Today's daf (as well as many other places in Shas) deals with limudim in Kodshim - that the first limud is l'chatchila and the second is l'ekuv.
In this way, kodshim is unique - we don't find the same concept (2 limudim, l'chatchila vs b'dieved) elsewhere.
Similarly we find differences in the way limudim work in kodshim vs elsewhere.
My question is - this is obvious that kodhim is different. What is the source of how we know it is different? It is assumed, but how do we know that
it is different. Is this a limud someplace? Is it a halacha l'Moshe misinai? Is there some other source?
Naftoli Willner, Baltimore
I will attempt to show that, in fact, it is not necessarily only for Kodshim that there is a Limud for l'Chatchilah and b'Di'eved but in fact this can also apply in other areas of the Torah.
1) See Tosfos to Pesachim 11a (DH Kotzrin) who writes, "One should not be perplexed as to how is it possible that something is forbidden l'Chatchilah by the Torah but b'Di'eved is permitted, because there are many things for which one requires 'Shinah ha'Kasuv Alav l'Akev' -- that it is only forbidden b'Di'eved if the Torah gives us two verses instead of one." Tosfos concludes, "For example, Kodshim."
This means that Tosfos gives Kodshim as an example of where something is forbidden only when the Torah says so twice. We may infer from Tosfos that Kodshim is only one example of this idea, and in other areas of the Torah one can also say that it is only forbidden b'Di'eved if there are two verses.
2) If we look at the Gilyon Maharsha on the above Tosfos in Pesachim (printed in the back of the Gemara), we find that he gives us additional examples of things which are forbidden only l'Chatchilah by the Torah. He cites the Ran in Pesachim (8b of the pages of the Rif, DH Madichan), in the name of the Ramban. The Rif there cites the Gemara in Avodah Zarah 75b that says that when one buys utensils from a Nochri, one first must kasher them and then immerse them in the Mikvah. However, the Ramban writes that this order of doing things is only l'Chatchilah; if one did it the other way around -- first immersing the utensils in the Mikvah and afterwards kashering them -- this is acceptable b'Di'eved. The Ramban writes that this is derived from the verse in last week's Parshah (Bamidbar 31:23) concerning the utensils captured in the war with Midyan. The verse says, "You shall pass through fire," and then it says, "and it shall become pure." "Pass though fire" refers to "Libun" wherein the utensil is exposed to white-hot fire. "It shall become pure" refers to immersion in the Mikvah. This is the correct order, l'Chatchilah, of doing it, but the Ramban writes that if one reversed the order it is also satisfactory because there is no "Ikuva" stated in the verse; nowhere does it say that the corrrect order is "Me'akev" such that if it was done in the wrong order it is invalid.
There is more to write on this topic but I will close here for the moment.
Kol Tov,
Dovid Bloom
Thank you very much for the response. I am eager to hear more (or even if you just have Maare M'komos).
One thing that I am still wondering about - how do we know when a limud is just L'chatchila as apposed to one that is also B'dieved. Is there a rule that we can learn from or is this all part of the Halacha L'Moshe Misinai just like the drasha itself. It is also interesting that it is so much more prevalent in Kodshim.
Thank you so much for the help on this,
Naftoli
1) The Gemara states in a few places (for example, Yoma 51b) the rule of "Shanah Alav ha'Kasuv l'Akev." It is only if the Torah says something twice, that it is Me'akev, that even b'Di'eved it is invalid if one did not do what the Torah tells one to do. (We can understand that this is similar to a father telling his son not to do something. If the son does not listen to his father but goes ahead and does it, this does not mean that the son's activities have no validity. For example, in the case I disussed in my first answer, the father told his child first to kasher the Kelim and only afterwards to dip them in the Mikvah. If he did it in the opposite order, the father is not happy with what his son did, but since he only told him once about it, this means he is not so particular about it such that he would totally invalidate what the son did. However, if the father told his son twice not to do it, this indicates that going against his instructions is totally unacceptable even b'Di'eved.)
2) There are some Rishonim who maintain that "Shanah Alav ha'Kasuv l'Akev" applies only for Kodshim. This is stated explicitly by Tosfos to Menachos 38a, DH v'Im. In fact, as far as I know, all the cases in which the Gemara cites this rule involve Kodshim. However, other Rishonim are of the opinion that "Shanah Alav..." applies to other areas as well. See Sotah 8b, where the Gemara asks whether the requirement that the Sotah be tied with the Egyptian rope is Me'akev or not. The Tosfos Shantz, printed on the page of the Gemara, asks why it should be Me'akev. Why is it different from untying the hair of the Sotah woman? Even though that requirement is stated explicilty in the Torah, Rebbi Yehudah states (in the Mishnah, Sotah 7a) that if her hair is beautiful, it is not untied? This suggests that even though something is stated explicitly in the Torah, it is not Me'akev.
May we experience Nechamah with the rebuildng of the Beis ha'Mikdash, speedily in our days.
Dovid Bloom