Question: Being that the question on Rebbi Yosi's Kal v'Chomer does not directly debate the topic of his Kal v'Chomer (that Milah pushes aside Shabbos whereas Kisuy does not), why don't we merely put the question into the Kal v'Chomer?

Question (cont.): The Gemara does this in Bava Kama (24b). The Gemara wanted to derive that Keren (a form of damage) done in the domain of the victim should cause the owner of the animal doing the damage to pay in full, as we should derive this from Shen v'Regel (other forms of damage). We do not ask that Shen v'Regel are different because they are more common forms of damage, being that this question does not directly debate the Kal v'Chomer which is regarding payment.

Answer: The Gemara there is merely discussing logic. However, a question regarding a stringency or leniency that is stated in the Pasuk, such as our Gemara's point that Milah does not apply at night as it does during the day, is asked even if it is not directly debating the point of the Kal v'Chomer.

Answer (cont.): The Gemara does this in Zevachim (10a). The Gemara there derives the law in a case where someone slaughtered a Korban with intent that he would sprinkle the blood with intent that it was a different Korban by using a Kal v'Chomer from someone who slaughtered a Korban with intent to sprinkle the blood outside of the allotted time to do so. The Gemara asks, Intending to sprinkle outside the allotted time is a far more serious issue, as it causes one to be liable to receive Kares.

Explanation: This means that they are merely putting their hand over the animal, as explained in Chagigah (16b). However, Rebbi Yosi admits that it would be prohibited for them to lean on the animal with all of their weight (as a regular Semichah is indeed done).

Explanation (cont.): The Gemara here quotes this in order to say that just as Rebbi Yosi allowed women to do a quasi Semichah by putting their hand above the animal even though it appears as if they are doing work with Kodshim, similarly he would permit Tekios for women being that it is only a Rabbinic prohibition (to blow Shofar without needing to do so).

Question: Rabeinu Nasan asked that regarding payments of four or five times the value of the animal (for stealing it and either selling or slaughtering it, four times the value for a sheep and five times the value for an ox), the Gemara in Bava Kama (71a) quotes the Rabbanan as saying one is liable for slaughtering the animal even if the slaughtering is inappropriate. Examples of such cases are someone who slaughters on Shabbos, for idolatry, through someone else, or when the animal is found to be a Treifah.

Question (cont.): Why don't the Rabbanan there derive "Tevichah" (slaughtering mentioned regarding stealing and slaughtering) from "Tevichah" (mentioned in Bereishis implying an appropriate slaughtering)?

Answer #1: The Gemara there prefers to derive "Tevichah" involving sin from "Shechitah" involving sin, rather than deriving "Tevichah" involving sin from "Tevichah" not involving a sin.

Answer #1 (cont.): Our Gemara is saying that we derive "Shechitah" from "Shechitah" even if the first animal was found to be a Treifah, meaning it was a permitted Shechitah. However, if the second animal was found to be a Treifah, and this slaughtering is a sin (as the mother was already slaughtered), we do not need to derive "Shechitah" from "Shechitah" (as the second slaughtering of every Oso v'Es Beno by nature is a sin for which one is clearly liable, despite the fact that it is an inappropriate slaughtering).

Answer #2: Alternatively, the Gemara prefers to derive a word stated by Har Sinai from a law stated by Har Sinai, instead of deriving from the Pasuk, "u'Tevoach Tevach v'Hachein" which was not stated by Har Sinai. (It was merely stated by Yosef when the brothers came down to Egypt, not said as part of a commandment to Bnei Yisrael.) This is despite the fact that deriving in this way would mean we could learn "Tevichah" from "Tevichah" (instead of from "Shechitah").

Implied Question: Our Gemara could have given this answer as well (when it asks why Rebbi Meir did not derive from "u'Tevoach etc." (If this is a valid answer, why wasn't it given by our Gemara?)

Answer: It gave a good answer without needing to give this answer.

Question: In Yevamos (17b), we say that we prefer to derive "Achim" from "Achim" and not "Achim" from "Achecha." This is despite the fact that the "Achim" being derived from is regarding the sons of Yaakov, and is not regarding a law stated at Har Sinai. (How can we reconcile this with our second answer (c) given above?)

Answer: Being that we learn here that an inappropriate slaughtering is called slaughtering regarding Oso v'Es Beno, it is understandable to generally say that it is called slaughtering. (Based on this) One should not say that, on the contrary, we should derive "Tevichah" from "Tevichah" to teach us in Bava Kama (71a) that an inappropriate slaughtering is not called slaughtering.

Answer (cont.): This type of logic can be used anywhere. Being that we can derive from various similar words, it is better to derive words regarding laws stated by Har Sinai from other words stated by Har Sinai.

Answer (cont.): However, if we did not derive "Shechitah" here from "Shechitah" there (thereby establishing that an inappropriate slaughtering is still considered slaughtering), we would indeed derive "Tevichah" from "Tevichah" in Bava Kama (71a), even though it was not stated by Har Sinai. This is similar to the derivation from a word ("Achim") not stated by Har Sinai in the Gemara in Yevamos (17b) mentioned earlier.

Question: Why does Rebbi Meir need to derive from Shechutei Chutz (the prohibition against Korbanos slaughtered outside the Beis Hamikdash)? Why doesn't he derive this from the fact that Oso v'Es Beno applies to Kodshim, even though Kodshim is not considered an appropriate slaughtering being that it is an animal that is not old enough to be slaughtered? (It can only be slaughtered the next day.)

Answer: It is better to derive from Shechutei Chutz because one can push aside a proof from the fact that Oso v'Es Beno applies to Kodshim. It is possible to say that the Torah only forbade Oso v'Es Beno involving Kodshim when the first animal slaughtered is Kodshim and the second is Chulin. The prohibition would then be done with an appropriate slaughtering (Chulin).

Explanation: Even so, Rebbi Shimon says that one is indeed exempt from Oso v'Es Beno if he slaughters Kodshim because it is an inappropriate slaughtering. This is because the Pasuk of Oso v'Es Beno is primarily regarding Chulin.

Question: This is difficult. The Gemara in Pesachim (63a) quotes a Mishnah as stating the following. Rebbi Shimon says that someone who slaughters a Korban Pesach on the fourteenth of Nisan when he owns Chametz with intent that it should be a Korban Pesach is liable for slaughtering it while owning Chametz. If he slaughtered it with intent that it should be a different Korban, he is exempt.

Question (cont.): Rashi explains that this is because the Korban Pesach is invalid, and Rebbi Shimon holds that inappropriate slaughtering is not called slaughtering.

Question (cont.): Why didn't Rebbi Shimon in Pesachim (ibid.) derive from Shechutei Chutz that inappropriate slaughtering is considered slaughtering? Such a teaching would involve deriving Kodshim from Kodshim!

Explanation: Without the Pasuk saying, "that it will be eaten" he would not derive from Tevichah. This is because Shefichah is not as comparable to Tevichah as Shechitah is to Tevichah.

Question: Rebbi Eliezer from Mitz asked, why don't we say the Pasuk "that it will be eaten" excludes food that cannot be fed to others (i.e. that is forbidden from benefit, as opposed to requiring appropriate slaughtering)? This is as Rebbi Shimon derives from the Pasuk, "from all the food that will be eaten" in Menachos (101b) and Chulin (129a) that it even includes an unkosher bird, being that it is permitted to benefit from it.

Answer: The Pasuk quoted later (129a), "from all of the food" includes any food, even food that is forbidden from benefit. "That will be eaten" qualifies the Pasuk by saying that it must only be permitted to benefit from it (which is why an unkosher bird is included). However, here "all of the food" is not stated. When stated by itself, the Pasuk "that it will be eaten" indicates things that are permitted for a Jew to eat.

Explanation: The Gemara specifically discussed, "a nine month old that was alive." However, if it was dead or it was eight months old and alive, it is obvious that it would be considered part of its mother which has been ruled to be a Treifah.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that the Gemara earlier (58a) states that the child of a Treifah is not considered to be part of its mother. (Why, then, should we exclude the cases stated above?)

Answer: This is because it is alive, and its being alive is not dependent on its mother (when it is eight months old the Gemara presumes it will not live without another month of pregnancy).

Question: Why should we think that because Rebbi holds like Rebbi Meir regarding Oso v'Es Beno, he should also hold that the Shechitah of the mother works for the fetus? Regarding Kisuy ha'Dam we have established he holds like Rebbi Shimon (that an inappropriate slaughtering is invalid)! (Why assume he holds like Rebbi Meir regarding Ben Pekuah over Rebbi Shimon?)

Answer: Rebbi generally holds like Rebbi Meir, as we find in Bava Kama (70a) that Rebbi's ruling in the Mishnah is as per the opinion of Rebbi Meir regarding payments of four or five (times the amount of a sheep or ox stolen and slaughtered/sold).

Implied Question: The Gemara does not quote the Mishnah quoted earlier (72b) that says, "No. If the slaughtering of a Treifah causes it to be pure..." (Why not bring proof from a Mishnah?)

Answer: This is because the Gemara could have asked a question on this (which is indeed asked by a Beraisa quoted earlier on 74a) by saying that an eight month old fetus that is alive should prove that the logic there is incorrect.

Implied Question: The Gemara could not have said that the case is where one slaughtered a Treifah and it was Oso v'Es Beno, and that we would have thought that being that one is exempt (according to Rebbi Shimon) it is not considered slaughtering at all, even to ensure it does not become Neveilah. (Why didn't the Gemara use this as the reason why it had to be said that Rebbi Shimon admits that inappropriate slaughtering ensures that an animal is not considered Neveilah?)

Answer: One could say that while it is not considered an inappropriate slaughtering by the one slaughtering it, it is still considered as if the animal was slaughtered. This is why the Gemara brings proof that even regarding itself, when it is considered Chulin in the Azarah and possibly forbidden from benefit, Rebbi Shimon still says it is considered an inappropriate slaughtering (and it is permitted to benefit from it).

Observation: This is a Mishnah in Temurah (33b).

Implied Question: The Gemara did not quote our Mishnah that says that Chulin brought in the Azarah does not require Kisuy. (Why?)

Answer: This is because Rebbi Shimon is not mentioned in our Mishnah. Our Mishnah, stated by Rebbi, merely says that the Chachamim say one is exempt.

Implied Question: However, the Gemara could have quoted the Mishnah in Bava Kama (70a) where Rebbi Shimon said that Chulin in the Azarah is exempt from payment of four or five times the amount of the animal. It could have deduced from here that if this wasn't a Torah law, he would be liable, as the Gemara indeed deduces in Bava Kama (72b). (Why didn't our Gemara quote the Mishnah in Bava Kama?)

Answer: Perhaps here the Gemara wants to prove that it is forbidden from benefit. It means to show that this Mishnah (Temurah 33b) implies that Rebbi Shimon holds that Chulin brought in the Azarah is forbidden from benefit according to Torah law.

Answer (cont.): This is why our Gemara did not quote the Mishnah in Bava Kama (70a), as it would not be able to deduce from there that it is forbidden from benefit. It would only be able to deduce that it is forbidden to be eaten.

Question: What is bothering the Gemara that prompts it to ask, "Does Rebbi Shimon indeed hold that Chulin slaughtered in the Azarah is a Torah prohibition?" (Why wouldn't it be a Torah prohibition?)

Answer #1: There is a Beraisa in Kidushin (58a) that quotes Rebbi Shimon as saying that a man who is Mekadesh a woman with Chulin slaughtered in the Azarah has indeed been Mekadesh the woman. Due to the Mishnah in Temurah (33b, quoted by our Gemara and the Gemara in Kidushin) the Gemara says that Rebbi Shimon must be talking about a Treifah.

Question: This does not seem correct. If so, our Gemara should have quoted the Beraisa (regarding Kidushin) and established that it is talking about a Treifah, as explained in Kidushin (ibid.).

Answer #2: It appears to Rabeinu Tam that our Gemara has difficulty with the Mishnah in Temurah (33b) that it quotes. This is because it says, "And so too a Chayah etc." This indicates that a Chayah is only a Rabbinic prohibition, being that the Mishnah states "And so too a Chayah." If so, a Beheimah could also possibly be only a Rabbinic prohibition, and the "And also" means that there is a Rabbinic decree regarding Chayah due to the prohibition of Beheimah. If Beheimah would be a Torah law as well as Chayah, it would not say, "And also" (as they are both Torah laws).

Answer (cont.): The Gemara answers, "This is true, as the Mishnah states etc." In other words, from the very question comes the answer that Beheimah must be a Torah law, as otherwise Chayah being a Rabbinic decree would be a Gezeirah l'Gezeirah (if Beheimah was a Rabbinic law)!

Observation: The Gemara in Kidushin (58a) also proves from the Mishnah in Temurah (33b) that Rebbi Shimon holds that Chulin in the Azarah is a Torah law. The Gemara there does not discuss this at length, as does our Gemara.

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that the deduction is from the fact that it must be burned. If it would be a Rabbinic law, it would not need to be burned.

Question: This is impossible, as our Gemara clearly indicates the proof is from the fact that it also mentions that this is the law regarding a Chayah!

Question: Our Gemara implies that even if Chulin in the Azarah was a Torah law, the prohibition of Chayah would only be Rabbinic in nature. The Gemara in Kidushin (ibid.) quotes a Pasuk (implying it is a Torah law) teaching that a Chulin Beheimah, Chayah, and Of cannot be slaughtered in the Azarah!

Answer #1: Rebbi Shimon argues on that Beraisa (that says Chayah is a Torah law).

Answer #2: It is also possible to answer that there is no argument. We can explain, as does Rashi in Kidushin (58a), that the deduction here is indeed from the fact that it is burned.

Answer #2 (cont.): You can say that it is understandable if Beheimah, Chayah, and Of are Torah laws. This is why there is a decree here that even a Chayah needs to be burned, due to the law that a Beheimah needs to be burned.

Answer #2 (cont.): This is despite the fact that a Beheimah itself is only burned due to a decree that it should be similar to Kodshim that leave their designated area that are obligated to be burned. However, one cannot confuse a Chayah and Kodshim.

Answer #2 (cont.): Accordingly, the only reason that this is not a Gezeirah l'Gezeirah is because both Beheimah and Chayah are Torah laws (that they are prohibited if they are slaughtered as Chulin in the Azarah). However, if they are Rabbinic laws, why should a Chayah be burned? (In other words, the proof is (as Rashi explains) from the fact that they are burned. Our Gemara's reason regarding Chayah in fact can be explained as focusing on the fact that it is burned, as stated above. This is also an answer for question b1. above.)