More Discussions for this daf
1. 3, 5, and 7 2. Tenth Man Leaving a Minyan 3. Refusing to Join a Minyan
4. Shem Hash-m Without a Minyan 5. A woman being called to read from the Torah 6. Women and Aliyot
7. Kavod ha'Tzibur 8. Question on Minyanim 9. Contradiction with Maseches Sofrim
10. Keneged Mi 11. Giving an Aliyah to a woman 12. Chazaras ha'Shatz
13. הני שלשה חמשה ושבעה 14. נשים בתפילה בציבור 15. סתירה למסכת סופרים
16. כנגד מי
DAF DISCUSSIONS - MEGILAH 23

Paul Kandel asked:

The Mishna on Megilla 23b says that we do not read the Torah, repeat the amidah, or conduct several other activities with fewer than 10 people present. The Gemara explains that these activities are "devarim shebikdusha"-the rabbis instituted them as a way for us to be mekadesh Shem Hash-m. The gemara brings a gezeirah shavah to show that the minimum number of people present is ten, as it is for Kiddush Hash-m and chillul hashem. The same gezeirah shava is brought on Sanhedrin 74b to show that "public" for purposes of Kiddush Hash-m and chillul Hash-m is with a minimum of ten people present. It uses the term "edah" by the ten spies to show that the minimum is ten.

My question is: why are women not included in the ten for devarim shebikdusha?

Women are included in the ten for Kiddush Hash-m and chillul Hash-m in Sanhedrin (according to the vast majority of poskim). This makes sense, as women are certainly included in the prohibition against creating a chillul Hash-m. Furthermore, the term "edah" throughout the Torah often refers to groups with women in it. Since the gemara does not explicitly exclude women, they seem to be included in the term "edah".

I have been looking for an answer to this question for years now, and have found two answers, neither of which is strong:

1. The Tosfot and Vilna Gaon on Berachot 45b say that women are universally excluded from a minyan. However, we do not hold like that opinion. The GRA holds there that women are chayav in zimun with only 3 women present. And they both hold that women can not be part of a minyan for Megillat Esther--neither of which we hold l'halacha.

2. Women can theoretically be included in a minyan. However, we say that it is not proper for women and men to be in a minyan together-similar to the gemara on Megilla 23a saying that women can be one of the Torah readers, but the chachamim said she should not because of kavod hatzibbur. This answer seems weak, as the gemara never mentions it. Plus, it allows women to have a minyan with only women, which we do not say l'halacha.

Basically, if a minyan of ten is an inyan of Kiddush Hash-m, it seems from the Gemara that women should be included, following Sanhedrin 74b.

Can you provide some insight here?

Thanks,

Paul Kandel, Givat Shmuel, Israel

The Kollel replies:

Let's start by clarifying the Halachah. Women are almost certainly obligated in the Mitzvah of Kiddush ha'Shem b'Farhesya. This is clear from the Gemara (Sanhedrin 74b) that asks why Queen Esther did not give up her life rather than cohabit with Achashverosh. The Gemara answers that she wasn't obligated to because a woman in such a case is considered Karka Olam. But without this special exemption she would have been obligated to give up her life. This does not mean, however, necessarily, that they can be counted in the Minyan that observes the Kiddush ha'Shem.

I could only find one Posek that states unequivocally that women are counted as part of the Minyan for the Mitzvah of Kidush ha'Shem b'Farhesya. Rav Yosef Engel (Gilyonei ha'Shas, Sanhedrin 74b) brings his proof from the wording of the Gemara - "Bnei Adam" - which, he says, certainly includes women. The Pischei Teshuvah (YD 157) and the Gilyon Maharsha (op cit) debate the question whether or not women are included. One could say that since they are obligated in the Mitzvah of Kiddush ha'Shem, they should be counted in the Minyan - an extension of the logic that one who is obligated in a Mitzvah can perform the Mitzvah for someone else.

This in fact is the logic that the Ran uses to include women in the Minyan of another Mitzvah - Krias Megilah. The Ran (to Mishnah 19b) says that since women are obligated in the Mitzvah of Krias Megilah they can be counted in the Minyan. It could be that the Ran would apply the same logic by the Mitzvah of Kidush ha'Shem. His opinion, however, on the matter has not come down to us.

Now, why are women, according to all opinions, excluded from a Minyan for a Davar sheb'Kedushah? The simple answer is that, unlike Krias Megilah and Kidush ha'Shem, they are not personally obligated. This answer, however, will not suffice for the Ran because he holds that not even men are personally obligated in Davar sheb'Kedushah as we will explain now.

The Ran, quoting the Ramban (Milchamos ha'Shem to Megilah 5a; 3a in the Rif and quoted by the Ran himself), tells us that there is an essential difference between a Davar sheb'Kedushah and Krias Megilah. The former is an obligation on the Tzibur and not on the individual; the latter is an obligation on each individual to perform the Mitzvah publicly - Pirsumei Nisa. One implication of this distinction is that the former requires that at least a majority of the Minyan has not yet performed the Mitzvah, whereas the latter can be performed even if only one person has not fulfilled his obligation. Another implication is that one is not obligated to seek out a Minyan for prayer, whereas he does have to for Krias ha'Megilah (l'Chatchila). (This, in fact, is the opinion of the Ramban, as opposed to Rashi (Pesachim 46a) who holds that one is obligated to seek out a Minyan for prayer.)

Clearly, the Mitzvah of Kidush ha'Shem is more similar to the Mitzvah of Krias Megilah - a Mitzvah on the individual that is performed publicly - than to the communal Mitzvah of Davar sheb'Kedushah.

Now let us try to understand why this affects women's participation in the Minyanim of these two types of Mitzvos. Rav Moshe Meiselman (Rosh Yeshivah of Toras Moshe in Yerusahalayim) writes: "...women are enjoined to develop the area of private responsibility, and therefore always remain ten individuals rather than a unit of ten members. A minyan [for prayer], however is a public unit expressive of the public functioning of the community, and only men, as the public figures, can bind together to form a community." (Jewish Woman in Jewish Law, p. 135)

We can say, now, that according to the Ran, a woman can be counted in the Minyan for Krias Megilah and Kidush ha'Shem because the Minyan is essentially ten individuals witnessing the Mitzvah, but she can't be counted in the Minyan for prayer because this Minyan is a unit of ten members called a Tzibur which only men have the capability of forming.

Now to address your basic question: if we use the same Gezeirah Shava for both Mitzvos (Kidush ha'Shem and Davar sheb'Kedushah), how can we include women in one Minyan and exclude them from the other? The answer, following what was said above, is that the two Mitzvos derived from this Pasuk are essentially different - one is an obligation on the individual and one is an obligation on the Tzibur - and even though the words "b'Soch Bnei Yisrael" mean, in both cases, "among ten Jews", the function of this group of ten Jews varies according to the Mitzvah.

Kol Tuv,

Yonasan Sigler

This reply is not intended as a Psak Halachah, but only as an elucidation of the issues involved in the question.

MEYER LIEBER comments:

SEE THE RAV'S SH. ARUCH CH.55 PAR.5 (AND BAIS YOSEF ibid) - citing a shittas rishonim that a woman can be counted with 9 men to form a minyan.

Please note that the Mishnah B'rurah doesn't bring this deyah at all.

MEYER LIEBER, WESLEY HILLS, NY

The Kollel replies:

I believe the reason that the Mishnah Berurah doesn't bring the opinion of Rabeinu Simchah that you are referring to, is because he holds that the Yesh Omrim opinion brought in 55:4 only allows a Tziruf of a minor, but not of a slave or a woman (see Biur Halachah, v'Hu ha'Din); in other words, it is not the opinion of Rabeinu Simchah. Therefore, since the Shulchan Aruch doesn't bring this opinion - even as a Yesh Omrim - and none of the Poskim ha'Achronim bring it l'Halachah, the Mishnah Berurah did not feel that it was necessary to mention it (Atu Ruchla Lichashiv v'Lizil (Gittin 33a)).

Kol Tuv,

Yonasan Sigler

Paul Kandel responds:

Thank you very much for the detailed response. I have several follow-up questions/comments.

This discussion touches many different issues. Let's split the discussion into the following specific points:

1. Rav Yaakov Emden says that women are counted in the public for Kiddush Hash-m, using a similar logic to the Ran's from Megillah 19b (Migdal Oz, Even Bohan 1:69). Also Margaliot HaYam, Sanhedrin 74b, notes 6 and 27; Einayim La-Mishpat Sanhedrin 74b; Or Hadash 8:12; several others.

2. The Mechilta (also brought by Rashi) on Shemot 19:3, says that Beit Yaakov refers to the women, whereas Bnei Yisrael refers to the men. So perhaps the Gemara has this understanding of the phrase Bnei Yisrael in the gezeirah shavah for devarim shebkdusha. However, this is not the understanding of the poskim listed in point #1 above. Also, it is not clear that this can be used a halakhic source, as the Gemara often uses different derashot of similar phrases.

3. According to both Rashi and Tosafot on Pesachim 46a, one who is saying Tefillah must exert himself to say it with a tzibbur (Rav Moshe Feinstein follows Rashi here). Rashi also holds that women are obligated in Tefillah, just as men are--in fact, Rashi holds that the whole idea of women being exempt from time bound mitzvoth does not apply to mitzvoth d'rabbanan (Brachot 20b). So, according to Rashi, women should be chayavot for Tefillah b'Tzibbur, just as men are. Right?

4. Devarim Sheb'kdusha is essentially an inyan of Kiddush Hash-m: We have a general biblical mitzvah of Kiddush Hash-m. Chazal then implemented Devarim Sheb'kdusha as ways to be M'kadesh Shem Hash-m several times a day. So Devarim Sheb'kdusha is not separate from Kiddush Hash-m--it fundamentally has the same source as does Kiddush Hash-m.

5. Kiddush Hash-m is biblical, and the category of devarim sheb'kdusha is rabbinic. Since devarim sheb'kdusha is a rabbinic extension of the biblical mitzvah, it should take on the same properties, unless specified otherwise. It is never specified otherwise--in fact, the same gezeirah shava is used for devarim sheb'kdusha as for Kiddush Hash-m, strengthening the idea that they should have the same properties.

6. In the source you cited, Rav Meiselman points out an intuitive distinction between men and women. However, he does not bring a specific halakhic source to support his reasoning. His general idea can not be relied upon without a specific halakhic source. See the next point for a related halakhic debate.

7. There is a debate about whether women can hold public office (based primarily on Sifrei, Devarim 17:15; perhaps on Pesikta there; and perhaps on Brachot 49a). In Melakhim 1:5(or 6), Rambam says: "To all offices in Israel, only a man may be appointed." However, several other poskim disagree with the Rambam. Rav Feinstein (Iggerot Moshe, Yore De'a, pt. II, nos. 44 and 45) can not find a source for the Rambam's halakha, but still accepts it as halakha.

Radbaz on the Rambam there says Devorah "taught laws to them," implying there is no issue with a woman being a public figure that teaches and leads. For him, the issue is in the formal appointment to a position of authority.

Similarly, the Minchat Chinukh restricts his understanding of the Sifrei to mean only that women can not be appointed to kingship--they can become queen by inheritance. This implies there is no general issur on women in public positions, but only a mitzvat asei specifically to appoint a king.

Ramban on Bava Kama 15a asks how Devorah was a shofetet. He answers that the people followed her as they would a queen, not as a judge. His answer implies that a woman can be a leader--even one similar in status to a queen.

In sum, even according to those who say that women can not be appointed to a formal position of authority, the case of Devorah shows that women can still be very public figures. To poskim who hold that the Sifrei is talking only about a king, women can be appointed to all formal positions of authority, except for that of a king.

8. There is a line of reasoning that goes as follows (employed by, amongst others, Minchat Chinukh): We know that women can not count in a minyan for devarim sheb'kdusha. It is unreasonable to say that women could count in a minyan for Kiddush Hash-m, but not for devarim sheb'kdusha. Therefore, we must say that women can not count for Kiddush Hash-m. However, this logic is circular, as there is no original source for the halakha that women can not count in a minyan for Devarim Shebkdusha.

Rav Meiselman's approach seems to be similarly circular, attempting to redefine the "tzibbur" for a minyan for devarim sheb'kdusha based on contemporary practice--as opposed to what seems to be the original halakhic understanding of it as an extension of "farhesya" for Kiddush Hash-m.

Thanks again for your help. I really appreciate all of your great materials for Daf Yomi study, as well as your willingness and ability to help readers with questions.

Paul Kandel