Explanation: It must be that Chizkiyah is referring to the Beraisa, not Rebbi Yochanan's words, as Chizkiyah is the Rebbe of Rebbi Yochanan.

Implied Question: However, in Yevamos (31b), we find that Abaye answered a question that the Gemara asked on Rav Ashi (although Abaye lived before Rav Ashi). (Perhaps it is possible that Chizkiyah would answer a question on his student Rebbi Yochanan?)

Answer: Rather, Abaye also knew the statement of Rav Ashi (from an earlier source than Rav Ashi), and needed to defend this explanation. The Gemara merely organized Abaye's answer after the question on Rav Ashi because it fit well in the give and take of the Gemara (not because Abaye actually answered a question on Rav Ashi).

Explanation: This means that they forced him by saying that they would kill him if he did not bow down on his own. However, one cannot say that they physically bent him over against his will, as if so he did not do anything. They merely did an action with his body, and a person cannot forbid something that does not belong to him.

Question #1: This is difficult. What is the question? Even though he is exempt from being killed once he sins, he is still obligated to allow himself to be killed. If so, why shouldn't he forbid the animal being that it was worshipped? We see later that Rava says an animal is forbidden if worshipped in public, being that the person should have allowed himself to be killed instead of serving idolatry. This is despite the fact that once he was forced to sin he is not killed by Beis Din, as every forced circumstance is always exempt from punishment by Beis Din.

Implied Question: One cannot say that according to Rebbi Zeira the Torah rules that a victim of forced circumstances is totally exempt, and he does not even have to allow himself to be killed Lechatchilah. (Why not?)

Answer: If so, what proof is there from the Pasuk, "And you should not do anything to the Na'arah?" On the contrary, from there the Gemara in Sanhedrin (74a) understands that one must give up his life unless it is a small Mitzvah (not murder, illicit relations, or idolatry, this is the text of the Maharsha in Tosfos, who changes "Afilu" to "Chutz").

Answer (cont.): This is as the Gemara there states that this Pasuk is coming to teach us, and instead is used to derive a law regarding Na'arah ha'Meurasah. Just as a person must give up his life not to murder, so too a Na'arah ha'Meurasah has to give up her life not to have relations. According to Rebbi Zeira, the Torah should have quoted the Pasuk of "v'Chai Bahem" to exclude forced circumstances, as stated by Rava.

Question #2: There is another question. What is the Gemara's proof later to Rava from the fact that platforms of idolatry during a time when it was decreed that Jews must worship idols are forbidden? Even Rebbi Zeira knows that being that it is a time of decrees against the keeping of the Torah one must sacrifice himself, as stated in Sanhedrin (ibid.) that even for a small Mitzvah (during such a time) one must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress.

Opinion: Rabeinu Yitzchak understands that Rebbi Zeira and Rava agree that Lechatchilah one must give himself up. Rebbi Zeira is asking as follows. Being that the Torah said he is exempt b'Dieved, as the Torah states, "And you should not do anything to the Na'arah," even though he should allow himself to be killed, we should not forbid anything due to his bowing down.

Opinion (cont.): Rava concludes that being that he is liable in public to give his life instead of serve idols, he is called an idolater. Even so, b'Dieved he does not receive a punishment. It is now understandable why the Gemara brings prof to Rava from the platforms of idolatry, as being that he is supposed to give up his life he forbids the platforms if he bows down to them.

Question: How can Rebbi Zeira quote the Pasuk, "And to the Na'arah" to teach us this law? In the case of Na'arah ha'Meurasah she is exempt anyways according to Torah law, as she is not an active participant in this illicit act!

Answer: It is possible to answer that this reasoning is not a reason why she would not be put to death. The only reason she would not be killed is because she is a victim of forced circumstances.

Proof: This is obviously true, as if she would willingly participate in this act she would be liable, even if she did not actively participate. The only reason that a lack of active participation is mentioned regarding whether or not she must allow herself to be killed is that it is a reason not to have to give one's life up, unless they tell her that she either must be killed or be an active participant in illicit relations.

Proof (cont.): However, if they say that she should allow herself to be an inactive participant in an illicit act or be killed, she does not have to allow herself to be killed. This is because we derive giving oneself up to be killed from murder, and the only situation where one must allow himself to be killed is to prevent him actively killing someone else. However, where the person does not actively kill someone else, for example if people wanted to throw him on top of a baby in a way that would crush the baby (or he should allow himself to be killed), he certainly should not give up his life.

Observation: The Gemara seemingly implies that Rava holds that when a person is forced to sin in private, he does not have to allow himself to be killed.

Observation (cont.): This would similarly indicate that we should rule like Rebbi Yishmael that one should commit idolatry in private rather than give up his life.

Question #1: This is difficult, as Heaven forbid that we should rule that idolatry is a son that one should commit rather than give up his life! (It is possible that Tosfos is referring to all of the people who gave up their lives rather than serve idols. It would be horrible to say that they gave up their lives without having to do so.)

Question #2: Additionally, the Sheiltos of Rav Achai Gaon in Parshas Va'eira (#42) rules like Rebbi Yochanan who says in Sanhedrin (74a) in the name of Rebbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak that any Mitzvos in the Torah should be committed instead of one giving up one's life, besides for idolatry, illicit relations, and murder. One might think that this is even when asked to violate a Mitzvah in public. This is why the Pasuk states, "And you should not make My holy name mundane."

Opinion: It therefore appears that Rava also agrees to Rebbi Yochanan. His answer in our Gemara is only in order to explain that the Beraisa could even be according to Rebbi Yishmael.

Opinion (cont.): The Gemara in Kesuvos (19a) also implies that Rava holds like Rebbi Yochanan. Rava said to him, If they (witnesses who signed falsely on a document because they were threatened that if they did not do so they would be killed) would come before us to ask us (if they should do so or not), wouldn't we tell them to sign? This is as Mar states that nothing pushes aside a life threatening situation besides for idolatry, illicit relations, and murder. The case there is when they were being threatened privately, as it is difficult to say that they would be forced to sign falsely on a document in front of ten people. (Being that Rava brings up in this context that they would have to give up their lives for idolatry, this implies that he holds they would have to give up their lives even in private, as the context of the Gemara is in private.)

Opinion (cont.): My master and uncle, Rav Moshe from Coucy, in his Sefer Hamitzvos that he wrote, states the following at the end of Ben Sorer u'Moreh in Sanhedrin (ibid.). "Rava in our Gemara does not argue on Rebbi Yochanan (in Sanhedrin). Rather, he means every prohibition was included in, "Do not serve them" whether it was a regular negative prohibition or punishable by death. When the Pasuk says, "And he will live with them," being forced privately is totally excluded, whether it be a regular negative prohibition or punishable by death.

Opinion (cont.): However, Rava admits that there is a positive Mitzvah of "with all of his soul" that means that one should give up his life when being forced to sin. This is as Rebbi Elazar says in the Beraisa that when the Pasuk says, "And they should not make mundane" it reverts back to the rule, meaning that when forced in public one must give up his life, whether for a regular negative prohibition or for one punishable by death. (See Avodah Berurah at length regarding the meaning of "it reverts back to the rule" which is seemingly difficult, as according to this explanation being forced in public was never "taken out of the rule (of "Do not serve them.")

Opinion (cont.): Being that Rava, who is a late Amora, does not argue on Rebbi Yochanan, the ruling of the Sheiltos is correct and upheld that a person must give his life up even under forced circumstances in private (rather than serve idolatry).

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that obviously if the person slaughtering moved the animal he makes it forbidden, as he is picking it up thereby acquiring it and making it his.

Question: This does not seem correct. The Gemara in Chulin (41a) asks a question from the law regarding pouring wine to idols (which makes it forbidden) that this is difficult according to the opinion that a person cannot forbid something that is not his (as how can a person pick up someone else's wine and forbid it by pouring it to an idol). What is the question? When he picks it up he effectively acquires it and it is therefore his! Rather, it must be that someone who picks up an item in this scenario (both by the wine and the animal) only makes himself liable for any forced circumstance that happens to it, but does not acquire it.

Explanation #2: It therefore appears that the Gemara says that the animal was already in front of the idol in order to include a case where he did not make it go there and did not do any significant action. Even so, he forbids it with a small action.

Explanation #2 (cont.): This does not necessarily mean that he slaughtered one Siman. This is even in a case where he started slaughtering the animal. This is apparent from the fact that slaughtering one Siman of an animal is not considered finishing an act.

Implied Question: Rav Nachman said that this was already explained, even though Rav Huna was discussing forbidding it to a regular person, as opposed to saying that it is considered worshipped which only forbids it to use for Hash-m. (How can Rav Nachman say this was already explained?)

Answer: Just as an action in its body like slaughtering makes it forbidden to a regular person, so too his actions, such as pouring wine between its horns, should (obviously, according to Rav Nachman) make it forbidden for use for Hash-m.

Explanation: We are referring to the Kohanim (who were forced to serve idols) who did an action that forbade the animals.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that this is not a clear proof, as they may have done this with their own animals (and this could be why they were forbidden).

Answer: Even so, the Gemara means that even if the cases were similar and the Kohanim only acted upon the animals of others, it is still not a proof, as they are people who have their own understanding.

Implied Question: Rashi says that this is specifically regarding the Kidushin of a woman. However, it is a Rabbinic prohibition to have benefit from this money. (Why should there be a difference between the two?)

Answer: One can give a reason why the Kidushin of a woman is unlike having benefit from the money. A possible reason is that the Rabbanan did not make a decree that it should be forbidden when the Mitzvah of Pru u'Rvu is at stake. [See Tosfos in Chulin 4b, DH "Mutar."]

Question: This is difficult, as they are clearly not the same. What is switched for idols, and what is switched for that etc. is forbidden forever. Regarding produce that is from Shemitah, specifically the last item switched has the holiness of Shemitah, while the rest is permitted. Accordingly, if only one would have been stated it is clear that the other could not be derived from it (as they indeed have different laws). [See Tosfos in Kidushin 55a, DH "v'Shani."]