Dear Daf Yomi,
Thank you so much for your wonderful website. You have revolutionized my learning. I cannot express how much it means to me to have access to a point-by-point summary of the entire gemara at my fingertips. I cannot tell you how it has helped my shiur preparation to be able to look up nuances of the text. Thank you so much.
I came across Horayos 12a today. I noticed that you have a section heading called "RELYING ON SIGNS." I respectfully request that you change the name of this heading. Nichush, relying on signs, is an issur d'oraisa. In parshas Balak it says "ki lo nachash b'yaakov v'lo kesem b'yisroel." Why it is mutar to do as the gemara suggests here needs to be understood; I plan to ask my posek to explain this. However, to label this section "relying on signs" may be confusing. Perhaps something like "omens?"
I await your response. Thank you again for your efforts to be marbitz Torah. May you go from strength to strength.
jessie
Jessie
Thank you for your warm and encouraging words. We are proud to be able to contribute to your spiritual growth in this manner.
Regarding signs and omens, one should not downplay the significance of signs. Some signs are sent from heaven to give a person an important message that he dare not ignore. The Gemara in Chulin 95b says that only a particular type of sign, when relied on in a particular manner, constitutes Nichush. We copy below the Kollel's Insights to the Daf on that subject.
Thank you again,
M Kornfeld
5) THE "NICHUSH" OF ELIEZER
QUESTION: Rav states that any form of divination (or interpretation of omens) which is not similar to the divination that Eliezer, the servant of Avraham, performed (when he wanted to determine who would be the proper wife for Yitzchak) is not considered divination. This implies that a form of Nichush that is similar to that of Eliezer is considered divination. Since the Torah forbids performing Nichush, how could Eliezer perform Nichush when choosing a wife for Yitzchak!
ANSWERS:
(a) TOSFOS (95b, DH k'Eliezer) answers that Rav maintains that the prohibition to rely on divination applies only to a Jew and does not apply to a Nochri. Eliezer was a Nochri.
(b) According to those who maintain that the prohibition of Nichush applies to a Nochri as well, Tosfos suggests that Eliezer did not intend to rely on the omen that he had set. He intended that the omen merely serve as a starting point in choosing the proper bride for Yitzchak; he did not accept Rivkah as the bride until he reached her home, met her parents, and checked into her lineage. This appears to be the opinion of the RAMBAM (Hilchos Avodah Zarah 11:4) as well.
(c) The RA'AVAD, however, strongly argues with the Rambam for implying that Eliezer practiced Nichush. He maintains that everything Eliezer did was entirely permissible.
The Ra'avad seems to understand the Gemara as the RADAK (Shmuel I 1:14) explains it. The Radak writes that the prohibition of Nichush applies only when one makes his actions dependent on an occurrence that is not related in any way to what he is doing (for example, he says that he will marry a certain woman if a chicken crosses his path). When he makes his actions dependent on an event that is related to what he is going to do, there is no prohibition of Nichush involved. When the Gemara says that any form of Nichush that is not similar to that of Eliezer is not considered Nichush, it means that if one does not specify in advance that he intends for an occurrence to serve as a good or bad omen, then the occurrence is not an omen and does not portend anything.
According to this explanation, what does the Gemara mean when it suggests that Rav did not want to eat his relative's meat due to Nichush? The Gemara means that Rav interpreted the fact that everyone left the meat behind as a bad omen for the meat. According to the Radak, the Amora'im regularly looked out for such "good omens" ("Rav Badik b'Mavra").
6) "RAV BADIK B'MAVRA"
QUESTION: The Gemara relates that Rav would decide whether or not to go on a trip based on the sign of the ferry. RASHI (DH Badik) explains that if Rav found a ferry ready to travel, then he would travel, and if he found a ferry only with difficulty, then he would not travel. Rashi (DH Af Al Pi) writes that it is forbidden to conduct one's actions based on the outcome of a Nichush. Why, then, was it permitted for Rav to decide whether or not to travel based on the Nichush of a ferry? (KESEF MISHNEH, Hilchos Avodah Zarah 11:5)
ANSWERS:
(a) The MAHARSHA explains that a person must fulfill two conditions in order for his act of Nichush to be prohibited. First, the person must express his Nichush orally. Second, the person must mention both sides (for example, "If this happens, then I will do this act, and if it does not happen, then I will do the other act").
Rav did not verbalize his Nichush of the ferry, and thus it was permitted for him to rely upon it. (This also might be the intention of the Kesef Mishneh, who writes that Rav did not really plan to rely absolutely on his Nichush.)
(b) According to the opinion of the RADAK (see previous Insight), Rav's action was certainly permitted. The Radak writes that the prohibition of Nichush applies only when one makes his actions dependent on an occurrence that is not related in any way to what he is doing (for example, he says that he will travel on the ferry if a chicken crosses his path). When he makes his actions dependent on an event that is related to what he is going to do, there is no prohibition of Nichush involved.