Explanation: This is just a way to push off the question.

Rebbi Yehudah holds in Bava Kama (90a) regarding the law of one or two days that acquiring fruit is not like acquiring the body of the item (the source of the fruit, i.e. a tree or field).

Question: Rabeinu Tam asks, how do we find our hands and legs (i.e. our bearings) in this Gemara? We hold like Reish Lakish that the acquisition of fruit is unlike an acquisition of the body, as stated in Yevamos (36b). We also hold regarding a Torah law that one cannot establish a status retroactively. This is apparent from the end of Beitzah (38a), where we rule like Rebbi Oshiya and Rav Nachman, whom we rule like in Kesuvos (13a) monetary law. (Note: Our Gemara says that unless we rule like Rebbi Yochanan, we cannot find our hands and legs in the Beis Hamedrash. Additionally, being unable to establish a status retroactively makes it difficult for us to say that one of the brothers inherited his portion directly from his father, as that portion was retroactively his. This makes it difficult to say that the field was not merely "bought" from his brother.)

We say in Kidushin (42b) that brothers who split the estate among themselves are like buyers from each other. If they split based on an evaluation that was mistaken by less than one sixth of the total value, the split is still valid. We also rule in Bava Basra (65a) that they do not automatically have a path through each other's property, as a person who sells does so with a bad eye (i.e. he does not give more than what is clearly included in the sale contract). This shows that they are considered buyers.

When we rule in Bava Basra (107a) like Rav who says that (if creditors seize part of an estate from one brother, after the brothers already split up the estate) the division is null and void, it is not because we hold that they are like inheritors (and not like purchasers). Rather, it is because they are like purchasers who give each other a guarantee regarding their portions of the estate. When Rav said they are like inheritors, he did not mean literally, but rather that they are similar to inheritors. Most Sefarim have this text in Bava Kama (9a).

However, Rav Asi says that they should divide the amount that the creditor collected (and therefore the other brother should give half that amount in land or money to the brother from whom the debt was collected). When he says he is unsure whether or not they are like inheritors, he means like actual inheritors, as is apparent in the Gemara in Bechoros (48a) regarding the case of five and not five (see Tosfos 47b DH "Taval" where this Gemara in Bechoros was explained at length).

When Rebbi Asi says in the name of Rebbi Yochanan that brothers who divide are like buyers, that is not the opinion of Rav Asi (rather someone else named Rebbi Asi).

Alternatively, it is Rav Asi, and he holds that it is unclear whether or not they are like inheritors, and his Rebbi holds that they are certainly like buyers.

When we rule in Nedarim (46b) like Rebbi Eliezer ben Yaakov who says that if partners vowed that they cannot benefit from each other, they can still enter their jointly owned courtyard, we do not rule so because of Rebbi Eliezer's reason. He holds this way because he holds that a person can create a status retroactively, as is apparent in Bava Kama (51b). However, we hold this way because we hold that if a person normally does not mind when a person receives a certain minor benefit from him or his property, it is even permitted for someone who is forbidden to have benefit from him. This is the opinion of Ravina in Bava Basra (57b). (Note: Tosfos continues showing that we cannot rely on creating a retroactive status to answer this question, as we do not hold this works.)

Answer: Only in the case where a person writes that all his property should go to his son "from today and after his death" do we hold like Reish Lakish that acquiring the fruit is not like acquiring the source. This is because a father relents (when giving the fruit to his son) that his son should have the land. The Gemara in Bava Basra (136b) indeed says that both of Reish Lakish's statement are necessary for this reason. However, we normally hold that acquiring the fruit is like acquiring the body (source).

Implied Question: Rava here says that the Pasuk and Beraisa support the position of Reish Lakish. (Note: Doesn't this imply that Rava rules like Reish Lakish?)

Answer#1: Rava himself does not hold this way. If this were not the case, Rava would not find his hands and feet in this Gemara. Rava holds that brothers are purchasers in Kidushin (42b). In Bava Metzia (48a), Rava similarly says that proof that pulling is a mode of acquisition in Torah law can be found in a Pasuk and Beraisa. This is despite the fact Rava himself rules like Rebbi Yochanan besides for three cases (see Yevamos 36a).

Answer#2: Only Rebbi Yochanan holds that they (brothers who divided an estate) return their fields to each other (to the estate) on Yovel. Although many other Amoraim also hold they are like buyers from each other, they do not hold that they should return their fields to each other. This is because the Torah only said that a sale should return when Yovel arrives, not inheritance and presents. Now this is understandable.

Question: According to Rebbi Yochanan who holds that brothers return their land to each other when Yovel arrives, it will not be possible to find an inherited field (which the Torah gives detailed laws about governing its sale)! Every field will be considered a bought field, and will not go to the Kohanim. Additionally, it will be redeemed based on its value alone, and not the amount given by the Torah which is fifty Shekel of silver for every area where one can plant a Beis Kur of barley (no matter the actual value of the field).

Answer: Being that instead of this field he will receive another field (his brother's portion), this is not called a bought field but rather an inherited field.

Implied Question: Damages have nothing to do with divorce.

Answer: However, because the Mishnah earlier in Ha'Sholei'ach (starting from 45a) was discussing things that are done due to Tikun ha'Olam, the Tana here states more things that are due to Tikun ha'Olam.

Implied Question: The chapter of Get Pashut is stated in (the last chapter of) Bava Basra and not here in Gitin. (Note: Why isn't it included in Meseches Gitin?)

Answer: The Mishnayos there deal with laws of creating documents. This is why it stated that chapter at the end of Bava Basra.

Explanation: The Gemara explains that this is because a woman wants to get married far more than a man wants to get married.

Question: This is difficult. There is an opinion that having a Kesuvah is a Torah law, as is derived in Kesuvos (10a) from the Pasuk, "k'Mohar ha'Besulos" (which the Gemara explains as the payment for a virgin wife). The Gemara there derives that this means that (the fine for seduction) should be like the payment for a virgin wife, and the payment for the wife should be like this (seduction). According to this opinion, she should be paid with the best property. Why did the Chachamim take away this law?

Rebbi Meir also says that she receives medium quality property, yet he also holds that a Kesuvah is a Torah institution in Kesuvos (56a). (Note: Why did the Chachamim take away her right to the best quality property?)

Answer: The reason that the Chachamim took away this law is similar to the reason given by the Gemara (49b) regarding why this is the law by a creditor. The Gemara states that we are scared that a person will see his friend has a nice field, and will think, "I will lend him money in order to end up seizing the field." Here, too, Chazal were scared that a woman will purposely bother her husband in order to make him divorce her, so that she could collect her Kesuvah.

The reason that a woman wants to get married more than a man is given in order that one should not say the following logic. One might say that just as a creditor collects from mid-grade property due to the suspicion that people will otherwise be unable to receive loans, so too a woman should receive mid-grade property because of Cheena (see the definition of Cheena in Tosfos 49b, DH "mi'Shoom Cheena").

Implied Question: According to the opinion that a lien on the property of one who owes money is not in effect according to Torah law, even without Tikun ha'Olam one would not be able to collect from property with a lien.

Even according to the opinion that such a lien is in effect, even so a creditor receives low grade property according to Torah law (not mid-grade). (Note: Why does Tikun ha'Olam change anything?)

Answer: Without the reason of Tikun ha'Olam, he would collect even from mid-grade property with a lien, due to the possibility that people would otherwise be unable to receive loans. This is why it says that this is because of Tikun ha'Olam. (Note: Tosfos means that Tikun ha'Olam teaches that he should collect from low-grade property.)

Implied Question: It is understandable that we do not suspect that a creditor of orphans being unable to collect will affect people's general ability to receive loans. This is as we state in the Gemara later (50a) that the lender never thinks that the borrower is going to die.

However, how could the Chachamim say regarding damages that must be paid according to Torah law from one's best property, that because the people who would be collected from are orphans one can only collect from their low-grade property? The Gemara indeed states that orphans only pay low-grade property, even if the collection is due to damages.

Answer: According to Rava (50a) there is no question, as he establishes that the case is where the best property of the person damaged was equal to the low-grade property of the one who damaged etc. (Note: The Gemara there explains at length that the orphans indeed pay high-grade property according to Rava. However, the orphans pay low-grade property when their low-grade property is equal to the high grade property of the person damaged (see Gemara there at length).)

According to Abaye and Mar Zutra who argue on Rava (ibid.) and say that orphans pay low grade property even when damages are being collected, it is possible to say that they hold that an automatic lien on property is not a Torah principle.

Alternatively, the Rabbanan do not differentiate between creditors and damages.

Question: Rabeinu Tam asks that here the Gemara implies that Rebbi Yishmael and Rebbi Akiva argue whether we evaluate based on the one who was damaged or the one who damaged. This is explicitly stated later. In Bava Kama (59a), Abaye establishes that they argue regarding evaluating damage based on what is left versus the value of the row (or evaluating the land as well, see Gemara there). (Note: What is their argument dependent on according to Abaye?)

Answer: It seems that even though they argue if the evaluation is done based on the one who damaged or the one who was damaged, even so Abaye understands that they also argue regarding the method of evaluation. This is evident from Rebbi Akiva's statement that "the Pasuk is not coming etc." His answer implies that he means the following. The Pasuk is not coming to be stringent with the one who damaged like you have said. It is only coming to say that one must pay with the best land.

If they do not argue regarding evaluation regarding what is left, and only argue regarding collecting from the best land, Rebbi Yishmael would not be much more strict with the one who damaged than Rebbi Akiva. Rather, on the contrary, Rebbi Akiva who says that we evaluate with the one who damaged should be more stringent, as I will soon explain.

This is why he made a bigger mistake in understanding Rebbi Yishmael than in understanding the words of Rebbi Akiva. This is evident from the Gemara's question that according to Rebbi Yishmael, is it possible that if he eats a weak animal he should pay the value of a fat animal? This misunderstanding came from Rebbi Akiva's rebuttal to Rebbi Yishmael, which implies that he thought Rebbi Yishmael said that the Pasuk is coming to be stringent with the one who damaged, more than the actual amount that he damaged, as we have explained.

Explanation#1: This means that it is understandable that if someone eats a fatty animal that he should pay the value of a fatty animal. However, if he ate a weak animal, why should he pay the value of a fatty animal?

Explanation#2: Alternatively, the Gemara might mean the following. Being that if he eats a fatty animal he only pays for the value of a fatty animal like the one he damaged, and we do not give him a fine that he must pay more than this, if he ate a weak animal we similarly should not fine him to pay as if he ate a fatty animal!