On daf 83a (before the first Mishna), the Gemoro brings a Baraisa about one who ate two Giddim, and concludes that the machlokes is about a gid less than a Kezayis, and the Gemoro brings another Baraisa that shows this machlokes.
Rashi explains that this means that in the first Baraisa, one of the two giddim had less than a Kezayis, hence the machlokes is whether the person gets one or two sets of Malkus.
My question is that if this is the machlokes, why do we need the first Baraisa?, i.e. why would they bother to argue also about one who ate two Giddim where one is less than a kezayis - obviously if they have a machlokes about a gid less than a kezayis, there will be a machlokes if there was another large gid as well?!
Meir Eliezer Bergman
Manchester UK
Reb Meir, this is another excellent question!
1. We first must point out that the source for both Beraisos which the Gemara cites (beginning of 83a) is the Tosefta in Chulin (7:2), where they are cited next to each other (with the difference that the Beraisa cited second in the Gemara is recorded first in the Tosefta). (Even though the Gemara often says, "Midi Gabei Hadadi Tanya?" -- see, for example, Shabbos 18a -- which means that in general a contradition cannot be asked between two Beraisos, because they may have been written by two different Tana'im, however in the Gemara here this contradiction is a problem because the two Beraisos are indeed recorded together in the Tosefta and were obviously said by the same Tana.)
2. Since the source for the two Beraisos is the Tosefta, it seems that your question is not actually a question on the Gemara but rather a question on the Tosefta. That is, since the Tosefta has already mentioned the dispute between the Tana Kama and Rebbi Yehudah (that the Tana Kama maintains that one is Chayav for eating a complete Gid ha'Nasheh even if it is less than a k'Zayis, while Rebbi Yehudah maintains that one is Chayav only for a k'Zayis), what additional Chidush is the Seifa of the Tosefta teaching when it says that if one eats two Gidim from two different animals, he receives 80 lashes according to the Tana Kama and 40 according to Rebbi Yehudah? This is exactly the same dispute taught by the first part of the Tosefta! (The commentary of the Minchas Bikurim on the Tosefta in the Shas, and Rav Abramsky zt'l in his commentary Chazon Yechezkel, both explain that in the Seifa, both Gidim do not contain a k'Zayis. Accordingly, the dispute is the same one as in the previous line of the Tosefta.)
3. I want to suggest the following solution to this problem. Until now, we thought that there were only two opinions in this Sugya. There is the Machlokes Tana'im about whether one is liable for both the Gid of the right leg and that of the left leg, or only for that of the right leg. Rebbi Yehudah maintains that one is liable only for the right Gid. In addition, there is a Machlokes about whether a complete Gid is considered a "Biryah" even when it is less than a k'Zayis. Rebbi Yehudah maintains that it must have a k'Zayis. The Chidush of the end of the Tosefta is that there is room for a third opinion in the Sugya. In other words, it is possible to follow Rebbi Yehudah's opinion on one of these issues and disagree with him on the other. The Chidush of the Tana Kama in the Seifa (of Halachah Beis in the Tosefta) is that he agrees with Rebbi Yehudah that one is liable only for the Gid of the right leg (which is why he requires the two Gidim to be from two different animals) but he disagrees with Rebbi Yehudah on the issue of "Biryah" and maintains that one is Chayav even without a k'Zayis. This is an opinion we have not seen until now, so it is necessary for the Tosefta to tell us about it.
4. However, I discussed this question for quite a while with a Talmid Chacham, and he thinks your question is better than my answer. (He argued that there is no Chidush in the fact that there is a third opinion in the Sugya, because there is no logical reason that the two disputes between Rebbi Yehudah and his opponents should depend on each other.) So this question may require further thought.
5. In addition, there is another problem which has been bothering me -- one word used by the Gemara: "Kegon." The Gemara says, "What is the reasoning of Rebbi Yehudah?" and it answers, "Kegon that there is not a k'Zayis."
"Kegon" is usually translated as "for instance" which seems to suggest that there is a choice in the matter, and one possible option is being given. However, in the Gemara here there is no other possibility; since the source of the two Beraisos is the Tosefta where they are stated next to each other, the Gemara's answer must mean that both parts are discussing a case in which there was not a k'Zayis on both Gidim, as the Minchas Bikurim and Chazon Yechezkel both explain. If so, the Seifa *must* be referring to a case in which there are not two k'Zeisim, and there is no other option!
(I initially thought that this problem could be answered by suggesting that the word "Kegon" does not have to mean "for instance" but rather it can sometimes mean "the case referred to is such and such...." However, I found that the Maharsham in Da'as Torah (Hilchos Shechitah 15:20) writes at some length that the word "Kegon" always means "for instance." So there is still something to think about on this question.)
Kol Tuv,
Dovid Bloom
The Gemara later (91a) answers your question when it says that the Beraisa which discusses eating 2 Gidin from 2 different animals is necessary according to Rebbi Yehudah's opinion. It is teaching that according to Rebbi Yehudah, it is obvious that the Isur applies only to the "Yamin" -- the right gid (which is why he at least receives one set of Malkus; if Rebbi Yehudah was in doubt about whether the Isur applied only to the right Gid or only to the left Gid, he would not receive Malkus at all), and, in addition, since only one of them contains a k'Zayis, he receives only one set of Malkus.
Kol Tuv,
Dovid Bloom
See Rashi to Sanhedrin 98b DH Iy Min Chayah Hu, and see Margoliyos ha'Yam there # 18, for more sources relating to this last point.
Y. Zirkind
Yitzchok, thank you very much for referring me to the Rashi in Sanhedrin (98b). With the help of this Rashi we can now resolve a problem, bs'd.
1. The Tur (EH 39, next to #14 in the Perishah) discusses the sort of blemishes in a woman which could render the marriage invalid. He writes that in addition to the blemishes for Kohanim, there are other "Mumim" that apply specifically for women. The Tur writes that these are "'Kegon' sweat and bad breath..." and proceeds to list all the blemishes that could exist.
2. The Beis Yosef there writes that the word "Kegon" stated by the Tur must be erased, because the Tur mentions *all* of the examples that exist. The Beis Yosef clearly understands that the word "Kegon" must mean "for instance," and if all the possible examples are listed, it is not appropriate to use the word "Kegon."
3. I want to argue that we can now defend the text of the Tur, and it is not necessary to erase the word "Kegon." The Gemara in Sahnhedrin (98b) quotes Rav as saying that if the Mashi'ach is alive at the present time, then he must be "Kegon" Rabeinu ha'Kodosh. Rashi writes that in fact there is no doubt about this, and if the Mashi'ach is alive today he is certainly Rabeinu ha'Kodosh, and therefore the word "Kegon" is "Lav Davka." We see from Rashi that sometimes "Kegon" does not mean "for instance," but rather it could possibly be explained as "Ki Hai Gavna" -- "in this way." In other words, when one looks at Rabeinu ha'Kodosh, he sees what the Mashi'ach is like. This may also be the intention of the Tur; the description of blemishes that occur in women is found in the complete list that he writes.
4. Returning to Chulin (83a), we have another example of "Kegon" being "Lav Davka." This is because the "Kegon" in "Kegon d'Leis Bei k'Zayis" also appears to be Lav Davka, since the only possible way of explaining the Beraisa is as I wrote in the above reply.
(The above argument disagrees with the Maharsham that I cited above.)
Kol Tuv.
Dovid Bloom