not, how can we say that the claim of the orphans that "our father left movable objects by you etc." is correct?

Rebbi Akiva in our Mishnah (84a) only stated that the inheritors should receive the money because they are the only one's that do not require an oath. This implies that in a case where others would not need an oath to get the money they would take precedence.

The purchaser in our case does not need to take an oath. There is no suspicion that he might have already been paid, being that he had the money of the sale the entire time in his possession. Why should he have taken other money?

This is why the case is that the purchase was done by way of a loan. There is now reason to think he might have taken money from the seller, in order that he should retain his money in case a creditor of the seller takes the field away. Being that the loan document is in the lender/seller's possession, he can claim the loan anytime he wants.

However, if the payment was not done in a loan there is no reason to think the buyer would have seized money from the seller, and he would therefore not have to take an oath. This would lead to the lack of a claim on the part of the orphans.

Question: The statement above that in a case where the payment was not turned into a loan, we said that there is no reason to suspect that the buyer seized money from the seller, is difficult.

If this is true, it is difficult to reconcile this with one of the reasons given in Erchin (22a) for the law that we do not sell the property of orphans who are minors unless their assets are being eaten away by interest. One opinion there states that this is because we suspect that the lender was already paid by their father, who did not have time to take away the loan document before he died. According to the previous answer, there should be another case that is an exception.

The case is where Reuven sold a field to Shimon with Achrayus and did not make the payment into a formal loan. Reuven then died. Shimon paid the money to the orphans, and the field was then found not to have belonged to Reuven when he sold it to Shimon.

Now the orphans are obligated to pay Shimon the money he paid for the field. Beis Din should make them pay because there is no suspicion in this case that Shimon was ever paid by Reuven. Why wouldn't the opinion cited above in Erchin (22a) hold that this is also a case where we sell the property of orphans to make them pay?

Answer: Rebbi answers that even though we would usually not suspect that the buyer had already been paid if the orphans were older, we are more suspicious when it comes to orphans who are minors.

Explanation: Rebbi says, it goes without saying that where the buyer did not appease the creditor that he cannot keep the purchase money for the field.

Even if he did appease him he cannot keep the money. One might think that as he paid the orphans debt and chased away their creditor that he can keep the money. The Gemara therefore teaches us that even so they can claim "we had movable objects etc."

Observation: One can prove a principle from our Gemara. The Gemara earlier (86a) stated that where a person who owes money has cash to pay back, he must pay his debt in cash.

However, if the borrower will lose money because he pays with cash, he does not have to pay with cash. This is apparent from our Gemara that states that the purchaser can pay back the orphans with land.

Rashi's Explanation: Rashi understands that the case in our Gemara must be where Reuven sold all of his fields to Shimon in one document. If it was done with two documents, we do not rule that a creditor can seize fields from either Shimon or Levi.

This is because the creditor cannot collect from Levi unless Levi bought from Shimon the last field that he bought from Reuven.

If Levi bought a field that was bought before the last field Shimon bought from Reuven, the creditor cannot seize Levi's field. This is because Levi can tell him that Shimon left him a field to collect (that Reuven still owned) when he bought my field from Reuven.

Levi can therefore say that when Shimon bought the first fields from Reuven the lien went away from those fields and remained on the fields which were left in Reuven's possession (before Shimon bought those too).

Question: Rebbi does not think this is correct. Shimon can make the following claim to Levi. Why did the Rabbanan say that a creditor cannot collect from property that has a lien on it before property that does not have a lien, even if that type of property is of low quality? This is in order to help the first buyer (from a person with debt).

Shimon can claim that in this case this law does not help him, and therefore it should not apply. We find a similar statement issued by Rava in Bava Kama (8b).

Rebbi's Opinion: Rebbi therefore states that it is possible to explain that the case is even where Shimon bought Reuven's lands in two or more documents.

Tosfos' Opinion: Tosfos agrees with Rashi that the case must be where Shimon bought all of Reuven's fields in one document. If the case would be that the sale was done in two documents, and Shimon bought a field of low quality last, and Levi would have bought from Shimon the second to last field bought from Reuven, the creditor would not be able to collect from Levi.

Levi could claim to the creditor that he purposely bought a land that was not appropriate for the creditor to take. This is because if all of the properties belonged to Shimon, Shimon would give the creditor the land of low quality.

Similarly, if Shimon bought land of excellent quality last, and Levi bought that field from Shimon, the creditor could not collect from Levi. This is because Levi could claim that he specifically bought a field which is not appropriate to give a creditor.

Certainly if Shimon owned all of these fields, the land of medium quality and low quality would be used to push off the creditor before the land of excellent quality. Shimon would have every right to do so, as explained in Bava Kama (8b).

Similarly, if Levi bought land of medium quality and left some land of medium quality by Shimon, Levi could claim that he left the creditor land to collect even if Shimon bought the fields in two separate documents.

Observation: However, it is possible to have a ruling that the creditor can collect from either Shimon or Levi. This is even if Shimon bought the fields in two separate documents, and even if Levi bought the second to last field.

If the last field was of excellent quality and the field bought prior to this field was of mediocre quality, and there was no other field of similar quality left in Shimon's possession, the creditor could opt to seize Levi's field. This is because Levi cannot claim in such a case that he left appropriate land for the creditor to seize.

Implied Question: This does not conflict with the rule that a creditor cannot collect from property that has a lien on it when he can collect from property that has no lien, even if this is property of low quality.

Answer: This case is different as there is no property that is free of a lien. Reuven's creditor has to seize property that already belongs (even more serious than a lien) to either Shimon or Levi, as he is coming to collect a debt from Reuven.

Explanation: This is not the specific reason for this law, as this reasoning can only be said to the original owner, not a first buyer.

The real reason is because we say that the first buyer only sold the second buyer any rights that he had in these fields. Being that the first buyer still has fields of similar mediocre quality, the second buyer can push the creditor off to the similar fields of the first buyer.

However, if the first buyer did not have any similar fields of mediocre quality left, the second buyer cannot push off the creditor to the low quality field of the first buyer, just as the first buyer could not have made the creditor take low quality instead of medium quality.

One might say the second buyer can push off the creditor by using a claim made in Bava Kama (8a). The claim that a buyer can make stated there is "if you are quiet (and collect like you are supposed to) you are quiet, if not I will return the document regarding the sale of the low quality field to its original owner and you will have to collect from that." [This is because the creditor must first take from the original owner's properties before taking from purchasers.] This is a claim stated there regarding a case where a person with all types of creditors sold his fields to one person, or three people together (see there at length), and these people take the place of the original owner (as their assets are possibly seized).

This is because the Gemara there concludes that this claim is invalid for the orphans of the original seller. Our Gemara is quoted immediately after the Gemara in Bava Kama (8b) says a case discussing orphans where such a claim is invalid. It is therefore sensible to assume that our Gemara is also talking about a case involving orphans where such a claim is invalid (see Rashi ibid. DH "b'Nezakin").

Explanation: Reuven can go to Beis Din with the creditor.

Question: What difference does it make that Reuven will go to Beis Din and not Shimon? What does Shimon gain by this? Whatever Reuven would claim, Shimon can also claim!

One might suggest the difference is if Shimon has witnesses but they are his relatives. While they cannot testify for Shimon, they can testify for Reuven.

This is incorrect. At the end of the day, once Shimon benefits that he can keep the land they cannot even testify if the official party in Beis Din is Reuven.

This is apparent from the Gemara in Makos (7a) where there is a case regarding Ila and Tuvyah who were the relatives of a guarantor. Rav Papa thought to say that they should be admissible witnesses, as they are not related to the principle people in the court case, the borrower and the lender.

Rav Huna the son of Rav Yehoshua said to Rav Papa that they are not admissible. After all, if the borrower does not have money, won't the lender go after the guarantor? [We see he from here that such witnesses are invalid.]

One cannot say that the difference is when the witnesses who verify the document in Beis Din are relatives of Reuven and not Shimon. This would seemingly preclude the witnesses from verifying the document if Reuven was the defendant.

This is also incorrect based on the above reasoning. Even if Shimon were officially the defendant they could not testify as if the creditor will take Shimon's field, Shimon's going to try to get his money back from Reuven.

Additionally, the Gemara here concludes that even if the land is sold without Achrayus Reuven can be considered a defendant. [Important: Tosfos is explaining that according to the second version of the Gemara this type of witness will always be valid as opposed to the first version where such a witness will always be invalid (see Maharam Shif). Either way, nothing would be gained by having Reuven become a defendant as well as Shimon.]

The Gemara in Bava Basra (43a) says that even the seller of a field without Achrayus can testify that he has sold the field to someone if he has other lands to pay off his creditors. His testimony is valid as long as there is no reason to say he is testifying in order to have the creditor seize the field from the buyer instead of from himself.

There we do not say he is unfit to testify because he does not want complaints from the buyer. If he can testify, certainly his relatives can testify when the only issue might be to protect him from complaints from his buyer.

We can't say the difference is regarding the taking of an oath. As Reuven knows whether or not he paid his creditor, Reuven can mandate that his creditor take an oath that he did not pay, as Rashi explains. Shimon, however, ostensibly has no idea whether or not Reuven paid his creditor, and will not claim a lie.

This is because an oath is required from the creditor anyway, as it is a standard law that someone who wants to collect property that is already on lien (or in this case bought by) to someone else must take an oath.

Answer: It is possible that the difference is in a case where Reuven would make the creditor swear that Reuven never paid him, and where Shimon already said that the creditor does not have to take the standard oath normally taken by someone who wants to collect from such property.

Rebbi's Answer: Rebbi said that if the creditor can't find witnesses to verify the document, only Reuven can claim the document is forged as he would know if it is forged or not. However, being that Shimon can only be doubtful whether or not it is forged, he cannot employ this claim. This would be a great (and more common) difference.

The same would apply to inheritors. They cannot claim that a document that their father's creditor is using is forged (as they wouldn't know), even if the creditor cannot verify the document.

Don't say that this is impossible, as it means that nobody would be able to live normally (because of all of the criminals who will start pulling out forged documents on innocent inheritors and the like). According to Torah law there is never a need to verify a document, as witnesses who are signed on a document are considered to have had their testimony investigated by Beis Din.

Rebbi continues that even a known thief does not need to verify a document. We do not assume his documents are forged, as even though he is suspected of stealing, he is scared to write a forged document lest Beis Din find out about his forgery.

Therefore, when the Rabbanan decreed that people need to verify a document if their opposition in Beis Din claims the document is forged, this is only if the borrower says that he knows it is forged. However, orphans and buyers were not given a right to claim that the document is forged which will force the document to be verified, as they have no idea whether or not it is forged.

Rebbi proves this concept from the Mishnah's statement in Bava Metzia (12b) regarding someone who finds loan documents. The Mishnah states that if they include a lien on the borrower's properties, the finder should not return the documents to either party, as Beis Din will use them to collect. If there is no lien in the document, he should return the document to the lender as Beis Din will not collect from it. This is all according to Rebbi Meir.

Shmuel understands that Rebbi Meir is discussing a case where the person described in the document as owing money says the document is forged (and does not admit to having taken the loan). Rebbi Meir said that such a document without Achrayus should be returned to the lender, because it cannot even be used to collect from possessions that do not have a lien on them. He can therefore give it back to the lender, who can use it as a bottle cover.

The Gemara there asks, why doesn't Rebbi Meir say that we should return the document to the borrower to use as a bottle cap? The Gemara answers, the borrower says the document is forged (so there is no reason to give it to him).

If one will say that we do claim for orphans and buyers that a document might be forged, why wouldn't Rebbi Meir say that even a loan document that does contain Achrayus should be returned to the lender?

If the lender can verify the document with witnesses, the document should certainly be returned to him as he is owed money! We do not suspect that the borrower repaid the loan, as the borrower said the loan never existed (and the document is forged). The rule is that whenever someone says he never took a loan, it is essentially as if he is also saying that (if the loan does exist) he never paid it back.

If the lender will not be able to verify the loan document, what do we lose by giving him the document? He can't collect any money from the borrower who will claim it is forged. Additionally, even his buyers and orphans will not lose property they received from him, as we will claim for them that the document is forged.

It must therefore be that we do not claim for buyers and orphans that the document is forged. Even though we do claim other claims for inheritors and buyers, in this case we leave the document with its Torah law status, which is that it is a proper document as long as the borrower himself does not claim it is forged. This is why Rebbi Meir in Bava Metzia (12b) states that a loan document with Achrayus should not be returned to the lender, in order that he could not end up taking away the property of the orphans and buyers.

Question: This conclusion is difficult. Why shouldn't Rebbi Meir hold that even a document with Achrayus should be given back to the supposed lender? He will still never be able to collect with this document from the orphans and buyers of the borrower. This is because despite the fact that we do not claim for them that the document is forged, we still do claim for them that perhaps the borrower paid back the loan. This is just like their (orphan's) father could claim he paid back the loan with a Migu that he could have claimed it was forged.

We find a precedent for this claim in Bava Basra (70a). The Gemara there discusses a case where someone deposited an object by his friend, and wrote a document to this effect. Rav Chisda says that if the guardian of the object is believed to say that he returned it to the original owner, even though the person depositing the object has a seemingly good claim, namely "what is the document still doing in my hand?" This is because the guardian can claim that the object had been lost in an accident that was out of his control.

The Gemara there concludes that this might be dependent on the argument regarding an investment document claimed from orphans. [The case is where Reuven decided to invest money with Shimon who would work to develop the money, and they would share the profits. Shimon then died, prompting Reuven to present his investment contract and get the money back from Shimon's estate.] The judges of the exile said that Shimon can swear and collect the entire amount from the estate, while the judges of Eretz Yisrael said that he can swear and collect half of the amount.

The Gemara there explains that according to the opinion that Shimon can swear but only receive half, Shimon clearly does not win the case by saying "what is the document doing in my hands?" This opinion holds of Rav Chisda's law above that we claim for the orphans that it is possible that the father returned half of the money, just as their father could have indeed claimed. Their father would have a winning claim, as he would be believed with a Migu that he could have said the money was lost in an accident that was out of his control. This is despite the fact that we do not directly claim for the orphans that the money might have indeed been lost in an accident.

The opinion that Shimon can swear and receive the entire amount clearly understands that the claim "what is the document doing in my hands?" is valid. He also must not hold of Rav Chisda, at least to the degree that we do not claim for them that the money may have been lost in an accident that was out of his control. This is because such an accident is uncommon.

Even so, we do claim for them according to the opinion that Shimon must swear and only collect half, that their father might have returned half of the money. This is despite the fact that the entire believability of this claim is based on a claim that we would not use for the orphans, that their father could have said the money was lost in an accident beyond his control. According to this Gemara, we should also claim for orphans that a loan document was paid even though it is based on the fact that their father could have claimed the document was forged. [This takes us back to the question above: Why doesn't Rebbi Meir in Bava Metzia (12b) allow a document with Achrayus to be returned to the owner? Beis Din will always claim for the orphans that their father may have already paid back the loan, using a Migu that he could have said the document was forged.]

However, this is not difficult if Shmuel would hold that if someone agrees to having written a document there is no need to verify the document. In such a case their father would not be believed that he paid his share with a Migu that he could have said the document was forged.

Shmuel clearly states in Bava Basra (154b) that according to Rebbi Meir even if a borrower admits to having written a document it still needs to be verified (under certain circumstances, see Gemara there).

This is also difficult, because it would mean that the sages did not protect orphans and buyers from criminals who would produced forged documents to take away their property.

Tosfos' Opinion: Tosfos therefore concludes that we do claim for orphans and buyers that a document is forged. Why did Rebbi Meir say in Bava Metzia (12b) that the document with Achrayus should not be given back to the lender? We suspect that the lender himself will find witnesses to verify the document. Being that the document is already considered invalid and this is supported by the fact that it was lost, we should suspect it is invalid even if the witnesses' verify their signatures.

It is possible that the "lender" created a good forgery from another document that the witnesses indeed signed, and the judges will make a mistake and verify the document (because the forgery is extremely good). This is like the case we find in the Gemara in Bava Basra (167a), where judges would have verified an expertly forged document containing the signature of the aged Rav Acha. The forger imitated his shaky handwriting by sitting on the "Zarnuka,"-"device used to draw water from a well" while he was signing. [Our Gemara in Bava Basra (ibid.) has a slightly different text.]

This is also similar to the Gemara earlier (36b) where we say that a document that is bad (two witnesses testify that the owner tried to have them forge a similar document) cannot be used to collect, even if the witnesses verify their signature. This is because we say that since we know the owner was trying to forge such a document, he must have indeed succeeded in staging a good forgery.

Question: If so, someone who finds a document that is verified by Beis Din should not return it, as we should suspect that perhaps he forged the signatures!

Answer: This is not difficult, as we can make a distinction between where the borrower claims that the document is forged to a case where he does not make such a claim.

Where the borrower does not claim the document is forged we have no reason to suspect that the fact that it was lost shows that it might not be a valid document. The case there can therefore be where the borrower was not around to claim anything.

However, if the borrower would claim it is forged, we would indeed suspect it is forged. The case where we say a document should not be returned because we suspect it is forged is specifically when there are no witnesses who will verify the document. Let us assume that the reasoning is because otherwise the orphans and buyers will lose, as we will not claim for them the document is forged.

Even if we would assume so, one could still ask from Shmuel's statement in Bava Metzia (16b). Shmuel said that someone who finds a document stating that a borrower will pay a certain amount of money to a "lender," whether or not that person lends him the said amount, should return the document to the "lender." Why did Shmuel say this? Why don't we suspect that the orphans of the borrower will lose money despite the fact that the document is not verified?

We can answer that the case of Shmuel is where the borrower is not around, and he will therefore not claim that it is forged. We therefore do not assume nor suspect that the document is forged.

We can also explain that the reason is because we suspect that the lender will even try to collect from the borrower himself by verifying the document. However, he will not be able to verify the document, as there is the bad aspect to it that it was lost and the borrower's counter-claim. This can also lead us to explain the reasoning behind the return of a document that has been verified in Beis Din.

We can say that the case there was where the borrower was not around to make any claims. If he would claim that the document was forged, we indeed would say the finder should not return the document to the lender as once it fell it is suspect.

Second Answer: Alternatively, it is possible that because it has already been verified it is considered a valid document that Beis Din verified which is not affected by the fact that it was lost. Even if the borrower claims it was forged the document should still be returned to the lender.

According to this answer, the case where one finds a loan document (and he should give it back) must be discussing a case where the document has not been verified. If it was verified, we don't suspect that the lender forged the signature of both the witnesses and the judges.

Proof (to (e): We can bring a proof that we do claim for orphans that their adversary's document is forged from a Gemara in Bava Basra (174b). Rav Huna states that a person on his death bed who is Makdish all of his property and says that he owes one hundred Zuz to someone is believed. This is because we have a principle that a person never pulls any trickery to cheat Hekdesh out of money.

The Gemara asks, if this is dependent on trickery, does this mean that a person might engage in trickery with his children (but not Hekdesh)? Rav and Shmuel both say that a person who is on his death bed who says he owes one hundred Zuz to someone is only believed if he actually says "give it to him." If he does not say this, he is not believed.

The Gemara there concludes that Rav Huna is discussing a case where there is a verified document to this effect, whereas Rav and Shmuel are talking about a case where there is an unverified document to this effect. When the dying person says "give" he is essentially verifying the document, as opposed to when he doesn't say to actually give the money. This is because we suspect that he only said this to his children to give an air that they are not rich.

If you will say that we do not claim for orphans that the document is forged, the person mentioned in the document in the case of Rav and Shmuel should still be able to collect the money being that the orphans can't claim that the document is forged.

It doesn't seem correct to say that the case is where the person did not die, as the Gemara says "we give" which implies that the orphans must give the money.