Opinion: It seems from here that if a Get is written on (a large piece of) parchment, and it was then cut off from the rest of the parchment, it should be invalid. We similarly derive regarding Gitin from "And he wrote...and he gave" that only something that needs to be written on and given can be used as a Get excluding etc.

Opinion (cont.): It is more understandable that a Get that is attached to a large Klaf should be considered attached than earth from an Ir ha'Nidachas should be considered attached to the ground, and yet the Gemara here says it is missing being pulled out of the ground. The Gemara in Gitin (21b, see Tosfos there DH "Yatza") writes at length regarding whatever needs to be known about this subject.

Implied Question: Rav Rechumi should have asked on Rava from the Mishnah in Sukah (29b) that says that if one uses a Lulav from an Asheirah or Ir ha'Nidachas it is invalid. (Why didn't he use this Mishnah as a question on Rava?)

Answer: Rather, it is better for him to quote a Beraisa that discusses both Shofar and Lulav.

Question: In Rosh Hashanah (28a), Rav says that a Shofar of idolatry should not be used. If he does use it, he has fulfilled the Mitzvah. Similarly, Rava says in Yevamos (103b) that if someone does Chalitzah with a Sandal of idolatry, the Chalitzah is valid, and we do not say that the size of the shoe is considered cut (i.e. burned) down. (This seems to go against our Gemara's conclusion!)

Answer #1: Our Gemara is referring to idolatry belonging to a Jew that cannot be nullified. However, idolatry belonging to a Nochri that can be nullified is not considered as if its size was cut down.

Proof: The Gemara in Sukah (31b) indeed answers in this fashion. Rava there says that if one used a Lulav of idolatry, he fulfills the Mitzvah. The Gemara asks from the Mishnah that says a Lulav of an Asheirah tree is invalid, and answers that the Mishnah is only referring to an Asheirah of Moshe (see Tosfos in Sukah at length regarding the definition of "Asheirah d'Moshe.")

Question: Once a Jew picks up the idol of a Nochri, it is considered to belong to him. This is as stated in Avodah Zarah (42a) that this is due to a decree that he might pick it up and then nullify it (which is not effective for an idol of a Jew). (Accordingly, once he picks it up it should not matter whether it belongs to a Jew or Nochri, as once he picks it up it can no longer be nullified!)

Answer: Since he picked up the Shofar and Sandal in order not to acquire it, it is valid. [Even if it is not his it is valid, as] The Mishnah states that if one does Chalitzah with someone else's shoe, it is valid. Similarly, the case of Lulav is on Yom Tov Sheini (when one does not need to own his Lulav).

Implied Question: The Gemara in Sukah (ibid.) could have answered that the Mishnah is referring to the first day of Yom Tov, and did not have to say it was referring to an Asheirah of Moshe. (Why did it have to say a case of Asheirah of Moshe?)

Answer: Rather, because the case of Asheirah is alongside the case of Ir ha'Nidachas in the Mishnah (in Sukah 29b), it seems like it is even referring to the second day of Yom Tov (just as a Lulav of Ir ha'Nidachas is referring to every day of Sukos).

Answer #2: Rabeinu Tam explains that both types of cases (where it is either valid or invalid) refer to the idol of a Nochri. When the idol is ruled to be invalid it is before it was nullified, and when it is ruled valid it is after it was nullified. Even after it was nullified it should not be taken, blown, or used in Chalitzah. This is because it is considered disgusting to use it for a Mitzvah, as it was at one point an idol.

Implied Question: Even if you will say that it is permitted Lechatchilah to do Kisuy with the earth of idolatry, as is the case regarding an Ir ha'Nidachas, one cannot compare the Halachah regarding Kisuy to the Halachah regarding Chalitzah. (Why not?)

Answer: Regarding Kisuy, we do not worry about something being disgusting (as it is used to cover blood).

Implied Question: The Gemara in Sukah (31b) answers that it is referring to an Asheirah of Moshe, and does not answer that it is referring to an idol of a Nochri before it is nullified. (Why doesn't it give this answer?)

Answer: This is because once the Lulav is cut off the palm tree it is nullified (and therefore there is no possible case of before nullification when one uses a Lulav on Sukos).

Implied Question: In Yevamos (103b), the Gemara differentiates between a Sandal that is an idol and a Sandal that is offered to an idol, as the offering cannot be nullified. It does not differentiate between before and after an idol is nullified. (Why not?)

Answer: It is teaching a side point that an offering to an idol can never be nullified.

Implied Question: The Gemara in Rosh Hashanah (28a) is the most difficult to answer, as Rava differentiates there between a Shofar that is an idol and a Shofar of an Ir ha'Nidachas. It could have differentiated, according to the opinion of Rabeinu Tam, between after it was nullified and before it was nullified.

Answer: However, it must be that both cases are after being nullified according to Rabeinu Tam and the Sefarim that have the text, "Rav Yehudah." If it would be before they were nullified, Rav Yehudah holds in the Gemara there that one does not fulfill the Mitzvah with a Shofar taken from a Korban Shelamim, as Mitzvos are considered a benefit. (He therefore would certainly say one cannot benefit from a Shofar of idolatry, as idols are forbidden from benefit, before nullifying it!)

Implied Question: However, it appears that the correct text there is "Rava," not "Rav Yehudah."

Implied Question (cont.): This is because the Gemara there explains that the reason that one does not fulfill the Mitzvah with a Shofar of an Ir ha'Nidachas is because its size is cut (i.e. burned) down. According to Rav Yehudah, the reason given should be because a Mitzvah is a benefit.

Implied Question: All of these categories listed in the Mishnah are obvious. (Why single out Mukdashin?)

Answer: However, we need to find one that is necessary to be written, and based on that we can say that all other categories stated were a side point to this detail.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that the Mishnah later (100b) states that it does not apply to a non kosher animal, as the prohibition of Gid ha'Nasheh cannot be added to the prohibition of a non kosher animal. (How can our Gemara say that the prohibition of Mukdashin will be added to the prohibition against Gid ha'Nasheh?)

Answer: It is more understandable that the prohibition of Mukdashin, which is punishable by Kares if he ate it while impure as explained by Rashi later (90a), will be added to the prohibition against Gid ha'Nasheh.

Implied Question: The Gemara could not have asked from the Mishnah later (100b) that says that Gid ha'Nasheh does not apply to a non kosher animal. This indicates that the reason why it does not apply is because the prohibition of Gid ha'Nasheh cannot be added to the prohibition of a non kosher animal. This indicates that there is a good taste given off by Gid ha'Nasheh! (Why didn't the Gemara ask this question?)

Answer #1: The Gemara could have answered that the reasoning of the Mishnah (ibid.) is as stated by Rebbi Shimon later (101a), that only the Gid of an animal whose Gid is forbidden but its meat is permitted is in fact forbidden.

Implied Question: Rebbi Yehudah asks, wasn't Gid ha'Nasheh forbidden to the sons of Yaakov? (What is Rebbi Yehudah's question if we hold Gidin don't have a good taste?)

Answer: This is a good question. Since the sons of Yaakov were forbidden to eat the Gid ha'Nasheh of any animal, kosher or non kosher, it is illogical to say that when it became forbidden for them to eat non kosher animals the prohibition against Gid ha'Nasheh no longer applied to non kosher animals.

Answer #2: Alternatively, even if he could deduce from here that Gidin have a good taste, it is better to ask a question from a thigh that had a Gid ha'Nasheh cooked in it as this is stated first.

Explanation: This means that the prohibition against Gid ha'Nasheh alone applies to Mukdashin, but other prohibitions do not.

Question: Why don't we say that Gidin have a good taste, and even so the prohibition of Mukdashin cannot be added on the prohibition of Gid ha'Nasheh? This is because he does not hold a prohibition can be added to another prohibition, even if the second prohibition is more stringent than the first and more inclusive.

Implied Question: Perhaps you will say this is due to the Mishnah that is like Rebbi Meir who holds that Gid ha'Nasheh applies to a fetus. Later (101a), Rebbi Meir says that one has transgressed two prohibitions if he eats the Gid ha'Nasheh of a Neveilah. This indicates that he holds a prohibition can be added on another prohibition!

Answer: Even now that we are saying that Gidin do not have a taste, it cannot be according to Rebbi Meir. This is because Rebbi Meir holds that Gidin have a good taste, as indicated by his saying that one is liable for transgressing Neveilah when eating a Gid (of a Neveilah).

Answer #1: It does not appear that our Stam Mishnah will argue on the Stam Mishnah in Kerisus (13b). The Mishnah there states that a person can eat one eating and be liable to bring four Korbanos Chatas and an Asham. This indicates the Mishnah there holds that a prohibition can be added to another prohibition when the second prohibition is more inclusive.

Answer #2: Alternatively, it does not want to give this answer because one could still ask the Gemara's question that the Mishnah should have said, "Mukdashin does not apply to a Gid."

Implied Question: Now that the Gemara says he holds there is no taste in Gidin, one could ask the Gemara's question that the Mishnah should have said, "Mukdashin does not apply to a Gid."

Answer: The Gemara instead asked a better question.

Question: This is difficult. Perhaps it is forbidden due to the fat of the Gid, but the Gidin themselves do not have any flavor?

Answer #1: According to Rabeinu Meir's explanation this is understandable, as he explained that one should not be stringent and forbid the fat of a Gid being that the Gid itself is not forbidden.

Answer #2: Rabeinu Tam explains that the fat of the Gid would not be called "Gid" (and therefore the Gemara is not discussing the fat of the Gid at all).

Question: There is a difficulty according to his explanation. Later, (91a) regarding the Mishnah (in Pesachim 83a) that the Gidin should be burned on the sixteenth, Rav Ashi explains that it is referring to the fat of the Gid. (This is despite the fact that it only states "Gid!")

Explanation: The prohibition of Gid and Mukdashin arrive at the same time.

Question: How can they arrive at the same time? The prohibition of Gid arrives when the animal is nine months in the womb! This is as stated earlier (92b) that Rebbi Oshiya says that the argument is regarding an animal who has been alive for nine months in the womb (when the mother is slaughtered), and Rebbi Meir is according to his opinion etc.

Answer: Rebbi Meir permits the Gid of a fetus that was alive for eight months in the womb if its mother was slaughtered (when it was in the womb), as it is permitted due to the slaughtering of the mother. However, as long as the mother was not slaughtered there is a prohibition of Gid in the fetus (even at eight months).

Question: However, there is a difficulty. In Chulin (75a), Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish argue regarding a person who tears off some Cheilev from a live nine month old fetus. However, if the fetus was only eight months old everyone agrees that there is no prohibition of Cheilev. Just as there is no prohibition of Cheilev at eight months, so too there should not be a prohibition of Gid at eight months! If so, the prohibition of Mukdashin was before the prohibition of Gid.

Answer #1: It is possible to answer that specifically the prohibition of Cheilev does not apply at eight months, as the Pasuk states, "All Cheilev of an ox and sheep etc." An eight month old fetus is not called an ox or sheep. However, the prohibition of Gid does apply to it.

Answer #2: Alternatively, it is better for the Gemara to ask a question from the Mishnah in Nazir that implies explicitly that the prohibition of Mukdashin and Gid do not arrive at the same time. (However, our question would also be a valid question.)

Question: Why don't we ask from our Mishnah that says that Gid does not apply to a non kosher animal that we see from here that the prohibition of eating a non kosher animal comes before the prohibition of Gid?

Answer: The Gemara could have answered that the reason for this is because its meat is forbidden as stated by Rebbi Shimon and as I explained earlier (see Tosfos #5 above).

Question #1: This is difficult. What is the question? The second part of the Mishnah is regarding a fetus whose mother was slaughtered and the first part was regarding a fetus whose mother was not slaughtered.

Question #2: Additionally, what is the answer that this is an argument between Rebbi Yehudah and the Rabanan? Even Rebbi Yehudah admits that when the mother is not slaughtered there is a prohibition. They argue only when it is slaughtered.

Proof: Rebbi Yochanan stated earlier (75a) that if one tears off Cheilev from a nine month old fetus that is alive, the Cheilev is considered like that of a regular animal. This is despite the fact that if the mother was slaughtered the animal would be permitted entirely, even the Cheilev and its Gid, due to the Pasuk, "Whatever is in the animal you should eat."

Question: This is difficult. In Nazir (50a), the text of all the Sefarim is "As Rebbi Yochanan states etc." This implies that Rebbi Yochanan did not say his statement regarding the Mishnah in Nazir (unlike what is implied by our Gemara).

Answer #1: It appears that in our Gemara as well the text should read, "As Rebbi Yochanan states." It is possible Rebbi Yochanan made his statement regarding a Mishnah in Ohalos (2:1) that states, "These cause impurity in a tent: A dead person etc."

Answer #2: Rabeinu Shmuel answers the text of our Sefarim that have the text of "As Rebbi Yochanan says" there and "And Rebbi Yochanan says" here.

Answer #2 (cont.): The Gemara there asks, if a Nazir must shave due to a Kzayis, he certainly must shave due to an entire dead person! Rav Yosef says that this is only necessary regarding a dead person who does not have even a Kzayis of meat left. The Gemara then asks that if a Nazir must shave due to a limb of a dead person, he certainly should shave due to an entire dead person! The Gemara answers, this is as Rebbi Yochanan says this is only necessary etc.

Answer #2 (cont.): This means as Rebbi Yochanan answered regarding the first question (posed to Rav Yosef above) that regarding a Kzayis etc. His answer was that being that the limbs were not formed, there probably was not a Kzayis of flesh on him. Similarly here (this answer can also be applied to the second question) etc.

Answer #2 (cont.): Our Gemara only quotes the first question, and therefore says, "And Rebbi Yochanan says" because Rebbi Yochanan originally said his remark regarding the first question.