Summation of Question #2: The Gemara infers that both of these are Pashut Zuzei. It does not infer at all from Rav Yehudah's teaching in the name of Rav Asi!

Question #3: The Kesuvah of a Besulah, which is 200 Tzuri Zuzei, both according to the opinion that it is mid'Oraisa, and according to the opinion that it is mid'Rabanan, and even the Kesuvah of a widow, which all agree that it is mid'Rabanan, is in Maneh Tzuri!

Answer (Ri): Here we discuss only Sela'im, similar to fixed money said in the Torah. The Torah mentions [fixed amounts] only of Shekalim.

Explanation #1 (Rashi): The text says "Tani Nami Rav Yosef" (also he recited a Beraisa) that he may not bring Siga, i.e. chunks of silver, rather, minted coins. Rav Yosef's Beraisa does not come to explain, rather, to support.

Question #1: It does not connote like this. Why must he bring a Beraisa to support a Beraisa?!

Question #2: He should not have said "that he should not bring", rather, "he should not bring"! ("That" connotes that it comes to explain.)

Question #3: It connotes like the other [matters taught in the first Beraisa], that the Gemara explains the reason for each one!

Explanation #2: [Rav Yosef's Beraisa] comes to explain the reason, that if he would bring Shaveh Kesef, sometimes he brings an ingot or chunks of silver that are not worth two Ma'os Kesef, and they will not sell to him a good Olas Re'iyah for the chunk as if he brought minted silver coins.

Citation: In Kesuvos (102a) this is brought regarding the argument of R. Yochanan and Reish Lakish of "I am obligated to you a Maneh in a document."

Explanation #1 (Rashi there): E.g. he wrote so to him in a document and did not sign it, and gave it to him in front of witnesses;

They argue about whether it is considered admission, for the matter of a document is strong, even though he did not say "you are witnesses against me."

Explanation #2 (R. Tam): The case is, he comes to obligate himself through that document, even though he did not owe him anything.

Remark: One must resolve the entire Sugya. There I explained.

Inference: In Pesachim (35b) and Bava Metzi'a (54a) it brings regarding Hekdesh that was redeemed on land, that it is not redeemed, since it says v'Nasan ha'Kesef v'Kam Lo. This implies that we expound that verse. (Tosfos Shabbos 128a DH v'Nasan points out that there is no such verse; it is an abridgement of "v'Yasaf Chamishis Kesef Erkecha Alav v'Kam Lo." The Ritva there and Tosfos in Megilah (3a DH va'Yalan) say that it is a mixture of parts of two verses.)

Rebuttal: One cannot say so, for in Toras Kohanim Parshas Bechukosai it expounds it from "v'Chol Erkecha Yihyeh b'Shekel ha'Kodesh", like Rashi explained (51b DH v'Lo Hekdeshos), and the Gemara was not concerned [to bring the precise Drashah], and brought just one of the verses that mention Kesef regarding Hekdesh.

Support: So we find that in several places that [the Gemara] does not bring the primary Drashah everywhere, like it brings in Kidushin (3b) "bi'Ne'ureha Beis Aviha" - all profits that come to a Na'arah belong to her father, even though the verse is written regarding Hafaras Nedarim;

And similarly in Gitin (21b, it expounds) "Sefer Korsah", and nothing else divorces, and that Drashah is unlike Rabanan, rather, like R. Yosi ha'Gelili.

Implied question: In Kesuvos (101b) it connotes that Ula's teaching is only like Reish Lakish (but unlike R. Yochanan. According to R. Yochanan, we need not say that it is a decree. The document created a new Chiyuv!)

Answer: One can resolve it even according to R. Yochanan. (Tosfos Kesuvos 102a DH explains that Ula needs to explain that in every case his son is not redeemed, even if he wrote to him explicitly "I am obligated to him five Sela'im for Pidyon." And even if he did not write so, Stam he said for Pidyon; really, Ula holds like R. Yochanan.)

Question: Also our Mishnah taught that he is obligated to give to him, and he is not redeemed!

Answer: We could reject, that it means that his son is not redeemed until he gives to him;

It comes to teach that even if he made it like a loan, it is not as if the Kohen received it and returned to lend to him, and if the Kohen pardoned [the coins], he is not redeemed until he gives.

Explanation #1: Mid'am is an expression of anything, i.e. you did not resolve and give anything.

Explanation #2: Mid'am Bish Avadt - you did a bad thing. The Targum of "Davar Ra" is Kol Mid'am Bish.

Alternative text: In some Seforim it is not written Avadt, only Mid'am Bish. I.e. a bad thing, i.e. this is a bad deal.

Question: Why is this different than on condition to return [the money]? We say in Kidushin (6b) that his son is redeemed, for we conclude that in all cases [discussed there of a gift on condition to return it], it acquires!

Answer: Here, R. Chanina wanted to acquire only a total gift, for we forbid there [Pidyon on condition to return the money] because it looks like a Kohen helping in the granary, like we derive above (26b), because it says "Shichatem Bris ha'Levi";

Even though the man gave to him Stam, it is as if he specified on condition that he return to him, since the matter is recognized.

Remark: This is not Devarim sheb'Lev (unspoken intents), like one who sold and did not need the money, in Kesuvos (97a. Since he did not stipulate, this is not grounds to invalidate the sale.)

Question: Since R. Tarfon and R. Chanina used to return all the time, they [fulfill] "Shichatem Bris ha'Levi." People will give only to them, because they normally return!

Answer #1: The giver does not know at the time that he gives to him whether or not he will return to him, so "Shichatem Bris ha'Levi" does not apply. It does not harm if they return afterwards!

Answer #2: Perhaps they returned only to Aniyim, but not to people who appeared to them to be rich.

Pesak: In Bava Basra (125b) we rule that the Halachah is that a Bechor does not receive double in a loan, whether [the orphans] collected land or collected coins.

Opinion #1: Based on this, it seems that a woman does not collect her Kesuvah from a loan, like our Mishnah teaches here that she does not collect from Ra'uy.

Opinion #2 (Tosfos' Rebbi): Even though a husband and a Bechor have weak power regarding a loan, that for them we consider it Ra'uy, regarding a woman's Kesuvah, it is considered Muchzak, and a woman collects her Kesuvah from a loan;

Source - Citation (Kesuvos 84a): If someone died and left a widow, a creditor and heirs, and he had a loan and deposit in another's hand, R. Tarfon says, we give them to the weakest among them. (Some say that this is the widow, to encourage marriage. Others say that it is the one who has the weakest proof.) R. Akiva says, we give them to the heirs, for the others need to swear [that they were not already paid], and heirs need not swear.

Inference: Even according to R. Akiva, if she did not need a Shevu'ah, she would collect. However, since she needs a Shevu'ah, the heirs collect, and then she does not collect from them, for [now] they are Metaltelim of heirs, and they are not Meshubad (there is no lien on them).

And if they collected land for their father's debt, she returns to collect from them with a Shevu'ah, like the law of a creditor;

Or if [her husband] exempted her from the Shevu'ah, she collects from a loan in others' hands even according to R. Akiva, and unlike Aba Sha'ul ben Miryam (Kesuvos 87a).

Implied suggestion: Perhaps the Mishnah in Kesuvos (84a) is like Rebbi, who considers a loan to be Muchzak, in Bava Basra (124a), but according to Rabanan no (she does not collect), for according to them, a loan is Ra'uy!

Rejection: If so, some Chacham [in the Gemara] there should have established it specifically like Rebbi!

Conclusion: Rather, it connotes that no one argues. Rather, everyone, i.e. both Rebbi and Rabanan, hold that a loan is Muchzak regarding a widow's Kesuvah.

Assertion: It seems that even Rabanan of R. Meir, who say (Kesuvos 80b) that Metaltelim are not Meshubad at all to [pay] a Kesuvah, even in [her husband's] lifetime, it seems from this Mishnah in Kesuvos that they agree that a loan of (owed to) orphans is Meshubad for a Kesuvah.

Implied question: Perhaps [the Mishnah in Kesuvos 84a] is R. Meir, and therefore that Mishnah holds that a Kesuvah pertains to (can be collected from) a loan, even though it is Metaltelim of orphans!

Rejection #1: R. Tam explains that even according to R. Meir, Metaltelim of orphans are not Meshubad for a Kesuvah, only Metaltelim of the Yavam [are], which [the Gemara there] was discussing (Kesuvos 81b);

It is unreasonable that R. Meir holds that a Kesuvah has better collection rights from Metaltelim of orphans than a creditor, opposite to Rabanan, who make her power weaker than a creditor, that [a divorcee] does not collect Metaltelim even from him (her ex-husband);

It connotes like this in Kidushin (65b) regarding two who came from overseas, and a woman and a package are with them. (Each man claims 'it is my package, and she is my wife.' If both give a Get to her, she collects a Kesuvah from the package. We establish it like R. Meir, who says that Metaltelim are Meshubad for a Kesuvah. This implies that Rabanan disagree.)

And the one who collects Metaltelim that fell to a Yavam, in the Mishnah in Kesuvos (80b), this is because the Yavam is in place of the husband, and it is considered like [collecting] from him, since she is tied to him due to the marriage to her [deceased] husband.

Support: R. Tam is correct, for if not that [collecting from] a Yavam is like from him (her husband), what is the source that according to Rabanan, Metaltelim are not Meshubad for a Kesuvah, even from him?

Rejection #2 (of Implied suggestion (h)): If so (the Mishnah in Kesuvos 84a is R. Meir, according to R. Akiva), how do they give to the heirs, for [the reason that] the others need a Shevu'ah, but the heirs do not?

Also when they give to the heirs, she will collect from them, since you will say that [R. Akiva] holds that orphans' Metaltelim are Meshubad for a Kesuvah!

Rejection #3: Granted, a woman's Kesuvah [is collected from them], but what can you say about a creditor? (One opinion says that R. Tarfon means that the creditor collects.) We do not find a Tana who holds that orphans' Metaltelim are Meshubad for a creditor!

Conclusion: We are forced to say that because a loan is not in the orphans' hands, the woman and creditor have better rights in it than in Metaltelim that are in the orphans' hands.

Implied question: [According to the opinion that R. Tarfon means that the widow collects,] two stringencies of a Kesuvah [apply here! Kesuvos (82a) says that we do not find that a Tana who holds of two stringencies of (extra rights to collect) a Kesuvah, i.e. that orphans' Metaltelim are Meshubad like R. Meir, and it is collected from one who owes the husband, like R. Nasan.)

Answer #1: They do not apply here, like I explained in Kesuvos (82a). The stringency of R. Meir is not here, like I explained. Since the loan is in others' hands, it is not Metaltelim of orphans.

Answer #2: Also the stringency of R. Nasan is not here, for R. Tarfon's opinion, that it is given to the weakest of them, and also R. Akiva would agree to him, if not for the reason that the others need a Shevu'ah, but the heirs do not need a Shevu'ah... (Tosfos will show why R. Tarfon and R. Akiva are even like Rabanan of R. Nasan.)