Shalom.
Where is the Rav Elchanan z"l regarding the difference between issur and avaira?
Thanks !!
Insights 15a.
>>2) EATING AN "ISUR" OR EATING AN "AVEIRAH"
QUESTION: Rebbi Meir maintains that food cooked on Shabbos accidentally (b'Shogeg) may be eaten on Shabbos by anyone, even by the person who cooked it. Food cooked intentionally (b'Mezid) may not be eaten on Shabbos by anyone, but it may be eaten after Shabbos. RASHI (DH Yochal) explains that the person who transgressed b'Shogeg may eat the food himself on Shabbos. He must wait until after Shabbos only if he "transgressed an Isur [and cooked] intentionally (b'Mezid)."
Rebbi Yehudah maintains that food cooked on Shabbos b'Shogeg may be eaten only after Shabbos, by anyone. Food cooked b'Mezid may never be eaten by the person who cooked it, but it may be eaten after Shabbos by one who did not cook it. Rashi (DH Rebbi Yehudah) explains that the reason why Rebbi Yehudah requires that one wait until after Shabbos is that "an Aveirah nevertheless was done," even though the act is not punishable with Sekilah since it was done b'Shogeg. In order not to derive benefit from an Aveirah, one must wait until after Shabbos.
Why does Rashi first refer to the act of cooking on Shabbos as an "Isur," and then refer to the same act as an "Aveirah"?
ANSWER: Perhaps one may answer as follows. Every transgression a person commits involves two components: a transgression of the specific, prohibited act, and a general rebellion against the word of Hash-m (see RAV ELCHANAN WASSERMAN Hy'd in CHIDUSHEI AGADOS, in the name of the RAMCHAL).
Accordingly, Rashi explains the argument between Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah as follows. When a person sins b'Shogeg, he performs a violation of a specific, prohibited act (and therefore he must attain atonement by bringing a Korban Chatas). However, he has not rebelled against Hash-m, because he did not commit the act intentionally. Rebbi Meir maintains that when there is no element of rebellion in the person's transgression of the laws of Shabbos, there is no need to prohibit benefiting from the result of his Melachah.
Rebbi Yehudah argues and maintains that since an unintentional sin still constitutes transgression of a prohibited act (as is evident from the fact that it needs atonement), it is also sufficient grounds to penalize the person and to prohibit him benefiting from his act until after Shabbos.
Rashi uses the word "Isur" when explaining the opinion of Rebbi Meir, and he uses the word "Aveirah" when explaining the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah. Perhaps Rashi uses the word "Isur" to refer to the element of rebellion in the sin, and he uses the word "Aveirah" to refer to the specific prohibition that was transgressed. Rebbi Meir permits benefiting from the Melachah on Shabbos itself because no "Isur" was done (there was no element of rebellion in his sin), while Rebbi Yehudah prohibits benefiting from the Melachah on Shabbos because an "Aveirah" was done (a transgression nevertheless was committed). (Z. Wainstein)<<
Rav Elchanan zt'l is in "Examples of explaining Agadot according to the simple explanation" ("Dugma'os l'Vi'urei Agados Al Derech ha'Peshat"), chapter 3:2 (second 3:2; DH Acharei), printed at the end of Kovetz He'aros on Yevamos.
Dovid Bloom