prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler of Kollel Iyun Hadaf
Rosh Kollel: Rabbi Mordecai Kornfeld
(a) The Tana Kama of a Beraisa rules that a female animal that one designates as an Olah, Pesach or Asham can make a Temurah. What basic Halachah do these three Korbanos share?
(b) Rebbi Shimon disagrees. What distinction does he draw between a Nekeivas Olah and a Nekeivas Pesach and Asham? What principle guides his ruling by the latter pair?
(c) Then what makes a Nekeivas Olah different?
(a) On what grounds does Rebbi disagree with Rebbi Shimon regarding a Nekeivas Pesach?
(b) Then on what grounds does he agree with him regarding a Nekeivas Asham, since, by the same token, a Mosar Asham is brought as an Olah?
(a) What does Rebbi Shimon hold with regard to a Kohen Gadol who designated a Parah in lieu of his Par on Yom Kipur?
(b) Which Parah is in fact, sanctified with Kedushas ha'Guf?
(c) Then why will Rebbi Shimon not concede that the Parah which the Kohen Gadol designated in lieu of his Par is sanctified with Kedushas ha'Guf, due to the precedent of Parah Adumah?
(a) What is the difference between the Chatas of a Yachid and the Chatas of the "Nasi" (the king)?
(b) What do we therefore suggest if, according to Rebbi Shimon, a Yachid designates a Sa'ir, or a king, a Se'irah, for his Chatas?
(c) On what grounds do we refute this suggestion?
(d) How, in the case of a Yachid who designates a female animal for his Olah, do we find the Din of Nekeivas ha'Of applicable to him?
(a) What is the Din of a Yachid who designates a Sa'ir for his Chatas, and is then anointed king?
(b) Seeing as he is the same person, why does the Kedushah not take effect on the Sa'ir?
(c) The Tana Kama in the Mishnah in Menachos, holds that someone who undertakes to bring an Olah S'tam, must bring (at least) a lamb. What does Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah say?
(d) Based on this Mishnah, how do we now establish Rebbi Shimon, to answer the Kashya why a Nekeivas Olah is Kadosh, even though the sinner (even if he was Chayav as Olah S'tam) would not normally bring a pigeon or a young dove?
(a) The Mishnah in Shekalim discusses someone who declares all his property Hekdesh. What does the Tana say about animals ...
1. ... that are fit to go on the Mizbe'ach, assuming they are females?
2. ... that are not fit to go on the Mizbe'ach at all?
(b) According to Rebbi Eliezer, males belonging to the former category, are sold as Olos, and the proceeds, like those of female animals, go to Bedek ha'Bayis. According to Rebbi Yehoshua, the male animals are brought directly as Olos. What does he say about the female animals?
(c) Rebbi Chiya bar Aba queries Rebbi Yehoshua's latter ruling, based on the fact that the animal comes from a rejected Kedushah. What ought the Din then to be?
(d) What did he ask Rebbi Yochanan, according to the second Lashon, based on the fact that the male animals are brought directly as Olos?
(a) Rebbi Yochanan replied that Rebbi Yehoshua holds like Rebbi Shimon. To which ruling of Rebbi Shimon was he referring?
(b) What problem did Rebbi Chiya bar Aba have with this answer, bearing in mind that Rebbi Yehoshua is talking about Nekeivas Olah?
(c) Rebbi Yochanan answered that Rebbi Yehoshua holds like Rebbi Shimon ben Yehudah in a Beraisa. What does he say with reference to Rebbi Shimon in this regard?
(a) The Tana Kama of our Mishnah rules that Temuras Asham, and V'lad Temuras Asham (ad Sof Kol ha'Doros) goes to Nedavah. What is the basis of this ruling with regard to ...
1. ... Temuras Asham?
2. ... V'lad Temurah ... ?
(b) Rebbi Eliezer holds 'Yamusu'. What does Rebbi Elazar say?
(a) Seeing as 'Nedavah' of the Tana Kama is an Olah too, what is the difference between the Tana Kama and Rebbi Elazar?
(b) What are the two practical differences between the two opinions, assuming that the owner is a Yisrael?
(c) What additional difference will there be if the owner is a Kohen?
(a) Having taught us the Machlokes between Rebbi Eliezer ('Yamus') and the Rabbanan ('Yir'eh') by ...
1. .... Asham, why does the Tana find it necessary to repeat it by Temuras Asham?
2. ... Temuras Asham, why does he need to repeat it by Asham?
(b) According to the Yerushalmi, we would have confined Rebbi Eliezer's ruling to an Asham, where both animals are alive. So what if they are? Why would Rebbi Eliezer have decreed there more than by the case of V'lad Temurah?
(c) Which two transgressions would he transgress, if he were to switch them round?
(d) How does Rav Nachman Amar Rabah bar Avuhah qualify the Machlokes? In which case will both Tana'im agree that the V'lad ha'Temurah is brought as an Asham?
(a) Rava queries Rav Nachman from two angles. First of all, he argues, one cannot receive atonement from an animal that comes via a sin. Which sin is he referring to
(b) How will he reconcile this with the fact that Temuras Olah and Shelamim are brought as an Olah and a Shelamim respectively?
(c) His second query is from Rebbi Chiya earlier in the Perek, who cited a Beraisa in support of Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi (in Rebbi Shimon). What distinction did the Tana there draw between V'lad Rishon and V'lad Sheini?
(d) What does that have to do with the V'lad Temurah about which we are talking?
(a) So we reverse Rav Nachman's statement, and he now says that Rebbi Eliezer and the Rabbanan argue before the Kaparah. What will they both hold after the Kaparah?
(b) Which problem ...
1. ... have we solved with this answer?
2. ... still remains?
(c) So we remain with a Kashya on Rav Nachman Amar Rabah bar Avuhah. According to some texts however, we amend Rav Nachman's statement again. What will both Tana'im then hold in a case of after the Kaparah?
(a) What did Rebbi Avin bar Chiya ask Rebbi Avin bar Kahana in connection with the son of a Nekeivas Asham?
(b) We suggest that Rebbi Avin bar Chiya might have resolved it himself from Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina's statement earlier. What did Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina say about Rebbi Elazar, regarding 'Mafrish Nekeivah le'Asham'?
(c) Then why did he not do so?
(d) What did Rebbi Avin bar Kahana, in fact, reply?
(a) On what grounds did Rebbi Avin bar Kahana reject the Kashya that Rebbi Elazar is bound to agree that it cannot be brought as an Olah, since the mother does not have the name of an Olah? What may otherwise be Rebbi Elazar's reason regarding 'Mafrish Nekeivah le'Olah'?
(b) How does Rebbi Avin bar Chiya query Rebbi Avin bar Kahana's ruling, from our Mishnah which, citing Rebbi Elazar, rules 'V'ladan ... ad Sof Kol ha'Doros Yir'u ... ve'Yavi bi'Demeihen Olos'?
(c) How does Rebbi Avin bar Kahana refute the Kashya?
(a) What did Rebbi Avin bar Chiya (who came from Eretz Yisrael) comment on the answer of Rebbi Avin bar Kahana (who was a Bavli)?
(b) What would he (Rebbi Avin bar Chiya) then have answered (see Hagahos ha'Gra)?