I have learned that secular Jews are halachically exempt from the Divine justice system, but not exempt from their obligation to do mitzvot - Avoda Zara 54a: ohnes Rachmana patrei (exempted from punishment); and Hilchot Mamrim 3:1-3, Rambam: they are "k'anoos" (considered as if they are forced to break the law, halachically speaking, "even after seeing and hearing what Torah is all about"). How generous. But not generous enough, apparently. If they're not necessarily expected to meet the challenge, why does HaSheim still obligate them (even though they're patur from breaking halacha)? I have a series of questions about this:

1. Do you take "k'anoos" to mean (in addition to being patur from din) that they are not necessarily expected to do mitzvot now, in the past, or even in the future (at this point in their lives, and even after hearing and seeing what Torah is all about) because they were raised errantly?

2. Even though they are patur from din, does HaSheim still obligate them to do mitzvot they are not necessarily aware of, or not necessarily capable in (because they can't handle it socially/emotionally etc.)?

3. If yes, then:

Why still obligate them in mitzvot if they are already exempt from punishment (and not even aware of many mitzvot, nor capable of performing them from a psychosocial perspective)? Why limit "k'anoos" to an exemption from din and not expand its definition here to an exemption from the obligation to perform "impossible" mitzvot as well (impossible due to plain ignorance or emotional/social incapacity, frustration, etc. - perhaps things like Shabbat, Kashrut, Niddah, Tefila, Talmud Tora...whatever mitzvot they cannot handle at this point in their lives)? Why not personally exempt them from the obligation to perform these so-called "impossible" mitzvot through some sort of personal system of din, thereby avoiding the need to exempt them from din? (Remove the obligation in the first place, rather than having to exempt them from din!)

Why does HaSheim place a continuous and mandatory obligation to perform mitzvot on Jews that are not necessarily capable, halachically expected, or knowledgeable? Why aren't they simply exempt from mitzvot they are not capable of performing and not expected to do halachically (until they are educated properly and capable and until the eitan haTorah enters them)? How can they be obligated in something they are not capable of doing in their specific situation in life? (HaSheim is infinitely perfect, and hence infinitely fair and just and righteous. HaSheim is much better than who we think He is. So why obligate them at all if they're not capable?)

4. Is the halachic exemption from breaking the law different for social/emotional issues than for physical/mental incapacity? If so, how so and why? (What's your source and logic?)

5. Could we possibly say that HaSheim actually wants certain people to live a secular life if that's indeed all they are capable of handling? If He is infinitely in control of his emotions, why would He want them to do something that they're not capable of doing? (Come on HaSheim, just make them capable of doing it if You really want them to!) Why would HaSheim want them to if He didn't allow them to have the freewill power to do so? Therefore, He must want them to do what they can do, whether it's a secular life or not, as long as they're using their freewill power to the utmost in their situation in life, correct? If so, why doesn't He allow everyone to have the potential freewill power to do all mitzvot? Perhaps it's because of olam hazeh, social pressure, emotional frustration, etc. that can be so overwhelming to someone?

6. Could we learn from "k'anoos" that freewill is completely absent from an halachic perspective?

7. As long as X has not been brought any closer to Torah (through learning and education, etc. - more than just seeing and hearing what Torah is all about), we perhaps could argue that they should live such a life (from HaSheim's perspective) precisely because a relationship with Him is strictly limited to mitzvot they are capable of handling halachically. Therefore, could we say that He actually wants certain people to live their secular lifestyle if that's indeed all they are capable of handling (halachically speaking)?

8. Could we say He prefers secular Jews to be non-observant? Only if they are not capable. Hence, He prefers certain people to be secular but still observant to the extent they can handle. What is kiruv's purpose from this perspective? Merely to increase their connection in whatever ways are reasonable? (Yes, in an ideal world, HaSheim for sure would want them to be obligated, observant, and capable - not exempt, secular, and "handicapped"/incapable. But if we would just wake up to reality and see the truth, then we would see that this is not how things work in real life. Hence, HaSheim doesn't necessarily want them to be observant, but rather He wants them to do what they can handle, and be observant to the extent they can - whether it's a secular lifestyle (with many mitzvot of course, let's not forget - bein adam l'chaveiro, tzedaka, chesed, parnassa, chinuch, matza, menora, fast, shul, etc.) or an observant life, correct?

Scott Craig Feldman, Baltimore, USA

Thank you for your time and help with this. Here is my revised question list, shortened a bit.

The question at hand: Why is it wrong to assume what I'm assuming, that secular Jews aren't obligated in what they can't do? In other words, why does the Torah obligate them in what they can't do, and probably do not even believe in or know about? I'm arguing that it should be the opposite: Precisely because HKBH is all-knowing (not like a Supreme Court Justice down here on Planet Earth) - HKBH is infinite and perfect, and therefore, to reason that He's going to obligate someone who's unaware or doesn't even believe there's an obligation all together in the first place seems to be quite irrational?€¦HKBH should just wait until he "sees" Jay Goldman, for example, as capable and ready - and then, BAM SMACK BOOM POOF KAZAM, the chiyuv is placed on Jay...out of love and concern!

The Shach, in Yoreh Deah 151.6, says, I think, that lifnei iveir doesn't apply bichlal to one who is porek oyl. Nowadays, people are not necessarily interested or capable, or even believe in Torah, or have the yira that others have had a chance to build within their neshamos. The only halachic category that makes sense for them is the same as people with low income in regards to their taxes - exempt, exempt from the mitzvos they can't do yet (or even ever) - but chayav in the mitzvos they can do. (Again, even secular law acknowledges this "novel" idea, which is really common sense, like when certain employees receive an exemption from having taxes withheld on their W2 and paycheck if they make under minimum income limit.) So why aren't they exempt, not only from din, but from mitzvos - who says aphilu shechatah yisroel applies even to non-observant Jews? Why assume that it does apply to them - they don't even beleive in Torah because they were raised without a real chinuch!

Again, they COULD be obligated, but it's not logical to assume so - it's a rejection of common sense logic. And you say "but what about 'aph al pi shechatu yisroel'" - and I say back, "well who says they have the status of the yisroel in this pasuk - maybe it's only an already observant Yisroel?!").

So, please tell me: WHY does the Torah have this position EVEN for secular Jews, apparently - what is the logic? Now listen carefully. We know that one can be obligated and yet not subject to punishment due to ohnes. That is the Torah's position. But WHY does the Torah have this position, that Jay is still obligated - what is the logic? It seems against logic/rational/objective thought because a secular Jew probably doesn't even know he has anything to do in the first place! And even if he does know that he can't drive on Shabbos, intermarry etc., his daas is so weak in this area - he will probably not do anything about it because he'll deny it and say something like this:

"it's only for observant people" or,

"the Torah was written by humans over many generations and it simply represents what G-d *would've* said had he *really* communicated with us" or,

"yes, it's mi'sinai but too much to handle for me to start up with right now - I MUST work on Saturday to earn my living, etc." or,

"well religion is religion, and while orthodox Jews are for the most part nice people, their thinking represents extreme black-and-white stubborn close-minded adherence to illogical thought" or,

"I don't want to talk about it" or,

"I'm not interested" or,

"It's not for me" etc. etc. etc.

So since HKBH *knows* this guy is not going to do it because of misunderstanding what the whole system of Torah is all about, why place a chiyuv on him at all *in those mitzvos* that he's not able to understand as applying to him!? (Or even: Why place a full chiyuv on him in certain mitzvos when he will only be able to fulfill some of the chiyuvim?) Just lift the chiyuv off him until he's ready? It's more than not punishing him - it's precisely about not obligating someone to do something when he's not ready for it. One day, hopefully, he'll realize he's ready to do harchakos with his wife, not talk on phone on Shabbos, daven, etc. Until then, don't just patur him from din, but don't even obligate him yet (or ever) in certain mitzvos!