Explanation: He (Rebbi Meir) mentioned the wife of a Kohen, as if to say that just as you admit that this would be a liability for the wife of a Kohen, admit that it is also a liability for a slave of a Kohen!

Implied Question: The Gemara concludes that regarding a wife of a Kohen this is a liability. (Note: Did the Rabbanan admit to Rebbi Meir?)

Answer: This is part of Rebbi Meir's statement, as is evident from the fact that the Gemara does not state, "they said to him etc."

Question: What about a minor who is the Kenani slave of a regular Yisrael? He does not want to act in a loose fashion, as is apparent from the Gemara in Kesuvos (11a) that says that this is because he never yet tasted the taste of "prohibited things."

Answer: Rebbi Meir agrees that in such a case there is no liability in him receiving his freedom.

Question: How do we know that we should rule like the Gemara in Kesuvos (ibid.), and as we indeed generally rule, that a servant wants to be able to act in a loose fashion? Don't the Rabbanan argue on Rebbi Meir, and say that he does not want to act in a loose fashion?

Answer: The Rabbanan actually agree that a slave wants to act in a loose fashion. However, they hold that because a slave is enslaved and others own him, he prefers to have his freedom than his ability to act loosely. However, they agree that a regular non-Jew who is not owned by anyone would rather be able to act loosely (than become Jewish).

Implied Question: Whose opinion is most like that of our Mishnah: Rebbi Meir or the Rabbanan (12a-b)?

Answer #1: If the correct text of the Mishnah is "give this Get," our Mishnah is solely according to the opinion of Rebbi Meir. (Note: According to him the Get was clearly not acquired by the messenger because it was a liability for the servant/wife, which is why it is not (physically) given after the death of the master/husband.)

Answer #2: Alternatively, it could even be according to the position of the Rabbanan. The case would be where the master/husband did not physically give the Get to the messenger, but rather only showed it to him and commanded him to give it to the slave/wife. However, the messenger only picked it up after the master/husband had died.

Answer #3: Alternatively, the messenger indeed took the Get immediately. Even so, the slave did not acquire the Get. This is because we will say that we do not say "give" is like "acquire" unless he physically gave the Get from his hand to that of the messenger. This teaches us that even though the Get is extant and ready to be given when he is made a messenger, and all the preparations were made when the master/husband was alive, even so the Get cannot be concluded after the master/husband dies, as there is no such thing as someone giving a Get after he is already dead.

Opinion: However, Rabeinu Tam says that we do not have the text "this" at all. The word "this" is not in our Mishnah to tell us a novelty, as is apparent from the fact that the Gemara deduced our Mishnah is discussing a healthy person. The Gemara deduces that if the Mishnah was talking about a deathly ill person, why say "give?" Even "write" would be enough!

If "this" was stated to say a novel idea, even if it was referring to a deathly ill person it would not have said a case of "write." (Note: This is because it would be mixing two different concepts together.)

It does not appear that the Gemara is inferring that if the Mishnah would be discussing a deathly ill person, it should have given a case of "write" a Get for my wife, and "give this" Get Shichrur to my slave. Being that the Mishnah would have to change its terminology and say "give this Get Shichrur," the Tana is not expected to change the first case to "write a Get for my wife" and to lengthen the way the Mishnah is written.

Explanation: We rule that a person cannot give a Get after he dies (even if it is clear that he wanted the Get to be given).

Implied Question: (Note: This is apparently not obvious enough), even though this is explicitly stated later (72a) that a person cannot give a Get after he dies. (Note: Why isn't that explicit Mishnah enough to convey this message?)

Answer: It is necessary to state this to teach that even though the person appointed a messenger while he was alive, the messenger is not like the person himself after the person himself dies, as if the person somehow lives on, but rather it is considered a Get after death.

The Mishnah later (72a) teaches that even though the Get reaches the woman when her husband is still alive (when the husband gives her a Get and says "here is your Get after I die"), the Get is invalid because it was given after he died. The Mishnah there also teaches which term implies that the giving of the Get was before he died and what term implies after death.

Implied Question: According to the one who establishes that our Mishnah is referring to a healthy person and the money was given over through "Ma'amad Shelashtan," it is unnecessary (meaning it is untrue) to say that according to him the first part of the Mishnah is also discussing a case of Ma'amad Shelashtan, and that the Get is already extant.

If the Get would not be extant, even regarding money it would not be possible to do Ma'amad Shelashtan. Additionally, the case would be where the woman wants the Get. The Mishnah would have been teaching us (if the first part of it had indeed been discussing a possible case of Ma'amad Shelashtan) that Ma'amad Shelashtan was not established for transferring documents, only monetary obligations. (Note: Why don't we assume that the first part of the Mishnah, according to this opinion, is indeed similar to the second part of the Mishnah?)

Answer: It does not appear that the Amoraim (who argue regarding the exact case of the Mishnah) will argue about the nature of the first part of the Mishnah, and that one will say the case is Ma'amad Shelashtan and one will say it is "write" and "give." They only argue about the second case of the Mishnah, and everyone agrees the first part is a case of "write" and "give." This is even according to the opinion that (the second case of) the Mishnah is referring to a healthy person. It is not possible that the first part (of the Mishnah) is also referring to Ma'amad Shelashtan (as we have explained).

Implied Question: Even though the first part of the Mishnah is unlike the second part, there is no reason to be suspect.

Answer: Even according to the opinion that the Mishnah is referring to a deathly ill person, the first and second parts of the Mishnah are not completely similar. This is because (in the first part of the Mishnah) the document is not extant when the deathly ill person commands it should be given, and the money (in the second part) is extant.

Implied Question: (Note: Even though) the Gemara proves from the first part of the Mishnah that the second part of the Mishnah must be talking about a healthy person, implying that the second part of the Mishnah should be similar to the first part of the Mishnah (unlike we have just stated).

Answer: This is because we would like to say that both cases can happen with the same person (and to this extent the Gemara compares them), but not to the extent that they have to be completely similar.

Question: What is the Gemara's question? We hold (15a) that it is a Mitzvah to uphold the words of the deceased! Accordingly, our Mishnah could be discussing a healthy person and the reasoning would be because it is a Mitzvah to uphold the words of the deceased!

Answer #1: It is possible to answer that because the Chachamim argue on Rebbi Meir and do not hold that it is a Mitzvah to uphold the words of the deceased, even though we hold like Rebbi Meir, we do not want to establish the Mishnah as a minority opinion. This is as we find later (30a), that Shmuel did not say the Mishnah is like Rebbi Yosi who says that they established someone who acquired as someone who did not acquire (regarding a Kohen or Levi who is accustomed to receiving someone's Terumos and Ma'asros). This is despite the fact that Shmuel himself holds like Rebbi Yosi in Bava Metzia (12a).

Answer #2: Additionally, it is possible that we cannot say the Mishnah's reasoning is because it is a Mitzvah to uphold the word of the deceased. If so, why say that the case is where the money is piled up (and not just among the other monies of his estate)? Even if it was not piled into a specific pile it should be sufficient. This is because the Gemara holds that the Mitzvah to uphold etc. even applies to a loan, as we do not suspect that a healthy person has a buried "Manah" that he is referring to, as he did not explicitly state that he is referring to such a Manah.

Question: According to Rav himself (who said the Mishnah is talking about a specific pile of money) it is possible to ask this question. Why don't we say that the Mishnah's reasoning is because it is a Mitzvah to uphold the words of the deceased even if the money is not in a specific pile?

Answer #1: Rav does not hold like Rebbi Meir but rather like Rebbi Yosi. This in accordance with Shmuel's ruling like Rebbi Yosi in Kesuvos (69b).

Answer #2: Rabeinu Tam also explains that we do not say that it is a Mitzvah to uphold the words of the deceased unless something has already been entrusted to a third party by the deceased (before his death). This is like a case of someone who gives over money for his daughter, or someone who says to give a Shekel to his son. Our Mishnah implies that there was no such giving over to a third party, as it does not say "give this Manah to Ploni."

Implied Question: This is unlike the case of "take a Manah to Ploni" later (where it is given for this purpose), where we say regarding this case that it is a Mitzvah to uphold the words of the deceased, even though it did not say "this Manah." (Note: Why?)

Answer: This is because "bring a Manah to Ploni" clearly implies without saying "this Manah" that he is giving it to him at that moment to take it, more than the case of "give a Manah to Ploni."

Proof: This is also implied in Bava Basra (149a) regarding (the case of) Issur the convert. The reason that it is a Mitzvah to uphold the word of the deceased did not help regarding the twelve thousand Zuz that Issur had deposited by Rava. This is because he did not originally deposit them to be given over (eventually) to Rav Mari (his son who did not inherit him because he was conceived before his "father," Issur, converted). (Note: See Gemara there at length.)

Question: It is possible to push aside this proof by answering that perhaps we do not say that it is a Mitzvah to uphold the words of the deceased unless the third party is willing to cooperate. Rava did not want to be a cooperative third party (to give the money to Rav Mari, as he wanted the money for himself). (Note: We therefore cannot prove from here that it is only a Mitzvah to uphold the words of the deceased when the deceased already entrusted what he wanted given to a third party before he died.)

Observation: Rabeinu Tam also states that regarding a convert in general we do not say that it is a Mitzvah to uphold the word of the deceased (convert). This is because it is only a Mitzvah to fulfill the words of those who bequeath, being that his power did not totally leave his possessions when he died, as is evidenced by the fact that his inheritors inherit because of him. However, regarding a convert who does not bequeath possessions, showing that he has no more power over his possessions at all, there is no Mitzvah to fulfill his words (after he dies).

A similar thing is said there (in Bava Basra 149a) that whoever is able to bequeath is able to give a present of a sick person on their deathbed.

Text: There are Sefarim (Gemaros) that have the following text (in the statement of Rav). "If a Shechiv Meira says, "give a Manah to Ploni from my possessions," we give the money. If he says, "this Manah," we give the money. If he says, "a Manah," we do not give him the money, as we suspect that there is a Manah that is buried somewhere (that is difficult to access) that he is referring to.

Explanation: The Ri explains this in the following manner. When he says, "from my possessions," we give the money even when he said "a Manah," and we do not suspect that there is a Manah that is buried somewhere that he is referring to. Once he is commanding to give a Manah from his possessions, he wants the Manah to be given in any manner.

When it states, "(if he says) this Manah, we give the money," it is when he does not command to give from his possessions, but admits that a Manah should be given to Ploni as he has a deposit from him.

Therefore, in a case where he merely says, "a Manah" we do not give the money, as we suspect that there is a Manah buried somewhere that he agrees belongs to that person. Our Mishnah is discussing a case of a deposit, and therefore only if the money is in a pile do we say it should be given. If it is not in a pile, we suspect that there is a Manah that is buried somewhere that he is referring to.

Question: Why is Rav saying that the Mishnah is talking about a case of a deposit? Let him say it is talking about giving a present, as is the implication of the word "give," and therefore it could even be discussing a case where the money is not in a specific pile!

Answer: The Gemara already taught in Bava Basra (151a) that the words of a Shechiv Meira are as if they written and given over. However, regarding a deposit the Mishnah is teaching us that we do not suspect that he only said this (give money to someone) in order that people should not think that his children are wealthy (see Bava Basra 174b). Being that he said "give," this is considered a full admission.

Question: However, the Ri has difficulty with this. If so, why say the Mishnah is referring to a Shechiv Meira? It could also say it is referring to a healthy person!

One might say that we only suspect that a Manah was buried somewhere by a Shechiv Meira, because he was unable to explain that he meant that the Manah was buried somewhere because he was disturbed by his illness (at the time). In contrast, a healthy person who does not explain this presumably does not care what Manah he gives. If this is the case, we can say the Mishnah is referring to a healthy person and money that is not in a specific pile!

Explanation: It therefore appears that we do not have the text "from my possessions, we give the money." Even when it is a present we suspect that there is a Manah that is buried somewhere. Rather, the correct text is "(if he says) from my possessions, than if he said "this Manah" we give the money, (but if he said) "a Manah" we do not give the money."

Question: According to Rav Papa, why didn't Rav himself establish the Mishnah as talking about a case of Ma'amad Shelashtan, even if the money is not in a specific pile?

If you will say the reason is because the Mishnah's terminology does not seem to imply that it is talking about Ma'amad Shelashtan, for that very reason the Gemara should say that Rav Papa does not say like Rav Zvid!

Answer: Even though the Mishnah does not seem to Rav to be discussing a case of Ma'amad Shelashtan, even so, being that Rav Papa is arguing on Rav Zvid, the implication is that he has a reason to say that Rav is certainly not talking about a case of Ma'amad Shelashtan.

Question: This that the Mishnah says "give" teaches us that even so we do not force the inheritors to free the slave. This is according to the opinion of Rebbi who argues in the Yerushalmi on the Rabbanan, and says that "give" is not akin to freeing the slave, rather it is like "write" (a Get Shichrur for him), and therefore we do not force the inheritors to free him. (Note: It is therefore not proof that the Mishnah is not dealing with a Shechiv Meira. Why, then, does Rav Zvid insist that it is?)

Answer #1: Our Mishnah does not come to teach us regarding the law of "Mitzvah l'Kayem Divrei ha'Mes" - "it is a Mitzvah to uphold the word of the deceased" whether or not we force the inheritors to uphold the deceased's wishes or not. It is coming to say that there is no Get that can be given after the master/husband has already died. (Note: Therefore, Rav Zvid does not accept that the reason for "give" and not "write" in the Mishnah is that we do not force the inheritors to free the slave.)

Answer #2: Additionally, presumably the Mishnah is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbanan in the Yerushalmi (not Rebbi).

Opinion: The Riva and Rabeinu Tam state that Ma'amad Shelashtan works against the will of the borrower or guardian.

If it would only work if he agrees, then according to the opinion that it only works with a deposit, why did they have to institute Ma'amad Shelashtan? He should just say to him (the person he wants to transfer his object to), "acquire!"

It does not appear correct to say that they needed to institute Ma'amad Shelashtan for a case where the object deposited is no longer in the hands of the guardian, and instead it is in someone else's possession, because in such a case saying "acquire" will not help. (Note: It does not seem likely that a special mode of Kinyan was made specifically for such a scenario.)

Additionally, even when the deposit is not in the hands of the guardian, he can still acquire the deposit through "Odisa"-"admitting." This is as stated in Bava Basra (149a) that when it was (being debated by Rava that he could keep Issur's money), an admittance came out of the house of Issur the convert.

Rather, it appears to them that Ma'amad Shelashtan even works to acquire against the will of the guardian. This is also evident from Issur the convert, as Rava said, "How will Rav Mari (Issur's son who was conceived when Issur was a Nochri and therefore did not automatically inherit his "father") acquire these monies? If he will do it through Ma'amad Shelashtan, I won't go." This implies that if he would be present together with them (Issur and Rav Mari), Rav Mari would acquire the monies against his will.

Implied Question: It cannot be said that Rava meant that if he would go there (to Issur's house) he would end up agreeing, because he would be too embarrassed in front of Issur to say that he is not willing to cooperate. (Note: Why can't this be what Rava meant?)

Answer: If so, without Ma'amad Shelashtan he should have simply said, "I will not go (to Issur's house)," in order that Issur should not tell Rav Mari in Rava's presence, "Acquire!" This would work, as presumably Rava had the deposit in his possession.

Implied Question: However, according to the reason explained nearby (14a) that due to the benefit that the borrower receives etc. (because his loan is extended he agrees to give it over), the implication is that Ma'amad Shelashtan can only work with the agreement of the borrower (or guardian).

Answer: In any event, the Gemara goes away from that reason (and therefore this does not remain a question on the position of the Riva and Rabeinu Tam).

Opinion: Rabeinu Tam says that even though someone who sells a loan document to his friend and then proceeds to forgo the loan has effectively done so, a person who sells a loan or gives it as a present through Ma'amad Shelashtan can no longer forgo it.

Proof: This is also implied in Kidushin (48a). The Gemara says that a loan recorded in a document is between them (Rebbi Meir and the Rabbanan on 47b in Kidushin). The opinion that holds she is Mekudeshes (if he is Mekadesh her with a loan document stating that someone else owes him money) does not hold of Shmuel's law (that a person who sells a loan document can still forgo it). The opinion that says she is not Mekudeshes does agree with Shmuel's law. Alternatively, the Gemara suggests that everyone agrees with Shmuel's law. The question is whether or not the woman trusts she will receive the money. The one who says she is Mekudeshes holds that the woman is certain that her husband will not eliminate her money (that she would receive from the collection of the loan) in order to forgo someone else's debt.

When the Gemara continues to say that they argue when the loan is said orally (not in a document) regarding Rav Huna's law whether or not someone can give over a loan someone owes him through Ma'amad Shelashtan. This implies, if everyone would agree with Rav Huna's law, a woman could certainly be Mekudeshes in this fashion.

If he can forgo the loan, why should she be Mekudeshes according to the opinion that said above that she does not trust his giving her a loan document because he might forgo the loan? The Gemara should answer that according to everyone the loan is acquired, even an oral loan, and the question is whether or not the woman trusts that she will see the money. This would be similar to the Gemara's conclusion (final answer) regarding Shmuel who discussed forgoing loan documents. The fact that the Gemara did not also give this answer regarding oral loans implies that one cannot forgo these loans when given over through Ma'amad Shelashtan.

Question #1: In Bava Kama (89a), the Gemara discusses a case of a married woman who damaged others (and the Gemara says is not liable to pay for she has no money of her own). The Gemara asks, let her sell her Kesuvah for less than the amount it is worth (as it is uncertain if it will be collected in the future, and let her pay from the money she receives)? The Gemara answers, anything regarding her husband she certainly forgoes. (Note: This means that she will certainly forgo the Kesuvah so her husband should not have to pay, causing it to be worth nothing.)

Now (according to what we established above), why can't she sell her Kesuvah through Ma'amad Shelashtan, as this will make her unable to forgo the payment of the Kesuvah! Even though the husband will not agree to pay, we explained earlier that Ma'amad Shelashtan works against the will of the debtor!

Question #2: Additionally, this should certainly be applicable to a married woman who damages her husband. Let her sell her Kesuvah through Ma'amad Shelashtan, as the husband will certainly agree to the sale in order to collect his damages.

Question #3: Additionally, in Bava Metzia (19b) where the Gemara discusses someone who found a receipt, the Gemara asks that when the woman agrees she was paid for her Kesuvah, why should we return the receipt to the owner? The Gemara asks, why don't we suspect that she wrote the receipt to be given in Nissan and she only gave it to him in Tishrei etc. (see Gemara at length)? The Gemara answers that we see from here that we hold of Shmuel's law (that one can forgo a debt document even after he sells it). Now (according to what we have established), why don't we suspect that she sold it through Ma'amad Shelashtan and she therefore cannot forgo the document?

Answer #1: They did not establish the Kinyan of Ma'amad Shelashtan regarding Kesuvah, as it is possible that it will never be collected.

Answer #2: We can additionally answer (only question #3 by saying) that regarding a receipt there is no reason to suspect that she might have sold it through Ma'amad Shelashtan. If there are no witnesses that she sold it, the husband and wife will deny the sale. If there are witnesses and they say that the husband agreed or was quiet, certainly the receipt is false. If he protested, it is clear that the receipt is authentic. We also do not suspect that she wrote it to give in Nisan etc. (as explained by the Gemara quoted above).

Opinion: Rabeinu Tam says that they did not establish Ma'amad Shelashtan for a Nochri. This means that if either the guardian or borrower were Nochrim, and a Jew said to the Nochri to give the deposit/loan to a different Jew, the second Jew has not acquired the deposit/loan. Being that even if the owner said to the Nochri "acquire," he would not be able to acquire as there is no acquiring for a Nochri, Ma'amad Shelashtan also does not acquire.

If the (final) recipient is a Nochri, and one Jew says to another that he should give the loan/deposit to the Nochri, as long as the first Jew did not retract his statement the second Jew should give it to the Nochri even if Ma'amad Shelashtan was not specified. However, if he retracts, the guardian/borrower should not give it to the Nochri even if he said to him that it should be done through Ma'amad Shelashtan, unless the guardian/borrower cannot avoid giving it to the Nochri.

If the giver was a Nochri, it appears that the acquisition is valid. If they (Chazal) took away (i.e. from owing one person to another) the money of a Jew through Ma'amad Shelashtan, which is a Halachah that has "no clear reason" (see Tosfos 14a, DH "k'Hilchasa" for an explanation of this phrase), certainly the money of a Nochri (can be taken away in this fashion).

Additionally, we judge them with their laws. We say to the Nochri, "This is your law," as said in Bava Kama (113a).

Explanation: The Gemara means, if someone gave via Ma'amad Shelashtan to people who were not yet born during the (original) giving of the money, they will not acquire!

According to the Sefarim that have the text "they also acquire," the explanation of the Gemara is as follows. If someone gives to those who are not born yet with a regular Kinyan, not through Ma'amad Shelashtan, the acquisition should certainly be valid if we will say that one can acquire for children who are not born yet through Ma'amad Shelashtan!

Observation: This Gemara is according to Rav Huna who holds that a person can give over something which has not yet come into existence, but he cannot give over something to a person who has not yet come into existence.

This is evident from the Gemara in Yevamos (93a), where Rav Huna holds that once the fruit has come into the world, it is not possible to retract. In Bava Basra (142a), Rav Huna states that someone who gives something to a fetus, even when the fetus is born (and turns into a child) he has not acquired the object.

Rav Nachman holds the exact opposite from Rav Huna. Rav Nachman holds there (in Bava Basra ibid.) that when the fetus becomes a child he does acquire what the person gave to him. However, in Yevamos (93a) Rav Nachman says that even when these things become extant the person can still retract (unless they already made a new Kinyan after they became extant).

Question: What is our source that Rebbi Meir holds that a person can acquire something that has not entered the world? It is from the Mishnah quoted in Yevamos (93b) that if someone says that they will be Mekadesh a woman "after you convert/are freed," Rebbi Meir holds that she is Mekudeshes. However, this same Mishnah teaches us that a person can also give something to someone who is not yet extant, as it says that if a person says that he is Mekadesh a woman "after he converts/is freed," the Kidushin is valid (after he is converted/freed).

Answer: It is possible to answer that a Nochri and slave are deemed extant, and are merely lacking conversion and freedom, unlike people who are not born yet who are not considered extant at all.

Implied Question: (Note: This is true) even though we learn from this Mishnah that Rebbi Meir holds a person can give over fruits (that are not extant), and we do not differentiate (that Rebbi Meir only holds this is true regarding fruits that are somewhat extant, but not fruits that are not extant at all). (Note: Why not?)

Answer: This is because we can say that he holds like the opinion of Rebbi Elazar ben Yaakov in Kidushin (62a). He says there that if someone says, "this row of fruit that is still connected to the ground should be Terumah on this row of fruit that is disconnected," when the (connected) fruits grow one third and they become detached, his words are valid. (Note: This shows that even fruits that are very removed from being ready for the purpose of being separated as Terumah are considered extant. Being that we see that Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Elazar ben Yakov share the opinion that a person can give over something that is not yet extant, it must be that Rebbi Meir agrees with Rebbi Elazar ben Yaakov that this is even if it is far removed from being extant (Maharam).)