Explanation: This is as if he said, you should not acquire the animal until we are having relations. This is why it is not obvious that the animal should be permitted, being that he clearly showed that she should not acquire the animal until they had relations.

Explanation (cont.): There is also not a problem of Esnan, as he told her that if she wants she can acquire the animal now (this is why it should be permitted).

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that the prohibition of Esnan cannot take effect on an animal that is already dedicated to be a Korban. This is as the Gemara in Temurah (30b) derives from the verse, "For all vows," teaching that this is besides an animal that was already pledged. (How, then, can the Gemara entertain that the prohibition of Esnan should take effect?)

Answer: Perhaps in this case, being that the animal is extant during the relations, the prohibition of Esnan should take effect retroactively from when he gave it to her when it was not yet dedicated to Hekdesh.

Explanation: This means that even according to Rebbi Yochanan who says that according to the Torah giving money is a valid mode of acquisition, in our case regarding Esnan they do not acquire. Being that Chazal generally took away this mode of acquisition and said that pulling must be done, they took this mode of acquisition away from her as well and therefore there is no status of Esnan.

Implied Question: This is unlike the Gemara in Bava Metzia (48a) which states that if a person gave money of Hekdesh to a merchant he transgresses Meilah (even though he did not yet pull the merchandise). This indicates that money alone causes the transgression (and is a valid mode of acquisition).

Answer: Being that he transgressed Meilah according to Torah law, nobody can take away the fact that money of Hekdesh was misused. (In other words, Chazal merely stated that the object is not considered acquired by the buyer, not that it was not given to the seller. Being that the Hekdesh money was given to the seller, it indeed has been misused. This is as opposed to our case where the Esnan has not been acquired.)

Explanation: She does not acquire through pulling. This is according to the opinion of Rebbi Shimon ben Lakish who says that "to your friend" teaches that only a Jew can do an acquisition of Meshicah (pulling). This indicates that a Nochri must acquire using money.

Explanation (cont.): According to Rebbi Yochanan a Nochri can acquire using Meshichah.

Explanation (cont.): Being that Rav Chisda understands in Bava Metzia (47b) that Rebbi Yochanan is correct, the Gemara gives a different answer that there is no question according to Rebbi Yochanan.

Question: Why don't we answer that both cases are with "this sheep," and one is when it is in her yard, and one is when it is not in her yard (and she therefore does not acquire it right away)?

Answer: It is better to explain that the case is with "a sheep" even if it is in her yard with other sheep of his. Even though he cannot say she should take a sheep of his that is in the marketplace, there is no sheep that clearly is called an Esnan at this moment. This is even if one holds of "Bereirah" (retroactive determination of status). Only the sheep that during the relations is set aside as payment for these relations can be considered an Esnan.

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that the worker might give this money to someone who is suspected to transgress Shemitah, and the Beraisa states that we do not give money of Shemitah fruit to an Am ha'Aretz.

Explanation #1 (cont.): The Gemara asks that being that we say that he cannot tell his workers to go out and eat and that he will pay for them, it must be that when he is paying them he is paying money of prohibition, and his money that he is paying for them is called money of Shemitah (f they bought Shemitah produce etc.). This is despite the fact that the fruit has already been eaten. Accordingly (the Gemara asks), the house of Rebbi Yanai was apparently paying money of Shemitah.

Question #1: This is difficult. Who made Rashi (or Rav Sheshes, see Avodah Berurah) switch the explanation regarding fruit of Shemitah from that regarding Ma'aser and Yayin Nesech (when they are all mentioned together)? The reason regarding Ma'aser and Yayin Nesech is because it appears that he is feeding his workers untithed produce or Yayin Nesech. Similarly, we can say that he appears as if he is feeding his workers Shemitah food, and it appears as if he is paying back his debt with money of Shemitah (see 62a).

Question #2: There is another difficulty. According to Rav Sheshes who explains that the reasoning behind the Beraisa is because of money of Shemitah fruit, perhaps the case is where it is after the Biur, and the prohibition is because he is benefiting from fruit of Shemitah when it is prohibited to do so. This would be similar to Yayin Nesech, as the problem is benefiting from Yayin Nesech.

Question #2 (cont.): Alternatively, the problem could be before the Biur, and the reason because he is paying his debt from money of fruit of Shemitah as he is buying Shemitah fruit and feeding it to his workers. This is not at all like the case of the house of Rebbi Yanai.

Question #3: An additional difficulty is that the Gemara later states that the case where it is prohibited is if the workers buy at a storekeeper who normally gives credit to the employer. Being that he normally gets credit, the money is acquired by him.

Question #3 (cont.): This means that being that the storekeeper gives credit to the employer he relies on him, and the employer is indebted to the storekeeper being that he relies on him. This is why the money is considered money of Shemitah.

Question #3 (cont.): However, the house of Rebbi Yanai is not considered similar to a storekeeper who gives credit, and people did not rely on them as much (as in the case of the storekeeper). The house of Rebbi Yanai was not indebted to the poor people. Therefore, when the house of Rebbi Yanai paid the poor people after some time had passed, it is not considered an exchange for Shemitah produce.

Question #4: Another difficulty is that the Gemara earlier compares the case of Rebbi Yanai to an Esnan which was given only after they had relations. The Gemara establishes that even if he made the sheep an Apotiki and it is in her yard when they are having relations, it is not considered an Esnan. This is despite the fact that he was indebted to her from the time of the relations. (The Maharsha explains that just as this is not called an Esnan, so too the case of the storekeeper should not be called the money of the employer as there was no money specifically set aside for the employer.)

Implied Question: One cannot say that the leniency regarding Esnan is because he is not indebted on this sheep but rather on his possessions in general, and that when he gives this sheep to take away the lien on his possessions it is called something that he gives in exchange for giving the sheep, which would not be an Esnan as is stated in Temurah (30a). (Why can't this be the Gemara's intent?)

Answer: If so, what proof is brought earlier from Esnan regarding the house of Rebbi Yanai? The case of Esnan is different as what is exchanged is permitted, as opposed to Shemitah where what is exchanged still has the holiness of Shemitah! Rather, it is clear that even though he is indebted, the animal is not considered to be prohibited due to Esnan at all! Similarly, even though Rebbi Yanai's house is indebted, there should be no prohibition.

Question #5: Additionally, according to Rashi's explanation, the term, "He acquired the Dinar by him" is extra. The Gemara should have merely said whether he was or was not indebted to the storekeeper.

Explanation #2: It therefore appears to Rabeinu Yitzchak to explain that the Gemara means that he does not have to suspect regarding Shemitah that he is paying his debt from fruit of Shemitah. This is because he already paid the Dinar, and he has no debt to pay after they have eaten these prohibited things. However, if he says, "(eat and) I will pay" we do suspect regarding Shemitah that it is as if the employer bough these Shemitah fruit himself and gave them to his workers. This would be paying his debt from the fruit of Shemitah.

Explanation #2 (cont.): Now, even if the Beraisa is referring to after the Biur, it is asking a good question that when the storekeeper pays, he is apparently paying something that is forbidden. However, if we generally say that money is not considered Shemitah money if it was paid after the fruit was no longer extant, in this case as well we should not consider this money as if the employer bought the fruit and gave them to his workers being that they buy the fruit from the house of the storekeeper, and he is paying the money after they ate the fruit.

Explanation #2 (cont.): The Gemara concludes that Rav Papa explains that the case is where he is indebted to the storekeeper who gives him credit. Being that he normally gives him credit, he acquires the Dinar that is by him. This means that the storekeeper immediately gains a lien on his possessions that is equal to the value of the food that he gives to his workers. This is the meaning of his acquiring a Dinar. In other words, due to the fact that the employer owes the storekeeper a Dinar, the storekeeper acquires a Dinar worth of the employer's possessions.

Explanation #2 (cont.): This is not a total Kinyan in a way that the storekeeper can now go and dedicate this money to Hekdesh. From the time that he acquires the Dinar worth of the employer's possessions and gives the equivalent to his workers, whatever he acquires from the employer's possessions are considered to be the money for the fruit.

Explanation #2 (cont.): This is why it is considered that the employer is buying the fruit and vegetables from the storekeeper and feeding it to his workers as their wages. In the end, when he gives the money to the storekeeper to take away the lien on his possessions, the money will turn into money of Shemitah.

Explanation #2 (cont.): If the poor people that the house of Rebbi Yanai borrowed from are like the storekeeper who gives credit to the employer, and Rebbi Yanai would say to the people of his house that they should go out and borrow and he will pay back their loan, he would transgress the prohibition of Shemitah by paying back his household.

Explanation #2 (cont.): However, they were not like a storekeeper to whom he owes credit, which is why he did not give them a lien on his possessions right away when they gave the fruit to the people of his house on Shemitah.

Explanation #2 (cont.): Even though he is indebted to the poor people using the mechanism of being a guarantor and accepting a debt, the one giving the answer in the Gemara understands that while the person who does so is obligated to pay, the possessions of this guarantor are not acquired by the lender immediately, and there is not even a lien on his possessions.

Explanation #2 (cont.): Alternatively, the one who gave the answer in the Gemara mistakenly thought that there is no lien on the possessions of the guarantor unless the loan is a typical loan. However, if someone says, "Give or lend someone a Manah to keep and he will not owe you anything, but I will give or pay it back to you" this is similar to the story of Rebbi Yanai.

Explanation #2 (cont.): There is no law of being a guarantor here. This is despite the fact that we say in Bava Basra (174a), "In a case of "Give him and I will give you," the lender is not owed money by the borrower at all." This indicates that the lender is owed money by the guarantor, as the Gemara did not say that there is no obligation from this guarantor.

Explanation #2 (cont.): The one who answered the question did not think about this Gemara in Bava Basra (174a), just as he did not think about Rava's statement. The Gemara quotes Rava as one of these two sources which show that this answer is difficult.

Explanation #2 (cont.): The Gemara's discussion was according to the mistake of the one giving the answer. The Gemara therefore asked, what is the law regarding a storekeeper with whom he does not have credit? It must be the money would be permitted etc. Additionally, in such a case isn't he indebted anyway? This is as if to ask, aren't his possessions on lien anyway just as they are regarding a guarantor? Didn't Rava say...this is considered acquisition based on the law of a guarantor?

Explanation #2 (cont.): When he says, "(if you give him money) my possessions should be acquired to you" he is making the Kinyan take effect through the law of a guarantor. This indicates that the law of a guarantor is that the possessions of the guarantor are indebted to the lender when the guarantee takes places, and it is not just that he owes the money (without a lien on his possessions).

Explanation #2 (cont.): According to the other mistake (8. above) one can also prove that there is a guarantee even in this case where he says, "Give this person a Manah and I will pay you back." Rather, whether or not he gives him credit, the employer gives him a lien and the storekeeper acquires a Dinar of his possessions.

Explanation #2 (cont.): Even so, being that he did not specify which of his possessions the lien should be on, the money is not forbidden. The Dinar acquired by the poor people in Rebbi Yanai's possessions is therefore not considered money of Shemitah.

Explanation #2 (cont.): When the employer says, "Go out, eat, and I will pay" it is as if he acquires the fruit and wine and gives it to his workers, despite the fact that when the workers take the fruit and wine from the storekeeper they just intend to take it for themselves. Even the storekeeper has this intent (of giving the food to the workers), and he merely intends to collect the money from the employer.

Explanation #2 (cont.): This is not because when he collects it will be considered as if the money is payment for the fruit, as the fruit will no longer be extant. Rather, the case is where the employer actually gave the storekeeper a Dinar as credit, so that he storekeeper should acquire it when he gives food to the workers.

Implied Question: Without Rava's question the Gemara could have asked the following question. Being that the house of Rebbi Yanai was allowed to do what they did because they are not considered as giving credit to the poor people, how can Rebbi Yochanan compare Esnan to the house of Rebbi Yanai even according to his mistake that the guarantor merely owes money and there is no lien on his possessions?

Implied Question (cont.): Rebbi Yochanan possibly assumed that the guarantor is only indebted for a loan that the borrower also must pay, but he is not indebted in a case where the person receiving the money does not have to pay and the lender is merely relying on the guarantor to fulfill his word and pay him back. This is why he would hold that the fruit of the eighth year paid back by Rebbi Yanai is not called fruit of Shemitah.

Implied Question (cont.): Even so, why didn't he consider the Esnan as payment for relations even if it is given after the relations? During relations the sheep should be acquired by the statement, "This sheep" in a place where money acquires or in her yard. If so, even if he said, "A sheep" his possessions will be indebted due to the sheep.

Implied Question (cont.): Additionally, it is obvious that anyone who receives money from his friend in exchange for an object that he must give him has a lien on his possessions! This is not worse than a lender who has a lien on the borrower's possessions. One cannot permit this due to it being something exchanged for an Esnan, as I have explained earlier.

Answer: Rather, the Gemara asks its question from Rava because it is easier to ask a question on the incident of Rebbi Yanai than from the proof of Esnan.

Implied Question: The Gemara does not ask that the Beraisa should have differentiated by saying that this is only in a case where the employer advanced a Dinar to the storekeeper. (Why not?)

Answer: It would rather say the entire Beraisa is referring to this case (the first case is where he advanced a Dinar to the workers, while the second is where he gave an advance of a Dinar to the storekeeper).

Question: Instead of differentiating between "This Dinar" (first case) and "A Dinar" (second case), a difference should be made between "Take and eat" and "Go out and eat!"

Answer: It is possible that the first case is teaching that when he says to them "Take and eat with this Dinar" and they give the Dinar to the storekeeper, even though he gave it to them with his own hand it is permitted. This is because he is only the messenger of the storekeeper.

Answer (cont.): The second case is teaching that even though the employer is not giving anything to the storekeeper at the time that he is giving the prohibited goods to the workers, and we therefore might think he is merely acting as a messenger for the storekeeper, it is still prohibited. Being that he pays in the end, it becomes clear that he was the one who bought the prohibited goods, and that they are eating from his food.

Implied Question: Rabeinu Tam noticed that whenever the Gemara says that "a person (Amora) sat by them," it mentions the person because he taught them a novel law. However, here Rav Chiya bar Ami did not say anything to them. We only find that Rav Nachman answered them. (Why, then, is Rav Chiya bar Ami mentioned here as sitting by them?)

Answer: I say that this incident happened at the same time as the incident in Kesuvos (53a) where Rav Chiya bar Ami said, "We already learned that if his wife was betrothed to him etc." Regarding this statement it was said that he sat by them. The Gemara mentioned each law in the appropriate Meseches (which is why the novel law is only found in Kesuvos).

Opinion: Rabeinu Tam forced proofs that Kilayim and Orlah apply to Nochrim as well, and all of these proofs are difficult.

Proof #1: However, he brought a proof from the Gemara earlier that said that cheese of Nochrim is forbidden because it hardens in the sap of Orlah.

Proof #1 (cont.): It is difficult to say that the Nochrim would buy Orlah from a Jew.

Proof #2: He indeed has a tremendous proof from the Yerushalmi at the end of Orlah and Kidushin. The Mishnah states that Mitzvos that are dependent on the ground only apply in Eretz Yisrael besides for Orlah and Kilayim. Rebbi Eliezer says that this even applies to Chadash (new grain). Rebbi Yonah asked, why doesn't the Mishnah say this also applies to Chalah? Rebbi Yosi answered that the Mishnah only discusses things that apply to both Jews and Nochrim. Chalah only applies to Jews, and does not apply to Nochrim.

Proof #2 (cont.): This means that the questioner thought that Chalah nowadays is a Torah law, as is the opinion of the Rabbanan who argue on Rav Huna the son of Rav Yehoshua in Kesuvos (25a). We see from here that Orlah, Kilai ha'Kerem, and Chadash apply to produce of Nochrim. This is even in Chutz la'Aretz where there is a prohibition of Chadash, as we understand in Menachos (68b). [See also Tosfos in Kidushin 36b, DH "Kol Mitzvah."]

Implied Question: One cannot explain that when the Gemara here refers to Kilayim it is referring to Kilai ha'Kerem. The Gemara would be proving that just as we say regarding Kilai ha'Kerem which is forbidden from benefit that it is best to lessen the amount of this prohibited item, so too we should say this regarding Yayin Nesech. (Why can't we say this explanation?)

Answer: If so, when the Gemara says that this Beraisa is like the Rabbanan, and it then asks why this should only be true if he is going to uproot the Kilayim, as he should even be able to deal with maintaining them, how can it ask this question? This would mean that he is benefiting from something that is prohibited from benefit!