According to rashi's second, preferred, pshat, as long as an issur was ever upon an object, that object remains assur forever, even if you didn't do any issur: so all milk and all meat should be assur, since there is an issur on each one to cook it with the other. And all chometz that existed over pesach (owned by a goy) should be assur forever because it was assur on pesach. And all food belonging to someone else should be assur forever (even if you buy it) because there was an issur gezel on it. And all fruit is assur to pull off the tree on shabbos, so it should be assur forever... Clearly we don't say this, so whats pshat in Rashi?
Y Barach, Brooklyn, NY
This is an excellent question.
1. There is a significant difference between milk and meat, and the mother sitting on its eggs. The Gemara in Pesachim (44b) which states that milk is permitted when it is by itself, and meat is permitted when it is by itself. Only when they are cooked together do they become forbidden. In contrast, when the mother is sitting on the eggs, the situation which exists at present is one of Isur: at the present moment, one is not allowed to take the eggs. This is not comparable to the Isur of milk and meat, where there is no prohibition whatsoever if one wishes to eat either the meat or drink the milk in its present form, before it is cooked with the other.
2. With regard to your question that all food belonging to someone else should be Asur forever because of the original Isur of Gezel, we may answer in the following way: The Gemara in Kesuvos (46b) states a rule, mentioned a few times in Shas, that "Mamona me'Isura Lo Yalfinan" -- we cannot derive laws concerning monetary matters from laws concerning questions of forbidden and permitted substances. (One way of understanding this rule is with the help of the Gemara in Kidushin (7a) that "Mamon Isyahiv l'Mechilah" -- it is possible for the owners to forego a monetary claim, and therefore monetary prohibitions are not absolute because they law depends on the wishes of the owner who is capable of releasing the prohibition).
3. Your question from the fruit on the tree on Shabbos can be answered using the logic of the Toras Chaim in the Sugya here. He writes that if someone cooks meat on Shabbos, the meat is not considered a "To'evah," but the problem is that he desecrated the holy day of Shabbos in order to prepare the meat. If he then proceeds to eat the meat, he does not actually "eat" Shabbos, and so it follows that he did not eat the actual To'evah. We can extend the logic of the Toras Chaim to argue that when the mother is sitting on the eggs, they are at the moment a To'evah itself, and is not comparable to meat cooked on Shabbos. This is because in the latter case, the To'evah is Shabbos itself, while the meat is only a secondary result of the prohibited act, whereas the mother sitting on the eggs is the original prohibtion itself, and therefore it is a To'evah.
4. The question from Chametz that existed on pesach can be answered if we consider the words of Rashi (concerning the mother sitting on the eggs), "I prohibited her to you at that time." It is not necessary to give this reason concerning the Chametz, because one does not need recourse to the Isur of Chametz on Pesach in order to prohibit the Chametz that was owned by the Nochri, since there is no reason why the Nochri should let the Yisrael use his Chametz then.
Thank you for your important question.
Kol Tuv,
Dovid Bloom
Thanks very much for your interesting answers. A follow-up- Regarding your fourth answer, about chametz, I don't see why it should make a difference if the only thing preventing you from eating it is the issur, or if there is also a practical reason, i.e. that it belongs to a goy. It would seem that as long as something has an issur on it, it should be assur forever, even if there is also another reason preventing you from eating it. And Rashi says kol shetiavti lach, because in this case, the issur is the only obstacle, but even in the case of chometz I don't see why it shouldn't apply.
Regarding the case of gezel, perhaps we can also answer that since there is a pasuk (I seem to recall) prohibiting gezel l'gavohah, michlal d'lhedyot shari, like the Gemara says by kilay beheima.
kol tuv
Y. Barach
After I sent my reply on this, I was thinking quite a bit more about this very interesting question. I would like to add more explanation for my answer to the fourth question. It may seem slightly different than what I wrote the first time, but I think the principles are the same.
1. It should be pointed out that the question about the Chametz owned by the Nochri is really included in the question about anything owned by anyone else: why do we not say that this should be forbidden forever because of the Isur of Gezel? To that I answered that Gezel is a different kind of Isur: it is monetary, and it is lighter in certain respects than Isur v'Heter between man and Hashem, and therefore we cannot prove from the fact that the mother bird is always forbidden that the same rule will apply to Gezel, that "once Asur always Asur."
(I did not understand your intent when you said that Gezel l'Hedyot Shari, because obviously it is forbidden to steal from private individuals, not only from the Beis ha'Mikdash.)
2. Hence, in order to get to the Chametz of a Nochri on Pesach, two hurdles have to be overcome. First, it has to be stolen, and then one would transgress the Chametz prohibition. Because a monetary Isur must be transgressed, it cannot be considered, at the present moment, the same level of To'evah as the mother bird. We do not need to concern ourselves with possible higher levels of To'evah that might develop later on because these are not yet here in front of us and are only doubtful possibilities. Therefore, we cannot derive the law of the Chametz of the Nochri from the mother bird, because they are not the same type of To'evah right now.
Kol Tuv,
Dovid Bloom
Regarding gezel, certainly the act of stealing is assur. But so is the act of being marbia kilayim. And so is the act of shechting oso v'es bno. And yet the gemara still says regarding them michlal d'lhedyot shari. Because it is not coming to allow the action, just allowing the item after the issur was done to it. So too here, since the Torah assurs the item that was stolen l'gavohah, that would imply that the stolen item is mutar l'hedyot, despite the fact that the act of gezel is assur. And if even an item that actually was stolen is mutar l'hedyot, certainly an item that wasn't stolen, but just had an issur gezel upon it, is mutar l'hedyot.
Y. Barach
1. Point accepted! I think that your explanation about why Gezel is not included in "Kol she'Ti'avti" is a good one. The verse from which we learn that Gezel is forbidden to Gevohah is, of course, Vayikra 1:2: "When an 'Adam' from among you will bring a Korban...." Rashi writes that just as the first man in the world, Adam ha'Rishon, did not bring a Korban from stolen property (because everything belonged to him), so, too, we may not bring Korbanos from Gezel.
2. I looked around in the Mefarshim who discuss at length the question of why Chametz on Pesach is not included in the prohibition of "Kol she'Ti'avti." They ask this question on the Gemara, not specifically on the second explanation in Rashi. The point is that Chametz, even Chametz of a Jew, which was in the Jew's possession on Pesach is forbidden only mid'Rabanan after Pesach; mid'Oraisa it is permitted. Why is it not forbidden mid'Oraisa because of "Kol she'Ti'avti"?
3. The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 469:4) answers that it is possible that "Kol she'Ti'avti" applies only if one performs a positive act, as is the case in the examples that the Gemara cites here in Chulin. The Minchas Chinuch suggests that if the transgression is only passive, "Kol she'Ti'avti" does not apply. Earlier (Mitzvah 18:9), the Minchas Chinuch writes further that even though Rashi earlier (Chulin 114b) writes that even if the milk and meat was cooked by a minor or a Nochri, the Isur of "Kol she'Ti'avti" also applies, nevertheless in the case of the minor or Nochri there was an action of transgression, whereas in the case of the prohibition of Chametz on Pesach the Isur of "Bal Yera'eh" -- not possessing Chametz on Pesach -- is totally passive, and therefore "Kol she'Ti'avti" does not apply.
4. Footnote #11 to the Machon Yerushalayim edition of the Minchas Chinuch points out that Tosfos in Temurah (4b, DH Rava) appears to contradict the Minchas Chinuch. Tosfos writes that even if meat fell into milk on its own, it is forbidden. We may add to this question on the Minchas Chinuch another question: the second (and preferred) explanation of Rashi here (Chulin 115a, DH Lo) also seems to contradict the Minchas Chinuch, because although the mother sits on the eggs and nobody does anything wrong, Rashi still writes that "Kol she'Ti'avti" applies.
5. I discussed your question with a few Talmidei Chachamim here in Ramot, Yerushalayim, and everyone commented what a strong Kashya it is. A couple of Talmidei Chachamim suggested that the answer may be that Chametz on Pesach is, by its nature, only something which is prohibited for a limited amount of time (7 days). In contrast, "Kol she'Ti'avti" makes the Isur forbidden potentially forever, as Rashi writes in the Sugya. It may be, therefore, that "Kol she'Ti'avti" does not have the power to transform a temporary Isur into a permanent one. When the mother bird is lying on the eggs, in principle there is no time limit to this Isur. As long as she can lie there, the Isur applies. In contrast, the Isur of Chametz never lasts more than 7 days.
6. This is a deep subject, but I must conclude at this point. If you are interested in going further into the subject, you will find further discussion in the following sources: Tzelach to Chulin 114b, who writes at length about Chametz; Teshuvos Beis ha'Levi 1:30:10, and Sefas Emes to Pesachim 28b.
Kol Tuv,
Dovid Bloom