QUESTION: The Mishnah teaches that even though the Torah forbids slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day (Vayikra 22:28), one is permitted to eat such animals once they were slaughtered, b'Di'eved.

What new point is the Mishnah teaching? Why would one have thought that it is prohibited to eat the animals?

(a) RASHI (DH Sheneihem) says that it is obvious that both animals are Kosher and are permitted to be eaten. The Mishnah makes this statement only to contrast with the next part of the Mishnah, which says that when Kodshim are slaughtered outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash, both the mother and the child are forbidden (they are Pasul as Korbanos), even b'Di'eved.

(b) TOSFOS (80a, DH Chulin) says that one might have thought that the second animal that is slaughtered is forbidden based on what the Gemara later (114b) says. In the Gemara later, Rav Ashi derives from the verse, "Lo Sochal Kol To'evah" -- "Do not eat any abominable thing" (Devarim 14:3), that anything that Hash-m has made abominable ("To'evah") is forbidden to eat. Since a transgression was committed when the animals were slaughtered, one might have thought that it is forbidden to eat their meat.

According to Tosfos, why are the animals permitted? The Gemara later (115a) says that the Torah forbids Korbanos that were slaughtered before the appropriate time arrived (that is, before the animal was eight days old, as the Torah teaches in Vayikra 22:27). One may infer that this prohibition applies only to Kodshim in the Beis ha'Mikdash, but not to ordinary animals of Chulin; slaughtering an ordinary animal at the wrong time (such as on the day that its mother was slaughtered) does not make the animal forbidden to be eaten.

However, the RAN (27a of the pages of the Rif, DH Oso) cites the HALACHOS GEDOLOS who rules that the second animal is prohibited mid'Rabanan to be eaten on the day that they were both slaughtered. The Ran explains that this is a penalty similar to the penalty that the Rabanan enacted for a person who performs Melachah on Shabbos. They prohibited him from deriving benefit from that Melachah on that Shabbos.

(c) In Temurah (4b), Rava says that when a person does something which the Torah prohibits, his act is ineffective ("Iy Avid Lo Mehani"). One might have thought that when a person transgresses the Torah's command not to slaughter a mother animal and its young on one day, the Shechitah is not valid (and it is considered like "Nechirah," killing an animal through a method other than Shechitah), and, consequently, the animal is a Neveilah and forbidden to be eaten.

The PRI MEGADIM (Sifsei Da'as YD 16:3, DH v'Ra'isi) explains why in fact this logic does not apply. The principle of "Iy Avid Lo Mehani" applies only when one performs an act that is inherently forbidden. The act of Shechitah, however, is not inherently forbidden. Rather, it is the time of slaughtering (i.e. slaughtering the child and the mother on the same day) that is forbidden. This type of Isur is not included in the rule of "Iy Avid Lo Mehani."

This distinction answers another question. The Mishnah earlier (14a) states that when one slaughtered an animal on Shabbos or on Yom Kippur, the animal is permitted b'Di'eved. Why does the principle of "Iy Avid Lo Mehani" not apply? The animal should be forbidden to be eaten, since it was forbidden to slaughter the animal on Shabbos! The Pri Megadim's distinction answers this question. The Shechitah that was performed was not an inherently forbidden act; it was forbidden only because of the time at which it was performed. (For other approaches to the question of why the Shechitah is valid when a transgression was committed, see Insights to Chulin 8:2.) (D. BLOOM)

QUESTION: The Gemara teaches that the extra word "Oso" in the verse, "v'Shor O Seh, Oso v'Es Beno Lo Sishchatu b'Yom Echad" (Vayikra 22:28), teaches that one transgresses the Isur of "Oso v'Es Beno" even though he did not slaughter both a Shor together with its child and a Seh together with its child. It suffices to slaughter one type of animal with its child in order to transgress the Isur. The Gemara says that Chananyah -- who uses the word "Oso" to teach that the Isur also applies to slaughtering the father and the child on the same day -- must maintain, like Rebbi Yonasan, that whenever the Torah mentions two things, each one is forbidden on its own (and it is not necessary to commit the act with both things in order to be Chayav).

The SHULCHAN ARUCH (YD 16:2) rules that when one knows which animal is the father of a calf, he may not slaughter it on the same day as the calf, because of the doubt about whether the Halachah follows the view of Chananyah or the Rabanan. Accordingly, since there is a doubt about whether the Halachah follows Chananyah, and since Chananyah agrees with Rebbi Yonasan, it should follow that there is a also a doubt about whether the Halachah follows Rebbi Yonasan.

However, the Mishnah later (86b) says that according to the Rabanan, if one slaughtered one hundred Chayos or birds in the same place, it suffices to perform one act of Kisuy ha'Dam for all of the animals or birds slaughtered. Rebbi Yehudah argues and says that one must perform a separate Kisuy ha'Dam for each Shechitah. The Gemara there explains that the Rabanan maintain that the word "or" in the verse, "a Chayah or a bird" (Vayikra 17:13), teaches that one must perform Kisuy ha'Dam when he slaughters a Chayah or a bird, even though he did not slaughter both. (According to Rebbi Yonasan, it is known even without the extra word "or" that it is not necessary to slaughter both in order to be obligated to perform Kisuy ha'Dam.) Rebbi Yehudah learns from the word "or" that each Shechitah requires its own Kisuy, and he learns from the word "Damo" ("its blood") that it is not necessary to slaughter both a Chayah and a bird in order to be obligated to perform Kisuy ha'Dam.

Since there is a doubt about whether the Halachah follows Rebbi Yonasan, there should also be a doubt about whether the word "or" is necessary to teach that Kisuy ha'Dam is required when only a Chayah or a bird is slaughtered. If the word "or" is not used to teach this Halachah (as Rebbi Yonasan maintains), then it teaches that one must perform a separate Kisuy ha'Dam for each Shechitah. Why, then, does the Shulchan Aruch (YD 28:9) rule that one Kisuy suffices for all of the Shechitos that a person performs in one place? It should be necessary to perform a separate Kisuy for each Shechitah out of doubt that perhaps the Halachah follows Rebbi Yonasan, and the word "or" teaches that a separate Kisuy is necessary for each Shechitah!

How are these two rulings of the Shulchan Aruch (in YD 16:2 and in 28:9) to be reconciled? (CHIDUSHEI REBBI AKIVA EIGER)

ANSWER: The MAHARAM MI'LUBLIN (Teshuvos #65, DH Teshuvah, cited by Rebbi Akiva Eiger) answers this question based on the words of TOSFOS (86a, DH Seifa). Tosfos explains that there are times when, in a case of doubt, the Shochet is exempt from performing Kisuy ha'Dam. Since Kisuy ha'Dam is a Mitzvas Aseh, one does not transgress any prohibition by refraining from doing it (moreover, one fulfills the Mitzvah in some part by performing Kisuy ha'Dam after the final Shechitah). Therefore, in a case of doubt, the Halachah is lenient and does not require that Kisuy be performed. In contrast, slaughtering a father animal and its offspring on one day is a Safek Isur d'Oraisa, which involves a possible transgression of a prohibition. Therefore, out of doubt, one must follow the view that says that slaughtering the father and its offspring on the same day is prohibited. (D. BLOOM)