1. The Gemara in Shabbos (4a) asks as a rhetorical question: "Do we tell a person Chateh Kedei she'Yizkeh Chavercha?" Accordingly, your question is certainly valid.

2. One may answer this question with the help of an idea expressed by Tosfos in Shabbos (4a, DH v'Ki). Tosfos cites the Gemara in Gitin (38b) that anyone who sets his Eved free transgresses a Mitzvas Aseh. The Gemara questions this ruling from an incident in which Rabbi Eliezer entered a Beis ha'Midrash to pray and found that there was not a Minyan of ten men present, and he freed his Eved in order to make a Minyan of ten men. The Gemara answers that the reason why Rebbi Eliezer was allowed to do this was "Mitzvah Sha'ani" -- "for the sake of a Mitzvah it is different"; one is allowed to transgress the prohibition against freeing an Eved in order to perform the Mitzvah of prayer with a Minyan. Tosfos writes that this Heter is because it is a "Mitzvah d'Rabim" -- a Mitzvah for the public. This principle is also stated by Tosfos in Gitin (41b, end of DH Kofin), who says that the rule that we do not tell a person "sin in order to be Mezakeh your friend" does not apply when the community does a Mitzvah as a result of the transgression of the individual.

According to this approach, we can answer that Moshe Rabeinu sinned in order to save the whole of Klal Yisrael. In fact, this is a Kal va'Chomer. If one is allowed to transgress a Mitzvas Aseh in order to enable ten Jews to pray with a Minyan, then Moshe Rabeinu certainly was allowed to break the Luchos in order to save the entire Jewish people.

3. I think that the above idea suffices to answer your question, but we can add one more idea. The conduct of Moshe Rabeinu with Klal Yisrael was one of total Mesirus Nefesh. Moshe was prepared to give everything to help the Jewish people. This is stated in many places in Chazal. One of the places is in the Mechilta d'Rebbi Yishmael in Parshas Beshalach (Shemos 15:1), which states that Moshe gave his soul for Yisrael, and as a result of this merit Yisrael are called his people. The proof for this is from Shemos 32:7, where Klal Yisrael are called "your people," the people of Moshe. We find in Shemos 2:11 that Moshe gave his soul for Klal Yisrael and was prepared to die for them when he killed the Egyptian. It is only a leader who is prepared to die for his people who can truly be considered a leader.

Thank you for your very interesting and thoughtful question.

Kol Tuv,

Dovid Bloom

1. Yes. The Gemara in Nazir (23b) says about Yael, "Gedolah Aveirah Lishmah." (Rashi there (DH Gedolah) writes that she did an Aveirah with the same intention as doing a Mitzvah. The Aveirah that she did to save Klal Yisrael was a great thing.

2. Even though what she did was very praiseworthy, she became Asurah to her husband through her act. This is learned from the Gemara in Megilah (15a) which relates that Esther said to Mordechai that she will become "lost" (Asurah) to him because she became Achashverosh's wife voluntarily. The Teshuvos Maharik (Shoresh 167) writes that it is entirely obvious and elementary that Esther did not commit a transgression at all, and there was not even any suggestion of an Aveirah in what she did. On the contrary, she did a great Mitzvah to save Klal Yisrael. One sees this from the fact that Ru'ach ha'Kodesh rested upon her when she came in front of the king. If she had committed any Aveirah, she certainly would not have received Ru'ach ha'Kodesh. The Maharik writes that since we know that Esther became prohibited to Mordechai, it follows that Yael certainly became prohibited to her husband, since the Mitzvah of Esther was greater than Yael's. The Maharik concludes that the question of whether what she did was permitted, and the question of whether she is allowed to remain with her husband, are not necessarily connected.

Kol Tuv,

Dovid Bloom

1. Apparently you are referring to the opinion of Rabeinu Tam cited by Tosfos in Kesuvos (3b, DH v'Lidrosh. Rabeinu Tam maintains that one is not liable for capital punishment for relations with a Nochri. He cites proof for his view from Sanhedrin (74b), where the Gemara asks how was Esther permitted to do this b'Farhesiya, in a way that everyone knew about it. Since the Gemara does not ask that it should have been prohibited because of Giluy Arayos, for which one must give up one's life even it is done in private, Rabeinu Tam comes to the conclusion that relations with a Nochri is not considered Giluy Arayos. Based on this, in practice he permitted a Jewish woman, who left the Torah and had relations with a Nochri and afterwards did Teshuvah, to marry the man after he converted to Judaism.

2. However, Tosfos cites the Rivam who disagrees with Rabeinu Tam. The Rivam explains that the reason why the Gemara in Sanhedrin does not ask that Esther's act should have been prohibited because of Giluy Arayos is that it was obvious to the Gemara that one could deflect this challenge by saying that Esther was "Karka Olam," her act was a passive act, for which she was not required to give up her life. (This is referring to the stage of the episode when Esther was only with Achashverosh out of duress. It was only later on that she went to him voluntarily, and it was only then that she became forbidden to Mordechai, as the Gemara says in Megilah 15a.) The Rivam cites proof for his opinion from Kesuvos (26b), where the Gemara says that if a woman was captured by Nochrim and voluntarily had relations, she is frobidden to return to her husband.

3. The Shach (YD 157:14) writes that if a Nochri has relations with a married Jewess, this constitues real Giluy Arayos. He writes that even though Rabenu Tam maintains that even with an Eishes Ish it is not considered Giluy Arayos, all of the Poskim disagree with Rabeinu Tam.

4. The Maharik that I cited in my previous reply clearly disagrees with Rabeinu Tam, and for this reason he writes that Esther and Yael were forbidden to return to their husbands.

Yeyasher Kochacha,

Dovid Bloom

1. This is a very strong challenge to my argument. You are making the important distinction between a "Safek" and a "Vadai": it is possible that a "Mitzvah d'Rabim" overrides an Isur when the Mitzvah will certainly be achieved as a result, but it does not override it when there is only a possibility that it will help.

2. However, I will attempt to prove that in fact a Safek is also sufficient to push aside the Isur. The proof is from a Halacha cited by the Beis Yosef in Hilchos Shabbos (end of OC 306). The Rashba was asked about a father who heard on Shabbos that his daughter had been kidnapped by an apostate who was trying to convert the girl to a different religion. Is he allowed to desecrate Shabbos in an attempt to save his daughter, because otherwise she might be coerced to leave the faith?

3. The Rashba answered that this question requires further study, but that he is inclined to think that one may not desecrate Shabbos in this case because of the rule that one may not transgress even a small prohibition in order to save another from a severe prohibition.

4. However, the Beis Yosef concludes that according to Tosfos in Shabbos (4a, DH v'Ki), one certainly should desecrate Shabbos to save her. Tosfos questions the rule above that the Rashba mentions from the Mishnah in Gitin (41a) that if an Eved is half-free and half-slave, and thus cannot marry anyone at all, we force the master to free the Eved to enable him to perform the Mitzvah of being fruitful and multiplying. The question is, how can we force the master to free his Eved? Since one is not allowed to free an Eved Kena'ani, how can we force the master to commit a transgression in order to enable the Eved to do a Mitzvah?

5. Tosfos gives two solutions to this paradox. (a) If the Mitzvah that the Eved will fulfil is a Mitzvah Rabah, a "great Mitzvah," such as having children, then we do make the person commit a smaller prohibition to make this possible. (b) In a case where the first person did not get himself into the predicament by negligence, we do tell someone else to transgress a smaller prohibiton to save him from the more severe prohibition. The Beis Yosef concludes that concerning the captured girl, the first answer of Tosfos certainly applies, since there is no greater Mitzvah than keeping the girl inside the Jewish fold. The second answer also applies, because she is not to blame for her predicament. The Beis Yosef therefore writes that it is a Mitzvah to desecrate Shabbos to save the girl.

6. However, the Teshuvas Chemdas Shlomo (EH 6:6) asks a similar question to yours on the Beis Yosef. How does the Beis Yosef know that Tosfos would permit one to commit a smaller transgression in order to prevent the girl from a great transgression, even in a case where the girl might never do the Aveirah? Indeed, there is no certainty that she will succumb to the temptation or intimidation; on the contrary, she may prove herself to be very strong! In other words, the Chemdas Shlomo asks how we know that even where there is only a Safek that the great transgression will be committed, we tell someone do to a smaller Isur in order to prevent the possibility of a greater transgression?

7. Rav Yitzchok Elchanan Spektor zt'l (in Teshuvas Be'er Yitzchak EH #1:2, DH v'Nir'eh) comes to the defense of the Beis Yosef and proves his point from the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah (22a). The Gemara there says that the witnesses who saw the new moon may travel to Yerushalayim even on Shabbos in order to testify in Beis Din so that the new month can be pronounced. How were they allowed to do this? Perhaps these witnesses would not be required because others had already arrived in Beis Din and testified! The Be'er Yitzchak writes that we see from this that there is a general rule in all of the Torah that for a Mitzvah d'Rabim or a Mitzvah Rabah, the smaller Isur is waived even in a case of a Safek.

8. Accordingly, my explanation about what Moshe Rabeinu did remains valid. Even though it was not certain that his tactic of breaking the Luchos would be succesful in saving Klal Yisrael, nevertheless if the Beis Yosef says that one must desecrate Shabbos in order to save a captured child even though the child is not in certain danger, then Moshe Rabeinu certainly could do an "Aveirah" which might be successful in saving the entire Jewish people.

Chodesh Tov,

Dovid Bloom

Here is a different way of approaching the question of whether Yael became forbidden to her husband as a result of what she did with Sisera:

It may be that since she did this for Piku'ach Nefesh -- to save the entire Klal Yisrael -- it was not a "Bi'as Ratzon", considered like voluntary relations. Even though, physically speaking, she did this willfully, it may be that according to the Halachah it is considered that she was "Anusah"; she was forced to do it in order to save lives.

The law is that the wife of a Yisrael (as opposed to the wife of a Kohen) who is forced into forbidden relations does not become forbidden to her husband.

Dovid Bloom

Reb Meir Eliezer - Yasher Koach!

In fact, the above answer -- that what is done for Piku'ach Nefesh is not considered voluntary -- was given to me by one of the Gedolim when I asked him the question a few months ago, at which time I asked him the same question that you asked from Esther, and he agreed that this is a good proof. So it seems that Yael indeed became forbidden to her husband in the same way as Esther.

See a very interesting Teshuvah of the Noda b'Yehuda (Mahadura Basra, YD #161) in which he writes that although the Halachah states that one may not save a life through Giluy Arayos, the Heter of Esther was in order to save all of Klal Yisrael, which is different. Rav Yitzchak Hutner zt'l explained that the Heter is because of Kidush Hashem.

Kol Tuv,

Dovid Bloom